Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D31

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Thirty First Distinction Single Question Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem trigesimam primam quaero utrum identitas, similitudo et aequalitas sint relationes reales in Deo. Quod non: Augustinus V De Trinitate cap. 7: ((Quaerimus, secundum quid aequalis sit Patri Filius? Non secundum hoc quod ad Patrem dicitur, Filius est aequalis Patri; restat ergo ut secundum illud quod ad se dicitur, sit aequalis)); et infert: ((restat ergo ut secundum substantiam sit aequalis)). Ergo aequalitas non dicitur ibi secundum relationem.	1. About the thirty first distinction I ask whether identity, likeness, and equality are real relations in God. That they are not: Augustine On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: “We ask, according to what is the Father equal to the Son? Not because he is said to be to the Father is the Son equal to the Father; it remains then that he is equal according to what he is said to be to himself;” and he concludes: “it remains then that he is equal according to substance.” Therefore equality is not said there according to relation.
2 Praeterea, forma eiusdem speciei non numeratur nisi per materiam; probatio: omnis forma separata a materia, habet totam speciem, secundum aliquos. Ergo aequalitas in divinis, cum sit forma eiusdem rationis et sine materia, non plurificatur nec distinguitur: ergo non est alia aequalitas in Patre et in Filio, et per consequens ƿnon est realis in Patre, quia tunc requireret relationem distinctam correspondentem in Filio.	2. Further, a form of the same species is not multiplied in number save through matter; proof: every form separate from matter has the whole species, according to some. Therefore equality in divine reality, since it is a form of the same idea without matter, is not multiplied or distinguished; therefore there is not a different equality in the Father and in the Son, and consequently it is not real in the Father, because then it would require a corresponding distinct relation in the Son.
3 Praeterea, si in Patre est aequalitas alia ab aequalitate quae est in Filio, pari ratione et ab aequalitate quae est in Spiritu Sancto, et tunc aequalitati in Filio et aequalitati quae est in Spiritu Sancto correspondebit alia et alia aequalitas in Patre, quia correlativa commultiplicantur, ergo in Patre erunt duae aequalitates, quod videtur inconveniens.	3. Further, if equality in the Father is different from the equality that is in the Son, by parity of reasoning it is also different from the equality that is in the Holy Spirit – and then to the equality in the Son and to the equality in the Holy Spirit there will correspond different equalities in the Father, because correlatives are co-multiplied; therefore in the Father there will be two equalities, which seems unacceptable.
4 Praeterea, si illae sint relationes reales, ergo aeque realiter sunt distinctae sicut relationes originis, - et per consequens ita possent constituere personas divinas sicut et illae originis; et si possunt constituere, ergo constituunt, quia non est ibi potentia sine actu.	4. Further, if these relations are real, then they are as equally distinct as are the relations of origin – and consequently they could thus constitute distinct persons just as do the relations of origin; and if they can so constitute, they do so constitute, because there is no potency there without act.
5 Oppositum: Hilarius III De Trinitate: ((Similitudo sibi ipsi non est)).	5. The opposite: Hilary On the Trinity III n.23: “There is no likeness to oneself.”
6 Ad quaestionem. Videtur dicendum quod ad relationem realem tria sufficiunt: primo, quod fundamentum sit reale et terminus realis; et secundo, quod extremorum sit distinctio realis; et tertio, quod ex natura extremorum sequatur ipsa talis relatio absque opere alterius potentiae, comparantis unum extremum alteri. ƿ	6. To the question: It seems one must say that the three are sufficient for a real relation; first, because the foundation is real and the term is real; and second, because there is a real distinction between the extremes; and third, because, from the nature of the extremes, such a relation follows without the work of any other power comparing one extreme to the other.
7 Quantum ad primam condicionem relationis realis, negatur hic esse fundamentum, quia dicitur quod magnitudo transit in essentiam (secundum Augustinum, in multis locis), et ita non manet sub ratione magnitudinis nisi secundum rationem.	7. As to the first condition for real relation [n.6], it is denied [by Henry of Ghent etc.] that there is here a foundation, because it is said that magnitude passes over into the essence (according to Augustine, in many places), and so it does not remain under the idea of magnitude save in reason.
8 Sed contra istud: Essentia divina ut est primum obiectum intellectus divini, visa prima cognitione intuitiva, ante omnem negotiationem est obiectum beatificum illius intellectus, quia ille non beatificatur per actum ƿnegotiativum; igitur ex se, absque omni negotiatione intellectus, est formaliter infinita, quia nihil beatificat nisi formaliter infinitum. Ergo est ibi magnitudo virtutis - immo infinitas magnitudinis - ex natura rei.	8. But against this: The divine essence as it is the first object of the divine intellect, seen in the first intuitive cognition, is, before any busying of the intellect, the beatific object of that intellect, because the intellect is not beatified by a busying act; therefore it is of itself, without any busying of the intellect, formally infinite, because nothing beatifies save what is formally infinite. So there is magnitude of virtue there – nay an infinity of magnitude – from the nature of the thing.
9 Item, intellectus antequam intelligatur aliquid intelligere vel negotiari est comprehensivus istius essentiae ut primi obiecti, et ex hoc - negotiativus circa illud - potest omnes rationes reducere in actum quae possunt circa illam essentiam considerari; ergo ex natura rei ille intellectus est infinitus, - ergo et essentia, in qua fundatur.	9. Again, the intellect, before it understands that it is understanding something or is busy about something, has a comprehensive grasp of the essence as first object, and from this – that it busies itself about it – it is possible to reduce to act all the ideas that can be considered in the essence; therefore from the nature of the thing the intellect is infinite, – therefore the essence too, on which it is founded.
10 Praeterea, ratio eorum non valet, quia licet quantitas molis dicat aliquid additum naturae subiecti, et ideo ipsa non possit manere sub ratione sua formali et transire in essentiam secundum identitatem, - tamen magnitudo virtutis in omni ente transit in illud cuius est per identitatem, etiam in creatura. - Probatio: si enim angelus habet aliquam magnitudinem virtutis (de qua dicit Augustinus VI Trinitatis cap. 7: ((In his quae non sunt magna mole, hoc est maius esse quod melius))), si ista perfectionabilis magnitudo non sit idem essentiae, circumscribatur ab ipsa essentia. Ipsa essentia remanente, quaero quem gradum perfectionis tenet in entibus? ƿnihil enim erit nisi aliquem gradum determinatum perfectionis habeat inter entia; ergo adhuc manet in ipsa essentia magnitudo virtutis, qua dicitur sic vel sic perfectum. Ergo illa quantitas in omnibus transit per identitatem, et manet in omnibus secundum propriam rationem, quia ratio talis quantitatis est dicere modum intrinsecum illius perfectionis cuius est: et ex hoc quod dicit 'modum', manet, - ex hoc autem quod dicit 'intrinsecum', per identitatem transit in essentiam cuius est.	10. Further, their reasoning [n.7] is not valid, because although a quantity of bulk states something added to the nature of the subject, and therefore it cannot remain under its formal idea and also pass over into the essence by identity, – yet magnitude of virtue in every being passes over into that which it by identity belongs to, even in the case of creatures. – Proof: for if an angel has some magnitude of virtue (about which Augustine speaks in ibid. VI ch.8 n.9: “In things that are not great by bulk, what it is to be greater is to be better”), and if its perfectible magnitude is not the same as its essence, let it be removed from the essence. With the essence then remaining, I ask what grade of perfection it has among beings? For it will be nothing unless it has some determinate grade of perfection among beings; therefore there still remains in the essence a magnitude of virtue, whereby it is said to be thus or thus perfect. Therefore the quantity in everything passes over by identity, and remains in everything in its proper idea, because the nature of such quantity is to state the intrinsic mode of the perfection it belongs to; and from the fact that it states ‘mode’, it remains – but from the fact that it states ‘intrinsic’, it passes by identity into the essence it belongs to.
11 Dico ergo quod hic est fundamentum aequalitatis reale et ex natura rei, $a non tantum remotum, quod est essentia, - sed propinquum, quod est magnitudo sive specialiter 'infinitas'. Et hoc probatur per omnes rationes quae fiunt ad ostendendum essentiam primi esse infinitam: illae quippe omnes concludunt quod ex natura rei ipsa sit infinita, nam quaecumque dependent ad ipsam sive ut primam in ratione principii effectivi, sive principii finalis, sive in ratione eminentis et mensurantis et participati (quae viae tactae sunt supra distinctione 2) - omnia, inquam, dependent ad ƿipsam secundum illud quod ipsa est ex natura rei, circumscripto omni actu intellectus, quia nulla dependentia effectus finiti est ad aliquid sub ratione formali entis rationis, sicut probari potest per rationes factas distinctione 13 contra opinionem sextam. Est etiam hic ex natura rei illud quod ponitur fundamentum proximum aequalitatis sive ratio fundandi, scilicet unitas, quia secundum Damascenum cap. 8: ((Illic)) (scilicet in Deo) ((commune et unum re consideratur)); non sic in creaturis, sed commune ibi est 'unum' intellectu tantum. a$	11. I say, therefore, that there is here a foundation or equality that is real and from the nature of the thing, not only a remote one, which is the essence, – but a proximate one, which is magnitude or specifically ‘infinity’. And this is proved by all the reasons that are given to show that the essence of the first thing is infinite; they do all indeed conclude that from the nature of the thing it is infinite; for all things that depend on it – whether on it as it is first in idea of effective principle, or in idea of final principle, or in idea of being eminent and measuring and participated (which ways were touched on in distinction 2 nn.111-144) – all these things, I say, depend on it according to what it is from the nature of the thing, after removing every act of intellect, because no dependence of a finite effect rests on something under the formal idea of a being of reason, as can be proved by the reasons given in distinction 13 against the sixth opinion [nn.31-42]). There is also here from the nature of the thing what is posited as the proximate foundation of equality, or the idea of founding it, namely unity, because according to Damascene ch.8: “In him” (namely in God) “common and one are considered to be in the thing;” it is not so in the case of creatures, but the common there is ‘one’ by intellect only.
12 Secundum sic, scilicet quod illa relatio requirit extrema distincta realiter: Patet per Hilarium, ut dictum est opponendo.	12. In this way, namely that the relation requires extremes really distinct [n.6]: The thing is clear from Hilary, as said in his opposing point [n.5].
13 Et per Augustinum VI De Trinitate cap . 9: ((In Filio)) - inquit - ((est prima aequalitas)). Quod non esset verum, si aliqua persona posset dici aequalis ad se; tunc enim Pater prius esset aequalis. Sed quia aequalitas non potest intelligi sine distinctione, et ƿprima distinctio est producto Filio, ideo est ibi 'prima aequalitas' in eo, - terminative et quasi subiective accipiendo illam aequalitatem, qua Filius est aequalis Patri.	13. And from Augustine, ibid. VI ch.10 n.11: “In the Son,” he says, “is the first equality.” Which would not be true if some person could be said to be equal to himself; for then the Father would be the first equal. But because equality cannot be understood without distinction, and the first distinction is in the produced Son, so the ‘first equality’ is there in him, – taking as term or as quasi subject the equality by which the Son is equal to the Father.
14 Hoc etiam probatur per hoc quod relationes originis ponuntur reales, et tamen non praeexigunt distinctionem extremorum, sed quasi formaliter causant eam; istae autem relationes illam distinctionem 'quasi causatam per relationes originis' praesupponunt, sicut communiter ponitur quod istae non possunt pullulare in essentia nisi iam praeexsistentibus relationibus originis in ea; ergo istae magis videntur requirere distincta extrema quam relationes originis, vel saltem non minus.	14. This is also proved by the fact that the relations of origin are posited as real, and they do not pre-require a distinction of the extremes, but as it were formally cause it; for the relations in question here presuppose the distinction ‘as caused by relations of origin’, just as the common position is that they cannot burgeon in the essence unless the relations or origin are pre-existing in it [d.26 n.96]; therefore they seem more to require distinct extremes than the relations of origin, or at any rate not less.
15 Et si obicias quod istae non sunt alterius rationis sicut illae originis, - hoc non concludit nisi quod non distinguuntur specie; in creaturis autem non tantum relationes suppositionis et superpositionis sunt reales, ubi extrema differunt specie, - sed etiam relationes communes sunt reales, ubi extrema differunt tantum numero; ergo hic sufficit distinctio numeralis realis in extremis, ad realitatem relationum communium, sicut ad distinctionem relationum originis, quae quasi specie differunt. ƿ	15. And if you object that they are not of different ideas as the relations of origin are, – this is not conclusive unless because they are not distinct in species; but in the case of creatures not only are the relations of supposition and superposition real, where the extremes differ in species, – but also the common relations are real, where the extremes differ only in number; therefore a real numerical distinction in the extremes is here sufficient for the reality of the common relations, just as for the distinction of the relations of origin, which differ as it were in species.
16 Quantum ad tertium articulum, - videtur quod ista relatio consequatur personas ex natura rei, sine omni comparatione per aliquam potentiam extrinsecam comparantem: Quia enim Pater generando communicat Filio perfecte essentiam suam, ideo communicat sibi eandem magnitudinem infinitam, - sicut dicit Augustinus Contra Maximinum libro III cap. 18: ((si dicis)) - inquit - (('eo ipso Pater est maior Filio quia Pater genuit', cito respondebo: immo, ideo non est Pater maior Filio, quia aequalem genuit)). Non videtur ergo aliqua ratio esse, quare aequalitas Patris ad Filium non debeat poni relatio realis.	16. As to the third article [n.6] – it seems that this relation [sc. equality etc.] is consequent to the persons from the nature of the thing, without any comparison by some extrinsic power comparing them. For because the Father by generating communicates his essence perfectly to the Son, therefore he communicates the same infinite magnitude – as Augustine says Against Maximinus II ch.18 n.3: “If,” he says, “you say ‘the Father is by his very self greater than the Son, because he generates’, I quickly reply: no, therefore the Father is not greater than the Son, because he generates an equal.” Therefore there does not seem to be any reason why the equality of the Father with the Son should not be posited as a real relation.
17 Consimiliter potest dici de similitudine. Et - sicut in creaturis - est duplex similitudo: scilicet essentialis, secundum differentiam specificam, - et accidentalis, secundum qualitatem aliquam accidentalem. Et licet prima negetur in proposito (quia Deus non habet aliquam differentiam specificam), tamen, quia - si illud 'quod est in differentia specifica in creatura' esset tota essentia individui - nihil minus esset forma respectu individui (ideo nihil minus relatio similitudinis quam modo), ideo videtur proprie posse concedi ibi similitudo secundum essentiam (non in quantum 'quid', sed in quantum est actus et quasi forma, qua personae sunt ƿDeus), et etiam similitudo secundum attributa omnia, quae sunt quasi proprietates huius naturae (sicut dicit Damascenus cap. 4: ((Quae circa naturam sunt, dicunt))): et tunc, sicut ex natura rei est fundamentum aequalitatis et distinctio realis extremorum (et ista relatio sine operatione intellectus), ita de similitudine.	17. One can speak similarly about likeness. And – just as in creatures – there is a double likeness, namely essential, according to specific difference, and accidental, according to some accidental quality. And even if the first be denied in the issue at hand (because God does not have any specific difference), yet because – if the fact ‘there is a specific difference in creatures’ were the whole essence of the individual – there would no less be a form in respect of the individual (therefore no less a relation of likeness than there is now), therefore it seems that likeness can properly be conceded there (not insofar as it is ‘what’, but insofar as it is act and quasi form, by which the persons are God), and also a likeness as to all the attributes, which are as it were properties of this nature (as Damascene says ch.4: “Things that concern the nature state the nature”): and then, just as there is from the nature of the thing a foundation of equality and a real distinction between the extremes (and this relation is without any operation of the intellect [nn.11-13, 16]), so also in the case of likeness.
18 De identitate etiam dici potest quod ipsa dupliciter accipitur in divinis: uno modo eiusdem personae ad se, sicut Pater est idem sibi, - alio modo unius personae ad alteram, sicut Pater est idem Filio et e converso. De prima identitate, alias. De secunda potest dici - sicut de aliis - quod est realis, quia ibi est vera unitas ex natura rei et sufficiens distinctio extremorum, nec videtur necessaria comparatio intellectus ad esse huius identitatis. Et si identitas eiusdem suppositi ad se in creaturis sit relatio rationis tantum, tunc numquam est vera et perfecta identitas nisi in Deo tantum: nam Socratis ad se non est perfecta identitas, quia rationis tantum, - et ita omnis talis est secundum quid; nec Socratis ad Platonem est perfecta identitas, quia non fundatur in perfecta unitate. Hic autem Patris ad Filium est perfecta identitas quantum ad fundamentum, quia Patris ad Filium est perfecta unitas, - et realis identitas, quia realis distinctio et sufficiens extremorum. ƿ	18. About identity too one can say that it is taken in two ways in divine reality; in one way of the same person to himself, as the Father is the same as himself, – in another way of one person with another, as the Father is the same as the Son and conversely. About the first identity, see elsewhere [II d.1 qq.4-5 n.24]. About the second one can say – as also about the others [equality, likeness] – that it is real, because there is there a true unity from the nature of the thing and a sufficient distinction between the extremes, nor does a comparison by the intellect seem necessary for the being of this identity. And if the identity of the same supposit with itself in the case of creatures is a relation of reason only, then there is never a true and perfect identity save in God alone; for Socrates is not a perfect identity with himself, because it is a relation of reason only, – and so every such relation is in a certain respect; nor is there a perfect identity of Socrates with Plato, because it is not founded on perfect unity. But here there is a perfect identity of the Father with the Son as to foundation, because there is a perfect unity of the Father with the Son, – and a real identity, because there is a real distinction and a sufficient one between the extremes.
19 Sed de aequalitate sunt duo dubia: Primo enim videtur quod non sit relatio distincta ab identitate et similitudine, quia (sicut dictum est alias) 'infinitum' non est speciale attributum, sed dicit modum intrinsecum cuiuslibet attributi, - et pari ratione 'magnum', quod quasi dicit indistincte quod 'infinitum' dicit distincte: ergo magnitudo essentiae non distinguitur ab essentia (nec illa distinctione quae est inter attributa), et tunc aequalitas secundum istam magnitudinem non distinguitur ab identitate, quae est secundum essentiam; similiter, magnitudo non distinguitur a sapientia, illa distinctione quae est inter attributa, - ergo aequalitas secundum magnitudinem sapientiae non distinguitur a similitudine secundum sapientiam. Omnis autem magnitudo vel est essentiae, secundum quam est identitas, - vel attributi, secundum quod est similitudo; ergo nulla aequalitas videtur in divinis esse distincta ab identitate et similitudine.	19. But about equality there are two doubts: For first it seems it is not a distinct relation from identity and likeness because (as was said elsewhere [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221, d.10 n.30, d.13 nn.72, 80]) ‘infinite’ is not a special attribute but states a mode intrinsic to any attribute, – and by parity of reasoning ‘great’ does too, which as it were states indistinctly what ‘infinite’ states distinctly; therefore the magnitude of the essence is not distinct from the essence (and not by the distinction either that is between the attributes), and then equality according to this magnitude is not distinct from identity, which is according to the essence; likewise, magnitude is not distinct from wisdom, by the distinction that is between the attributes, – therefore equality in magnitude of wisdom is not distinct from likeness in wisdom. But every magnitude is either of the essence, according to which there is identity, – or of an attribute, according to which there is likeness; therefore no equality in divine reality seems to be distinct from identity and likeness.
20 Praeterea, si etiam quodlibet attributum habet suam magnitudinem propriam, secundum quamlibet videtur fundari aequalitas, ergo tot erunt aequalitates personarum, quot sunt attributa.	20. Further, if also any attribute has its own proper magnitude, then equality seems to be founded in accord with any one of them; therefore there will be as many equalities of the persons as there are attributes.
21 Ad primum potest concedi quod - sicut in creaturis - potest; esse similitudo sine aequalitate (sicut remissum album est simile intenso albo, licet non perfecte), non autem e converso, in forma ƿilla qua aliqua nata sunt assimilari; et per hoc, comparando aliqua in forma secundum quam nata est esse similitudo, aequalitas videtur quasi determinare similitudinem et fundamentum similitudinis. Ita potest concedi hic quod aequalitas non ita distinguitur ab identitate et similitudine sicut illa inter se, sed quod ipsa dicat modum proprium fundamenti utriusque illarum duarum relationum, et quasi etiam modum proprium utriusque relationis, - quod scilicet tam identitas quam similitudo sit perfecta: quia si per impossibile Pater haberet deitatem maiorem et Filius minorem, esset aliqua identitas, sed quia fundamentum identitatis non haberet eandem magnitudinem, non esset identitas perfecta, nec cum aequalitate; similiter, si per impossibile Pater haberet maiorem scientiam et Filius minorem, essent aliquo modo similes, sed quia deficeret modus ille fundamenti - scilicet magnitudo perfecta ideo non esset similitudo perfecta. Nunc autem magnitudo, quae est quasi modus fundamenti identitatis et similitudinis, fundat aequalitatem, quae est quasi modus similitudinis et identitatis, quia dicit utramque illarum ut perfectam.	21. As to the first [n.19], one can concede that – as in the case of creatures – there can be likeness without equality (as a weak white is like an intense white, although not perfectly), but not conversely, as to the form by which certain things are of a nature to be likened; and in this respect, by comparing certain things in the form according to which likeness is of a nature to exist, equality seems to quasi determine likeness and a foundation of likeness. So one can concede here that equality is not so distinct from identity and likeness as they are from each other, but it states a proper mode of the foundation of each of those two relations, and as it were also a mode proper to each relation, – because namely both identity and likeness are perfect; because if per impossibile the Father had a greater deity and the Son a lesser deity, there would be some identity, but because the foundation of the identity would not have the same magnitude, it would not be perfect identity, nor go along with equality; likewise, if per impossibile the Father had a greater knowledge and the Son a lesser one, they would be in some way alike, but because the mode of the foundation would be deficient – namely perfect magnitude – there would therefore not be a perfect likeness. But now the magnitude, which is as it were the mode of the foundation of identity and likeness, founds equality, which is as it were the mode of likeness and identity, – because it asserts each of them as perfect.
22 Ad secundum potest concedi quia quot sunt perfectiones in ƿDeo simpliciter, tot et magnitudines et tot aequalitates; sicut tamen omnes illae sunt simpliciter una res, ita et 'aequalitates secundum eas' sunt simpliciter una res. Et ex hoc patet quomodo Magister bene assignavit - distinctione l9 - 'aequalitatem perfectam' in tribus (secundum Augustinum De fide ad Petrum cap. 2), scilicet 'magnitudine, potentia et aeternitate': per magnitudinem quidem intelligitur aequalitas in omnibus attributis (accipiendo magnitudinem non pro aliquo attributo distincto, sed ut est commune magnitudini cuiuslibet attributi), et per potentiam notantur esse aequales ad obiecta extra, et per aeternitatem notatur aequalitas esse in eis quasi secundum durationem. Aequalitas autem secundum quantitatem discretam non quaeritur ibi, quantitatibus vero continuis in creaturis - quae sunt quantitas permanens et successiva - correspondent ibi magnitudo et aeternitas.	22. To the second [n.20] one can concede that there are as many perfections in God simply as there are also magnitudes and equalities; however just as all of them are simply one thing, so too ‘the equalities in accord with them’ are simply one thing. And from this is plain how the Master – distinction 19 ch.1 n.168 – well assigned ‘a perfect equality’ in the three (according to Augustine [Fulgentius] On the Faith to Peter ch.1 n.4), namely ‘in magnitude, in power, and in eternity’; by magnitude indeed is understood equality in all attributes (taking magnitude not for any distinct attribute, but as it is common to the magnitude of any attribute at all), and by power they are indicated to be equal as to objects outside, and by eternity equality is indicated to be in them as it were in duration. But equality according to discrete quantity is not looked for there, but to continuous quantities in creatures – which are permanent and successive quantity – there correspond there magnitude and eternity.
23 Ad primum argumentum dico quod album et album dicuntur similia secundum albedinem, et hoc ƿprout ly 'secundum' notat suum determinabile esse proximum fundamentum relationis; dicuntur autem esse similia similitudine formaliter. Ita dico quod Pater et Filius sunt aequales secundum essentiam ut secundum fundamentum proximum, quia istae relationes communes fundantur super aliquid ut commune est; nihil autem est unum in personis, nisi essentia vel essentiale.	23. [To the first principal argument] – To the first argument [n.1] I say that a white things and a white thing are said to be alike according to whiteness, and this insofar as the ‘according to’ indicates that its determinable is the proximate foundation for the relation; but they are said to be alike by likeness formally. So I say that the Father and Son are equal according to essence as according to proximate foundation [nn.11, 35], because the common relations are founded on something as it is common; but nothing is one in the persons save the essence as essential.
24 $a Contra istam solutionem arguitur multipliciter: Primo, quia pari ratione videtur in Deo unica aequalitas, sicut unica paternitas: tum quia aeque adaequatur utraque relatio suo fundamento; tum quia quidlibet in Deo unius rationis est unicum, - alioquin non esset de se summe unum, sed alio 'ens secundum quiditatem', alio 'hoc ens', et ita potentialitas et compositio; tum quia eodem modo videtur sequi infinitas in omnibus, quia non erit dare per quid plurificabile determinetur ad certam pluralitatem; tum quia habens causam unius rationis et rationem unicam receptivam, est unicum, quia nec distinguitur ab agente nec materia, VIII Metaphysicae (similitudo est huiusmodi).	24. Against this solution there are multiple arguments: First, because by parity of reasoning there seems to be a single equality in God, just as also a single paternity; both (1) because each relation is equally adequate to its foundation; and (2) because anything in God of one idea is single, – otherwise he would not be of himself supremely one, but by one thing he would be ‘being according to quiddity’ and by another ‘this being’ and so there would be potentiality and composition; and (3) because infinity in all of them seems to follow in the same way, because it will not be possible to give what a plural thing is determined by to a definite plurality; and (4) because what has a cause of one idea and a single receptive idea is single, because it is not distinguished by agent or by matter, Metaphysics 8.4.1044a25-32 (likeness is of this sort).
25 Item, non tantum sequitur quod sint sex aequalitates in tribus personis, immo quaelibet persona est aequalis duabus et e converso, - et non eadem aequalitate qua uni, quia non idem extreƿmum; immo quaelibet est aequalis tribus, quia VIII Trinitatis 1: ((Non maius aliquid sunt tres quam una)) (nec minus, patet; igitur aequale). Et istud ultimum videtur satis ostendere quod non est realis, quia est eiusdem ad se, dummodo non ad se praecise sed cum aliis; numquam realis est ad se, quantumcumque connumeretur aliis. Quare autem non est ad se praecise, - potest dici, non quia dicit relationem, sed tantum significat unitatem quantitatis; connotat tamen distinctionem suppositorum, et ideo est ad alterum. - Ulterius: haec aequalitas est aequalis illi aequalitati, et sic in infinitum; haec etiam est similis illi, et eadem illi quasi specie, et sic iterum in infinitum.	25. Again, not only will it follow that there are six equalities in three persons, nay any person is equal to two persons and conversely, – and not by the same equality by which they are one, because the extreme is not the same; indeed any person is equal to the three, because On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2: “The three are not a greater thing than one is” (nor a lesser, as is plain; therefore they are equal). And this last point seems to show sufficiently that equality is not real, because it is of the same thing to itself, provided not to itself precisely but along with others; it is never real to itself, however much it may be communicated to others. But as to why it is not to itself precisely, – one can say, not because it states a relation, but it only states the unity of quantity; yet it connotes a distinction of supposits, and therefore it is to another. – Further, this equality is equal to that equality, and so ad infinitum; this person is also like that one, and the same as it in species, and so again ad infinitum.
26 Ad ista: Ad primum dicitur quod nulla relatio ibi adaequat fundamentum, quia essentia est immediatum fundamentum omnium: cum enim relatio non fundet relationem, et non est nisi essentia et relatio, sequitur. - Ad hoc dicitur quod distincta attributa sunt proxima fundamenta relationum originis, sicut memoria 'dictionis activae' et notitia actualis 'dictionis passivae'; isti fundamento proximo aequatur una relatio originis.	26. To these objections: To the first [n.24 (1)] it is said that no relation there is adequate to the foundation, because the essence is the immediate foundation of them all; for since a relation does not found a relation, and there is only essence and relation there, the conclusion follows. – To this it is said that the distinct attributes are the proximate foundations of the relations of origin, as memory is of ‘active saying’ and actual knowing is of ‘passive saying’; with this proximate foundation one relation of origin is equated.
27 Aliter dicitur ad primum quod in creaturis relationes disquiparantiae requirunt distincta fundamenta (quia illae differunt specie), relationes communes non: ideo illa disquiparantiae sic adaequat, quod non est idem fundamentum oppositae relationis; non sic in communibus. Ad propositum patet. ƿ	27. In another way it is said to the first [n.24 (1)] that in creatures disquiparant [sc. correlates that are denoted by different names, as father and son] relations require distinct foundations (because they differ in species), but common relations do not; therefore the first is thus adequate to what is disquiparant because it is not the same foundation for the opposite relation; things are not so in the case of the common relations. How this relates to the issue at hand is plain .
28 Sed data ista responsione, quare est tantum unica paternitas? quia licet fundamentum eius proximum non sit oppositae relationis (quae quasi differt specie), tamen quare 'haec paternitas' adaequat, et 'haec aequalitas' non adaequat suum? - Responsio: nulla relatio communis unica potest adaequare, quia oportet oppositam habere idem fundamentum; aliqua disquiparantiae potest.	28. But given this response, why is there only a single paternity? Because although its proximate foundation is not the foundation of the opposite relation (which as it were differs in species), yet why is ‘this paternity’ adequate to its foundation and ‘this equality’ not adequate to its? – Response: no unique common relation can be adequate, because the opposite has to have the same foundation; some relation can be adequate to what is disquiparant.
29 Contra: quare necessario adaequat 'haec paternitas'? - Responsio: nihil unius rationis plurificatur nisi quasi praeintelligantur aliqua alterius rationis, quae causaliter necessario requirantur ad eius plurificationem; ideo paternitas non potest plurificari, quia non praeexigit talia alterius rationis (quae sint quasi causa plurificationis eius), - aequalitas potest, quia praeexigit relationes constituentes personas, ex quarum personarum distinctione distinguuntur aequalitates. Probatur: per quid est a aliud a b ? Si per aliquid alterius rationis in eis, vel causaliter, habetur propositum; si non, sed tantum per aliquam eiusdem rationis, quaero iterum per quid illa distinguitur, et sic in infinitum. - Quidquid sit de ista probatione generali, est probatio specialis in Deo: quia alias esset infinitas, quia nihil ibi determinatur ad certam multitudinem per aliquam causam priorem; ergo tantum per aliquam alterius rationis, quia 'quidquid unius rationis se habet ad plura, non determinat ad quot talia se extendat' (habetur supra distinctione 2 quaestione 7, in solutione, extra). ƿ	29. On the contrary: why is ‘this paternity’ necessarily adequate? – Response: nothing of one idea is multiplied unless some things of another idea are pre-understood that are causally necessarily required for the multiplication of it; therefore paternity cannot be multiplied because it does not pre-require such things of a different idea (which would be as it were the cause of its multiplication), – equality can be, because it prerequires relations that constitute persons, by which distinction of persons the equalities are distinguished. Proof [sc. that in something of one idea multiplication is made by something of another idea]: by what is a other than b? If by something of a different idea in them, or causally, the intended conclusion is gained; if not, but only by something of the same idea, I ask again by what it is distinguished, and so ad infinitum. – However it may be with this general proof, there is a special proof in God; because otherwise [sc. if multiplication were not made by something of a different idea] there would be an infinity, because nothing there is determined to a definite multitude by any prior cause; therefore only by something of a different idea, because ‘anything of one idea that is related to several things does not determine to how many such things it extends itself’ (it is got from distinction 2 above, question 7, in the solution, addition, sub n.303).
30 Per istud patet ad tertium; quare certa pluralitas aequalitatum, sed non esset paternitatum.	30. Through this is plain the response to the third point [n.24 (3)]; why there is a certain plurality of equalities but there would not be of paternities.
31 Ad secundum: quidlibet unius rationis in re - non tantum in conceptu - est unicum, concedo. Ad probationem dico quod, in conceptu, non eodem est 'aequalitas' et 'haec', sed quaelibet in re eodem est 'aequalitas' et 'haec', - sicut respondetur distinctione 8 de conceptu communi Deo et creaturae, sive re communi (ita etiam distinctione 29 de principio et distinctione 23 de relationibus pluribus habentibus conceptum communem).	31. To the second [n.24 (2)]: that whatever is of one idea in the thing – not only in concept – is unique, I concede. To the proof I say that, in concept, ‘equality’ and ‘this’ are not by the same thing, but anything in the thing is ‘equality’ and ‘this’ by the same thing – as is replied in distinction 8 nn.137-150 about a concept common to God and creatures, or a common thing (so too in distinction 29 nn.3-4 about principle and in distinction 23 n.9 about several relations having a common concept).
32 Ad quartum: illa propositio potest concedi, et est vera quando 'una receptiva' est tantum in uno recipiente et est forma absoluta; in relationibus plures sunt in eodem, et necessario plures in extremis oppositis.	32. To the fourth [n.24 (4)]: the proposition can be conceded, and it is true when ‘receptive’ is only in one recipient and is an absolute form; in relations several things are in one thing, and necessarily several things are in opposite extremes.
33 Ad aliud: conceditur sex esse aequalitates alias, inter quam libet personam et duas alias; sed inter unam et tres, vel duas et duas, conceditur sicut quasi partis numeralis ad quasi totum numerale, - et tunc negatur illa 'numquam est realis' etc. Aliter negatur realis, ubi eadem persona in utroque extremo: non sequitur 'non maius nec minus, ergo aequale', quia praemissa vera est de Patre respectu Patris, conclusio falsa. ƿ	33. To the other [n.25]: it is conceded that there are six other equalities, between any person and two others; but between one and three, or two and two, it is conceded as a quasi numeral part to a quasi numeral whole – then the proposition ‘it is never real to itself etc.’ is denied. It is denied to be real in another way, when the same person is in each extreme: the inference does not follow ‘not greater nor lesser therefore equal’, because the premise is true of the Father with respect to the Father, the conclusion false.
34 Ad ultimum, de infinitate aequalitatum, respondetur libro II distinctione l quaestione 4 quae relationes referantur aliis, quae se ipsis. a$	34. To the last one, about an infinity of equalities [n.25], a response is given in book II distinction 1 question 4 nn.23-24, about which relations are referred to others, which to themselves.
35 Et si obicias quod tunc posset dici Pater secundum essentiam, quia essentia est fundamentum paternitatis (quod tamen non conceditur), licet istud argumentum alias fecerim ad probandum quod relatio originis non sit actus essentiae, tamen tenendo communem viam potest assignari ratio quare secundum essentiam dicitur Pater aequalis Filio et non Pater Filii: quia licet sit fundamentum utriusque, et non distinctum (nec per istam, nec per illam), tamen est fundamentum relationis communis in quantum unum, - non autem in quantum 'unum' est fundamentum relationis originis, licet sit unum; et quia essentia 'ut essentia' non accipitur ibi nisi prout est unum formaliter in tribus, ideo dicitur Pater aequalis esse secundum essentiam, propter hoc quod essentia ƿut 'una' est proximum fundamentum istius relationis. Non autem dicitur secundum deitatem esse Pater, quia deitas ut 'una' non est 'ratio fundamenti' huius, ita quod unitas sit ratio fundandi, sicut notaretur si diceretur secundum deitatem esse Pater: $a quia ubicumque relatio est actus fundamenti, ibi suppositum potest dici ad alterum secundum illud fundamentum (sicut Socrates secundum albedinem est similis, ignis calore calefacit, lapis secundum quiditatem lapidis est mensura notitiae de lapide); haec autem non conceditur 'Pater deitate est Pater, vel secundum deitatem'; ergo etc.	35. And if you object that then the Father could be said according to essence, because the essence is foundation of paternity (which however is not conceded), although I have made this argument elsewhere to prove that a relation of origin is not an act of the essence [I d.5 n.137], yet by holding to the common way [sc. opposite to the objection here, that the Father is not said according to essence] a reason can be assigned as to why according to essence the Father is said to be equal to the Son but not Father of the Son; because although the essence is foundation of both, and is not distinguished (neither by the former nor by the latter), yet it is the foundation of the common relation insofar as it is one – but not insofar as it is ‘one’ is it foundation of a relation of origin, although it is one; and because essence ‘as essence’ is not taken there save as it is one formally in the three, therefore the Father is said to be equal according to essence, because of the fact that the essence as ‘one’ is the proximate foundation of this relation [sc. equality]. But Father is not said according to deity, because deity as ‘one’ is not ‘the idea of the foundation’ of this relation [sc. paternity], such that unity be the idea of the foundation, as would be indicated if Father were said according to deity; because wherever a relation is the act of a foundation, there a supposit can be said relatively to another according to that foundation (as Socrates according to whiteness is like, fire by heat heats, a stone according to the quiddity of stone is the measure of knowledge about a stone); but this is not conceded ‘the Father is Father by deity, or according to deity’; therefore etc.
36 Sed ita videtur posse argui quod nec secundum deitatem sit aequalis, quia ista relatio non est actus fundamenti. - Responsio: ubi relatio est actus fundamenti, ibi secundum fundamentum dicitur aliquid ad alterum (hanc accepi), sed non concedo e converso quod ubicumque aliquid dicitur ad alterum secundum fundamentum, quod ibi relatio sit actus fundamenti, - quia universaliter tale 'secundum' est nota causae inhaerentiae per se secundo modo, non primo. Et bene 'actuatio fundamenti per relationem' concludit fundamentum esse causam inhaerentiae relationis ipsi ƿsupposito (causam, inquam, per se secundo modo), non autem e converso, quia 'esse per se fundamentum' quandoque sufficit ad esse per se causam inhaerentiae relationis ipsi supposito absque hoc quod relatio actuet, licet quandoque non sufficiat, quia tunc Pater secundum essentiam esset Pater.	36. But in this way it seems one can argue that neither is he equal according to deity, because this relation is not the act of the foundation. – Response: where a relation is an act of the foundation, there something can according to the foundation be said relatively to another (this I have accepted), but I do not concede conversely that wherever something is said relatively to another according to the foundation that there the relation is an act of the foundation – because universally such ‘according to’ is a mark of the cause of inherence per se in the second mode, not the first. And well does ‘actuation of the foundation through relation’ entail that the foundation is the cause of the inherence of the relation in the supposit (cause per se in the second mode, I say), but not conversely, because ‘to be per se the foundation’ sometimes suffices for being a per se cause of the inherence of the relation in the supposit without the fact that the relation actuates, although sometimes it may not be sufficient, because then the Father according to essence would be Father.
37 Sed saltem, quae est ratio dissimilitudinis hic, quod relatio communis dicitur inesse secundum essentiam, propria sive originis non, - cum neutra sit magis actus quam alia? In creaturis utraque est actus, et utraque dicitur inesse secundum fundamentum: tam enim 'calidum' secundum calorem est calefactivum quam secundum calorem est simile! a$	37. But at any rate, what is the reason for the dissimilarity here, that a common relation is said to be present [sc. in a supposit] according to essence, a proper relation or a relation of origin not, – since neither is more act than the other? In creatures each is an act, and each is said to be present according to the foundation; for ‘hot’ is both capable of heating according to heat and is like according to heat!
38 Ad secundum dico quod maior propositio est falsa, immo ubi forma distinguitur in materia et cum materia, materia non est ratio principalis huius distinctionis, quia in quacumque distinctione illud est principalis ratio distinguendi quod est ratio principalis essendi in illo esse (de hoc alias, in quaestione 'De individuatione').	38. [To the second principal argument] – To the second [n.8] I say that the major proposition is false; nay when a form is distinguished in matter and with matter, the mater is not the principal reason for this distinction, because in any distinction the principal reason of the distinction is that which is the principal reason of being in that existence (about this elsewhere, in the question ‘On individuation’ [II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6 nn.9, 15, 20]).
39 Ad tertium: videtur concedendum quod in Patre sit alia aequalitas ad Filium et alia ad Spiritum ƿSanctum, sicut si Pater genuisset Spiritum Sanctum, esset in eo alia paternitas ad Filium et alia ad Spiritum Sanctum, - et de isto dicto, generaliter erit sermo in III libro 'utrum in uno, relato ad plura, sint plures relationes'.	39. [To the third principal argument] To the third [n.3]; it seems one must concede that in the Father there is one equality to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit, just as if the Father had generated the Holy Spirit there would be in him one paternity to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit – and about this statement there will be general discussion in book III d.8 q. un. n.6-11, 21-22, ‘whether in one thing, related to several, there are several relations’.
40 Ad quartum: videtur difficile argumentum illis qui ponunt personas esse relativas (sicut argutum fuit contra eos distinctione 26, pro opinione tertia), tamen tenendo communem viam oportet dicere quod prius pullulant in essentia relationes originis quam communes, et illae 'primo pullulantes' distinguunt et constituunt personas, - non autem illae communes, quia sunt quasi adventiciae personis (sicut ponitur quod spiratio actio nullam personam constituit, quia intelligitur quasi advenire Patri et Filio iam constitutis in esse personali); prima enim ibi pullulantia quae possunt personaliter distinguere, distinguunt personaliter et constituunt.	40. [To the fourth principal argument] – To the fourth [n.4]; the argument seems difficult to those who posit that the persons are relative (as was argued against them in distinction 26 n.96, for the third opinion), yet by holding to the common way [sc. that the persons are relative] one must say that relations of origin burgeon in the essence before the common ones do, and those ‘first burgeoning’ ones distinguish and constitute the persons, – but not the common ones, because they are as it were adventitious to the persons [n.14] (as it was posited that active-inspiriting does not constitute a person because it is understood to happen as it were to the Father and the Son once they have been constituted in personal being); for the first things burgeoning there that can distinguish personally do distinguish personally and constitute persons.