Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D29

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Twenty Ninth Distinction Single Question Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles Inwardly and Outwardly in God
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam nonam quaero utrum principium uno modo dicatur de principio sumpto personaliter et notionaliter, et essentialiter sumpto'. Quod non: Quia si principium esset unius rationis hoc triplici modo sumptum, ergo principiata essent unius rationis; hoc falsum est, quia nec Filius et Spiritus Sanctus principiantur uno modo, nec creatura eodem modo cum eis.	1. About the twenty ninth distinction I ask whether principle is said in one way of principle when taken personally and notionally and taken essentially. That it is not: Because if principle were of one idea when taken in this triple way, then things from the principle would be of one idea; this is false, because neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are from a principle in a single way, nor are creatures from a principle in the same way as they are.
2 Contra: Sequitur 'creans, ergo principians', et 'generans, ergo principians', et 'spirans, ergo principians', - et non e converso; ergo consequens est commune ad omnia antecedentia.	2. On the contrary: This inference holds ‘creating, therefore being a principle’, and ‘generating, therefore being a principle’, and ‘inspiriting, therefore being a principle’, – and not conversely; therefore the consequent is common to all the antecedents. I. To the Question
3 Ad istam quaestionem dico quod principium non dicitur univoce de principio essentialiter et notionaliter sumpto, - et hoc loƿquendo de relatione quae per se significatur hoc nomine 'principium', et accipiendo principium principiative, pro eo 'quod principiat' (sive pro principio 'quod', non 'quo'). Et ratio est, quia principium essentialiter sumptum non dicit nisi relationem rationis (non realem, quia non est relatio realis Dei ad creaturam, ut ex distinctione sequente patebit), ut autem accipitur ad intra, notionaliter vel personaliter, dicit relationem realem; relationi autem reali et rationis non est commune aliquid idem, quod est 'commune' rei in uno et in alio rationis, quia ei quod est secundum quid tale et ei quod est simpliciter tale, in quantum huiusmodi, non est commune univocum illud quod accipitur in eis secundum quid et simpliciter: relatio autem realis est simpliciter relatio, et relatio rationis secundum quid relatio, quia sicut 'esse in ratione' est esse secundum quid, ita referri secundum rationem sive comparari a ratione est referri vel comparari secundum quid; ergo non est principium univocum istis.	3. To this question I say that principle is not said univocally of principle taken essentially and notionally, – and this when speaking of the relation that is per se signified by this name ‘principle’, and taking principle as it is a principle, for ‘that which is actually principle of something’ (or for the principle ‘which’ not ‘by which’). And the reason is that principle essentially taken only states a relation of reason (not a real relation, because there is no real relation of God to creatures, as will be plain from the following question [d.30 nn.48-51]), but as it is taken inwardly, notionally or personally, it does state a real relation; but to a real relation and a relation of reason there is nothing common that is the same, something that is common really in the one case and in reason in the other, because to that which is such in a certain respect and to that which is simply such, insofar as it is such, what is taken in them in a certain respect and simply is not a common univocal; but a real relation is simply a relation, and a relation of reason is a relation in a certain respect, because just as ‘to be in reason’ is to be in a certain respect, so to be referred in reason or to be compared by reason is to be referred or compared in a certain respect; therefore there is no principle univocal to them.
4 Si autem loquamur de principio ad intra, ut est personale et notionale, videtur quod eis possit esse ratio principii communis univoce; sicut paternitati et filiationi potest hoc quod est 'relatio originis' esse commune univoce, et generationi et spirationi potest hoc quod est 'productio' esse commune univoce, sicut tactum est supra distinctione 23 de communi univoce personis in quantum personae. ƿ	4. Now if we speak of principle inwardly, as it is personal and notional, it does seem that there could for them be the idea of a common principle univocally; in the way it is possible for what it means to be ‘a relation of origin’ to be univocally common to paternity and filiation, and in the way it is possible for what it means to be ‘production’ to be univocally common to generation and inspiriting, as was touched on above in distinction 23 n.9 about what is univocally common to the persons insofar as they are persons. II. To the Arguments
5 Ad argumenta. Primum probat quod non est principium unius rationis, ibi, ad notionale et personale. Respondeo quod in creaturis aliqua duo 'distincta specie' dicuntur esse alterius rationis, et tamen potest abstrahi ab eis unum commune unius rationis, sicut genus. Ita in proposito: istae productiones - generatio et spiratio - sunt alterius rationis, loquendo de propriis rationibus earum, et tamen potest aliquid unum commune abstrahi ab eis; et eodem modo de hoc communi quod est 'principium', ipsum potest esse commune unius rationis, licet illa de quibus dicitur sint alterius rationis, loquendo de propriis rationibus eorum.	5. To the arguments [nn.1-2]. The first [n.1] proves that there is no principle there of a single idea for the notional and the personal. I reply that in creatures two things ‘distinct in species’ are said to be of different idea, and yet there can be abstracted from them one common thing of one idea, as the genus. So it is in the issue at hand: these productions – generation and inspiriting – are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas, and yet some single common thing can be abstracted from them; and in the same way about the common term ‘principle’, that it can be a common thing of one idea, although the things of which it is said are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas.
6 Et si obiciatur contra hoc, quia tunc est universale in divinis, - de hoc tactum est distinctione 23.	6. And if you object to this that then there is a universal in divine reality – this was touched on in distinction 23 nn.12-13.
7 Argumentum 'ad oppositum' probat communitatem huius quod est 'principium', ad tale et tale principium, - sicut probat univocationem ad principium intra et extra. Ideo potest responderi quod non sequitur 'creans, ergo principians' et 'generans, ergo principians', accipiendo principians, quod infertur, pro aliquo communi univoco simpliciter, - quia principians, quod infertur ad hoc quod est 'creans' (ut dicitur de Deo), dicit tantum relationem rationis, principians autem quod infertur ex generante dicit relationem realem.	7. To the argument for the opposite [n.2], it proves the commonness of what it means to be ‘principle’ as to a principle of this sort and of that sort – just as it proves univocity as to principle inwardly and outwardly. Therefore one can respond that these inferences do not follow ‘creating, therefore being a principle’ and ‘generating, therefore being a principle’, taking the being a principle, which is the conclusion inferred, for some common univocal simply – because the being a principle that is inferred for what it is to be ‘creating’ (as it is said of God), states only a relation of reason, but the being a principle that is inferred from ‘generating’, states a real relation.