Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D8/Q1

Translated by Peter Simpson

Latin	English
Quaestio 1
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem octavam quaero utrum Deus sit summe simplex, et perfecte talis. Quod non: Quia simplicitas non est simpliciter perfectionis, ergo non est ponenda in Deo ut essentialis. - Probatio antecedentis: si esset simpliciter perfectionis, ergo quilibet habens eam simpliciter esset perfectior non habente eam, et ita materia prima esset perfectior homine, quod falsum est, - immo generaliter, in creaturis corruptibilibus vel generabilibus compositiora sunt perfectiora.	1. Concerning the eighth distinction I ask whether God is supremely simple, and perfectly so. That he is not: Because simplicity is not a mark of perfection simply, therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential. - Proof of the antecedent: if it were a mark of perfection simply then anything having it simply would be more perfect than anything not having it, and so prime matter would be more perfect than man, which is false, - nay, generally, in corruptible or generable creatures the more composite things are more perfect.
2 Item, perfectionis est in forma posse dare esse licet imperfectionis sit dependere a materia; ergo si prima ratio separetur a secunda, quia non videtur contradictio in tali separatione, potest deitas esse forma dans esse licet non dependeat ab illo cui dat ƿesse, et ita potest poni sine imperfectione compositio materiae et formae vel componibilitas saltem deitatis ut formae.	2. Again, it is a mark perfection in a form to be able to give being, although it is a mark of imperfection to depend on matter; therefore if the first idea were separated from the second, because there does not seem to be a contradiction in such a separation, deity can be a form giving being, although it does not depend on that to which it gives being, and so it can be posited without imperfection to be a composition of matter and form, or a combinability at least of matter and of deity as form.
3 Item, quod uni est non substantia, nulli est substantia, ex I Physicorum; sed sapientia in nobis est accidens; ergo in nullo est substantia vel non accidens. Sed in Deo est sapientia secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in nobis; ergo est ibi accidens, et ita compositio subiecti et accidentis.	3. Again, what is a non-substance for one thing is not a substance for anything, from Physics 1.3.186b4-5; but wisdom in us is an accident; therefore in nothing is it a substance or a non-accident. But wisdom is in God according to the same idea as it is in us; so there is an accident in God and thus a composition of subject and accident.
4 Contra: VI De Trinitate cap. 6: 'Deus vere et summe simplex est'.	4. On the contrary: On the Trinity VI ch.7 n.8: 'God is truly and supremely simple'.
5 Ad quaestionem respondeo, et primo probo simplicitatem divinam per media quaedam particularia, secundo ex mediis communibus, scilicet infinitate et necessitate essendi	5. I reply to the question, and first I prove the divine simplicity through certain particular middle terms, and second from common middle terms, namely infinity and necessity of existence.
6 Primo modo procedendo, ostendo simplicitatem oppositam compositioni ex partibus essentialibus, secundo oppositam compositioni ex partibus quantitativis et tertio oppositam compositioni ex subiecto et accidente.	6. Proceeding in the first way, I show that [divine] simplicity is opposed to composition from essential parts, second that it is opposed to composition from quantitative parts, and third opposed to composition from subject and accident.
7 Primum sic: causalitas materiae et formae non est simpliciter prima, sed necessario praeƿsupponit causalitatem efficientem priorem, - ergo si Primum esset compositum ex materia et forma, praesupponeret causalitatem efficientis; non autem huius, quia istud non efficit se, coniungendo materiam suam cum forma, - ergo alterius efficientis, prioris; ergo Deus non esset primum efficiens, cuius oppositum probatum est distinctione 2 quaestione 1. - Probatio primae propositionis: causalitas materiae et formae includit imperfectionem, quia rationem partis, causalitas autem efficientis et finis nullam imperfectionem includit, sed perfectionem; omne imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum sicut ad prius se essentialiter; ergo etc.	7. [God is not from essential parts] - The first thus: the causality of matter and form is not simply first, but necessarily presupposes a prior efficient causality, - therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form it would presuppose the causality of an efficient cause; but not the causality of this First thing, because it does not, by joining its matter with a form, cause itself - therefore of a different efficient cause, a prior one; therefore God would not be the first efficient cause, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 2 question 1 [I d.2 nn.43-59]. Proof of the first proposition: the causality of matter and form involves imperfection, but the causality of the efficient and the final cause do not involve imperfection but perfection; every imperfect thing is reduced to a perfect one as to what is essentially prior to it; therefore etc.
8 Idem probo sic: materia de se est in potentia ad formam, et hoc in potentia passiva et contradictionis, quantum est ex se, ergo non est de se sub aliqua forma, sed per aliquam aliam causam, reducentem materiam ipsam ad actum formae; ista autem causa reducens non potest dici tantum forma in quantum forma, quia sic non reducit materiam nisi actuando formaliter ipsam materiam; ergo oportet ponere aliquid reducens effective materiam ad istam actualitatem. Ergo si Primum esset composiitum ex materia et forma, esset aliquod efficiens per cuius efficientiam esset materia eius sub forma, et ita ipsum non esset primum efficiens, ut prius.	8. I prove the same thus: matter is of itself in potency to form, and this in a potency that is passive and open to contradictories, as far as concerns itself, - therefore it is not under a form of itself but through some other cause, reducing the matter to the act of the form; but this cause reducing it cannot be called form only as it is form, because thus it does not reduce matter save by formally actualizing the matter itself; therefore one must posit something effectively reducing the matter to that actuality. Therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form, there would be some efficient cause through whose effecting act its matter would be under the form, and so it would not be the first efficient cause, as before [n.7].
9 Tertio sic: omnis entitas una causata habet aliquam unam causam a qua est eius unitas, quia non potest poni unitas in causato sine unitate in causa. Unitas ergo compositi, cum sit causata, requiƿrit aliquam unam causam a qua sit ista entitas causata. Illa causalitas non est materiae nec formae, quia utraque est entitas deminuta respectu entitatis compositi; ergo praeter illas duas, materiae scilicet et formae, oportet ponere aliquam aliam, - illa erit efficiens, et ita redit idem quod prius.	9. Third in this way: every single caused entity has some one cause from which comes its unity, because there cannot be unity in the caused without unity in the cause. The unity therefore of a composite, since it is caused, requires some one cause from which comes this caused entity. The causality in question is not of matter or form, because each of these is a diminished entity in respect of the composite entity; therefore besides these two causalities, namely of matter and form, some other one must be posited - it will be the efficient cause, and so the same result returns as before [n.8].
10 Secundum, scilicet carentiam compositionis quantitativae, probare videtur Philosophus VIII Physicorum et XII Metaphysicae, quia Primum est potentiae infinitae; potentia autem infinita non est in magnitudine: et hoc probatur, quia maior potentia est in maiore magnitudine, et ita infinita potentia non potest esse in finita magnitudine; nulla autem est magnitudo infinita; ergo nec aliqua potentia infinita in magnitudine.	10. [God is not from quantitative parts] - The second, namely the lack of quantitative composition, seems to be proved by the Philosopher in Physics 8.10.226a24-b6 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-11, because the First thing is of infinite power; but infinite power cannot exist in a magnitude; and the proof of this is that in a greater magnitude there is a greater power, and so an infinite power cannot exist in a finite magnitude; but no magnitude is infinite; therefore neither does any infinite power exist in a magnitude.
11 Sed istud argumentum videtur deficere, quia qui poneret potentiam infinitam esse in finita magnitudine, diceret ipsam esse eiusdem rationis in parte magnitudinis et in tota magnitudine, et ita in maiore ƿet in minore: sicut anima intellectiva est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte corporis, nec maior in maiore corpore, nec maior in toto corpore quam in parte; et si animam istam consequeretur infinita potentia intelligendi, ipsa esset in magnitudine finita, et ita in parte sicut in toto et in parva parte sicut in magna. Ita diceretur in proposito, quod potentia infinita in magnitudine esset eiusdem rationis in toto et in parte.	11. But this argument seems deficient, because one who would posit that an infinite power exists in a finite magnitude would say that the power is of the same nature in a part of the magnitude as in the whole magnitude, and so of the same nature in a greater as in a lesser magnitude; just as the intellective soul is whole in the whole of the body and whole in any part of it, and is not greater in a greater body, nor greater in the whole body than in a part; and if an infinite power of understanding were consequent on this soul, this infinite power would exist in a finite magnitude, and in a part just as in the whole and in a little part just as in a big one. So should it be said in the proposed case, because an infinite power in a magnitude would be of the same nature in the whole as in the part.
12 Declarando ergo rationem Aristotelis dico quod conclusio sua est ista, quod potentia infinita 'non est in magnitudine finita' extensa per accidens ad extensionem magnitudinis. Hoc probat ratio sua hoc modo: quaecumque potentia est extensa per accidens, ceteris paribus maior est - id est efficacior - in maiore magnitudine, et non sic maior, id est formaliter intensior, quia parvus ignis potest plus habere de calore quam magnus si magnus sit multum rarus et parvus densus (et ideo addendum est in maiore 'ceteris paribus'); exemplum etiam est de calore in eodem igne, qui licet sit aequalis intensionis in parte et in toto, tamen maior ignis est 'maioris potentiae', id est efficacior.	12. Making clear, then, the reasoning of Aristotle [n.10], I say that his conclusion is this, that an infinite power, extended per accidens to the extension of the magnitude, 'does not exist in a finite magnitude'. His reasoning proves this in the following way: any power that is extended per accidens is, ceteris paribus, greater - that is more efficacious - in a greater magnitude, and it is not greater as follows, namely that it is more intense formally, because a small fire can have more heat than a big one if the big one is very diffuse and the small one concentrated (and therefore one must add the 'ceteris paribus' clause in the major); the example too is about heat in the same fire, which although it is of equal intensity in the part as in the whole, yet a greater fire is 'of a greater power', that is, more efficacious.
13 t ex hoc sequitur quod omnis talis potentia 'extensa per accidens' quamdiu est in magnitudine finita, potest intelligi crescere in ƿefficacia per augmentum magnitudinis, - sed quamdiu intelligitur potens crescere in efficacia non est infinita in efficacia; et ex hoc sequitur quod omnis talis potentia 'extensa per accidens' quamdiu est in magnitudine finita, est finita, quia infinitas intensiva non potest esse sine infinitate in efficacia; et ex hoc sequitur quod potentia infinita in efficacia non potest esse in magnitudine finita, - nec ergo potentia infinita intensive; et tunc ultra: cum non sit aliqua magnitudo infinita, patet quod non est aliqua talis potentia infinita in magnitudine.	13. And from this it follows that every such power 'extended per accidens ', as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, can be understood to grow in efficacy by increase of magnitude - but as long as it is understood to be able to grow in efficacy it is not infinite in efficacy; and from this it follows that every such power 'extended per accidens ' , as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, is finite, because an intensive infinity cannot exist without infinity in efficacy; and from this it follows that a power infinite in efficacy cannot exist in a finite magnitude, - nor therefore can a power infinite in intensity so exist; and then further: since there is no infinite magnitude, it is plain that there is no such infinite power in a magnitude.
14 Sed quid hoc ad propositum, quod omnis potentia talis non sit in magnitudine? Respondeo. Coniungendo huic illam conclusionem quam prius probavit Philosophus, - quod tale 'potens' est sine materia sequitur propositum. Quia enim extensione extenditur aliquid, vel si extensio esset per se exsistens, aliquid esset forma informans extensionem, extensa per accidens, - ergo si potentia ista infinita poneretur in magnitudine, quaero quid est ista extensio magnitudinis? Non ipsa potentia infinita, sicut probatum est, - nec ipsa ƿperficit istam sicut forma materiam, quia non est in materia, ex conclusione praeostensa: ergo oporteret ponere materiam extensam ista magnitudine, quae materia perficeretur potentia infinita, sicut materia nostra vel corpus nostrum extenditur magnitudine et perficitur per animam intellectivam non extensam; sed nulla materia est in habente talem potentiam, ex praeostensa conclusione a Philosopho. Ex ista ergo immaterialitate - praeostensa per Philosophum et modo ostensa in ista conclusione - habet ista ratio efficaciam.	14. But how does this result, that every such power would not exist in a magnitude, relate to the intended proposition [nn.5-6],? I reply. By joining with this result the conclusion proved earlier by the Philosopher [Metaphysics 12.6.1071b19-22], - that such a 'potent thing' is without matter - the intended proposition follows. For, because it is by extension that a thing is extended, or, if extension were to be per se existent, there would be something that was the form informing the extension, and the form would be extended per accidens, -therefore if the infinite power were to be posited in a magnitude, I ask what thing is this extension of magnitude? Not the infinite power itself, as was proved [n.13], - nor does the infinite power perfect the magnitude as form does matter, because the power is not in matter, from the conclusion shown before [sc. by the Philosopher ibid.]; therefore one would have to posit that the matter is what is extended with this magnitude, which matter would be perfected by infinite power, just as our matter or our body is extended in magnitude and is perfected by a non-extended intellective soul; but there is no matter in a possessor of such [infinite] power, from the conclusion shown before by the Philosopher [ibid.]. From this immateriality then - shown before by the Philosopher and just shown in this conclusion [n.13] - the reasoning in question [that God is not a quantity, n.10] gets its efficacy.
15 Tertia probatur conclusio specialiter ex istis: quia enim Deus non est materialis nec quantus, ideo non est capax accidentis alicuius materialis, convenientis rei materiali sicut qualitas rei materialis; ergo tantum est capax illorum quae conveniunt spiritibus - puta intellectionis et volitionis, et habituum correspondentium - sed talia non possunt esse accidentia illi naturae, sicut probatum est distinctione 2 quia intelligere eius et velle eius sunt substantia eius, et habitus et potentia, etc. ƿSecundo probo generaliter propositum.	15. [God is not from subject and accident] - The third conclusion is proved specifically from these [first two conclusions, nn.7, 10]: for because God is not material or a quantity, therefore he is not capable of any material accident fitting a material thing in the way a quality fits a material thing; therefore he is only capable of those accidents that fit spirits - to wit intellection and will and the corresponding habits - but such things cannot be accidents of such a nature, as was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.89-110], because its understanding and its willing, and its habit and power etc., are its substance.
16 Primo ex ratione necesse esse, - quia si Primum sit compositum, sint componentia a et b; quaero de a, si sit ex se formaliter necesse esse, aut non, sed possibile esse (alterum istorum oportet dare in quacumque re, sive in omni natura ex qua aliquid componitur). Si est ex se possibile esse, ergo necesse esse ex se componitur ex possibili, et ita non erit necesse esse; si a est ex se necesse esse, ergo est ex se ultima actualitate, et ita cum nullo facit per se unum. Similiter, si ex se est necesse esse compositum, erit necesse esse per a, et pari ratione erit necesse.esse per b, et ita erit bis necesse esse; erit etiam compositum necesse esse per aliquid, quo sublato nihil minus erit necesse esse, quod est impossibile.	16. Second I prove the intended proposition [n.5] generally. [From necessary existence] - First from the idea of necessary existence, - because if the First thing is composite, let the components be a and b; I ask about a, whether it is of itself formally necessary existence, or is not but is possible existence (one of these two must be given in each thing, or in the whole nature, from which something is composed). But if it is of itself possible existence, then necessary existence of itself is composed of possible existence, and so it will not be necessary existence; if a is of itself necessary existence, then it is of itself in ultimate actuality, and so with nothing can it make itself to be per se one thing. Likewise, if the composite is of itself necessary existence, it will be necessary existence through a, and by parity of reasoning it will be necessary existence through b, and so it will be twice necessary existence; it will also be a composite necessary existence through something which, when taken away, will leave it to be no less necessary existence, which is impossible.
17 Secundo ostendo generaliter propositum ex ratione infinitatis, et primo quod Deus non sit componibilis: per hoc, quod omne componibile potest esse pars alicuius totius compositi quod est ex ipso et alio componibili; omnis autem pars potest excedi; contra rationem vero infiniti est posse excedi, ergo etc.	17. [From infinity] - Second I show the intended proposition from the idea of infinity, - and first that God is not combinable; for this reason, that everything combinable can be part of some composite whole which is combinable from itself and from something else; but every part can be exceeded; but to be able to be exceeded is contrary to the idea of infinity; therefore etc.
18 Et confirmatur ratio, et quasi idem est, - quia omne componibile caret perfectione illius cum quo componitur, ita quod illud ƿcomponibile non habet in se omnem et omnimodam identitatem cum illo, quia tunc non posset cum illo componi; nullum infinitum caret eo cum quo potest esse aliquo modo idem, immo omne tale habet in se secundum perfectam identitatem, quia alias posset intelligi perfectius, puta si haberet illud in se sicut 'compositum' habet et illud 'infinitum' non habet; contra rationem autem infiniti simpliciter est quod ipsum posset intelligi perfectius vel aliquid perfectius eo.	18. And there is a confirmation of the reason, and it is almost the same, - because everything combinable lacks the perfection of that with which it is combined, such that the combinable does not have in itself complete identity, and identity in every way, with that with which it is combined, because then it could not be combined with it; nothing infinite lacks that with which it can in some way be the same, nay everything such has all that in itself according to perfect identity; because otherwise it could be understood to be more perfect, for example if it had all that in itself as a 'composite' has it and if the 'infinite' does not have it; but it is contrary to the idea of infinity simply that it could be understood to be more perfect, or that something could be understood to be more perfect than it.
19 Ex hoc sequitur ulterius quod sit omnino incompositus, quia si sit compositus, aut ergo ex finitis, aut ex infinitis: si ex infinitis, nullum tale est componibile, ex probatis; Si ex finitis, ipsum non erit infinitum, quia finita non reddunt aliquid infinitum in perfectione sicut modo loquimur.	19. From this follows further that it is altogether incomposite, - because if it is composite, then composed either of finite things or of infinite things; if of infinite things, nothing such is combinable, from what has been proved [nn.17-18]; if of finite things, then it will not be infinite, because finite things do not render anything infinite in the perfection that we are now speaking of.
20 Ad primum argumentum dico quod simplicitas est simpliciter perfectionis secundum quod excludit componibilitatem et compositionem ex actu et potentia vel ex perfectione et imperfectione, sicut dicetur in sequenti quaestione.	20. To the first argument [n.1] I say that simplicity is simply a mark of perfection according as it excludes combinability and composition of act and potency or of perfection and imperfection, as will be said in the following question [nn.32-34].
21 Nec tamen sequitur quod omnis creatura simplex sit perfectior creatura non simplici, quia aliquid quod est simpliciter perfectionis potest repugnare alicui naturae limitatae, et ita illa non esset simpliciter talis natura perfecte si haberet illud quod sibi repugnat: ƿita canis non esset simpliciter perfectus canis si esset sapiens, quia repugnat sibi sapientia. Similiter, alicui naturae limitatae potest repugnare una perfectio simpliciter et alia non, - et tunc non sequitur illam naturam esse perfectiorem cui convenit talis perfectio quam cui repugnat, maxime quando illi cui ista repugnat convenit alia perfectio simpliciter, quae forte simpliciter est perfectior illa alia, repugnante. Exemplum: 'actualitas' est perfectio simpliciter et 'simplicitas' est perfectio simpliciter; composito autem convenit maior actualitas, licet non maior simplicitas, - materiae autem licet conveniat simplicitas, non tamen tanta actualitas quanta convenit composito; simpliciter autem actualitas est perfectior simplicitate, - et ita, simpliciter, perfectius potest esse illud cui convenit actualitas sine simplicitate quam illud cui convenit simplicitas sine actualitate.	21. Nor, however, does it follow that every simple creature is a more perfect creature than a non-simple one [n.1], because something that is simply a mark of perfection can be repugnant to any limited nature, and so it would not simply be such a nature if it had that which is repugnant to it; so a dog would not be a simply perfect dog if it were wise, because wisdom is repugnant to it. Likewise, to any limited nature one perfection simply can be repugnant and another one not be, - and then it does not follow that that nature is more perfect to which such a perfection as is repugnant to it belongs, especially when there belongs to that to which this perfection is repugnant another perfection simply, which latter perfection is perhaps simply more perfect than the former, the repugnant one. An example: 'actuality' is a perfection simply and 'simplicity' is a perfection simply; but to a composite there belongs greater actuality though not greater simplicity, - while to matter, although there belongs simplicity, there does not however belong as much actuality as belongs to the composite; simply, however, actuality is more perfect than simplicity, - and so, simply, that to which actuality without simplicity belongs can be more perfect than that to which simplicity without actuality belongs.
22 Sed hic videntur dubia: unum, quomodo perfectio simpliciter est quae non est perfectio ubicumque, cum de ratione simpliciter perfectionis sit quod 'ipsum sit simpliciter melius, in unoquoque, quam non ipsum', secundum Anselmum, Monologion 15; secundum dubium est, quomodo una perfectio simpliciter est perfectior alia absolute.	22. But there seem to be doubts here: one, how a perfection simply is something that is not a perfection everywhere, although it is of the idea simply of perfection that 'it be simply better, in each thing, than not-it', according to AnselmMonologion ch.15; the second doubt is how one perfection simply is more perfect than another absolutely.
23 Ad primum dico quod ista descriptio sic debet intelligi, quod ƿperfectio simpliciter est melius non tantum suo contradictorio (ita enim quodcumque positivum est melius et perfectius simpliciter sua negatione, immo nulla negatio est perfectio aliqua formaliter), sed intelligitur sic 'ipsum est melius quam non ipsum' - id est 'quolibet sibi incompossibili' - et tunc debet intelligi hoc quod dicitur 'in quolibet est melius', considerando praecise quodlibet in quantum suppositum, non determinando in qua natura illud suppositum subsistat. Considerando enim aliquid in quantum subsistit in aliqua natura, potest aliqua perfectio simpliciter esse non melior sibi, quia incompossibilis sibi ut est in tali natura, quia repugnat tali naturae; tamen ei in quantum praecise subsistens est non repugnat, sed si hoc modo consideretur illam habere erit simpliciter perfectius ens quam si haberet quodcumque sibi incompossibile.	23. To the first I say that this description [from Anselm's Monologion] ought to be thus understood, that perfection simply is not only better than its contradictory (for thus anything positive is better and more perfect simply than its negation, nay no negation is a perfection formally), but this is how is understood the remark 'it is better than not-it' - that is, than 'anything incompossible with it' - and then should the remark which is 'in anything it is better' be understood by considering the 'anything' precisely insofar as it is a supposit, without determining in what nature the supposit subsists [cf. I d.2 n.384]. For, by considering something insofar as it subsists in a nature, some perfection simply is able to be not better for it, because it is incompossible with it as it is in such nature, because it is repugnant to such nature; yet it is not repugnant to it insofar precisely as it is subsistent, but it will be a simply more perfect being if it is in this way considered to have it than if it had whatever [sc. perfection simply] is incompossible with it.
24 Ad secundum dubium dico quod requirit declarationem 'quis sit ordo perfectionum simpliciter'. Et modo, breviter, supponatur quod sit aliquis ordo perfectionis inter eas, ita quod aliqua ex ratione sui est perfectior alia praecise sumpta, licet quando quaelibet est in summo tunc sint omnes aeque perfectae, quia infinitae, et quaelibet tunc est infinita. De hoc alias.	24. To the second doubt [n.22] I say that clarification is required of 'what is the order of perfections simply'. And now, briefly, let it be supposed that there is some order of perfection among them such that one is of its idea more perfect than another precisely taken, although when any of them exists in supreme degree then all are equally perfect, because infinite - and then any of them is infinite. About this elsewhere.
25 Ad secundum principale dico quod 'dare alicui esse formaliter' necessario ponit limitationem, quia sic dans esse non includit per identitatem illud cui dat esse; nec potest separari a sic dare ƿesse imperfectio, quia nec limitatio, nec etiam dependentia omnimoda: licet enim separetur ab eo dependentia ad materiam, semper tamen manet dependentia ad efficiens virtute cuius forma informat materiam. Et si instetur de Verbo, quod dat esse naturae humanae, - non est hoc dare esse formaliter, sicut patebit libro III distinctione 1.	25. To the second principal argument [n.2] I say that 'to give something being formally' necessarily posits a limitation, because what thus gives being does not include by identity that to which it gives being; nor can imperfection be separated from thus giving being, because neither can limitation, or even every sort of dependence, be separated from it; for although dependence on matter be separated from it, yet there always remains dependence on the efficient cause by virtue of which the form informs the matter. And if an instance be made about the Word, that it gives being to human nature, - this is not to give being formally, as will be clear in book 3 distinction 1 [III d.1 qq.1-5]
26 Ad tertium dico quod sapientia secundum illam rationem secundum quam est species qualitatis et accidens in nobis, non est eiusdem rationis in Deo, sicut melius patebit distinctione ista, quaestione illa 'Utrum Deus in genere'.	26. To the third [n.3] I say that wisdom, according to the idea by which it is a species of quality and an accident in us, is not of the same idea in God, as will be clear in this distinction better at the question 'Whether God is in a genus' [nn.112-113].