Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/P2Q4B

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 4
220 Quia, sicut dixi, pluralitas declaratur ex productione, ideo primo respondeo ad quaestionem de productione, quae est tertia in ordine, et dico quod in divinis est et potest esse productio.	220. Because, as I said [n.201], plurality is made clear from production, therefore I respond first to the question about production, which is the third in order [nn.191, 201], and I say that in divine reality there is and can be production.
221 Quod probo sic: Quidquid de ratione sua formali est principium productivum, in quocumque est sine imperfectione, in eo est principium productivum; sed memoria perfecta, sive, quod idem est, istud totum 'intellectus habens obiectum intelligibile sibi praesens', ex ratione sua formali est principium productivum notitiae generatae, $a et patet quod memoria talis est in ƿaliqua persona divina et a se, quia aliqua est improducta; ergo illa poterit per tale perfectum principium perfecte producere. a$	221. I prove this as follows: [The first principal reason] – Whatever is of its own formal nature a productive principle, is a productive principle in whatever it is without imperfection; but perfect memory, or, what is the same, the whole ‘intellect having the intelligible object present to itself’, is of its own formal nature a productive principle of generated knowledge [n.310], and it is plain that such memory is in some divine person and is so of itself, because some divine person is not produced; therefore that person will be able through such a perfect principle to produce perfectly.
222 $a Ulterius arguo: nulla productio per memoriam perfectam est ƿperfecta nisi sit notitiae adaequatae illi memoriae sive illi intellectui respectu talis obiecti; memoriae autem sive intellectui personae divinae infinitae nulla notitia adaequatur respectu essentiae divinae ut intelligibilis nisi infinita; quia intellectus ille est comprehensivus illius obiecti infiniti, igitur aliqua persona divina per memoriam potest producere infinitam notitiam. Ultra, sed illa non erit nisi in natura divina, quia nihil aliud est infinitum; ergo in divinis per memoriam potest esse productio ad intra. Ultra, sed si potest esse, igitur est: tum quia 'esse' ibi 'possibile' est 'necessarium', tum quia illud principium est productivum per modum naturae; igitur necessario. Consequentia patet, quia non potest impediri, nec ab aliquo alio dependere in agendo; omne autem agens ex necessitate naturae necessario agit nisi impediatur vel ab alio dependeat in agendo.	222. I argue further: no production through perfect memory is perfect unless it be of knowledge adequate to that memory or that intellect with respect to such object; but to the memory or intellect of a divine person no knowledge is with respect to the divine essence adequated as intelligible save an infinite one; because that intellect comprehends the infinite object, therefore some divine person can through memory produce infinite knowledge. Further, but the knowledge will exist only in the divine nature, because no other thing is infinite; therefore in divine reality there can through memory be an internal production. But, further, if it can be then it is; both because there ‘possible being’ is ‘necessary being’, and because the principle is productive by way of nature; therefore necessarily. The consequence is plain, because it cannot be impeded, nor does it depend on another in acting; but everything acting from necessity of nature necessarily acts, unless it is impeded or depends on another in acting.
223 Maior primi syllogismi apparet, quia quod principio productivo ex se non conveniat quod in isto sit productivum, non potest esse nisi propter alterum duorum: vel propter imperfectionem eius in illo, vel quia ut in illo acceptum, est per productioƿnem adaequatam illi, sicut est de potentia generativa si sit in Filio, et spirativa si sit in Spiritu Sancto; utrumque autem istorum excluditur per hoc quod dicitur in maiore 'a se', quia nihil habet a se principium productivum nisi habeat illud sine imperfectione et etiam non communicatum per productionem competentem tali principio.	223. The major of the first syllogism [n.221] is clear, because what does not of itself agree with a productive principle which is productive in it can exist only for one of two reasons: either because of the principle’s imperfection in it, or because the principle exists, as received in it, by a production adequate to it, as is true of the generative power if it exist in the Son, and of the inspiriting power if it exist in the Holy Spirit; but each of these reasons is excluded by the ‘of itself’ [‘of its own formal nature’] which is said in the major, because nothing has of itself a productive principle unless it have it without imperfection and as also not communicated by a production fitting such a principle.
224 Minor primi syllogismi probatur, quia omni memoriae creatae hoc competit; non autem unde creata sive imperfecta, quia imperfectio numquam est ratio producendi sive communicandi esse, quia hoc competit ex perfectione, non ex imperfectione. ƿ	224. The proof of the minor of the first syllogism [n.221] is that this belongs to every created memory; not however insofar it is created or imperfect, because imperfection is never the idea of producing or communicating existence, because this belongs to it from perfection, not from imperfection.
225 Maior secundi syllogismi declaratur sic: sicut enim non est perfecta memoria respectu alicuius intelligibilis nisi illud obiectum sit praesens in ratione actu intelligibilis, quantum potest esse praesens ut intelligibile illi, ita non est perfecta proles talis memoriae nisi sit actualis notitia tanta illius obiecti quanta potest competere tali intellectui respectu talis obiecti; et illam voco adaequatam tali intellectui respectu talis obiecti. a$	225. The major of the second syllogism [n.222] is made clear thus: for just as there is no perfect memory with respect to any intelligible object unless the object is present to it in its idea of being actually intelligible, insofar as it can be present to it as an intelligible, so there is no perfect offspring of such memory unless there is as much actual knowledge of the object as can belong to such an intellect with respect to such an object; and I call that knowledge adequate to such an intellect with respect to such an object.
226 Istud potest argui de voluntate, quia voluntas habens obiectum actu cognitum sibi praesentatum, ex ratione sua est productiva amoris talis obiecti producti. ƿ	226. This [n.221] can be argued of the will, because the will that has an actually known object present to it is of its own nature productive of love of such a produced object.
227 Contra istam rationem insto, ut magis declaretur. Et maiorem quidem rationis concedo. Sed ad minorem diceretur quod illud totum non est ex se principium productivum, sed tantum quando potest intellectus habere ex se notitiam productam; hoc autem est quando potest habere notitiam aliam a se per quam perficiatur: intellectus autem infinitus non potest habere notitiam distinctam a se qua perficiatur, et ideo non videtur quod ibi debeat poni principium productivum.	227. [Response to the first principal reason] – On the contrary I bring an instance against this reason [n.221] so as to make it clearer. And the major indeed of the reason I concede. But to the minor let it be said that the whole thing is not of itself a productive principle, but only when the intellect can have of itself a produced knowledge; but this happens when it can have a knowledge other than that by which it is perfected; but an infinite intellect cannot have a knowledge distinct from itself by which it is perfected, and so it does not seem that a productive principle should be there posited.
228 Et confirmatur ista ratio, primo quia notitia genita frustra poneretur, secundo quia impossibile est eam poni.	228. And this reason [n.227] is confirmed, first because a generated knowledge would be posited in vain, second because it is impossible to posit it.
229 Primum probatur: in nobis est necessaria notitia genita, quia per eam intellectus perficitur, qui sine ea esset imperfectus: intellectus autem infinitus licet habeat obiectum sibi praesens, non tamen formaliter perficitur per notitiam genitam, sed per notitiam ingenitam, eandem sibi realiter, qua formaliter intelligit.	229. Proof of the first point [n.228]: in us there is a necessary generated knowledge, because by it the intellect is perfected, and it would without it be imperfect; but an infinite intellect, although it have an object present to itself, is however not formally perfected by generated knowledge but by the ungenerated knowledge, really the same as itself, by which it formally understands.
230 Secundum, scilicet impossibilitatem, probo, quia productivum habens productum adaequatum non potest aliud producere; ƿergo cum totum istud 'intellectus habens obiectum actualiter sibi praesens', vel memoria, habeat in intellectu paterno notitiam ingenitam sibi adaequatam quasi productam ex se (quia aliquo modo secundum rationem intelligendi posteriorem tali memoria vel praesentia obiecti), videtur quod nullam virtutem ulteriorem habeat ad producendam notitiam distinctam, aliam ab ista.	230. The second point, namely impossibility [n.228], I prove because a productive thing that has an adequate product cannot produce another one; therefore since that whole ‘an intellect having an object actually present to itself’, or a memory, has in the paternal intellect an ungenerated knowledge adequate to itself that is quasi-produced from itself (because posterior in some way in idea of understanding to such memory or to such presence of an object), it seems that it has no further virtue for producing a distinct knowledge, different from this one.
231 Istas rationes excludendo, confirmo rationem. Et ad excludendum responsionem ad minorem in se, dico quod intellectus noster respectu notitiae genitae habet potentiam receptivam; et ista potentialitas est imperfectionis, quia est potentialitas passiva: nihil autem facit per se ad rationem principii productivi, quia nulla est imperfectio formaliter de ratione principii productivi, et maxime quando principium productivum potest in se esse perfectum. Habet etiam intellectus noster rationem principii productivi respectu notitiae genitae; et hoc est ex perfectione eius, quatenus actus primus virtualiter continet illum actum secundum.	231. By excluding these reasons I confirm the argument [n.221]. And to exclude the response to the minor [n.227] in itself, I say that our intellect has with respect to generated knowledge a receptive power; and this power is one of imperfection, because it is a passive power; but nothing is active through itself on the idea of a productive principle, because there is no imperfection formally in the idea of a productive principle, and especially when the productive principle can in itself be perfect. Our intellect also has the idea of productive principle with respect to generated knowledge; and this comes from its perfection, insofar as a first act virtually contains the second act.
232 Primum istorum, scilicet recipere intellectionem, patet quod convenit intellectui possibili. De secundo non est ita certum an ƿconveniat possibili vel agenti; de hoc alias inquiretur. Nunc autem hoc indistincte acceptum de intellectu, quod est principium productivum notitiae, satis puto verum, et declarabitur distinctione 3; et intellectus sic est in Deo, quia habet intellectum secundum omnem rationem intellectus quae non ponit imperfectionem.	232. The first of these, namely to receive intellection, clearly belongs to the possible intellect. About the second it is not as certain whether it belongs to the possible or to the agent intellect; let there be inquiry about this elsewhere [Scotus, Quodlibet q.15 nn.13-20, 24]. But as for now, taking this point about the intellect indistinctly, that it is a productive principle of knowledge, I suppose it to be sufficiently true, and it will be made clear later [I d.3 p.3 q.2]; and intellect in this sense exists in God, because he has intellect in every idea of intellect that does not posit imperfection.
233 Tunc arguo sic: quandocumque in aliquo concurrunt duo per accidens, scilicet ratio agendi et patiendi, ubi illud quod est ratio agendi est per se, non minus est ratio agendi; patet ex II Physicorum, de medico sanante se: si separetur medicina ab infirmitate nihil minus erit ratio sanandi. Ergo si separentur ista duo in intellectu ab invicem, remanente eo quod erat per se ratio principii productivi adhuc erit ratio producendi, quantumcumque non sit ibi potentialitas passiva receptiva. Exemplum huius esset manifestum: si intellectui nostro esset concreata vel consubstantialis notitia sui, secundum quod quidam intelligunt Augustinum ƿde notitia abdita, XIV De Trinitate, tunc intellectus licet non possit recipere notitiam genitam qua cognoscat se formaliter, $a tamen in alio intellectu, puta angelico vel humano beato in patria, posset gignere notitiam sui in ratione obiecti, quia sic gignere competit sibi unde est in actu, licet non sit receptivus illius. a$ Ex hoc patet quod glossa illius primae minoris in se nulla est.	233. Then I argue thus: whenever two things per accidens come together in something, namely the idea of doing and of suffering, then, when that which is the idea of acting exists per se, the idea of acting no less exists; the point is plain from Physics 2.1.192b23-27 about a doctor healing himself; if the medical art is separated from the illness the idea of healing will exist no less. Therefore if these two are separated in the intellect from each other, then, when that remains which was the per se idea of active principle, the idea of producing will still exist, however much the passive power of receiving is not there. There might be a manifest example of this: if knowledge of itself were co-created or consubstantial with our intellect, as some understand Augustine about hidden knowledge, On the Trinity XIV ch.7 n.9, then the intellect, although it could not receive the generated knowledge by which it knows itself formally, yet in another intellect, to wit in an angel or a blessed man in the fatherland, it could generate knowledge of itself in idea of object, because thus to generate belongs to itself in the way it is in act, although it is not receptive of it. From this is plain that the gloss [n.231] on that first minor [n.221] is in itself nothing.
234 Ad confirmationem illius glossae per 'frustra' dico quod ƿin omni ordine agentium, praecipue ubi principium activum de se non est imperfectum, status est ad aliquod principium activum simpliciter perfectum - quod scilicet agens agit ex plenitudine perfectionis et dicitur agens ex liberalitate, secundum Avicennam VI Metaphysicae cap. ultimo. Nullum autem agens liberaliter agit quod ex actione sua exspectat perfici. Sicut enim in actibus humanis liberalis est ille qui agit vel dat non exspectans retributionem, ita, similiter, agens dicitur liberale quod nullo modo perficitur a productione vel producto.	234. To confirm the gloss about the ‘in vain’ [n.228], I say that in every order of agents, especially where a principle active of itself is not imperfect, there is a stand at some active principle that is simply perfect – namely because the agent acts from the fullness of its perfection and is called an agent from liberality, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 6. ch.5 (95ra). But no agent acts liberally which expects to be perfected by its action. For, just as in human acts he is liberal who acts or gives expecting no return, so, similarly, that agent is called liberal which is in no way perfected by its production or product.
235 Ex hoc arguitur sic: in omni genere principii productivi non includentis imperfectionem possibile est stare ad aliquod principium simpliciter perfectum; sed intellectus est tale principium, et voluntas similiter; ergo in isto genere potest stari ad aliquod simpliciter perfectum. Sed nihil est simpliciter perfectum agens quod non agit liberaliter, secundum dictum modum. Ergo in genere istius generis productivi est aliquod principium tale quod ƿnullo modo perficitur per suam productionem: talis intellectus, habens sic sibi obiectum actu intelligibile praesens, nullus est nisi ille qui non recipit nec perficitur per intellectionem quam gignit sive quae virtute eius gignitur. Igitur non oportet omnem intellectum producere notitiam ut ea perficiatur, sed oportet esse aliquem priorem producentem non perfectibilem per productum.	235. From this an argument is made as follows: in every genus of productive principle that does not include imperfection, it is possible to stand at some principle simply perfect; but the intellect is such a principle, and the will similarly; therefore in that genus it is possible to stand at something simply perfect. But no agent is simply perfect which does not act liberally, in the way stated [n.234]. Therefore in the genus of that productive genus there is some such principle that is in no way perfected by its production; such an intellect, thus having an object actually intelligible to itself, is only that which does not receive nor is perfected by the intellection which it generates or which is by its virtue generated. Therefore it is not necessary that every intellect produces a knowledge so as to be perfected by it, but it is necessary that there is some prior producing intellect that is not perfectible by its product.
236 Et cum dicit 'tunc erit frustra', non sequitur, nam erit summum bonum; sed non est productum a producente ut producens per ipsum perficiatur, sed ex plenitudine perfectionis ipsius producentis.	236. And when one says ‘then it will be in vain’ n.228, this does not follow, for it will be the supreme good; but it is not produced by the producer so that the producer be perfected by it, but it comes from the fullness of perfection of that producer.
237 Cum autem post arguitur de impossibilitate, duco ad oppositum, quia si intelligentiae vel memoriae Patris aliquod obiectum actu intelligibile praesens habeat ibi notitiam actualem Patris quasi productam, non tamen habet notitiam actualem in Patre productam. Nulli autem principio productivo ex se tollitur producere ut est in aliquo nisi intelligatur illud principium produxisse vel producere aliqua productione adaequata virtuti talis principii proƿductivi; ideo, quantumcumque memoria ut in Patre habeat quasi productum, adhuc potest producere vere productum. Sed verum est quod cum habuerit vere realiter productum adaequatum sibi, non poterit aliud producere.	237. But when the argument about impossibility is made afterwards [n.230], I reduce it to the opposite, because if some actually intelligible object present to the intelligence or memory of the Father have actual quasi-produced knowledge there of the Father, yet it does not have actual knowledge produced in the Father. Now from no principle productive of itself is producing as it exists in something taken away, unless that principle be understood to have produced, or to produce, by some production adequate to the virtue of such productive principle; therefore to whatever extent memory, as it is in the Father, has a quasi-product, it can still truly produce a product. But it is true that when it truly have a really produced product adequate to itself, it will not be able to produce another.
238 Secundo principaliter ad conclusionem principalem arguo sic: obiectum ut est in memoria producit ƿvel est aliqua ratio producendi se ipsum ut est in intelligentia; quod autem obiectum habet 'esse' utrobique secundum quid, hoc est imperfectionis, quia si memoria esset perfecta et intelligentia perfecta, obiectum esset simpliciter utrique idem; ergo ablata omni imperfectione, reservando illud quod est simpliciter perfectionis, obiectum idem simpliciter memoriae gignet vel erit ratio gignendi aliquid in intelligentia cui est simpliciter idem, quod est propositum.	238. [Second principal reason] – Second principally [n221] to the principal conclusion [n.220] I argue thus: the object as it is in the memory produces or is a reason for producing itself as it is in the intelligence; but that the object has ‘existence’ in both places in a certain respect is a matter of imperfection, because if the memory were perfect and the intelligence perfect, the object would be simply the same as both; therefore when all imperfection has been taken away, but preserving that which is simply a matter of perfection, the object simply the same as the memory will generate or will be the reason for generating something in the intelligence to which it is simply the same, which is the intended proposition.
239 Praeterea, tertio sic: in qualibet condicione entis quae non est ex ratione sua imperfecta, necessitas est simpliciter perfectionis; igitur et in productione, quia illa non dicit ex se imperfectionem. Probatio antecedentis, quia sicut necessarium est condicio perfectionis in ente in quantum ens, ita etiam est perfectionis in quolibet dividente ens quod non est necessario ex se imperfectum et limitatum. Sicut enim quando ens dividitur ƿper opposita alterum dividentium est perfectionis in ente, alterum imperfectionis, ita in quolibet quod est perfectionis, cuiuslibet divisionis alterum membrum est possibile quod est imperfectionis, alterum necessarium quod est perfectionis. Producens autem in quantum tale non includit imperfectionem, igitur non est producens perfectum in ratione producentis nisi sit necessario producens. Producens autem primum non potest esse necessario producens aliud a se et ad extra, sicut dicitur distinctione 8; ergo ad intra. Similiter arguitur de productione naturali, quia productio naturalis est prima productio; igitur competit primo producenti; non autem competit primo producenti ad extra, ut patebit alias, ergo ad intra. ƿ	239. [The third principal reason] – Further, third in this way: in any condition of being which is not in its idea imperfect, there is a necessity simply for perfection; therefore in the production too, because it does not of itself signify imperfection. The proof of the antecedent is that, just as the necessary is a condition of perfection in being insofar as it is being, so also it is a condition of perfection in anything that divides being which is not necessarily of itself imperfect and limited. For just as when being is divided through opposites, one of the dividing things is a matter of perfection in being and the other of imperfection, so in anything at all which is a matter of perfection one member of any division is possible and is a matter of imperfection, and the other is necessary and is a matter of perfection. But the producer insofar as it is such does not include imperfection, therefore it is not a perfect producer in idea of producer unless it is necessarily a producer. But the first producer cannot be necessarily a producer of something other than itself and externally, as is said later [I d.8 p.2 q. un nn.12-14]; therefore internally. A similar argument is made about natural production, because natural production is primary production; therefore it belongs to the first producer; but it does not belong to the first producer externally, as will be clear elsewhere [ibid.], therefore internally.
240 Praeterea, relationes oppositae de secundo modo relativorum possunt competere eidem naturae limitatae, sicut eidem voluntati competit ratio motivi et mobilis quando voluntas movet se; sed relationes producentis et producti, licet magis repugnent quam relationes moventis et moti, sunt relationes huiusmodi secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae cap. De ad aliquid: ibi enim, pro exemplo, ponit calefactivum et calefactibile pro primis, et patrem et filium, sive genitum et eum qui genuit, pro secundis.	240. [Fourth principal reason] – In addition, opposite relations in the second mode of relatives can belong to the same limited nature, just as to the same will can belong the idea of motive and movable when the will moves itself; but the relations of produced and produced, although they are more repugnant than the relations of mover and moved, are relations of this sort according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32, 1021a14-25; for in that place he sets down, for example, the heater and heated as relations of the first kind [mover and moved], and father and son, or generated and him whom he generates, as relations of the second [producer and produced].
241 Confirmatur ratio, et tunc arguo sic, quia sicut voluntas est quodammodo illimitata quatenus fundat relationes aliquas secundi modi oppositas, ex hoc scilicet quod virtualiter continet illud ad quod formaliter habendum est in potentia, ergo multo magis essentia simpliciter illimitata potest simpliciter fundare relationes oppositas eiusmodi magis repugnantes, quales sunt relationes producentis et producti. $a Plus enim excedit infinitas divinae essentiae ƿillimitationem aliqualem cuiuscumque creati, quam repugnantia quarumcumque relationum secundi modi excedat repugnantiam quarumcumque aliarum eiusdem modi. a$	241. The reason is confirmed, and then I argue thus, that just as will is in a way unlimited insofar as it founds some opposed relations of the second mode, namely from the fact it virtually contains that which it is in potency for formally possessing, therefore much more can an essence simply unlimited simply found relations of the same mode that are more opposed, such as are the relations of producer and produced. For the infinity of the divine essence more exceeds any lack of limitation of anything created than the repugnance of any relations of the second mode exceeds the repugnance of any others of the same mode.
242 $a Secundum articulos cantuarienses oportet rationes ad quaestionem istam solvendam non esse demonstrationes.	242. According to the Canterbury articles the reasons [nn.221, 238-241] for solving this question should not be demonstrations.
243 Itaque primae minor secundum rationem naturalem non est manifesta. Cum probatur, respondeo: esse principium producendi realiter competit memoriae non unde memoria, prout meƿmoria habet unitatem analogiae ad infinitam et finitam, sed memoriae finitae tantum, non tamen quod finitas sit ratio formalis producendi, sed natura illa, quam specifice circumloquimur per 'memoriam finitam'. Concedo ergo quod imperfectio non est ratio producendi sed perfectio, tamen non communis finitae et infinitae, sed perfectio talis, quam necessario concomitatur imperfectio aliqua; ratio est, quia habere habitudinem causae naturaliter productivae secundum rationem naturalem competit soli perfecto tali quod imperfecto, quia imperfectum non est producibile immediate naturaliter nisi ab imperfecto, et non patet quin omne producibile sit imperfectum.	243. So, the minor of the first reason [n.221] is not manifest according to natural reason. When it is proved [n.224] I reply: to be a principle of producing really belongs to the memory not whence it is memory, insofar as memory has a unity of analogy to an infinite and finite memory, but to the finite memory only, not however that finitude is the formal reason of producing, but the nature is, which we specifically gesture to by ‘finite memory’. I concede therefore that imperfection is not the idea of producing but perfection is [n.224], yet not a perfection common to finite and infinite perfection, but such perfection as is necessarily accompanied by some imperfection; the reason is that to have the relation of naturally productive cause according to natural reason belongs only to such a perfect thing as is imperfect, because the imperfect is not naturally immediately producible save by the imperfect, and it is not plain that every producible is imperfect.
244 Itaque instantia contra glossam minoris concedenda est quod non ideo est non activum quia non receptivum.	244. Therefore the instance against the gloss of the minor [n.233] is to be conceded because it is not for the reason that it is non-receptive that it is not-active.
245 Sed ad secundam instantiam de agente liberali respondeo: hic principium productivum non patet quin necessario sit imperfectum et perfectibile a producto, licet perfectibilitas illa non sit ratio agendi.	245. But to the second instance about a liberal agent [n.235] I reply: here it is not plain that the productive principle is necessarily imperfect and perfectible by the product, although that perfectibility is not the idea of acting.
246 Ad tertiam instantiam de producto et quasi producto respondeo: non patet memoriam perfectam esse principium producendi.	246. To the third instance about the product and quasi-product [n.237] I reply: it is not plain that perfect memory is a principle of producing.
247 Ad quartam de agere et facere: ad maiorem non valet responsio per glossam, quod 'intelligitur de principio producendi in quo est univoce, non analogice', quia - contra hoc - ubi est principium analogice, ibi erit magis principium producendi; exemplum de calore in sole respectu caloris in igne. a$ ƿ	247. To the fourth about acting and making [footnote to n.237]: the response to the major by the gloss is not valid, that ‘it is understood of a principle of producing in which it is univocally, not equivocally’, because – against this – where the principle is analogical, there will be there a greater principle of producing; an example is about heat in the sun with respect to heat in fire.
248 Arguit autem quidam doctor aliter sic: prima persona constituitur per relationem ad secundam, et non nisi per relationem originis: igitur oportet ponere in divinis diversa supposita quorum unum sit ab alio, etc. Prima propositio probatur: est enim prima persona relativa ad secundam; et si non constitueretur per illam relationem, ergo accideret sibi illa relatio sive adveniret illi personae constitutae, quod est inconveniens.	248. A certain doctor argues otherwise in this way: the first person is constituted by relation to the second, and only by relation of origin; therefore one should posit in divine reality diverse supposits of which one is from another, etc. Proof of the first proposition: for the first person is relative to the second; and if it were not constituted by that relation then that relation would either be accidental to it or would be adventitious to the person constituted, which is discordant.
249 Secundo arguit sic: virtus summe activa summe se diffundit; sed non diffunderet se summe nisi produceret aliquod summum, vel nisi communicaret alicui summam naturam; ergo etc.	249. Secondly he argues thus: a virtue supremely active diffuses itself supremely; but it would not diffuse itself supremely if it did not produce something supreme, or unless it communicated a supreme nature to something; therefore etc.
250 Arguunt alii per rationem boni, quia bonum est de se communicativum; igitur summe bonum est summe communicativum: non nisi ad intra, quia nihil 'aliud' potest esse summum. ƿ	250. Others argue through the idea of good, that the good is of itself communicative; therefore the supremely good is supremely communicative; only internally because nothing ‘other’ can be supreme.
251 Similiter arguitur de ratione perfecti, quia perfectum est quod potest producere sibi simile, ex I Metaphysicae et IV Meteorologicorum; igitur primum agens, quod est perfectissimum, potest producere sibi simile. Sed perfectius est quod potest producere sibi simile univoce quam aequivoce, quia productio aequivoca est imperfecta; igitur etc.	251. There is a similar argument about the idea of the perfect, that the perfect is what can produce something like itself, from Metaphysics 1.1.981b7 and Meteorology 4.3.380a12-15; therefore the first agent, which is most perfect, can produce something like itself. But the more perfect is what can produce something univocally like itself than equivocally so, because an equivocal production is imperfect; therefore etc.
252 Istae rationes non declarant propositum per manifestius neque fideli neque infideli. Prima quando accipit quod prima persona constituitur per relationem, si vult persuadere infideli accipit minus notum principali proposito; minus enim notum esset tali per se subsistens constitui per relationem, quam productionem esse in divinis. Si etiam vult persuadere fideli adhuc procedit ex minus noto, quia quod productio sit in divinis evidens est articulus fidei; non autem est ita primo evidens hoc esse articulum fidei quod prima persona constituatur per relationem. ƿ	252. These reasons do not make the intended proposition [n.220] clear through what is more manifest, whether to the faithful or to the infidel. The first [n.248], when it accepts that the first person is constituted by relation, is, if it intends to persuade the infidel, accepting something less known than the principal proposition; for it is less known to such a person that a per se subsistent thing is constituted by relation than that there is production in divine reality. If the reason intends to persuade the faithful it still proceeds from that is less known, because that there is production in divine reality is an evident article of faith; but it is not so primarily evident that it is an article of faith that the first person is constituted by relation.
253 Et cum arguitur ultra quod distinctio non est ibi nisi per relationes originis, haec non est manifesta statim ex fide, sicut conclusio quam intendit ostendere.	253. And when it is argued further that the distinction there is only by relations of origin [n.248], this not as immediately manifest from faith as is the conclusion which it is intending to show.
254 $a Cum probat quia aliter illa relatio adveniret personae constitutae et ita esset accidens, haec probatio non videtur valere, quia simili modo posset argui de spiratione activa, de qua tenent omnes quod non constituit personam, nec tamen est accidens, quia perfecte est eadem fundamento quae est essentia in persona. a$	254. When he proves that otherwise the relation would be adventitious to the constituted person and so would be an accident [n.248], this proof does not seem to be valid, because it could be argued in a similar way about active inspiriting, about which all hold that it does not constitute a person, nor yet is it an accident, because it is perfectly the same as the foundation that is the essence in the person.
255 Et cum arguitur secundo quod summe activum est summe diffusivum sui, responsio esset quod verum est quantum possibile est aliquid diffundi, sed oporteret probare quod possibile esset aliquid diffundi sive communicari in unitate naturae. ƿ	255. And when it is argued secondly that something supremely active is supremely diffusive of itself, the response would be that this is true to the extent that it is possible for something to be diffused, but it would be necessary to prove that it would be possible for something to be diffused or communicated in unity of nature.
256 Per idem ad tertium de ratione boni, quia oporteret probare quod communicatio eiusdem rei vel naturae esset possibilis, quia ad impossibile includens contradictionem non est potentia nec communicatio bonitatis.	256. The same to the third about the idea of good [n.250], because it would be necessary to prove that the communication of the same thing or nature would be possible, because there is no power or communication of goodness for an impossible that involves a contradiction.
257 Similiter ad quartum 'perfectum est natum producere summum sibi simile', verum est ita summum sibi simile sicut potest produci; oporteret igitur probare quod simile summum univoce esset producibile.	257. Likewise to the fourth ‘the perfect is of a nature to produce something supreme like itself’ [n.251], this is true as to something that is a supreme as similar to itself as can be produced; therefore one ought to prove that a like univocal supreme would be producible.