Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D30/Q2

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio 2	Question Two Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures
5 Secundo quaero utrum Dei ad creaturam possit esse aliqua relatio realis'. Quod sic: Quia Deus ex natura rei, absque consideratione intellectus, est omnipotens et omnisciens (ista enim ponuntur in Deo sicut attributa dicentia in Deo perfectionem simpliciter, et omne tale est ibi ex natura rei, secundum Anselmum Monologion cap. 15); ista autem dicunt respectum ad creaturam possibilem et scibilem; ergo etc.	5. Secondly I ask whether there can be some real relation of God to creatures. That there can be: Because God from the nature of the thing, without consideration of the intellect, is omnipotent and omniscient (for these are posited in God as attributes stating in God a perfection simply, and everything such is there from the nature of the thing, according to Anselm Monologion ch.15); but these terms [sc. omnipotent, omniscient] state a respect to possible and knowable creatures; therefore etc.
6 Praeterea, Deus ab aeterno voluit omne creandum esse pro tempore pro quo creavit istud; 'velle creare' includit relationem, et non rationis (probatio, quia prius potuit velle creaturam quam intelligeret se velle eam; non enim quia scivit creaturam, ideo voluit eam, sed quia voluit eam, ideo scivit se velle eam); ergo illa relatio aeterna voluntatis Dei ad creaturam est realis, quia non est in voluntate per actum alicuius intellectus comparantis eam ad aliquid.	6. Further, God from eternity willed everything needing to be created to exist for the time for which he created it; ‘to will a creature’ includes relation, and not a relation of reason (proof, because he could will a creature before he understood that he willed it; for he willed the creature, not because he knew it, but because he willed it); therefore that eternal relation of the will of God to the creature was real, because it is not in the will by act of some intellect comparing it to something.
7 Praeterea, relationes fundatae super quantitatem sunt reales, ex V Metaphysicae; ergo inaequalitas Dei ad creaturam, fundata super quantitatem virtutis in Deo (scilicet super infinitatem maƿgnitudinis eius), et super virtutem finitam creaturae, et super magnitudinem virtutis in creatura (scilicet finitam magnitudinem creaturae), erit relatio realis. - Confirmatur, quia magnitudo in Deo est fundamentum aequalitatis, quae est relatio realis ad intra, et magnitudo in creatura est fundamentum relationis realis; ergo comparando hanc magnitudinem ad illam, videtur quod habitudo fundata super eas sit realis.	7. Further, relations founded on quantity are real, from Metaphysics 5.15.1021a8- 14; therefore the inequality of God to creatures, founded on the quantity of virtue in God (namely on the infinity of his magnitude), and on the finite virtue of creatures, and on the magnitude of virtue in creatures (namely the finite magnitude of creatures), will be a real relation. – A confirmation is that magnitude in God is the foundation of equality, which is a real relation inwardly, and magnitude in creatures is the foundation of a real relation; therefore, by comparing this magnitude with that, it seems that the disposition founded on them is real.
8 Praeterea, relationes secundi modi relativorum (quae scilicet fundantur super actionem et passionem), sunt relationes reales; sed talis est relatio Dei ad creaturam in quantum causa efficiens; ergo etc. - Si dicas quod non est verum nisi in agentibus naturaliter, contra: ergo voluntas creata non habebit habitudinem realem ad suum effectum.	8. Further, relations of the second mode of relatives (which namely are founded on action and passion, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b28-30, 21a14-29) are real relations; but such is the relation of God to creatures insofar as he is efficient cause; therefore etc. – If you say that this is not true save of agents acting naturally [sc. and not by will], on the contrary: then the created will will not have a real disposition to its effect.
9 Praeterea, sicut forma est in aliquo, ita denominat illud; ergo si non est relatio aliqua in Deo ad creaturam realiter, Deus non est realiter dominus creaturae (sive non realiter creator), quod videtur absurdum.	9. Further, as a form is in something, so does it denominate it; therefore if there is not any relation in God to creatures really, God is not really lord of creatures (or he is not really creator), which seems absurd.
10 Contra Relatio realis est ad terminum secundum esse eius reale; sed terminus necessario exigitur ad relationem realem; ergo si Deus refertur realiter ad creaturam, creatura secundum esse reale fuit aeterna. ƿ	10. On the contrary: A real relation is toward a term according to its real existence; but a term is necessarily required for a real relation; therefore if God is really referred to creatures, then creatures according to their real being have been eternal.
11 Ad primam quaestionem dicitur quod nulla est in Deo nova relatio, quia sicut actio est eadem, licet diversimode considerata (ut in aptitudine, ut in potentia, ut praesens, ut praeterita, ut futura), ita relatio fundata super actionem - sic et sic consideratam - est eadem relatio: eandem ergo relationem dicit in Deo, ipsum esse creativum et creantem; sed aeternaliter fuit creativus; ergo cum dicitur 'creans', non est in eo relatio nova, sed nova appellatio relativa. Quod confirmatur per Augustinum V De Trinitate cap. ultimo, ubi potius videtur dicere novam 'appellationem' quam novam 'relationem'.	11. To the first question [n.1] it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there is no new relation in God, because just as his action is the same, although considered in diverse ways (as in aptitude, as in power, as present, as past, as future), so the relation founded on his action – as thus and thus considered – is the same relation; therefore it states the same relation in God, that he is creative and creating; but he was creative eternally; therefore when he is said to be ‘creating’ there is not in him a new relation but a new relative appellation. This is confirmed from Augustine On the Trinity V ch.16 n.17, where he seems rather to say new ‘appellation’ than new ‘relation’.
12 Ad secundam quaestionem dicit quod non, quia illud quod ƿrealiter est relatum, est realiter ordinatum, - sicut albedo quae est ratio referendi realiter ad aliam albedinem, est naturaliter et realiter ordinata ad illam, pro eo quod aliquam perfectionem habet ista ab illa in quantum in eis est natura perfectior simul quam in altero eorum. Omne autem naturaliter ordinatum dependet ab illo ad quod naturaliter ordinatur (pro quanto scilicet exspectat illud, ut in ipso fundetur relatio ad illud): et si dependet, ergo est mutabile, quia dependentia non est sine potentialitate ad actum; et si mutabile, ergo imperfectum, quia carens illa perfectione ad quam mutatur; et si imperfectum, ergo limitatum. Ergo, a primo ad ultimum: si realiter relatum, igitur limitatum.	12. To the second question he [Henry] says no, because that which is really related is really ordered – just as whiteness, which is the reason for a reference really to another whiteness, is naturally and really ordered to it, because of the fact that it has some perfection from it insofar as there is in them a more perfect nature together than in either of them alone. But everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered (namely to the extent it waits for it, so that the relation to it may be founded in itself); and if it depends, then it is changeable, because dependence is not without potentiality for act; and if it is changeable, then it is imperfect, because lacking the perfection to which it changes; and if it is imperfect, then it is limited. Therefore, from first to last: if it is really related, then it is limited.
13 Et quia posset instari quod tunc non esset realis relatio in divinis, ideo videtur exponenda illa propositio 'de relato ad aliud ƿin natura': si enim realiter referatur ad aliquid quod est idem realiter ei in natura, non oportet quod dependeat, quia non exspectat aliud a se in natura, ut in eo fundetur relatio ad illud.	13. And because an instance could be made that then there would not be a real relation in divine reality, therefore the proposition ‘about what is related to another in nature’ [sc. everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered; above] seems to need an exposition: for if it is really referred to something which is the same really with it in nature, there is no need for it to be dependent, because it does not wait for something other than itself in nature, in order for the relation to it to be founded on it.
14 Tunc ad propositum: cum Deus non sit imperfectum quid, nec mutabile, nec dependens, etc., - ergo non est realiter relatum ad aliquid aliud a se, non ergo ad creaturam.	14. Then to the issue at hand: since God is not an imperfect something, nor changeable, nor dependent, etc., – therefore he is not really related to anything other than himself; therefore not to creatures. 2. Rejection of the Opinion
15 Contra istam opinionem, quantum ad illud quod dicit ad primam quaestionem: Si relatio actualis et aptitudinalis sint eadem, et propter hoc non sit aliqua relatio nova actualis Dei ad creaturam, ergo pari ratione non est aliqua relatio nova creaturae ad Deum, quia aptitudinali in Deo correspondebit aptitudinalis in creatura, sicut actuali actualis; et tunc, si sunt eadem in Deo actualis et aptitudinalis, pari ratione aptitudinalis illa in creatura erit eadem cum actuali, et ita nulla nova in uno extremo, sicut nec in alio.	15. Against this opinion, as to what it says to the first question [n.11]: If actual and aptitudinal relation are the same thing, and because of this there is not any new actual relation of God to creatures, then by parity of reasoning there is not any new relation of creatures to God, because to the aptitudinal in God there will correspond an aptitudinal in creatures, just as actual corresponds to actual; and then, if the actual and aptitudinal are the same in God, by parity of reasoning the aptitudinal in creatures will be the same as the actual, and thus there will be no new relation in one extreme just as not in the other either.
16 Consequens videtur absurdum secundum veritatem, quia ƿtunc nec essentia esset nova, nec 'aliquid absolutum' novum; impossibile est enim fundamentum esse novum, et relationem esse aeternam secundum illud fundamentum. Et etiam sequitur impossibile secundum eos, quia tunc, cum omnia sint 'illud quod sunt' per respectum ad Deum ut ad causam exemplarem vel ad causam efficientem, sequitur quod omnia sint aeterna et nihil novum (quia si non respectus, nec absolutum), quia respectus non potest esse aeternus sine aeternitate fundamenti. Specialiter etiam videtur inconveniens secundum eos, quia dicunt 'esse exsistentiae dicere respectum ad causam efficientem ut efficiens est' (et illud est 'esse' novum, per creationem), et tamen iste respectus est in creatura in comparatione ad Deum; igitur non obstante aptitudinali relatione praecedente ut aptitudinalis est, potest actualis esse nova, tamquam alia ab illa aptitudinali. ƿ	16. This consequent seems in truth absurd, because then neither would there be a new essence nor would ‘anything absolute’ be new; for it is impossible that a foundation is new and the relation according to that foundation is eternal. And something impossible according to them follows, because then, since all things are ‘what they are’ with respect to God as to exemplar cause or efficient cause, it follows that all things are eternal and nothing is new (because if a respect is not new neither is the absolute [sc. on which it is founded] new), because a respect cannot be eternal without eternity of the foundation. It also seems especially unacceptable according to them that they say ‘the being of existence states a respect to the efficient cause as it is efficient’ (and it is a new ‘existence’, by creation), and yet this respect is in creatures in comparison to God; therefore notwithstanding the preceding aptitudinal relation as it is aptitudinal, there can be a new actual one, as being other than that aptitudinal one.
17 Praeterea, non potest esse eadem relatio nisi sit inter eadem extrema. Nunc autem intellectus divinus non tantum ab aeterno intellexit animam Antichristi ut possibilem pro tali tempore, antequam crearetur, sed intellexit eam ut actu exsistentem pro illo instanti creationis, istud autem 'intelligibile' videtur esse distinctum ab illo intelligibili, in ratione intelligibilis, quia videtur aliud intelligibile esse 'potentiale' et 'actuale' animae; ergo intellectio divina, quae unica est, potest habere ista pro obiectis distinctis unici actus, distincti secundum rationem, sicut possunt esse obiecta distincta duorum actuum intellectus nostri: et per consequens, intellectus divinus comparans se ad primum extremum 'ut creativum ad creabile' et ad aliud extremum 'ut creans ad creatum', videtur in essentia sua quasi producere duas relationes rationis ad distincta extrema, et ita relatio creativi et creantis non est una relatio rationis, sicut nec extrema - ad quae comparaturidem.	17. Further, the same relation cannot exist save between the same extremes. But now the divine intellect not only from eternity understood the soul of Antichrist as possible for such and such a time, before it was created, but also understood it as actually existing for that instant of creation; but this ‘intelligible thing’ seems to be distinct from that intelligible thing, in idea of being intelligible, because the being ‘potential’ and being ‘actual’ of the soul seem to be different intelligibles; therefore divine intellection, which is single, can have them for distinct objects of its single act, distinct in reason, just as they can be distinct objects of two acts of our intellect; and consequently, the divine intellect when comparing itself to the first extreme ‘as creative to creatable’ and to the other extreme ‘as creating to created’ seems to produce as it were in its essence two relations of reason to distinct extremes, and so the relation of creative to creating is not one relation of reason, just as neither are the extremes – to which it is compared – the same.
18 Confirmatur ista ratio: in quocumque genere, illud quod est in potentia, non est nisi 'secundum quid' tale; ergo non est simpliciter idem ei quod est actu tale, - et per consequens, si intelligatur hoc ut in potentia tale et illud ut in actu, erit 'aliud intelligibile' simpliciter. ƿ	18. There is a confirmation for this reason: in any genus, that which exists in potency is only such ‘in a certain respect’; therefore it is not simply the same as that which is actually such, – and consequently, if this thing be understood as such in potency and that thing as such in act, it will be ‘another intelligible’ simply.
19 Praeterea, quod dicitur de nova appellatione, videtur irrationabile, quia in quocumque eadem forma habet idem esse, videtur eodem modo posse appellari ab illa: quia enim forma talis est et in tali, ideo tale appellatur ab ipsa, et non e converso; ergo si relatio sit eadem et uniformiter ad creaturam ex parte Dei, non videtur quare non posset Deus semper ab ea uniformiter appellari.	19. Further, as to what is said about new appellation [n.11], it seems irrational, because anything in which the same form has the same being seems able to be named in the same way by it; for because such a form is in such a thing, therefore it is named such by it, and not conversely; therefore if the relation is the same and is uniform to creatures on the part of God, there seems no reason that God cannot always be uniformly named by it.
20 Contra illud quod dicitur ad secundam quaestionem, videtur quod illa quae ponuntur ibi conexa, non sint conexa: Primo quidem, quia si ponantur duo albissima, illa erunt perfecte similia (quod declaratur, quia modo perfecta similitudo et aequalitas est in personis divinis, et non tollitur perfectio similitudinis propter infinitatem fundamenti, sed magis ponitur); ergo ibi esset perfectissima similitudo, et tamen neutrum ordinaretur ad alterum ut a quo haberet perfectionem.	20. Against what is said to the second question [n.12], it seems that the things posited as connected there [sc. real relation and dependence] are not connected. First indeed, because if two things most white are posited, they will be perfectly alike (which is made clear by the fact that now there is perfect likeness and equality in the divine persons, and the perfection of likeness is not taken away because of the infinity of the foundation but rather is the more posited); therefore there would be the most perfect likeness there, and yet neither would be ordered to the other as that from which it had the perfection.
21 Si dicas quod natura specifica est perfectior in ambobus simul quam in altero tantum, - hoc non est 'unum illorum ordiƿnari ad alterum', quia unum illorum nullam perfectionem habet per hoc quod alterum est, sive natura sit perfectius in ambobus simul quam in altero, sive non.	21. If you say that a specific nature is more perfect in two than in either alone, – this is not ‘one of them being ordered to the other’, because one of them has no perfection by the fact that it is other, whether or not the nature exists more perfectly in both together than in one.
22 Praeterea, agens creatum naturale non agit in quantum est imperfectum, quia agere competit sibi in quantum est in actu (et 'agere' summe competit Deo), et tamen agens tale - in quantum sic agens - ponitur habere relationem realem ad effectum suum; ergo non est necesse omne relatum, in quantum tale, dependere realiter ad illud ad quod refertur: licet enim agens creatum ad aliquid dependeat, non tamen videtur dependere ad aliquid quod ab eo causatur, nec in quantum potentiale et imperfectum et mutabile causat illud, sed in quantum in actu.	22. Further, a natural created agent does not act insofar as it is imperfect, because to act belongs to it insofar as it is in act (and ‘to act’ belongs supremely to God), and yet such an agent – insofar as it is thus agent – is posited to have a real relation to its effect; therefore there is no need that every related thing, insofar as it is such, depend really on that to which it is referred; for although a created agent depends on something, yet it does not seem to depend on something which is caused by it, nor insofar as it is potential and imperfect and changeable does it cause it, but insofar as it is in act.
23 Praeterea, si a, in quantum refertur ad b, realiter dependet ad ipsum, pari ratione (si relationes sint mutuae) b dependebit ab a in quantum refertur ad a, et ita erit dependentia circularis a ad b, et e converso, - quod videtur impossibile, quia in nullo ordine essentiali est circulus.	23. Further, if a, insofar as it is referred to b, really depends on it, by parity of reasoning (if the relations are mutual) b will depend on a insofar as it is referred to a, and so the dependence will be circular, a on b and conversely – which seems impossible, because in no essential order is there a circle.
24 Aliter dicitur ad primam quaestionem quod in Deo non est aliqua relatio ex tempore ad creaturam, sed in sola creatura ƿest relatio ex tempore ad Deum, - et sic illa relatio qua Deus dicitur ad creaturam, est tantum in creatura, et non in Deo. Quod videtur accipi ab Augustino cap. praeallegato et a Magistro hic in littera. Et ad secundam quaestionem dicitur quod nulla relatio talis potest esse realis, quia relatio realis non est sine ordine; Deus non habet ordinem realem ad creaturam, quia est supra ordinem.	24. It is said in another way [Richard of Middleton] to the first question [n.1] that in God there is not any relation to creatures from time, but in the creature alone there is a relation to God from time, – and thus the relation by which God is said with respect to the creature is only in the creature, and not in God. Which seems to be taken from Augustine in the cited chapter [nn.11, 4] and from the Master here in the text. And to the second question [n.5] it is said that no such relation can be real, because a real relation is not without order; God has no real order to creatures, because he is above order.
25 Contra primum: Quia tunc relatio esset in eo in quo non est fundamentum; ƿfundamentum enim relationis qua Deus dicitur ad creaturam (si dicatur ad eam), non est in creatura, sed in Deo; ergo relatio illa non erit in creatura.	25. Against the first [n.24]: Because then relation would be in that in which there is no foundation; for the foundation of the relation by which God is said with respect to the creature (if he is so said) is not in the creature but in God; therefore that relation will not be in the creature.
26 Praeterea, oppositae relationes causae et causati non possunt esse in eodem, quia magis repugnant quam relatio producentis et producti, - quae tamen non possunt esse in eodem supposito, licet sint in eadem natura.	26. Further, the opposite relations of cause and caused cannot exist in the same thing, because they are more repugnant than the relations of producer and produced, – which however cannot exist in the same supposit, although they are in the same nature.
27 Et si dicas quod hic sunt relationes oppositae in eodem supposito, non tamen denominant ipsum, - hoc videtur omnino irrationabile, quod aliqua forma sit in aliquo subiecto et tamen subiectum non possit dici tale quale natum est constitui per illam formam.	27. And if you say that here the opposite relations are in the same supposit but do not denominate it, – this seems altogether irrational, that some form is in some subject and the subject cannot be said to be of the sort that that is which is of a nature to be constituted by the form.
28 Responsio quae ponitur ad secundam quaestionem, videtur petere principium et peccare secundum consequens. Probatio primi, quia cum Deus sit prior creatura multiplici primitate, - extendendo nomen 'ordinis' non tantum quod posterius dicatur ordinatum ad prius, sed etiam prius ad posterius ƿ(licet alio modo), oporteret probare quod ista prioritas (quae potest dici 'ordo') non sit relatio realis in Deo; hoc ergo petitur. Nec sequitur ex isto noto 'quod Deus est supra ordinem', accipiendo ordinem prout est posteriorum ordinatorum ad prius; ex hoc enim non sequitur nisi 'quod non sit posterius', et ex hoc non sequitur quod non habeat ordinem, generaliter accipiendo ordinem.	28. The response that is given to the second question [n.24] seems to beg the question and to be a fault in the consequent. Proof of the first, that since God is prior to the creature with a multiple priority – extending the name of ‘order’ so that not only is a posterior said to be ordered to a prior but also a prior to a posterior (although in a different way), one must prove that this priority (which can be called order) is not a real relation in God; this point therefore is begged. Nor does it follow from the known fact ‘that God is above order’, taking order as it is of posterior things ordered to a prior; for from this there only follows ‘that he is not posterior’, and from this it does not follow that he has no order, taking order generally.
29 Quod autem ratio peccet secundum consequens, probatur, quia ordo est quaedam relatio; non autem omnis relatio est ordo (quia non 'relatio communis, fundata super unum', ut relationes aequiparantiae), sed solae relationes disquiparantiae dicunt ordinem. Arguendo ergo a negatione ordinis ad negationem relationis, est arguere ac si primo negaretur antecedens et postea consequens.	29. But that the argument is a fault in the consequent is proved by the fact that order is a certain relation; but not every relation is an order (because it is not the case ‘common relation, founded on one of them’, as with equivalent relations), but only nonequivalent relations state an order. Therefore by arguing from a negation of order to a negation of relation is to argue as if the antecedent were first denied and afterwards the consequent.
30 Respondeo ergo ad primam quaestionem quod relationes creaturarum ad Deum sunt novae et ex tempore, nec propter illas in quantum sunt ad Deum 'ut ad terminum' necesse est ponere aliquas relationes in Deo ex tempore, terminantes istas.	30. I respond therefore to the first question [n1] that the relations of creatures to God are new and from time, nor is there need, because of them, insofar as they are related to God ‘as to their term’, to posit any relations in God from time to be their term.
31 Quod probo: Primo, quia secundum Philosophum, V Metaphysicae cap. ƿ'De ad aliquid', tertio modo dicuntur relativa, quae dicuntur 'ad aliquid' quia alia sunt eorum, - ita quod haec est per se differentia duorum primorum modorum a tertio, quod in primis duobus est relatio mutua, in tertio autem non est relatio mutua, sed alterum praecise refertur ad reliquum, et reliquum non refertur sed tantum est aliquid eius; omnes autem relationes creaturae ad Deum pertinent ad tertium modum relativorum; ergo qualescumque sunt illae quae sunt in uno extremo, non oportet alterum extremum - secundum aliquam relationem in eo - terminare relationes illas, sed potest terminare praecise sub ratione absoluti.	31. I prove it thus: First, because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.15.1021a26-30 ‘About relation’, relatives in the third mode are called those that are said ‘to something’ because other things belong to them, – so that this is the per se difference of the two first modes from the third, that in the first two the relation is mutual, but in the third it is not mutual, but one of the relatives is referred precisely to the other and the other is not referred but is only something of it; but all relations of creatures to God pertain to the third mode of relatives; therefore of whatever sort those are which are in one extreme, there is no need for the other extreme – according to some relation in it – to be the term of those relations, but it can be the term precisely under the idea of an absolute.
32 Et istud etiam probatur ex intentione Philosophi IX Metaphysicae cap. 7, ubi probat quod 'actus est prior potentia, definitione, quia potentia definitur per actum'; Si autem actus referretur ad potentiam, tunc - e converso - etiam actus definiretur per potentiam, sicut dicit Porphyrius in cap. 'De speƿcie', quod in relativis mutuis ((necesse est in utrorumque rationibus utrorumque rationes poni)).	32. And this is also proved from the intention of the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.8.1049b12-17, where he proves that ‘act is prior to power in definition, because power is defined by act’; but if act were referred to power, then – conversely – act would also be defined by power, as Porphyry says Book of Predicables ch.3 ‘About species’, because in mutual relatives “the ideas of both must be posited in the ideas of both.”
33 Tunc arguitur: actus definit potentiam ut terminat relationem; aut ergo terminat relationem eius ut absolutum, et habetur propositum, - aut ut correlativum, et sic potentia definiet actum; ergo ut actus est 'prior' definitione, est 'posterior' definitione!	33. Then the argument goes: act defines power as it is the term of the relation; either then it is term of the relation as an absolute, and the intended conclusion is gained, – or as a correlative, and thus power will define act; therefore as act is ‘prior’ in definition it is ‘posterior’ in definition!
34 Ergo ita definit actus potentiam, quod e converso non definitur per ipsam, et per consequens actus non refertur ad potentiam, sed est mere absolutum, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua definit potentiam; definit autem potentiam, in quantum potentia est ad ipsum ut relatio ad terminum; ergo actus, secundum quod mere absolutum 'quid' est, est terminus huius relationis, qualiscumque sit illa relatio, sive simpliciter sive secundum quid.	34. Therefore act so defines power that it is not conversely defined by it, and consequently act is not referred to power but is a pure absolute, and this under the idea under which it defines power; but it defines power insofar as power is to it as a relation to a term; therefore act, according as it is a pure absolute ‘something’, is the term of this relation, whatever the relation be, whether simply so or in a certain respect.
35 Hoc etiam probatur generalius per omnia relativa, quia nullum relativum refertur primo ad correlativum ut ad terminum, in creaturis. Probatio: relativum, in quantum relativum, primo definitur per terminum ad quem refertur, - ergo terminus 'ut terminus' est prior definitione relativo ut relativum. Consequentia patet ex VII Metaphysicae, ubi Philosophus comparat accidens ad substantiam, - et per ipsum IX Metaphysicae, ubi comparat potentiam ad actum. ƿ	35. This is also more generally proved by all relatives, because no relative is referred first to the correlative as to a term in the case of creatures. Proof: a relative, insofar as it is relative, is first defined by the term to which it is referred, – therefore the term ‘as term’ is prior in definition to the relative as relative. The inference is plain from Metaphysics 7.4.1030b4-7, where the Philosopher compares accident to substance – and from him Metaphysics 9.8.1049b12-17, where he compares potency to act.
36 Si ergo terminus, in quantum terminus, referatur ad relatum in quantum fuit relatum, ergo 'in quantum terminus' respiciet relatum pro definiente, et per consequens pro priore secundum definitionem; ergo pater esset prior filio secundum definitionem, et e converso. Impossibile est autem circulum esse in prioritate essentiali quacumque, ergo impossibile est patrem referri primo ad filium in quantum filius refertur ad patrem. Ergo refertur ad illud absolutum primo, quod est proximum fundamentum relationis (scilicet filiationis), et illud absolutum est prius patre ut pater; et e converso, filius 'ut filius' refertur ad absolutum quod est proximum fundamentum paternitatis, et illud absolutum prius est filiatione, et filio in quantum filius.	36. If then the term, insofar as it is term, is referred to the related thing insofar as it was related, then ‘insofar as it is term’ it will have regard to the related thing for definition, and consequently for what is prior according to definition; therefore father would be prior to son in definition and conversely. But it is impossible for there to be a circle in any essential priority whatever, therefore it is impossible for father to be referred first to son insofar as son is referred to father. Therefore it is referred first to the absolute that is the proximate foundation of the relation (namely of filiation), and the absolute is prior to the father as father; and conversely, son ‘as son’ is referred to the absolute which is the proximate foundation of paternity, and the absolute is prior to filiation and to son insofar as it is son.
37 Nec secundum hoc est circulus aliquis, ut quod patre 'in quantum pater' prius sit a (quod est 'absolutum' et proximum fundamentum filiationis), et quod filiatione 'in quantum filiatio' prius sit b (quod est proximum fundamentum relationis paternitatis). Ex hoc enim non sequitur nisi quod ista duo absoluta sunt ƿpriora duabus relationibus, et hoc verum est; immo ambo absoluta sunt priora utraque relatione, quia quaelibet relatio praeexigit non tantum fundamentum, sed etiam terminum ut terminus est. Sic ergo, quando sunt relationes mutuae; accidit tamen ibi termino, in quantum terminus est, ut e converso referatur. Possibile est ergo aliquid referri ad absolutum, - et ita videtur hoc rationabile ponere in Deo, qui maxime habet rationem absoluti ut creaturae sunt ad eum.	37. Nor is there because of this any circle, as that to the father ‘insofar as he is father’ a should be prior (which is an ‘absolute’ and the proximate foundation of filiation), and that to filiation ‘insofar as it is filiation’ b should be prior (which is the proximate foundation of the relation of paternity). For from this there only follows that these two absolutes are prior to two relations, and this is true; nay both absolutes are prior to each relation, because any relation pre-requires not only the foundation but also the term as it is term. Thus therefore is how things are when the relations are mutual; but it happens there to the term, as it is term, that it is conversely referred. It is possible therefore for something to be referred to an absolute, – and so it seems reasonable to posit this in God, who most of all has the idea of an absolute as creatures are related to him.
38 Praeterea, licet intellectus possit negotiari circa terminum alicuius relationis tertii modi et in illo termino causare relationem rationis, tamen illa non est ratio terminandi: licet enim intellectus aliquis conferat quadraturam circuli ad scientiam, causando in illo absoluto relationem rationis quae est scibilitas, tamen illa non est ratio terminandi relationem scientiae ad ipsum; ista enim relatio rationis non est in hoc absoluto nisi ut actu consideratur ab intellectu, scientia autem realiter refertur ad illud, non tantum ut consideratur ab intellectu; ergo illa relatio rationis in scibili non fuit ratio terminandi relationem scientiae.	38. Further, although the intellect could busy itself about the term of some relation of the third mode [n.31] and cause a relation of reason in that term, yet that is not a reason for being the term; for although some intellect confer the squaring of the circle on science, causing in that absolute the relation of reason which is knowability, yet that is not a reason for terminating the relation of reason to it; for this relation of reason is not in this absolute save as actually considered by the intellect, but science is really referred to it, not merely as it is considered by the intellect; therefore the relation of reason in the knowable was not the reason for terminating the relation of the science.
39 Hoc etiam potest declarari in proposito de Deo, quia licet essentia divina possit comparari ad creaturam, et hoc tam per actum intellectus creati quam increati, et sic in ea causare reƿlationem rationis, tamen illa non erit ratio terminandi relationem creaturae ad ipsum. Non quidem illa quae causatur per actum intellectus creati: probatio, quia tunc nullo intellectu creato considerante, comparando Deum ad lapidem (si Deus produceret lapidem), non esset in lapide relatio realis ad ipsum, quia nec in Deo relatio rationis quae esset ratio terminandi relationem realem lapidis ad ipsum; consequens est falsum. Ergo nec etiam illa quam causat intellectus divinus in essentia sua: probatio, quia si per impossibile Deus non esset natura intellectualis (sicut aliqui dixerunt, ponentes solem esse primum principium) et produceret lapidem, lapis realiter referretur ad Deum et tamen tunc non esset relatio rationis in Deo ad ipsum.	39. This can also be made clear in the issue at hand about God, because although the divine essence can be compared to creatures, and this through an act both of the created intellect and of the uncreated intellect, and so this act can cause in the essence a relation of reason, yet it will not be the reason for terminating the relation of creatures to it. Certainly not the one that is caused by act of the created intellect; proof, because then, when no created intellect was considering, by comparing God to a stone (if God were to produce a stone) there would not be in the stone a real relation to him, because neither is there a relation of reason in God which would be the reason for terminating the real relation of the stone to him; the consequent is false. Therefore also not that one either that the divine intellect causes in its own essence; proof, because if per impossibile God were not an intellectual nature (as some have said, positing that the sun is the first principle [Wisdom 13.1-2]) and he were to produce a stone, the stone would be really referred to God and yet then there would be no relation of reason in God to it.
40 Absolute ergo dico quod, propter terminationem relationum in creaturis ex tempore ad Deum, non oportet ponere aliquam relationem in Deo, nec novam nec antiquam, quae sit ratio terminandi relationem creaturae.	40. Absolutely then I say that, because of the termination of relations in creatures from time to God, there is no need to posit any relation in God, neither new nor old, which might be the reason for terminating the relation of the creature.
41 Potest tamen in Deo poni aliqua relatio rationis, nova quidem, sicut illa quae causatur in eo per actum intellectus nostri considerantis ipsum, sed non nova aliqua per actum intellectus sui. Quod probo, quia numquam est transitus a contradictorio in contradictorium sine mutatione: si enim nulla esset mutatio in ƿaliquo, non esset ratio quare magis unum contradictoriorum posset esse nunc verum quam reliquum, nec quare magis aliud falsum quam illud, et ita ambo simul falsa vel ambo simul vera; sed si in Deo posset esse nova relatio per actum intellectus sui, alicuius contradictionis alterum extremum modo esset verum de aliquo, quod prius non erat verum; ergo aliqua mutatio in aliquo. Non in essentia divina ut cognita, - nec in obiecto considerato, quia nondum est. Nec in aliquo ad quod comparatur per intellectum suum, nisi ponatur mutatio in ipso intellectu comparante: quia, sicut obiectum comparatum et illud ad quod comparatur - in quantum talia - non habent aliud esse nisi in intelligi, ita non possunt habere aliud esse nec aliter esse, nisi sit aliud intelligi vel aliter intelligi eorum; si autem diversum intelligi vel aliter intelligi eorum non potest esse sine aliqua mutatione intellectus divini, ergo nulla relatio potest esse nova in Deo, per actum intellectus sui comparando essentiam suam ad aliquod temporale. Sed istud non est propter hoc quod relatio actualis et potentialis sunt una (sicut dixit prima opinio improbata), sed propter hoc quod intellectus divinus - ad quodcumque comparat essentiam suam - in aeternitate comparat, licet non pro aeternitate; unde sicut in aeterƿnitate comparat voluntatem suam 'ut creativam' ad animam Antichristi ut possibilem pro aliquo tempore, ita comparat in aeternitate voluntatem suam 'ut creantem' ad animam Antichristi ut actualiter exsistentem pro illo nunc pro quo vult creare illam animam: et istae quidem sunt duae relationes rationis, sicut sunt duo extrema, - sed utraque aeterna, licet non pro aeterno.	41. Yet there can be posited in God some relation of reason, new indeed, as that which is caused in him by act of our intellect when considering him, but not any new one by act of his own intellect. Which I prove because never is there passage from contradictory to contradictory without change; for if there were no change in anything, there would be no reason why one of the contradictories could now be true rather than the other, nor why one should be false rather than the other, and so both are false at the same time and true at the same time; but if in God there could be a new relation by act of his own intellect, one extreme of some contradiction would now be true about something which before was not true; therefore there is some change in something. Not in the divine essence as known, – nor in the object considered, because it does not yet exist. Nor in anything to which it is compared by his own intellect, unless change is posited in the intellect itself when comparing; because, as the object compared and that to which it is compared – insofar as they are such – do not have another being save in being understood, so they cannot have another being or exist in another way unless something else is understood of them or understood in another way; but if something different being understood of them or being differently understood is impossible without some change of the divine intellect, then no relation can be new in God by act of his own intellect comparing his essence to something temporal. But this is not for this reason, that an actual and a potential relation are one (as the first rejected opinion said [nn.11, 15-19]), but for this reason, that the divine intellect – whatever it compares its essence to – compares in eternity, although not for eternity; hence just as in eternity he compares his will ‘as creative’ to the soul of Antichrist as possible for a certain time, so he compares in eternity his will ‘as creating’ to the soul of Antichrist as actually existing for the now for which he wishes to create that soul; and these indeed are two relations of reason, as they are two extremes, – but each is eternal, although not for eternity.
42 Et ex hoc apparet responsio ad istam obiectionem: 'Si nulla potest esse relatio nova in Deo per actum intellectus sui, ergo si nullus intellectus creatus esset possibilis et Deus posset creare lapidem, non posset intelligere se creantem lapidem, sicut intellectus creatus potest intelligere ipsum modo creantem lapidem, quando ipsum creat; consequens videtur inconveniens, quia quidquid est cognoscibile a nobis, multo magis et ab ipso'. - Respondeo: Deus posset cognoscere se creantem lapidem pro a; sed non posset noviter cognoscere se creantem lapidem, sed in aeternitate cognosceret se pro a creantem lapidem sicut in aeternitate cognoscit se pro aliquo tempore creativum lapidis. Hoc est dictu, in aeternitate cognoscit illam relationem actualem eius ad illud pro a, sicut et cognoscit relationem sui quasi potentialem - rationis tamen - ad illud pro aliquo tempore.	42. From this is apparent the response to this objection: ‘If there can be no new relation in God by act of his own intellect, then if no created intellect were possible and God could create a stone, he could not understand himself creating a stone as a created intellect can understand him now creating a stone, when he does create it; the consequent appears unacceptable, because whatever is knowable by us is much more knowable also by him’. – I reply: God could know himself creating a stone at time a; but he could not newly know himself creating a stone, but in eternity he would know himself creating a stone at time a just as in eternity he knows himself to be at some time creative of a stone. This is to say, in eternity he knows the actual relation of it to that at time a, just as he also knows the quasi potential relation of himself to it – a relation of reason, however – at some time.
43 Breviter ergo patet quod nulla est relatio nova in Deo, per se ƿterminans relationem novam creaturae; est tamen aliqua nova per actum intellectus creati, nulla autem per actum intellectus sui.	43. In brief I say that it is plain there is no new relation in God, per se terminating a new relation of a creature; there is however some new relation by act of a created intellect, but none by act of his own intellect.
44 Sed tunc primum membruml videtur dubium, quomodo ponatur Deus esse dominus, - secundum Augustinum V Trinitatis cap. ultimo. Respondeo: sola relatione nova, quae est in creatura ad ipsum, ipse denominatur 'dominus'; non quidem quod in creaturis sint duae relationes oppositae (quarum altera ipse denominetur), sed una tantum, quae est ad ipsum ut ad absolutum. Et propter hoc quod 'sicut absolutum' est terminus illius relationis, denominatur quasi esset in eo relatio nova, correspondens, - quemadmodum opus factum ab homine dicitur 'humanum', non propter aliquid humanitatis quae sit formaliter in opere, sed propter humanitatem quae est formaliter in homine, ad quem opus habitudinem habet.	44. But then the first member [n.43] seems doubtful, as to how God is to be posited as lord, – according to Augustine On the Trinity V ch.16 n.17 [above, n.4]. I reply: by the sole new relation that is in the creature to him is he denominated ‘lord’; not indeed that in creatures there are two opposite relations [sc. of lord and servant] (by one of which God is denominated [n.24]), but there is one relation only [sc. of servant], which is to God as he is absolute. And for this reason, because ‘as absolute’ he is the term of that relation, he is denominated as if there were in him a new relation, namely the corresponding one [sc. lord], – in the way that a work made by a man is called ‘human’, not because of something of humanity that is formally in the work, but because of the humanity that is formally in man, to whom the work has a disposition.
45 Et haec videtur intentio Magistri expresse in littera, concludentis hoc ex verbis Augustini. Ait enim sic: ((Appellatio qua creatura relative ad creatorem dicitur, relativa est, et relationem notat quae est in ipsa creatura; appellatio autem illa qua ƿcreator dicitur ad creaturam, relativa quidem est, sed nullam notat relationem quae sit in creatore)); et hoc idem videtur Augustinus dicere V De Trinitate cap. 19, secundum quod Magister adducit eum: ((Quod temporaliter incipit dici Deus quod antea non dicebatur, manifestum est relative dici, non tamen secundum accidens Dei (quod ei aliquid acciderit), sed plane secundum accidens eius ad quod dici incipit Deus relative)).	45. And this seems to be the intention of the Master expressly in the text [d.30 ch.1 n.264], when he concludes this from the words of Augustine. For he speaks thus: “The appellation by which a creature is said relatively to the creator is relative, and it indicates the relation that is in the creature itself; but the appellation by which the creator is said relatively to the creator is relative indeed, but it indicates no relation that is in the creator;” and this same thing is what Augustine seems to say On the Trinity V [nn.4, 11, 24, 44], as the Master adduces him: “That God begins in time to be called what he was not called before is manifestly relatively said, not however according to an accident of God (because something has happened to him), but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins relatively to be said.”
46 Ad argumenta. Ad primum: concedo quod quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum per identitatem; sed non oportet quod quidquid praedicatur de Deo, per hoc quod aliud habet habitudinem ad ipsum sit aeternum formaliter, quia nec aliud habet aeternam habitudinem ad ipsum, - sicut si Deus sit aeternus et dilectus temporaliter a voluntate creata, dicitur quidem dilectus a nobis, sed non 'dilectus aeternaliter'.	46. To the arguments [nn.1-3]. To the first [n.1]: I concede that whatever is in God is eternal by identity; but it is not necessary that whatever is predicated of God, by the fact that something else has a disposition to him, is eternal formally, because nothing else has an eternal disposition to him – just as if God is eternal and loved in time by a created will, he is indeed said to be loved by us but not ‘loved eternally’.
47 Ad secundum: consequentia non tenet, quia quando extrema sunt alterius rationis, propter hoc quod unum excedit alterum non oportet esse similem coexsistentiam unius ad alterum et e converso, - sicut non sequitur 'quodcumque aeternum est cum toto tempore, ergo omne temporale est cum tota aeternitate'; ƿprima enim est vera ratione immensitatis aeternitatis, et illud deficit in altero extremo, - et ideo non oportet esse concomitantiam e converso, qualis est hic. Ita hic, aeternum potest esse terminus novae habitudinis ad ipsum (quia aeternaliter exsistens potest aliquid de novo producere), et potest de eo aliqua appellatio dici ex tempore, sed temporale non ita potest habere habitudinem alicuius aeterni ad ipsum; vel potest concedi quod temporale etiam potest denominari ab habitudine aeterni ad ipsum, - sicut lapis, non tantum ut ideabilis sed ut exsistens, est aeternaliter scitus a Deo.	47. To the second [n.2]: the consequence does not hold, because when extremes are of different ideas, then, on account of the fact that one extreme exceeds the other, there is no need for there to be a like coexistence of one with the other and conversely, – just as this inference does not hold, ‘whatever is eternal is with the whole of time, therefore everything temporal is with the whole of eternity’; for the first part is true by reason of the immensity of eternity, and that is lacking in the other extreme, – and so there is no need for concomitance conversely, of the sort there is in the above inference. So here, the eternal can be the term of a new disposition to it (because what eternally exists can produce something de novo), and some appellation can be said of him from time, but the temporal cannot thus have the disposition of something eternal to him; or one can concede that the temporal too can be denominated from the disposition of something eternal to him, – as a stone, not only as ideational but as existing, is eternally known by God.
48 Ad tertium: 'fieri', non determinatum per aliquid (puta quando praedicatur secundum adiacens), notat factionem simpliciter eius de quo dicitur, - ut si dicatur 'homo fit', notatur factio simpliciter inesse homini; si autem praedicatur tertium adiacens, sicut 'homo fit albus', non notatur fieri nisi secundum aliquid eius, scilicet quod specificat ipsum. Et ita concederet forte aliquis quod Deus fit dominus notando factionem 'secundum quid', puta factionem secundum aliquam relationem rationis vel secundum terminationem alicuius relationis; magis tamen conceditur quod incipit esse dominus, quia hoc non significat imperfectionem sicut 'fieri': nullo tamen modo conceditur, nec 'fieri' nec incipere', absolute. ƿ	48. To the third [n.3]: ‘to come to be’, not determined through anything (namely when it is predicated according to something added to it [sc. ‘comes to be white’]), does not indicate the making simply of that of which it is said, – as that, if it be said ‘man comes to be’, making is indicated to be simply present in man; but if an adjacent third thing is predicated, as ‘man comes to be white’, coming to be is not indicated save according to something of him, namely what specifies him. And so someone might perhaps concede that God comes to be lord by indicating a making ‘in a certain respect’, namely a making according to some relation of reason or according to the termination of some relation; what however is conceded rather is that he begins to be lord, because this does not signify imperfection as ‘comes to be’ does; however in no way, either ‘comes to be’ or ‘begins’, is it conceded absolutely.
49 Ad secundam quaestionem respondeo quod in Deo non est aliqua relatio realis ad creaturam.	49. To the second question [n.5] I respond that in God there is not any real relation to creatures.
50 Cuius ratio accipitur ex perfecta simplicitate et ex perfecta necessitate Dei: quia enim Deus perfecte simplex est, nihil est in eo quod non est ipsum (secundum Augustinum XI De civitate Dei cap. 10: ((Deus simplex est, quia hoc est quod habet))); perfecta etiam necessitas eius est ex se talis, quod non variabitur eius esse, quacumque hypothesi posita - sive possibili sive impossibili - circa aliud a se, quia alia non sunt necessaria nisi secundario.	50. The reason for this is taken from the perfect simplicity and perfect necessity of God: for because God is perfectly simple, there is nothing in him which is not him (according to Augustine City of God XI ch.10: “God is simple, because he is what he has”); also his perfect necessity is of itself such, because his being will not vary whatever hypothesis is laid down – whether possible or impossible – about anything other than himself, because other things are not necessary except secondarily.
51 Ex his sequitur quod nulla est in eo realitas quae necessario coexigat aliud a se: tale enim, necessario coexigens aliud a Deo, non esset illo coexacto non exsistente, et per consequens aliquid quod perfecte esset idem Deo, non esset, aliquo alio - quod non est necessarium ex se - non exsistente; relatio autem realis de necessitate coexigit ad suum 'esse' terminum illius relationis; ergo in Deo non est relatio realis ad aliud a se.	51. From this it follows that there is no reality in him which necessarily corequires anything other than himself; for such a thing, necessarily co-requiring something other than God, would not exist if that co-required thing does not exist, and consequently something that was perfectly the same as God would not exist when something else – which was not necessary of itself – does not exist; but a real relation of necessity corequires for its ‘being’ the term of the relation; therefore in God there is no relation to anything other than himself.
52 Contra istam rationem instatur: Primo, quia licet creatura non sit necessaria in esse actuali, tamen videtur quod 'aliud a Deo' sit necessarium in esse possibili, quia ipsum 'possibile esse' est necessarium (quod probatur ex hoc quod prius videtur aliquid possibile possibilitate eius in ƿse, quam relatio Dei ad ipsum, nam non est potentia in aliquo nisi respectu possibilis in se; ergo relatio ad creaturam 'in quantum possibilis' non coexigit aliquid quod non est sub illa ratione necessarium sub qua terminat); relatio autem in Deo ad creaturam 'ut possibilem' videtur esse eadem cum relatione eius ad creaturam ut actualem, per illam deductionem positam pro opinione prima ad primam quaestionem; ergo aliqua relatio potest esse in Deo - stante necessitate eius - simpliciter ad creaturam ut possibilem, et eadem etiam cum illa quae est ad creaturam ut actualem.	52. Against this reason instances are raised: First, because although the creature is not necessary in actual being, yet it seems that ‘something other than God’ is necessary in possible being, because the ‘possible being’ is necessary (which is proved by the fact that something seems possible by its possibility in itself before there is a relation of God to it, for there is no power in anything save with respect to something possible in itself; therefore a relation to a creature ‘insofar as it is possible’ does not co-require anything that is not necessary under the idea under which it is its term); but a relation in God to a creature ‘as possible’ seems to be the same as his relation to a creature as actual, by the deduction set down for the first opinion to the first question [n.11]; therefore there can be in God – while his necessity stands – some relation simply to creatures as possible, and the same relation as that which is to creatures as actual.
53 Item, si creatura habet esse quiditativum in quantum habet esse exemplatum (secundum unam opinionem), istud esse creaturae est necessarium; ergo respectus ad istud, ut sic, videtur posse esse absque possibilitate in eo in quo est talis respectus.	53. Again, if the creature has quidditative being insofar as it has exemplared being (according to one opinion), this being is necessary for the creature; therefore a respect to this being, as such, seems to be possible without possibility in that in which such respect is.
54 Item, si philosophi ponerent aliqua alia a Deo producta, formaliter necessaria (sicut dictum est de opinione Aristotelis et Avicennae distinctione 8), tunc respectus ad illa posset esse idem Deo et tamen posset stare necessitas entitatis divinae, eo quod terminus illius relationis secundum illam positionem esset necessarius; ergo tenendo positionem philosophorum, qui tamen negabant in Deo relationem realem, ista ratio iam posita (ex simplicitate et necessitate Dei) non videtur sufficiens. ƿ	54. Again, if the philosophers were to posit certain things produced by God as formally necessary (as was said about the opinion of Aristotle and Avicenna in distinction 8 nn.251-253, 255, 248, 242), then the respect to those things could be the same as God and yet the necessity of the divine could still stand, because of the fact that the term of the relation, according to the opinion, would be necessary; therefore, by holding the position of the philosophers who yet denied a real relation in God, the reasoning already set down (from the simplicity and necessity of God) does not seem sufficient.
55 Item, quarto: tunc in nulla creatura magis necessaria deberet poni respectus realis ad minus necessariam, et ita in corporibus caelestibus non esset respectus realis ad generabilia et corruptibilia.	55. Again, fourth: in that case there should not be posited in a more necessary creature a real respect to a less necessary creature, and so in the celestial bodies there should be no real respect to generable and corruptible things.
56 Ad ista. Licet ad duo prima possit responderi quasi uno modo (ad primum per hoc quod esse possibile non sit nisi esse secundum quid, et ideo ad ipsum non sit aliqua relatio simpliciter sed secundum quid, - et ad secundum simili modo, quod esse exemplatum non est esse nisi secundum quid, et ideo habitudo ad talem terminum non esset realis, sicut nec terminus est realis), tamen potest dici una responsione generali ad omnes istas instantias, quod necessarium ex se - ut dictum est - non mutabitur secundum aliquid perfecte idem sibi, quacumque positione possibili facta circa aliud a se; quidquid autem est in perfecte simplici, est idem sibi perfecte; ergo necessarium ex se secundum nihil in eo potest mutari, quocumque posito circa aliud. Nihil autem aliud a Deo est ita formaliter necessarium sicut ƿDeus, secundum quamcumque positionem, quia si poneretur aliquid aliud formaliter necessarium, non tamen sine omni dependentia ad primum necessarium, et ideo non ex se necessarium; ergo nulla realitas in primo mutabitur propter positionem quamcumque circa aliquod tale quod non est ex se formaliter necessarium: fieret autem aliqua mutatio in aliqua realitate in primo, propter mutationem in alio a se, si aliqua realitas in ipso necessario exigeret aliquid aliud a se.	56. To these objections [nn.52-55]. Although to the two first objections [nn.52-53] a response can be made in more or less a single way (to the first by the fact that possible being is only being in a certain respect, and therefore there is no relation to it simply but in a certain respect, – and to the second in like manner, that exemplared being is only being in a certain respect, and therefore the disposition to such term would not be real, just as neither is the term real), yet one can say with one general response to all these instances, that the necessary of itself – as was said [n.50] – will not change according to anything perfectly the same as itself, whatever possible position is constructed about what is other than it; but whatever is in the perfectly simple is the same as it perfectly; therefore the necessary of itself cannot be changed according to anything that is in it, whatever is posited about something else. But nothing other than God is as formally necessary as God, according to any position, because if something else formally necessary were posited, it would not be without all dependence on the first necessary, and so would not be of itself necessary; therefore no reality in the first will change because of any position about anything of such a sort that it is not of itself formally necessary; but some change could come to be in some reality in the first because of a change in something other than itself, if some reality in it necessarily required something other than itself.
57 Et tunc ad duas instantias, de potentiali et esse quiditativo (secundum aliquos), respondeo quod nec illud 'possibile' est ex se necessarium in tali esse - etiam necessarium possibile - sicut Deus ex se est actus necessarius; sic etiam nec illae quiditates sunt ex se necessariae in illo esse quiditativo, sed per participationem sunt sic necessario entes; nec tertio, creaturae - si essent necessariae (secundum philosophos) - essent ita necessariae sicut primum, sed haberent necessitatem tantum participatam. Et ideo ponere ista non esse, non esset ita impossibile sicut aliquam realitatem in primo non esse (quia nullum istorum est ita necessarium sicut quaecumque realitas in primo est necessaria), ƿet tamen ex positione 'minus impossibilis' videretur sequi impossibilius! Non ergo ad aliquod istorum, licet aliquo modo necessarium (non tamen ex se necessarium), posset esse aliqua realitas in necessario ex se.	57. And next to the two instances about potential and quidditative being (according to some) I reply [nn.52-54] that neither is the ‘possible’ of itself necessary in such being – even a necessary possible – in the way God is of himself necessary act; thus too neither are those quiddities of themselves necessary in their quidditative being, but they are necessary beings thus by participation; nor, third, would creatures – if they were necessary (according to the philosophers [n.54]) – be as necessary as the first, but they would have only a participated necessity. And so to posit that they do not exist would not be as impossible as that some reality in the first does not exist (because none of them is as necessary as any reality in the first is necessary), and yet from positing ‘the less impossible’ something more impossible would seem to follow! Therefore there could not be as regard any of these things, although they are in some sense necessary (though not of themselves necessary), any reality in that which is necessary of itself.
58 Ad quartum dico quod si aliquid 'magis necessarium' esset etiam simplex (hoc est non compositum, nec componibile cum alia realitate non necessaria), magis necessarium esset cum non haberet respectum extra se ad minus necessarium; sed istud suppositum est falsum, quia licet aliquod corpus caeleste poneretur in se esse necessarium, non tamen est simplex quin possit recipere aliquam realitatem non necessariam aliam a se: Deus autem, sicut non potest esse illud quod est in ordine ad aliquid non ex se necessarium, ita non potest habere aliquam realitatem in ordine ad aliquid tale, quia illa realitas esset ipsum.	58. To the fourth [n.55] I say that if something ‘more necessary’ were also simple (that is, not composite, nor combinable with any non-necessary reality), the more necessary would exist when it does not have a respect outside itself to the less necessary; but this supposition is false, because although some celestial body were posited to be in itself necessary, yet it is not a simple that could not receive any non-necessary reality other than itself; but God, just as he cannot be what exists in order to something not of itself necessary, so he cannot have any reality in order to such a thing, because that reality would be himself.
59 Ad argumenta de omnipotentia et omniscientia, et voluntate futurorum, dicetur in quaestionibus specialibus de eis.	59. As to the arguments about omnipotence and omniscience [n.5], and about willing future things [n.6], there will be discussion in the questions specific to them [I d.43 nn.6-14, d.35 nn.27-34, d.45 n.7].
60 Ad illud de actione et passione: Philosophus non dicit quod illae relationes sunt reales, sed dicit quod sunt muƿtuae; et in hoc praecise distinguuntur relationes in primo et secundo modo, a tertio modo relationis. Sed quidquid sit de dicto, propositio Philosophi non est de se vera quando agens est ex se necessarium et perfecte simplex, sicut dictum fuit in solvendo.	60. To the argument about action and passion [n.8]: the Philosopher does not say that those relations are real, but he says that they are mutual; and in this precisely are the relations in the first and second mode distinguished form the third mode of relation [n.31]. But however it may be with what he said, the position of the Philosopher is not of itself true when the agent is of itself necessary and perfectly simple, as was said when solving the point [nn.49-51].
61 Sed quaeres: quare ergo sunt relationes reales, quae fundantur super actionem et passionem in creaturis?	61. But you ask: why then are the relations real that are founded on action and passion in creatures?
62 Quamvis ad hoc non oporteat dicere propter solutionem argumenti, tamen dicitur quod hoc est verum in agente naturali, quia forma quam habet - qua est activum - naturaliter inclinatur ad effectum producendum; agens autem liberum non inclinatur naturaliter ex forma, quam habet, ad effectum, - et tunc, cum Deus sit agens libere, sequitur quod super actionem eius non fundetur relatio realis. ƿ	62. Although there is no need to speak to this point for the solution of the argument [n.8, 60], yet one can say that this is true in the case of a natural agent, because the form it has – whereby it is active – is naturally inclined to producing the effect; but a free agent is not naturally inclined to the effect from the form it has, – and then, since God is a free agent, it follows that on his action there is not founded a real relation.
63 Contra: Philosophi, concedentes Deum naturali necessitate producere res, negaverunt relationem realem eius ad ipsas; ergo illa non est praecisa ratio.	63. On the contrary: The philosophers, when conceding that God produces things by natural necessity, denied a real relation of him to them [n.54]; therefore that [n.62] is not the precise reason.
64 Similiter, voluntas creata videtur habere relationem realem ad suum effectum, licet sit libera.	64. Likewise, a created will seems to have a real relation to its effect, although it is free.
65 Praeterea, effectus sua entitate absoluta non necessario requirit causam proximam (posset enim eadem entitas absoluta esse a causa remota), et tamen quando producitur a causa proxima, habet relationem realem ad eam; ergo non requiritur ad relationem realem quod natura illa absoluta, in qua fundatur, necessario inclinetur ex se ad alterum extremum.	65. Further, an effect does not by its absolute entity necessarily require a proximate cause (for the same absolute entity could be from a remote cause), and yet when it is produced by its proximate cause it has a real relation to it; therefore there is not required for a real relation that the absolute nature, on which it is founded, be necessarily inclined of itself to one of the two extremes.
66 Item, similitudo duorum alborum est relatio realis in eis, et tamen unum album, praecise consideratum in quantum est fundamentum relationis, non videtur inclinari ex entitate sua (qua est fundamentum) ad alterum extremum, - maxime, summa albedo, si ponatur ad aliam albedinem summam, sicut argutum fuit contra primum argumentum suum ad istam quaestionem.	66. Again, the likeness of two white things is a real relation in them, and yet one white thing, precisely considered insofar as it is the foundation of the relation, does not seem inclined of its entity (whereby it is the foundation) to one of the two extremes – especially a supreme whiteness, if it is posited in relation to another supreme whiteness, as was argued against his [Henry’s] first argument to this question [nn.12, 20].
67 Item, si ante relationem realem semper oportet ponere in fundamento inclinationem naturalem ad terminum, ergo ante relationem realem est relatio realis, quia inclinatio ad alterum est relatio realis! ƿ	67. Again, if it is always necessary, before there is a real relation, to posit in the foundation a natural inclination to the term, then there is a real relation before the real relation, because the inclination to another is a real relation!
68 Ideo breviter: Non videtur necessarium ad relationem realem quod illud absolutum quod est fundamentum illius relationis, ex se inclinetur ad reliquum, sed quod ipsum sit tale quod posito termino, ad ipsum et ad terminum consequatur talis habitudo ex natura extremorum, - et tunc quod omne agens creatum tale est, quod aliquo posito effectu per ipsum, ad ipsum ut ad fundamentum et ad productum ut ad terminum consequitur habitudo eorum.	68. Therefore in brief: It does not seem necessary for a real relation that the absolute thing which is the foundation of the relation be inclined of itself to the remaining thing, but that it be such that, when the term is posited, there follow on it and on the term such disposition from the nature of the extremes, – and then that every created agent is such that, when some effect is posited to exist through it, the disposition of them follow on it as on the foundation and on the product as on the term.
69 Ratio autem quare relatio realis consequitur, non est nisi quia hoc est hoc et illud est illud: sicut ratio quare albedinem et albedinem - positas - consequitur relatio realis (ut 'similitudo'), non est nisi haec albedo et illa albedo; et quare binarium et ternarium - positos in esse - sequitur maioritas realis, non est alia ratio nisi quia hic est binarius et ille ternarius.	69. But the reason why a real relation follows is only because this is this and that is that; just as the reason why a real relation (as ‘likeness’) follows on whiteness and whiteness – once posited – is only this whiteness and that whiteness; and there is no other reason why a real greater-ness follows on double and triple – once posited in existence – than that this is double and that is triple.
70 Et tamen ratio potentialitatis in fundamento et termino potest assignari generalis causa, quare scilicet possit sequi habitudo realis: Quaecumque enim possunt esse partes alicuius totius, sunt ƿpotentialia ad formam illius totius, - et si possunt esse partes alicuius per se unius, possunt esse potentialia ad formam illam qua illud est per se unum (sicut patet de partibus corporis organici respectu animae intellectivae), et etiam, si possunt esse partes alicuius unius unitate ordinis, possunt esse potentialia ad formam illius, a qua illud 'totum' est unum secundum ordinem; et generaliter, patet propositio de potentialitate partium, secundum Philosophum V Metaphysicae, ubi vult quod sunt partes sicut materia, respectu totius. Omnia creata - quia limitata - nata sunt esse partes totius universi, quod est 'unum' unitate ordinis (sicut patet XII Metaphysicae), et ideo quodlibet illorum est potentiale ad istam formam quae est 'ordo', ut scilicet habeat ordinem ad aliam partem: et hoc vel secundum eminentiam quae est in naturis diversis in universo, vel secundum aequalitatem (quia ((ordo est rerum parium dispariumque)), secundum Augustinum De civitate), vel secundum actionem et passionem sive secundum causalitatem. Et ideo quodcumque agens creatum, pro ducens effectum, ita potentiale est quod ad ipsum et ad effectum productum potest consequi ordo inter ea. ƿNon sic autem potest ad agens illimitatum et eius effectum, quia illud agens illimitatum nec est potentiale ad formam absolutam nec ad relationem, propter eius infinitatem.	70. And yet the idea of potentiality in the foundation and the term can be assigned as the general cause, namely as to why a real disposition can follow: For whatever things can be parts of some whole are potentials for the form of the whole, – and if they can be parts of something per se one, they can be potentials for the form by which it is per se one (as is plain about the parts of the organic body with respect to the intellective soul), and also, if they can be parts of something that is one with unity of order, they can be potentials for its form, by which form the ‘whole’ is one in order; and generally, the proposition about the potentiality of parts is plain, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.2.1013b19-21, where he means that parts are like matter with respect to the whole. All created things – because they are limited – are of a nature to be parts of the whole universe, which is ‘one’ with unity of order (as is plain in Metaphysics 12.10.1075a16-19), and therefore any of them is potential for this form which is ‘order’, so as namely to have an order to another part; and this either according to the eminence which is in diverse natures in the universe, or according to equality (because “order is of things equal and unequal,” according to Augustine City of God XIX ch.13 n.1), or according to action and passion, or according to causality. And therefore any created agent, when producing an effect, is potential such that on it and on its produced effect an order among them can follow. But it cannot be thus as regard an unlimited agent and its effect, because the unlimited agent is potential neither to absolute form nor to relation, on account of its infinity.
71 Per idem potest responderi ad argumentum de quantitate, quia omne creatum 'quantum' - sive virtute sive mole - ad aliud 'quantum' etsi ponatur posse habere relationem realem (propter hoc quod ordo, a quo est unitas universi, potest attendi inter talia quanta), tamen quanti infiniti nulla potest esse habitudo realis ad quantum finitum.	71. One can reply through the same point to the argument about quantity [n.7] because every created quantity – whether in virtue or mass – even if it be posited to have a real relation to another quantity (because of the fact that the order, from which comes the unity of the universe, can exist between such quanta), yet there can be no real disposition of an infinite quantity to a finite one.
72 Et cum confirmatur ratio per aequalitatem, quae est relatio realis in creaturis et etiam in divinis, - respondeo quod in divinis est realis quia est habitudo ex natura rei, et stat cum simplicitate et necessitate relati in se quia non refertur ad aliud quod est minus necessarium formaliter quam ipsum relatum; in creaturis est relatio realis propter ipsam potentialitatem quantorum relatorum. Sed comparando illam quantitatem infinitam ad istam, utraque ratio destruitur, quia iam tollitur simplicitas et necessitas in uno extremo, et tollitur potentialitas et limitatio in altero.	72. And when a confirmation for the argument is given through equality, which is a real relation in creatures and even in divine reality [n.7], – I reply that in divine reality it is real because it is a disposition from the nature of the thing, and it stands together with the simplicity and necessity of the related thing in itself because it is not referred to another that is less necessary formally than the related thing itself; in creatures the relation is real because of the very potentiality of the related quantities. But when comparing the infinite quantity to this [finite] one, both reasons are destroyed, because then simplicity and necessity are taken away from one of the extremes, and potentiality and limitation are taken away from the other.
73 Ad aliud dico quod realitas aliquando determinat compositionem, et tunc nihil aliud est quam illud quod est vere, - sicut cum dicitur 'illa propositio realiter est falsa', hoc est 'vere est falsa'. Si autem realitas accipiatur prout adverbialiter determinat ƿpraedicatum, hic 'Deus est dominus realiter', - licet possit negari ista, tamen potest concedi secundum quod 'dominus' non notat relationem aliquam in Deo, sed secundum quod Deus terminat relationem realem creaturae, prout dictum est in praecedente quaestione.	73. To the other argument [n.9] I say that reality sometimes determines the composition [of a proposition], and then it means nothing other than that it is so truly, – as when it is said ‘that proposition is really false’ that is, ‘it truly is false’. But if reality is taken as it adverbially determines the predicate, here ‘God is really lord’, – although this proposition can be denied, yet it can be conceded according as ‘lord’ does not indicate any relation in God but according as God is the term of a real relation of the creature, as was said in the preceding question [n.44].