Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/P2Q4D

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 4
[270] Ad quartam quaestionem, de numero productionum, patet veritas quod sunt tantum duae productiones.	270. To the fourth question, about the number of productions [n.212], the truth is plain that there are only two productions.
[271] Sed hoc declaratur sic ab aliquibus: actus notionales fundantur super actus essentiales immanentes; sed tantum sunt duo actus essentiales manentes intra, qui sunt intelligere et velle; ergo sunt tantum duo actus notionales qui sunt productivi intra, fundati super eosdem essentiales.	271. But this is explained by some [Henry of Ghent] in the following way: notional acts are founded on immanent essential acts; but there are only two essential acts abiding internally, and these are understanding and willing; therefore there are only two notional acts that are productive internally, founded on the same essential acts.
[272] Confirmatur ratio, quia actus notionales fundati super actus essentiales adaequantur eis, et ita non possunt plurificari actus notionales fundati super actum eundem essentialem.	272. A confirmation of the reason is that notional acts founded on essential acts are adequated to them, and so there cannot be a multiplication of notional acts founded on the same essential act.
[273] Modus fundandi eorum est iste, sicut colligitur ex multis dictis opinantis sparsim in pluribus locis: ((Tam intellectus quam voluntas in quocumque habent esse, propter separationem eorum a materia, postquam habuerint esse in suo actu primo simplicis intelligentiae aut volitionis, possunt se convertere super se et super eorum actus simplices et super obiecta eorum per actus conversionis vel conversivos intelligendi et volendi.	273. The mode of their founding is the following, as collected from the many things that he opined scattered about in many places: “Both the intellect and the will, whatever they have being in, because of their separation from matter, after they have being in their own first act of simple intelligence or volition, can turn themselves back on themselves and on their simple acts and on their objects through acts of turning back or through conversive acts of understanding and willing.
[274] Intellectus enim non solum intelligit verum simplici intelligentia, sed etiam intelligentia conversiva, intelligendo se intelligere et convertendo se super obiectum intellectum et super actum intelligendi simplicem et super se intelligentem per actum conversivum, quia notitia secunda quae est in verbo non solum scit et intelligit rem, sed sic scit et intelligit eam, ut sciat se scire et intelligere eam. Similiter voluntas non solum vult bonum simplici volitione, sed etiam volitione conversiva, volendo se velle, convertendo se super obiectum volitum et super actum volendi simplicem et super se volentem per actum suum conversivum.	274. For the intellect not only understands truth by simple intelligence but also by conversive intelligence, by understanding that it understands, by turning itself back on the understood object and on the simple act of understanding and on itself understanding through a conversive act, because the second knowledge which is in the word not only knows and understand the thing but knows and understands it in such a way that it knows that it knows and understands that thing. Likewise the will not only wills the good with simple volition, but also with conversive volition, by willing that it will, by turning itself back on the willed object and on the simple act of willing and on itself willing through its conversive act.
[275] Sed ista conversio partim uno et eodem modo convenit intellectui et voluntati et partim alio modo et alio. Quod enim ambo se convertunt ut sunt ut nudae, purae et solae potentiae, hoc est uno et eodem modo quantum est a parte ipsarum se convertentium; ambae enim se solas convertunt vi sua activa quae aequaliter eis convenit, sed alio et alio modo quantum est ex parte obiectorum ad quae se convertunt.	275. But this turning back agrees with the intellect and the will partly in one and the same way and partly in different ways. For the fact that both turn themselves back as they exist as bare, pure, and mere powers, this happens in one and the same way as far as concerns their turning themselves back; for both turn only themselves back by their own active force, which force agrees equally with both; but it happens in different ways as concerns the objects to which they turn themselves.
[276] Intellectus enim postquam est conversus ad illa ad quae conversus est se habet ut potentiale quoddam et purum possibile, et hoc ut intellectus nudus et purus natus est recipere ab illis, sicut proprium passivum a suo activo proprio naturali, quod quidem activum est intellectus informatus notitia simplici, et hoc respectu formationis notitiae declarativae. Voluntas autem postquam conversa est ad quae conversa est se habet ut activum quoddam, et hoc ut voluntas nuda et pura nata est exprimere de illis, sicut proprium activum de suo proprio passivo, quod est eadem voluntas, informata per amorem simplicem, de qua - sic formata - eadem voluntas ut nuda nata est exprimere amorem incentivum, qui est Spiritus: Sanctus in divinis, qui habet esse a producentibus ipsum non per informationem eius de quo est subiective, neque per aliquam impressionem factam eidem secundum modum quo Verbum sive Filius procedit a Patre per quandam quasi informationem sive impressionem factam intellectui paterno converso, sed per quasi quandam excussionem sive expulsionem, aut progressum, aut magis proprie loquendo - per quandam expressionem producti de eo de quo subiective producitur)).	276. For the intellect, after it has turned itself back to the things to which it has been turned back, possesses itself as a certain potential and pure possible, and this in the way the bare and pure intellect is of a nature to receive something from those things, as a proper passive thing receives from its proper natural active thing, which active thing indeed is the intellect informed with simple knowledge, and this in respect of the formation of declarative knowledge. But the will, after it has turned itself back to what it has turned itself back to, is related as a certain active thing, and this in the way the bare and pure will is of a nature to express something about those things, as a proper active thing about its proper passive thing; this passive thing is the very same will, informed by simple love, about which – when thus informed – the same will as bare naturally expresses incentive love, who is in the divine reality the Holy Spirit, and he has being from the persons producing him, not by an informing of that about which he is subjectively, nor through any impression made on the same according to the manner in which the Word or the Son proceeds from the Father by a certain quasi-informing or impressing made on the intellect by the paternal turning back, but by a certain quasistriking or pushing out or progress or – speaking more properly – by a certain expressing of what is produced by that about which it is subjectively produced.
[277] ((Ex parte intellectus causatur actus dicendi a notitia simplici in intellectu nudo converso supra se et supra notitiam suam simplicem, ita quod intellectus informatus notitia simplici est principium activum et elicitivum actus notionalis intellectus. Ipse autem intellectus nudus conversus non est nisi principium passivum, de quo quasi de materiali producitur Verbum quasi per impressionem. Ex parte autem voluntatis causatur actus notionalis ab ipsa voluntate nuda conversa supra se et super amorem suum simplicem et ipsam voluntatem informatam amore simplici, ita quod voluntas nuda conversa est principium activum et elicitivum actus notionalis voluntatis. Ipsa autem voluntas amore informata simplici est principium quasi passivum, de quo quasi de materiali producitur Spiritus Sanctus secundum quandam expressionem)).	277. On the part of the intellect an act of saying is caused by simple knowledge in the bare intellect when it is turned back on itself and on its simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed with simple knowledge is an active and eliciting principle of the notional act of the intellect. But the bare converted intellect itself is only a passive principle, about which, as if about some material, the Word is produced as though by impression. Now, on the part of the will, a notional act is caused by the bare will itself when turned back on itself and on its simple love and on its will informed with simple love, such that the bare converted will is an active and elicitive principle of the notional act of the will. But the will itself, informed with simple love, is a quasi-passive principle, from which, as from some material, the Holy Spirit is produced according to a certain expressing.”
[278] $a Qualiter autem intellectus ut natura sit principium activum respectu intellectus ut puri ad producendum Verbum, declaratur sic, a$ quia ((intellectus ut in Patre exsistens notitia essentialis, sive quod idem est, exsistens in actu intelligendi suam essentiam, quem actum ipsa essentia quasi operatur in ipso intellectu suo ut est quasi in potentia ad notitiam essentialem secundum rationem intelligendi, fecundus est naturali fecunditate ad producendum de se ipso sibi similem.	278. But how the intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to intellect as pure for producing the Word, this is made clear in this way, because [point f] “the intellect as notional essence existing in the Father, or, which is the same thing, existing in an act of understanding its own essence, which act the essence itself as it were brings about in its own intellect as intellect is in potency, as it were, to essential knowledge according to the idea of understanding – this intellect is fertile with natural fertility for producing from itself something like itself.
[279] Intellectus autem ut est quaedam notitia essentialis secundum actum est natura et ut principium activum, quo Pater de intellectu eodem ut est intellectus purus et tantum intellectus ut de principio passivo format notitiam quae est Verbum, quod secundum rem est eadem notitia cum illa de qua formatur, differens solum ab ea in quantum procedit ab ea ut manifestativa et declarativa ipsius.	279. Now the intellect, as it is a certain essential knowledge in act, is the nature and as if the active principle by which the Father, as he is pure intellect and only intellect, forms from the same intellect, as from a passive principle, the knowledge which is the Word, which in reality is the same knowledge as that from which it is formed, differing from it only insofar as it proceeds from it as making it manifest and declaring it.
[280] Et per omnem eundem modum debemus sic intelligere verbum formari in nobis. Cognitum enim primo simplicem sui notitiam imprimit intellectui nostro repraesentando se illi ut pure passivo et sub illa ratione qua est intellectus. Intellectus autem sic perfectus simplici notitia per obiectum cognitum, quod in se continet expressive, factus est fecundus et principium activum ut natura, imprimens in se ipsum ut intellectus est tantum, ut in principium passivum, ad formandum in se notitiam declarativam de notitia simplici, ut - secundum hoc - quando dicitur 'formari verbum per intellectum' et quod 'intellectus sit etiam in formatione eius activus', hoc intelligitur de intellectu actu informato simplici notitia, per quam ut per rationem formalem agendi intellectus est principium activum; per hoc enim est principium, et necessario prior est ratio eius ut est intellectus et passivus respectu notitiae simplicis quam recepit ab obiecto quam ratio eius secundum quam est natura et activus per notitiam simplicem inhaerentem: et ideo ordine rationis prius habet esse ut est intellectus quam ut est natura)).	280. And in the whole same way we must thus understand the word to be formed in us. For a thing when first known impresses a simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to the intellect as to something purely passive and as under the idea in which it is intellect. But the intellect thus perfected by simple knowledge through the object known, which it contains expressed in itself, is made to be fertile and an active principle by way of nature, making impress on itself as it is merely intellect, as on a passive principle, so as to form in itself a declarative knowledge about the simple knowledge, so that – according to this – when it is said ‘a word is formed by the intellect’ and that ‘the intellect is active also in the formation of it’, this is understood about the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge, by which, as by the formal idea of acting, the intellect is an active principle; for by this it is a principle, and its idea as it is intellect and passive with respect to the simple knowledge, which it receives from the object, is necessarily prior to its idea according to which it is nature and active by the inhering simple knowledge; and therefore, in order of idea, it has being as it is intellect before it has being as it is nature.”
[281] Sic itaque patet modus quomodo secundum istam opinionem fundatur actus notionalis super actum essentialem, et quomodo diversimode in intellectu et voluntate.	281. Thus then the mode is plain in which, according to this opinion, the notional act is founded on the essential act, and how it is so in diverse ways in the intellect and in the will [nn.273-280].
[282] Ista opinio ponit quattuor articulos, quos non credo esse veros. $a Primus est quod Verbum divinum generatur per impressionem; secundus est quod per impressionem in intellectum ut conversus est super se; tertius est quod notitia essentialis est ratio formalis gignendi notitiam declarativam; quartus est quod generatur per impressionem in intellectum ut nudum.	282. This opinion posits four articles which I do not believe to be true. The first is that the divine Word is generated by impression [nn.273-280]; the second is that this is by impression on the intellect as it is turned back on itself; the third is that essential knowledge is the formal idea of generating declarative knowledge; the fourth is that it is generated by impression on the intellect as bare.
[283] Improbationem primi articuli dimitto usque ad distinctionem 5, ubi proprie habet locum.	283. [Article one] – I dismiss the rejection of the first article until distinction 5 [I d.5 q.2 nn.2-10], where it properly has place.
[284] Contra secundum articulum arguo tripliciter: primo quod in intellectum sic conversum non imprimatur Verbum, secundo quod non sit necessaria talis conversio ad gignitionem Verbi, tertio quod nulla sit talis conversio.	284. [Article two] – Against the second article I argue in a threefold way: first that on the intellect thus converted the Word is not impressed, the second that such conversion is not necessary for generating the Word, the third that there is no such conversion.
[285] Primum arguo sic, scilicet, a$ intellectus non convertitur nisi ut est in aliquo supposito, quia conversio ponitur actio, et actiones sunt suppositorum. Tunc quaero, cuius suppositi vel cuius personae est ut convertitur super intellectum formatum? Si ut convertitur est personae Filii, et praecedit per te ista conversio generationem Verbi, ergo ante generationem Verbi sunt duae personae, quod est haereticum. Si autem ut convertitur super intellectum formatum est ipsius Patris, et cuius est ut convertitur eius est ut a notitia genita formatur, ut probabo, ergo intellectus ut est Patris formatur a notitia genita; igitur notitia genita est formaliter personae ipsius Patris, quia cuius personae est intellectus ut formatus, eiusdem est notitia qua formatur. Assumptum probandum probo sic: cuius est ut convertitur super intellectum formatum, eius est ut habet intellectum formatum pro obiecto actu praesente; igitur eius est ut ab illo obiecto formatur. Probatio huius consequentiae: passivum proportionatum, dispositum et approximatum activo sufficienti proportionato natum est immediate perfici ab illo activo, per Philosophum IX Metaphysicae cap. illo Quando autem potentia est unumquodque; tunc enim est aliquid in potentia proxima, secundum ipsum, quando nihil oportet addi, subtrahi aut minui ad hoc quod actus insit. Intellectus autem nudus, ut conversus et habens intellectum formatum ut obiectum praesens, est passivum dispositum, proportionatum et approximatum intellectui informato ut obiecto sufficienter activo; ergo intellectus nudus ut con versus - nulla facta variatione circa ipsum, subsistentiae vel cuiuscumque entitatis ut sic - formatur notitia genita. Et sic probatur prima consequentia,	285. I argue for the first as follows, namely that the intellect is not turned back save as it is in some supposit, because turning back is posited as an action, and actions are of supposits. Then I ask, to which supposit or to which person does it belong as turned back on the formed intellect? If as so converted it belongs to the person of the Son, and according to you this conversion precedes the generation of the Word, then before the generation of the Word there are two persons, which is heretical. But if, as it is turned back on the formed intellect, it belongs to the Father himself, and if to that to which it belongs as converted it belongs as it is formed by generated knowledge, as I will prove, then the intellect as it belongs to the Father is formed by generated knowledge; therefore generated knowledge belongs formally to the person of the Father himself, because to what person the intellect belongs as formed, to that same person belongs the knowledge by which it is formed. The assumption that needs to be proved I prove thus: to what person the intellect belongs as it is turned back on the formed intellect, to that person it belongs as it possesses the intellect formed for the object actually present; therefore it belongs to that person as it is formed by the object. The proof of this consequence is that a passive thing proportioned, disposed, and approximated to a sufficient proportioned active thing is of a nature to be immediately perfected by that active thing, from the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.5.1048a5-7; for, according to the Philosopher, something is in proximate potency when nothing needs to be added, subtracted, or lessened so that act might be present in it. But the intellect bare, as converted and having the intellect formed as present object, is a passive thing disposed, proportioned, and approximate to the intellect formed as a sufficiently active object; therefore the bare intellect as converted – with no variation made with respect to it, in subsistence or any entity as such – is formed by generated knowledge. And thus is the first consequence proved.
[286] $a Hic posset poni una responsio, quod intellectus nudus per hoc quod de ipso actualiter formatur illa notitia, sive ex hoc quod est quasi materia informata notitia genita, habet 'esse' in persona genita. Sed contra istam responsionem sunt duo prima argumenta quae ponuntur distinctione 5 quaestione ultima, contra illam opinionem de quasi materia, quae ibi specialiter improbatur. a$	286. Here a response could be made that the intellect bare, through the fact that from it the knowledge is actually formed, or by the fact it is a quasi-matter informed by generated knowledge, has ‘existence’ in the generated person [I d.5 q.2 n.8]. But against this response are the two first arguments set down later [ibid. nn.5-8] against the opinion about quasi-matter, which is there specifically refuted.
[287] $a Secundum arguo sic, a$ quia intellectus Patris habens obiectum sibi praesens est naturale principium, non solum operativum respectu intellectionis Patris, sed etiam productivum respectu notitiae genitae; adhuc ergo circumscripta illa reflexione esset principium productivum.	287. I argue for the second [n.284] thus, that the intellect of the Father, when it has the object present to itself, is a natural principle, not only operative with respect to the intellection of the Father but also productive with respect to generated knowledge; therefore, when the reflexion is removed, it would still be a productive principle.
[288] $a Item tertium probo sic: si per conversionem nihil intelligitur esse in intellectu quod non intelligeretur ibi esse non intellecta conversione, ergo conversio nihil est ibi; si aliquid intelligitur esse in intellectu quod sine ipsa non intelligeretur, quaero, quid? non praesentia obiecti, non perfectio potentiae, non tandem determinatio potentiae ad actum vel exercitium actus . Sicut aliqui ponunt voluntatem in nobis convertere intelligentiam ad memoriam, patet quod voluntas non convertit ad gignitionem Verbi divini.	288. Again I prove the third [n.284] thus: if by conversion nothing is understood to be in the intellect which would not be understood to be there when no conversion is understood, then conversion is nothing there; if something is understood to be in the intellect which would not be understood without the conversion, what, I ask, is it? – not the presence of the object, not the perfection of the power, not finally the determination of the power to act or to the exercise of act. As to the way in which some posit that the will in us converts the intelligence to memory, it is plain that the will does not convert it to generation of the divine Word.
[289] Item, conversio ista non est actio quae est operatio, quia non intellectio nec volitio, nec est actio productiva cuius. a$	289. Again, this conversion is not an action which is an operation, because it is not intellection nor volition, nor is it an action productive of which.
[290] Tertius articulus est quod intellectus informatus notitia actuali essentiali est principium activum et elicitivum notitiae genitae.	290. [Article three] – The third article [n.282] is that the intellect informed by actual essential knowledge is a principle active and elicitive of generated knowledge.
[291] Hoc improbo sic: Verbum non gignitur ab intelligentia sed a memoria, secundum Augustinum XV De Trinitate cap. 14; igitur licet in Patre concurrant memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, Pater non gignet Verbum formaliter intelligentia ut 'quo', sed ut est memoria. Ut autem habet notitiam actualem quasi elicitam et ut actum secundum, est in actu intelligentiae, cuius est omne intelligere actuale; igitur ut sic, non gignet Verbum, sed ut est in actu memoriae, hoc est, ut habet obiectum intelligibile praesens intellectui suo; in hoc enim intelligitur actus primus quasi praecedens actum secundum, qui est actu intelligere.	291. This I refute as follows: the Word is not generated by intelligence but by memory, according to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.14 n.24; therefore, although in the Father memory, intelligence, and will go together, the Father does not generate the Son formally by intelligence as ‘by which’ but as it is memory. But as it has actual knowledge quasi-elicited and as second act, it is in act of intelligence, to which belongs all actual understanding; therefore as such it does not generate the Word, but as it is in act of memory, that is, as it has the intelligible object present to its intellect; for here first act is understood as if preceding second act, and second act is actual understanding.
[292] Secundo sic: productio magis convenit actui primo ut principio productivo quam actui secundo, quia operationes perfectae de ratione sui sunt fines, et ideo non sunt gratia aliorum finium; ergo intellectio ut est operatio Patris non est ratio formalis productiva alicuius termini, sed tantum actus primus - cuius virtute elicitur illa operatio - erit principium productivum.	292. Second thus: production more agrees with first act as active principle than with second act, because perfect operations are ends in their idea, and so they are not for the sake of other ends; therefore intellection as it is the operation of the Father is not the formal productive reason of any term, but only first act – by whose virtue the operation is elicited – will be productive principle.
[293] Tertio sic: si intellectio Patris actualis est ratio formalis producendi Verbum, adhuc obiectum ut praesens intellectui Patris ut habenti rationem memoriae erit principium prius productivum notitiae genitae, quia in nobis apparet quod illud est natum immediatius gignere quam actus intelligendi; ergo aliquod Verbum prius erit genitum a Patre ut ipsa memoria quam ut ipsa intelligentia noscente.	293. Third thus: if the actual intellection of the Father is the formal idea of producing the Word, still the object as present to the Father’s intellect, as the intellect possesses the idea of memory, will be the prior productive principle of generated knowledge, because it is apparent in us that it is of a nature to generate more immediately than the act of understanding is; therefore some Word will be generated by the Father as he is memory itself before being generated by him as he is knowing intelligence itself.
[294] $a Praeterea, omnis intellectio, cum eius esse sit in fieri, habet principium vel quasi principium cuius esse non sit in fieri, quia alias erit processus in infinitum; alicuius ergo intellectionis a obiecti, puta primae, necesse est principium vel quasi esse tantum memoriam ita quod non hoc totum 'intellectus intelligens', alias ista non esset prima intellectio. Sed omnes intellectiones a, et in intellectu eiusdem rationis, sunt eiusdem rationis. Sed quidquid est perfectum principium primi in specie, potest esse principium cuiuscumque et immediate; ergo memoria perfecta a potest esse immediatum principium vel quasi principium omnis intellectionis a. Ergo memoria Patris potest esse principium immediatum Verbi; ergo necessario est. Contra: ergo non sic memoria Filii ad intelligentiam Filii sicut memoria Patris ad intelligentiam Patris. a$	294. Further, all intellection, since its existence is in becoming, has a principle or quasi-principle whose existence is not in becoming, because otherwise there will be a process to infinity; therefore of some understanding of the object a, to wit the first understanding, only the memory must be the principle or quasi-existence such that it is not the whole complex ‘intellect understanding’ [n.221], otherwise there would not be a first intellection. But all understandings of a, and in an intellect of the same nature, are of the same nature. But whatever is the first principle of the first thing in a species can be the principle of anything else and immediately; therefore perfect memory of a can be the immediate principle or quasi-principle of every understanding of a. Therefore the memory of the Father can be the immediate principle of the Word; therefore necessarily it is. On the contrary: therefore the memory of the Son to the intelligence of the Son is not as the memory of the Father to the intelligence of the Father.
[295] Praeterea, Verbum est illius immediatissime declarativum a quo immediatissime exprimitur; ergo si ratio elicitiva Verbi sit actualis notitia in intellectu Patris formato, sequitur quod Verbum sit immediatius Verbum seu declarativum intellectionis Patris quam essentiae Patris, quod videtur inconveniens, quia tunc esset aliud prius Verbum quod esset declarativum essentiae Patris immediate, vel oporteret dicere quod illa essentia non posset immediate declarari per aliquod Verbum, quod videtur inconveniens, cum secundum Augustinum XV Trinitatis ((notitia formata ab ea re quam memoria continemus)) est verbum; primum obiectum memoriae divinae est essentia ut essentia.	295. Further, the Word is most immediately declarative of that by which it is most immediately expressed; therefore if the elicitive nature of the Word is the actual knowledge in the formed intellect of the Father, it follows that the Word is more immediately Word, or declarative, of the intellection of the Father than of the essence of the Father, which seems discordant, because then there would be some prior Word that would be immediately declarative of the essence of the Father, or one should say that the essence could not immediately be declared by some Word, which seems discordant, since according to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.10 n.19: “knowledge formed by the thing which we contain in memory” is the word; the first object of the divine memory is essence as essence.
[296] Praeterea, si actualis intellectio Patris esset genita vel producta, produceretur virtute essentiae non ut iam cognita sed ut prior omni cognitione; hoc patet etiam secundum veritatem, quia alias esset processus in infinitum in actibus intelligendi, scilicet actus ante actum; tum secundum istos, quia supra dixit quod in Patre actum intelligendi essentiam operatur ipsa essentia in intellectu ipsius. Ex hoc arguo sic: actualis notitia essentiae non potest esse formaliter alterius rationis in personis per hoc quod est ab alio communicata vel non ab alio communicata, quia tunc deitas esset formaliter alterius rationis in personis; ergo actualis notitia essentiae est eiusdem rationis in Patre et Filio. Quod ergo natum est esse principium 'quo' respectu unius si illud esset principale, idem erit principium respectu alterius si principiatur.	296. Further, if the actual intellection of the Father were generated or produced, it would be produced by virtue of the essence not as already known but as prior to all knowledge; this is plain also according to truth, because otherwise there would be a process to infinity in acts of understanding, namely act before act, and also according to them, because he said above [Henry of Ghent, n.278] that in the Father the essence itself in the Father’s intellect operates the act of understanding the essence. From this I argue as follows: actual knowledge of the essence cannot formally be of another idea in the persons by the fact that it is communicated by another or not communicated by another, because then deity would formally be of a different idea in the persons; therefore actual knowledge of the essence belongs to the same idea in the Father and in the Son. Therefore, that which is of a nature to be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to one of them if it were principal, will be the same principle with respect to the other if it is what follows a principle.
[297] $a De quarto articulo transeo, nisi quod in hoc videtur sibi ipsi contradicere sic opinans, sicut arguitur ante apud 'vacat'. a$	297. I pass over the fourth article [n.282], except for the fact that by thinking in this way here he seems to contradict himself, as was argued before [footnote to n.285].
[298] Secundus etiam articulus falsus est in nobis, quia verbum perfectissimum erit in patria, secundum Augustinum XV De Trinitate, et tamen non erit illud verbum genitum per conversionem super actum primum, ut propter hoc illud verbum sit actus reflexus, sicut iste dicit quod notitia secunda quae est in verbo scit intellectus se scire vel intelligere. Quod autem non sit notitia reflexa, probatur, quia verbum perfectissimum creatum non habet pro obiecto suo primo aliquid creatum, sed increatum.	298. The second article [n.282] is also false in us, because the most perfect word will exist in the fatherland, according to Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.11 nn.20-21, and yet it will not be a word generated by a turning back on first act, so that the word, because of this, is a reflex act in the way he says that by the second knowledge which is in the word the intellect knows that it know and understands [n.274]. But the proof that the word is not reflex knowledge [n.257] is that the most perfect created word does not have for its first object something created but something uncreated.
[299] Tertius etiam articulus falsus est in nobis: tum quia notitia confusa non potest esse principium elicitivum notitiae distinctae, sicut nec imperfectum potest esse principium elicitivum productionis alicuius perfecti; tum quia illa notitia actualis confusa esset simul cum notitia actuali distincta, et ita duo actus eliciti simul, vel actus confusus quando non esset generaret actum distinctum; tum quia omnis actus intelligendi secundus est genitus a memoria ut memoria est in actu primo proportionali sibi, puta perfectus a perfecto, imperfectus ab imperfecto, sicut patebit distinctione 3.	299. The third article too [nn.282, 290] is false in us; both because confused knowledge cannot be the elicitive principle of distinct knowledge, just as neither can an imperfect thing be the elicitive principle of some perfect production; and also because the actual confused knowledge would exist at the same time with actual distinct knowledge, and so there would be two elicited acts at the same time, or a confused act would, when it did not exist, generate a distinct act; and also because every second act of understanding is generated by memory as memory exists in a first act proportional to itself, to wit perfect act by perfect memory, imperfect by imperfect, as will be clear later [I d.3 p.3 q.2 nn.12-13].