Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q3

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 3
157 Quaero utrum sit tantum unus Deus. Et quod non, arguitur: Cor.: Siquidem sunt multi domini et dii multi.	157. I ask whether there is only one God. Argument that there is not: I Corinthians 8.5: “As there be gods many and lords many.”
158 Item sic: Deus est; ergo Dii sunt. Probatur consequentia, quia singulare et plurale idem significant licet differant in modo significandi; ergo includunt idem praedicatum proportionaliter acceptum. Ergo sicut singulare includit singulare, ita plurale includit plurale. Probatur secundo, quia sicut Deus est quo maius cogitari non potest, ita Dii sunt quibus maiores cogitari non possunt; illa autem quibus maiora cogitari non possunt sunt in effectu, quod videtur, quia si non essent in effectu, possent cogitari maiora eis; ergo etc.	158. Again thus: God is; therefore Gods are. The proof of the consequence is that singular and plural indicate the same thing although they differ in mode of signification; therefore they include the same predicate taken proportionally. Therefore as the singular includes the singular predicate so the plural includes the plural. Proof in a second way is that just as God is that than which a greater cannot be thought [n.11], so Gods are that than which greaters cannot be thought; but things than which greaters cannot be thought exist in fact, as it seems, because if they did not exist in fact greaters than them could be thought; therefore etc.
159 Praeterea, omne ens per participationem reducitur ad aliquid ƿtale per essentiam; individua in quacumque specie creata sunt entia per participationem, alioquin non essent multa; ergo reducuntur ad aliquid tale per essentiam: ergo est aliquis homo, aliquis bos, per essentiam, etc. Quidquid autem est per essentiam, non per participationem, est Deus; igitur etc.	159. In addition, every real being by participation is reduced to something such by essence; created individuals in any species are real by participation, otherwise they would not be many; therefore they are reduced to something such by essence; therefore there is some man, some ox by essence, etc. But whatever is by essence and not by participation is God; therefore etc.
160 Item, plura bona sunt paucioribus meliora; sed quaecumque meliora sunt ponenda in universo; ergo etc.	160. Again, more goods are better than fewer; but whatever is better should be posited in the universe; therefore etc.
161 $a Item, quidquid si est, est necesse esse, est simpliciter necesse esse; sed alius Deus si est, est necesse esse; ergo etc. Maior probatur: da oppositum praedicati, 'non est necesse esse simpliciter', et sequitur oppositum subiecti, quod scilicet si est, est possibile esse et non necesse esse. Responsio: debet inferri oppositum subiecti sic, 'non est necesse esse si est', ubi negetur habitudo inter antecedens et consequens. a$ ƿ	161. Again, anything that, if it is, is a necessary being is simply a necessary being; but if there is another God it is a necessary being; therefore etc. Proof of the major: grant the opposite of the predicate, ‘it is not simply a necessary being’, and the opposite of the subject follows, namely that, if it is, it is a possible being and not a necessary being. Response: the opposite of the subject should be inferred in this way, ‘it is not a necessary being if it exists’, where the relation of antecedent and consequent is denied.
162 Contra: Deut. 6: Audi, Israel, Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est; et Is.: Extra me non est Deus. ƿ	162. To the contrary: Deuteronomy 6.4: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God;” and Isaiah 45.5: “Beside me there is no God.”
163 In ista quaestione conclusio est certa. Sed dicunt aliqui quod haec conclusio non est demonstrabilis, sed tantum accepta per fidem; et ad hoc sequitur auctoritas Rabbi Moysis, 23 cap., quod ((unitas Dei accepta est a Lege)).	163. [The opinion of others] – In this question the conclusion is certain. But some say that this conclusion is not demonstrable but only accepted on faith; and for this there follows the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides], Guide of the Perplexed I ch.75: “the unity of God is received from the Law.”
164 Hoc etiam arguitur per rationem, quia si per naturalem ratioƿnem posset cognosci Deum esse unicum, ergo posset cognosci Deum esse singularem naturaliter; ergo posset cognosci singularitas Dei, et essentia ut singularis, quod falsum est, et contra prius dictum est in quaestione de theologiae subiecto.	164. This is also argued by reason, that if it could be known by natural reason that God is one, therefore it could naturally be known that God is naturally a singular; therefore the singularity of God and his essence as singular could be known, which is false, and the contrary was said above in the question about the object of theology [Prol. nn.167-168].
165 Videtur tamen quod illa unitas posset naturali ratione ostendi, et hoc sumendo viam: primo ex infinito intellectu, secundo ex infinita voluntate, tertio ex infinita bonitate, quarto ex ratione infinitae potentiae, quinto ex ratione infiniti absolute, sexto ex ratione necesse esse, septimo ex ratione omnipotentiae.	165. [Scotus’ own opinion] – However it seems that the unity might be shown by natural reason, and that by taking a way, first, from infinite intellect, second from infinite will, third from infinite goodness, fourth from the idea of infinite power, fifth from the idea of an infinite absolutely, sixth from the idea of necessary being, seventh from the idea of omnipotence.
166 Ex parte intellectus infiniti arguitur sic, primo: intellectus infinitus cognoscit intelligibile quodcumque perfectissime quantum est intelligibile in se; igitur si ƿsunt Dii, sint a et b, a cognoscit b perfectissime, quantum scilicet b est cognoscibile. Sed hoc est impossibile. Probatio, quia aut cognoscit b per essentiam b, aut non. Si non, et b est cognoscibile per essentiam, igitur non cognoscit b perfectissime et quantum scilicet est cognoscibile. Nihil enim cognoscibile per essentiam perfectissime cognoscitur nisi cognoscitur per essentiam suam, vel per aliquid perfectius includens essentiam suam quam ipsa sit in se; essentia autem b in nullo perfectius includitur quam in b, quia tunc b non esset Deus. Si autem cognoscit b per essentiam ipsius b, ergo actus ipsius a est posterius naturaliter essentia ipsius b, et ita a non erit Deus. Quod autem actus ipsius a sit posterior ipso b, probatio, quia omnis actus cognoscendi qui non est idem obiecto, est posterior obiecto; neque enim prior neque simul natura est actus cum aliquo alio ab actu, quia tunc actus posset intelligi sine obiecto, sicut e converso.	166. [First way, from infinite intellect] – On the part of infinite intellect the argument is first as follows: an infinite intellect knows most perfectly any intelligible whatever insofar as it is intelligible in itself; therefore, if there are Gods – let them be a and b – a knows b most perfectly, namely insofar as b is knowable. But this is impossible. The proof is that either it knows b through the essence of b or it does not. If it does not and b is knowable through its essence, then a does not know b most perfectly and insofar, that is, as it is knowable. For nothing knowable through its essence is most perfectly known unless it is known through its essence, or through something more perfect which includes the essence which it is in itself; but the essence of b is included in nothing more perfectly than in b, because then b would not be God. But if a knows b through the essence of b itself, then the act of a itself is naturally posterior to the essence of b itself, and so a will not be God. Now the proof that the act of a itself is posterior to b itself is that every act of knowing which is not the same as the object is posterior to the object; for an act is neither prior to nor simultaneous in nature with anything other than the act, because then the act might be understood without the object, just as conversely.
167 Si dicatur quod a intelligit b per essentiam ipsius a quae simillima est ipsi b, sic videlicet quod a intelligit b in ratione speciei communis ipsi a et ipsi b, contra: neutra salvat responsio quod a intelligat b perfectissime, et per consequens non est Deus, quia cognitio alicuius in simili tantum et in universali non est cognitio ƿperfectissima et intuitiva ipsius rei, et ita a non cognosceret b intuitive nec perfectissime, quod est propositum.	167. If it be said that a understands b by the essence of a itself, which is most similar to b itself, namely in this way, that a understands b in the idea of a species common to a itself and to b itself, on the contrary: neither response saves the fact a understand b most perfectly, and consequently a is not God, because the knowledge of a thing in a similar and a universal only is not a knowledge most perfect and intuitive of that thing, and so a would not know b intuitively nor most perfectly, which is the conclusion intended.
168 Secundo ex parte intellectus arguitur sic: actus idem non potest habere duo obiecta adaequata; a est obiectum adaequatum suae intellectioni, et b esset adaequatum eidem si a posset intelligere b; ergo impossibile est quod a intelligat unica intellectione simul perfecte a et b. Si a habeat intellectiones realiter distinctas, ergo non est Deus. Maior patet, quia aliter actus adaequaretur obiecto quo subtracto non minus quietaretur et adaequaretur, et ita frustra esset tale obiectum.	168. The argument second on the part of the intellect is as follows: one and the same act cannot have two adequate objects; a is the adequate object of its own intellection, and b would be the adequate object of the same intellection if a could understand b; therefore it is impossible that a understand in a single intellection perfectly all at once both a and b. If a have intellections that are really distinct then it is not God. The major is plain, because otherwise the act would be adequated to an object which, when removed, the act would no less be at rest in and adequated to, and so such an object would be in vain.
169 Quantum ad secundam viam arguitur sic: voluntas infinita est recta, ergo diligit quodlibet diliƿgibile quantum est diligibile; si b est alius Deus, est diligendus in infinitum (cum sit bonum infinitum) et infinite a voluntate sic potente diligere; ergo voluntas a diligit b infinite. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia a naturaliter diligit plus se quam b. Probatio: quilibet enim naturaliter diligit plus esse suum quam esse alterius cuius non est pars vel effectus; a autem nihil est ipsius b nec ut pars nec ut effectus; ergo plus diligit a se naturaliter quam ipsum b. Sed voluntas libera quando est recta conformatur voluntati naturali, alioquin voluntas naturalis non esset semper recta; ergo a si habet istam voluntatem rectam, actu elicito plus diligit se quam b; ergo non b infinite.	169. [The second way, from infinite will] – As to the second way the argument is as follows: an infinite will is correct, therefore it loves whatever is lovable insofar as it is lovable; if b is another God it is to be loved infinitely (since it is an infinite good) and to be loved infinitely by a will that is able thus to love it; therefore the will of a loves b infinitely. But this is impossible because a naturally loves itself more than b. Proof: for anything whatever naturally loves its own being more than the being of something else of which it is not a part or an effect; but a is nothing of b whether as a part or as an effect; therefore a naturally loves itself more than it loves b. But a free will, when it is correct, is in conformity with the natural will, otherwise the natural will would not always be correct; therefore if a has this correct will it loves itself with an elicited act more than it loves b; therefore it does not love b infinitely.
170 Secundo sic de voluntate: aut a fruitur b, aut utitur; si utitur eo, ergo habet a voluntatem inordinatam; si fruitur b et fruitur a, ergo a est beatus in duobus obiectis quorum neutrum dependet ab ƿalio, quia sicut a beatus est in se, sic et in b. Sed consequens est impossibile, quia nihil potest esse actu beatum in duobus obiectis beatificantibus totalibus; probatio, quia utroque destructo nihilominus esset beatus; ergo in neutro est beatus.	170. A second argument about will is as follows: a either enjoys b or uses it; if it uses it then a has a disordered will; if it enjoys b and enjoys a then a is blessed in two objects neither of which depends on the other, because just as a is blessed in itself so it is blessed in b. But the consequent is impossible, because nothing can be actually blessed in two total beatifying objects; the proof is that when either object is destroyed it would nevertheless be blessed; therefore it is blessed in neither.
171 De tertia via, scilicet de ratione infiniti boni, arguitur sic: voluntas ordinate potest appetere maius bonum et magis amare maius bonum; sed plura bona infinita, si sint possibilia, plus includunt bonitatis quam unum infinitum; ergo voluntas ordinate plus posset amare plura infinita quam unum, et per consequens in nullo uno bono infinito quietaretur. Sed hoc est contra rationem boni - quod sit infinitum et non quietativum cuiuscumque voluntatis.	171. [Third way, from infinite goodness] – About the third way, namely about the idea of infinite good, the argument is as follows: the will can in an ordered way desire a greater good and love more a greater good; but several infinite goods, if they were possible, include more goodness than one infinite good; therefore the will could in an ordered way love several infinites more than one infinite, and consequently it would not rest in any single infinite good. But this is contrary to the idea of good – that it be infinite and not give rest to any will whatever.
172 Quantum ad quartam viam, de potentia infinita, arguo sic: non possunt esse duae causae totales eiusdem effectus in eodem ordine causae; sed infinita potentia est causa totalis respectu cuiuscumque effectus in ratione primae ƿcausae, ergo nulla alia potest esse in ratione causae primae respectu alicuius effectus, et ita nulla alia causa, infinita in potentia.	172. [The fourth way, from infinite power] – As to the fourth way, about infinite power, I argue thus: there cannot be two total causes of the same effect in the same order of cause [n.73]; but infinite power is the total cause in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, therefore there can be no other power in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, and so there is no other cause infinite in power.
173 Primam propositionem probo, quia tunc posset aliquid esse causa alicuius a quo illud non dependeret. Probatio: a nullo aliquid dependet essentialiter quo non exsistente nihil minus esset; sed si c habet duas causas totales, a et b, et in eodem ordine, utroque eorum non exsistente nihil minus esset ipsum c ab altero eorum, quia non exsistente a nihil minus est ipsum c ab ipso b, et non exsistente b nihil minus est c ab a.	173. The proof of the first proposition is that then it would be possible for something to be the cause of something on which that something did not depend. Proof: nothing essentially depends on a thing such that, when that thing does not exist, it would no less exist; but if c has two total causes, a and b, and in the same order, then when either of them does not exist, c would no less exist on the other of them, because when a does not exist c would no less exist on b, and when b does not exist c exists no less on a.
174 Iuxta illud arguitur de unitate cuiuscumque primi in quacumque primitate praedicta: nihil enim est excessum a duobus primo excedentibus, vel finitum essentialiter ordinatur ad duos primos fines; esset enim aliquid ad finem, quo non exsistente nihil minus esset finitum, ut prius argutum est, et excessum esset essentialiter ab aliquo, quo non exsistente nihil minus haberet essentiale excedens quo mensuraretur essentialiter, et a quo acciperet suam ƿperfectionem essentialiter, quod est impossibile; ergo impossibile est aliquorum duorum finitorum duos esse fines primos, vel duorum excessorum duo prima eminentia.	174. Next to this is an argument about the unity of any first thing in any of the aforesaid primacies [n.41]; for nothing is exceeded by two first exceeding things, or no finite thing is essentially ordered to two first ends; for there would be something in relation to an end such that, when the end did not exist, it would no less have an end, as was argued before [nn.173, 73], and it would be essentially exceeded by something such that, when that thing did not exist, it would no less have an essential exceeder by which it was essentially measured, and from which it would essentially receive its perfection, which is impossible; therefore it is impossible for there to be two first ends of any two finite things, or two first eminents of two exceeded things.
175 De quinta via dico quod infinitum non potest excedi, et arguo sic: quaecumque perfectio potest numerari in diversis, plus perfectionis habet in pluribus quam in uno, sicut dicitur VIII De Trinitate cap. 1; igitur infinitum omnino in pluribus numerari non potest.	175. [The fifth way, from the infinite absolutely] – About the fifth way I say that an infinite cannot be exceeded, and I argue thus: whatever perfection can be numerically in diverse things has more perfection in several of them than in one, as is said in On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2; therefore the infinite cannot at all numerically be in many things.
176 De sexta via primo arguo sic: species plurificabilis scilicet in individuis non determinatur ex se ad certum numerum individuorum, sed quantum est ex se compatitur infinitatem individuorum, sicut patet in speciebus omnibus corruptibilibus; ergo si ratio 'necesse esse' sit plurificabilis in individuis, non determinat se ad certum numerum, sed compatitur infinitatem quantum est ex se. Sed si possent esse infinita necesse esse, sunt infinita necesse esse; ergo etc. Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens ex quo sequitur. ƿ	176. [The sixth way, from necessary being] – About the sixth way I argue first thus: a species that can be multiplied, namely in individuals, is not of itself determined to a definite number of individuals, but as far as concerns itself it allows of an infinity of individuals, as is plain in all corruptible species; therefore if the idea of ‘necessary existence’ is multipliable in individuals, it does not determine itself to a definite number, but, as far as concerns itself, allows of an infinity. But if there could be infinite necessary beings, there are in fact infinite necessary beings; therefore etc. The consequent is false, therefore so too is the antecedent from which it follows.
177 Secundo arguo sic, et iuxta istam viam: si sint plura necesse esse, aliquibus perfectionibus realibus distinguuntur; sint illae a et b. Tunc sic: aut illa duo distincta per a et b sunt formaliter necesse esse per a et per b, aut non. Si non, ergo a non est ratio formalis essendi necessario, nec b per consequens: nec ergo ea includens est necessarium primo, quia includit aliquam entitatem quae non est formaliter necessitas essendi nec necessaria ex se. Si autem illa sint formaliter necesse esse per a et b, et praeter hoc utrumque est necesse esse per illud in quo convenit unum cum alio, ergo utrumque habet in se duas rationes quarum utraque formaliter est necesse esse, sed hoc est impossibile, quia neutra illarum includit alteram; utraque ergo illarum circumscripta esset tale necesse esse per reliquam, et ita aliquid esset formaliter necesse esse per rationem aliƿquam, qua circumscripta nihilominus esset necesse esse, quod est impossibile.	177. Secondly I argue thus, and next to this way: if there are several infinite beings they are distinguished by some real perfections [n.71]; let those perfections be a and b. Then as follows: either those two things distinct by a and b are formally necessary beings by a and b or they are not. If they are not then a is not the formal idea of necessarily existing, and consequently not b either; therefore also what includes them is not a first necessary, because it includes some reality which is not formally the necessity of existing, nor necessary of itself. But if the two things are formally necessary beings by a and b, and if in addition to this each of them is a necessary being by that in which one of them agrees with the other, then each of them has in itself two reasons each of which is formally necessary being, but this is impossible, because neither includes the other; therefore when either reason is removed each would be this sort of necessary being by the other reason, and so something would be formally a necessary being by a reason such that, when the reason was removed, it would nevertheless be a necessary being, which is impossible [n.71].
178 De septima via, scilicet omnipotentia, videtur quod non sit per rationem naturalem demonstrabile, quia omnipotentia - ut alias patebit - non potest concludi ratione naturali ut catholici intelligunt omnipotentiam, nec concluditur ex ratione infinitae potentiae.	178. [The seventh way, from omnipotence] – About the seventh way, namely omnipotence, it seems that it is not demonstrable by natural reason, because omnipotence – as will be plain elsewhere [n.119] – cannot be proved by natural reason in the way Catholics understand omnipotence, nor can it be proved by reason of infinite power.
179 Tamen ex omnipotentia credita arguitur sic propositum: si a est omnipotens, ergo potest facere circa quodcumque aliud ipsum esse vel non esse, et ita posset destruere b, et ita faceret b nullipotentem, et sic sequitur quod b non est Deus.	179. Yet from omnipotence as believed the intended proposition may be argued for in this way: if a is omnipotent then it can cause being and not being in the case of anything else, and so it could destroy b, and so might make b impotent of everything, and the consequence is thus that b is not God.
180 Ista ratio non valet sicut quidam respondent ad eam, quia b non est obiectum omnipotentiae, quia omnipotentia pro obiecto respicit possibile; b autem ponebatur necessarium sicut a. Ideo arguitur aliter, declarando sic rationem Richardi II De Trinitate ƿcap. 17: sicut omnipotens per suum velle potest producere quodcumque possibile, ita suo nolle potest impedire vel destruere omne possibile; sed si a est omnipotens, potest velle omnia alia a se esse, et ita suo velle ipsa in esse producere. Non necesse est autem quod b velit omnia illa esse quae vult a, quia voluntas b contingenter se habet ad illa, sicut voluntas a ad illa quae b vult, si est Deus. Si autem b nolit illa esse, ergo nullum illorum est. Ergo si sint duo omnipotentes, uterque illorum faceret alium nullipotentem, non destruendo illum, sed prohibendo per suum nolle esse volitorum ab alio.	180. This reasoning is not valid, just as some reply to it, because b is not an object of omnipotence since omnipotence has regard to the possible for its object; but b was posited as necessary [n.177] just like a. Therefore one argues in another way by declaring thus the reason of Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity I ch.25: just as the omnipotent by its willing can produce whatever is possible, so by its not willing it can impede or destroy anything possible; but if a is omnipotent it can will everything other than itself to exist, and so by its willing them to bring them into existence. But it is not necessary that b will all the things that a wills, because the will of b is contingently related to them, just as the will of a is to the things that b wills, if it is God [n.156]. But if b does not will them to be, then none of them exists. Therefore if there are two omnipotents, each of them would make the other impotent, not by destroying it, but by preventing by its non-willing the existence of the things willed by the other.
181 Quod si dicas quasi sophisticando quod concordent in voluntate sua, quamvis nulla sit necessitas, sed quasi fecerint pactum, ƿadhuc probo quod neuter eorum erit omnipotens: nam si a est omnipotens, potest producere suo velle quodcumque producibile volitum aliud a se; ex hoc sequitur quod b nullum poterit producere suo velle, et ita non est omnipotens. Quod autem hoc sequitur, patet ex quarta via, quia impossibile est duas causas esse totales unius effectus, quia ex quo totaliter causatus est ab una, impossibile est quod sit ab alia.	181. But if you say, by playing the sophist as it were, that they may agree in their will, although there is no necessity [n.180], but they would as it were make a pact, still I argue that neither of them will be omnipotent; for if a is omnipotent it can produce by its willing any willed possible other than itself; from this it follows that b could produce nothing by its own willing, and so it is not omnipotent. Now that this follows is plain from the fourth way [n.172], because it is impossible for there to be two total causes of one effect, because from the fact that the effect is totally caused by one, it is impossible that it be caused by the other.
182 Ad argumenta. Primo enim ad illa quae sunt pro alia opinione. Respondeo ad auctoritatem Rabbi Moysis et dico quod Deum esse unum traditur in Lege; quia enim populus fuit ƿrudis et pronus ad idolatriam, ideo indiguit instrui per Legem de unitate Dei, licet per naturalem rationem posset demonstrari. Ita etiam acceptum est a Lege quod Deus sit (Ex. 3: Ego sum qui sum, et Apostolus ad Hebr. dicit quod oportet accedentem ad Deum credere quia est), et tamen non negatur Deum esse demonstrabile; ergo pari ratione nec negandum est posse demonstrari per rationem Deum esse unum, licet 'accepta' sit a Lege. Illa etiam quae possunt demonstrari utile est communitati tradi etiam per viam auctoritatis - et propter negligentiam communitatis in inquirendo veritatem, et etiam propter impotentiam intellectus et propter errores inquirentium per demonstrationem, quia veritatibus suis multa falsa permiscent, ut dicit Augustinus XVIII De civitate Dei. Et ideo, quia simplices sequentes tales demonstratores possent dubitare cui esset assentiendum, ideo tuta est via et stabilis et communis, auctoritas, circa quae non potest fallere nec falli.	182. To the arguments [nn.163-164, 157-160] – For first to those that are for the other opinion. I reply to the authority of Rabbi Moses [n.163] and I say that God’s being one is handed down in the Law; for because the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry therefore they needed to be instructed by the Law about the unity of God, although it could by natural reason be demonstrated. For it is thus received by the Law that God exists (Exodus 3.14: “I am who am”, and the Apostle says in Hebrews 11.6: that “he who comes to God must believe that he is”), and yet it is not denied that God is demonstrable; therefore by parity of reasoning it should not be denied either that it could be demonstrated by reason that God is one, although it be ‘received’ from the Law. Also, it is useful for things which can be demonstrated to be handed down to the community also by way of authority – both because of the negligence of the community in inquiring into truth, and also because of the impotence of the intellect and the errors of those who make inquiry by demonstration, because they mix many false things in with their truths, as Augustine says in The City of God XVIII ch.41 n.2. And therefore, because the simple who follow such demonstrators could be in doubt as to what to assent to, so an authority is a safe and stable and common way about the things it can neither deceive nor be deceived about.
183 Ad secundam rationem de singulari dico quod aliud est singularitatem esse conceptam vel ut obiectum vel ut partem obiecti, aliud singularitatem esse praecise modum concipiendi sive sub quo ƿconcipitur obiectum. Exemplum: cum dico 'universale', obiectum conceptum est pluralitas, sed modus concipiendi, id est modus sub quo concipitur, est singularitas; ita in intentionibus logicis cum dico 'singulare', quod concipitur est singularitas, sed modus sub quo concipitur est universalitas, quia quod concipitur, ut concipitur, habet indifferentiam ad plura. Ita dico in proposito quod essentia divina potest concipi ut singularis ita quod singularitas sit concepta vel ut obiectum vel ut pars obiecti; non tamen sequitur quod essentia possit cognosci ut est singularis, ita quod singularitas sit modus concepti: cognoscere enim sic aliquid ut singulare, est illud cognoscere ut hoc sicut album videtur ut hoc, et hoc modo praedictum est quod non cognoscitur essentia divina sub ratione singularitatis; et ideo in argumento est fallacia figurae dictionis, commutando rem in modum.	183. To the second reason about the singular [n.164] I say that it is one thing for singularity to be conceived either as an object or as part of an object, and another thing for singularity to be precisely the mode of conceiving or that under which the object is conceived. An example: when I say ‘universal’, the object conceived is a plurality, but the mode of conceiving, that is, the mode under which it is conceived, is singularity; thus in the case of logical intentions, when I say ‘singular’, what is conceived is singularity, but the mode under which it is conceived is universality, because what is conceived, in the way it is conceived, is indifferent to many things. Thus I say in the proposed case that the divine essence can be conceived as singular such that singularity is conceived either as the object or part of the object; yet it does not follow that the essence can be conceived as it is singular, such that singularity be the mode of the concept; for thus to know something as singular is to know it as this, as a white thing is seen as this, and in this way it was said before [n.164] that the divine essence is not known under the idea of singularity; and therefore there is in the argument a fallacy of figure of speech [Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1.4.166b10-14], by changing thing to mode.
184 Ad rationes principales. Dico quod Apostolus loquitur de idolis, et ideo de 'diis' nuncupative; et subdit ibi: nobis autem unus est Deus, quia omnes dii gentium daemonia. ƿ	184. To the principal reasons [nn.157-160]. – I say that the Apostle [n.157] is speaking of idols, and so of ‘gods’ in name only; and he adds there: “but for us there is one God,” because “all the gods of the Gentiles are demons.”
185 Ad secundum dico quod consequentia non valet, quia numerus non est talis modus significandi grammaticus sicut alii modi grammaticales, qui praecise dicunt modum concipiendi rei absque aliqua realitate correspondente tali modo concipiendi; unde dicunt praecise aliquid in re a quo moveri possit intellectus ad talem modum concipiendum. Sed numerus vere includit rem subtractam; unde sequitur 'homines currunt, ergo plures homines currunt'. Sed non sic de aliis consignificatis nominis vel verbi, quia non sequitur 'Deus est, igitur Deus est masculinus', quia ad masculinitatem sufficit aliquid in re a quo iste modus concipiendi possit accipi, puta activitas. Dico ergo quod illud solum 'Dii' conceptum sub modo plurali includit contradictionem, quia modus concipiendi repugnat ei quod concipitur sub modo. - Cum igitur probatur consequentia quia idem includit singulare et plurale, dico quod singulare includit illud sub modo concipiendi convenienti ƿipsi concepto, sed plurale includit illud sub modo impossibili illi concepto; et ideo singulare includit rationem quasi in se veram prout includit conceptum et modum concipiendi, plurale autem prout includit ista duo includit rationem quasi in se falsam. Et ideo non sequitur quod plurale sit verum de plurali sicut singulare de singulari, quia de eo cuius est ratio in se falsa nihil est verum.	185. I say to the second [n.158] that the consequence is not valid, because number is not a grammatical mode of signifying as are other grammatical modes that mean precisely a mode of conceiving a thing without any reality corresponding to such a mode of conceiving; hence they mean precisely some aspect in a thing by which the intellect can be moved to conceive such a thing. But number truly includes a subsumed thing; hence the inference follows ‘men are running, therefore several men are running’. But it is not like this in the case of the other co-signified things in a noun or a verb, because this inference does not follow ‘God exists, therefore God is masculine’ [in Latin the word for ‘God’ is a masculine noun, ‘Deus’], because it suffices for masculinity that there is something in the thing from which the mode of conceiving might be taken, such as activity. I say therefore that only the term ‘Gods’ conceived in the plural mode includes a contradiction, because the mode of conceiving is repugnant to that which is conceived in that mode. – When therefore the consequence is proved that the same thing includes the singular and plural [n.158], I say that it includes the singular under a mode of conceiving fitting to the concept but it includes the plural in a mode impossible to that concept; and therefore the singular, insofar as it includes the concept and the mode of conceiving, includes an idea that is as it were in itself true, but the plural, insofar as it includes those two things, includes an idea that is as it were in itself false. And so it does not follow that the plural is true of the plural as the singular is of the singular, because about that whose idea is in itself false nothing is true [n.30].
186 Per illud patet ad aliam probationem 'quo maius cogitari non potest', quia non sunt Dii cogitabiles sine contradictione, quia modus repugnat rei conceptae; et ideo maior est glossanda sicut prius est dictum in quaestione praecedenti. Ad sensum autem et veritatem requiritur quod ratio subiecti non includit contradictionem, sicut dictum est in quaestione secunda huius distinctionis.	186. Through this is plain the response to the other proof ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [n.158] because Gods are not thinkable without contradiction, because the mode is repugnant to the thing conceived; and therefore the major is to be glossed as was said before in the preceding question [n.137]. Now for sense and truth it is required that the idea of the subject not include a contradiction, as was said in the second question of this distinction [n.30].
187 Ad tertium dico quod illa maior propositio non est prima, sed reducitur ad istam 'omne imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum'; et quia omne ens per participationem est imperfectum, et tantum illud ens est perfectum quod est ens per essentiam, ideo sequitur propositio illa. Haec autem maior de 'imperfecto' sic habet distinƿgui: aliquid est imperfectum secundum perfectionem simpliciter, quae non necessario habet imperfectionem concomitantem, quia non includit in se limitationem, sicut 'hoc bonum', 'hoc verum', 'hoc ens'; et huiusmodi imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum eiusdem rationis, scilicet 'bonum', 'ens' et 'verum', quae important perfectiones simpliciter. Aliquid autem est imperfectum secundum perfectionem non simpliciter, quae de ratione sui includit limitationem, et ideo necessario habet imperfectionem annexam, ut 'hic homo', 'hic asinus'; et huiusmodi imperfecta non reducuntur ad perfectum per essentiam absolute eiusdem rationis sicut ad rationem specificam, quia ipsa adhuc includit imperfectionem, quia limitationem, sed reducuntur ad perfectum primum quod continet ea supereminenter et aequivoce. Quod ergo imperfectum est primo modo, reducitur ad perfectum simpliciter secundum perfectionem illius rationis, quia aliquid secundum istam rationem potest esse simpliciter perfectum. Quod autem est imperfectum ƿsecundo modo, non reducitur ad aliquid perfectum secundum perfectionem eiusdem rationis; quia enim illa imperfectionem includit, ideo illa non potest esse perfectum simpliciter, propter illam limitationem, sed reducitur ad aliquid simpliciter perfectum aequivocum, eminenter includens illam perfectionem. Et ideo bonum imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum bonum, sed lapis, qui est imperfectus, non reducitur ad lapidem perfectum simpliciter, sed ad summum ens et ad summum bonum, quae includunt virtualiter illam perfectionem.	187. To the third [n.159] I say that the major proposition is not first but is reduced to this ‘every imperfect thing is reduced to a perfect thing’; and because every being by participation is imperfect, and only that being is perfect which is a being by essence, therefore does the proposition follow. But this major about ‘imperfect’ has to be distinguished in this way: a thing is imperfect according to a perfection simply when the perfection does not necessarily have an accompanying imperfection, because it does not include in itself a limitation, as ‘this good’, ‘this true’, ‘this being’; and an imperfect of this sort is reduced to a perfect of the same nature, namely ‘good’, ‘being’, and ‘true’, which indicate perfections simply. But a thing is imperfect according to a perfection nonsimply when the perfection includes a limitation in its idea, and so it necessarily has an annexed imperfection, as ‘this man’, ‘this ass’; and imperfects of this sort are not reduced to a perfect by essence absolutely of the same idea as to their specific idea, because they still include imperfection, because they include a limitation, but they are reduced to a first perfect that contains them super-eminently and equivocally. What is imperfect then in the first way is reduced to a perfect simply according to a perfection of the same nature, because something can according to that nature be simply perfect. But what is imperfect in the second way is not reduced to something perfect according to a perfection of the same nature; for because that nature includes imperfection, therefore it cannot be a perfect thing simply, because of the limitation, but it is reduced to some simply perfect equivocal that eminently includes that perfection. And for this reason an imperfect good is reduced to a perfect good, but a stone, which is imperfect, is not reduced to a simply perfect stone, but to supreme being and to supreme good, which include that perfection virtually [n.69].
188 Ad ultimum dicitur quod plura bona finita sunt meliora paucioribus bonis finitis, non autem plura bona infinita.	188. To the final one [160] the response is that many finite goods are better than fewer finite goods, but not many infinite goods.
189 Sed hoc non videtur respondere ad argumentum, quia quaecumque si essent meliora essent videntur ponenda esse in entibus, et maxime in ente supremo, quod est 'necesse esse', quia ibi quidquid posset esse, bonum est et necesse est ibi esse; sed plura bona infinita si essent, essent meliora; videtur igitur quod plura bona infinita sunt ponenda in natura summi boni.	189. But this does not seem to respond to the argument, because it seems that all things that would be better if they existed should be posited within beings, and most of all within the supreme being, which is a ‘necessary being’, because there whatever could exist is good and must necessarily be there; but many infinite goods, if they existed, would be better; therefore it seems that many infinite goods should be posited in the nature of the supreme good.
190 Ad istud respondeo quod cum dicitur in maiori 'illa quae si ƿessent essent meliora sunt ponenda ibi', dico quod aut per ly 'si' implicatur positio possibilis, aut positio incompossibilium. Si primo modo, dico quod maior est vera et minor falsa, quia implicatio illa in minori non est possibilis, sed incompossibilium. Si autem ly 'si' implicet positionem incompossibilium, tunc minor est vera et maior falsa; quae enim non essent meliora nisi ex positione incompossibilium, non essent meliora, nec etiam sunt bona, sicut illud quod non est nisi ex positione incompossibilium omnino non est, sicut nec illud positum a quo dependet. ƿ	190. To this I reply that when it is said in the major ‘things which would be better if they existed should be posited there’, I say that by the ‘if’ either a possible positing is implied or a positing of incompossibles is. If in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false, because the implication in the minor is not possible but is of incompossibles. But if the ‘if’ implies a positing of incompossibles then the minor is true and the major false; for things that would only be better from a positing of incompossibles would not be better, nor are they even good, just as that which only exists from the positing of incompossibles altogether does not exist, just as neither does the posited thing on which it depends.