Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/Prologus/P3Q1/A4

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Art. 4
158 Ex his dictis respondeo ad secundam quaestionem. Ad cuius intellectum pono exemplum: homo intelligitur ut animal rationale, ut substantia, ut mansuetum, ut nobilissimum animalium. In primo intelligitur secundum rationem quiditativam propriam, in secundo in communi, in tertio per accidens, in passione, in quarto in respectu ad aliud. Sed perfectissima notitia de homine non potest esse in respectu ad aliud, quia respectus praesupponit notitiam absoluti; nec de homine sub ratione passionis, quia notitia passionis praesupponit notitiam sublecti; nec de homine in communi sive in universali, quia illa confusa est. Ergo nobilissima coƿgnitio de homine est secundum rationem eius quiditativam. - Ita posset poni de Deo aliqua scientia sub ratione respectus ad extra, ut aliqui ponunt sub ratione reparatoris, glorificatoris, vel capitis Ecclesiae; vel posset poni de Deo aliqua scientia sub ratione aliqua attributali, quae est quasi passio, sicut aliqui ponunt de Deo sub ratione boni esse hanc scientiam; vel posset poni de Deo sub ratione communi et universali, ut entis, vel entis infiniti, vel necesse esse, vel alicuius talis.	158. From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. To make it intelligible I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first sense he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in a general way, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because knowledge of relation presupposes knowledge of what is non-relational or absolute; nor can the most perfect knowledge be about man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in general or universally, because that is confused or unspecific knowledge. Therefore the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. Thus one could posit some science of God under the idea of relation to something extrinsic, in the way that some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or of glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or one could posit some science of God under the idea of some attribute, which is a sort of property, in the way that some posit that knowledge of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137] is this science; or one could posit some science of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n.146-147], as under that of being, or infinite being, or necessary being, or some such thing.
159 Contra istas omnes positiones arguitur. Primo contra illam de ratione communi, nam nullus conceptus communis dictus de Deo continet virtualiter omnes veritates proprie theologicas pertinentes ad pluralitatem personarum; nam si sic, cum illi communes conceptus naturaliter concipiantur a nobis, igitur propositiones immediatae de illis conceptibus possunt a nobis naturaliter cognosci et intelligi, et per illas propositiones immeƿdiatas possemus scire conclusiones, et ita totam theologiam naturaliter acquirere.	159. Argument against all these positions. First against the one about general idea, for no general concept asserted of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths that pertain to the plurality of persons; for if it did, since those general concepts are naturally conceived by us, then the immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we would be able to know the conclusions, and so acquire naturally the whole of theology.
160 Secundo, quia ex quo conceptus communes non sunt soli Deo naturaliter noti, ergo nec veritates inclusae in illis conceptibus communibus; theologia igitur si esset de Deo sub tali ratione communi, non esset soli Deo naturaliter nota, cuius oppositum ostensum est in prima quaestione.	160. Second, because since general concepts are not naturally known only to God, then neither are the truths included in those general concepts naturally known only to God; therefore theology, if it was of God under such a general concept, would not be naturally known only to God, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].
161 Contra aliam positionem de ratione attributali posset argui per easdem rationes, sed arguo tamen per alias speciales. Primo, quia cognitio eius secundum quod quid est est perfectissima secundum quod dicit Philosophus VII Metaphysicae; igitur cognitio istius essentiae est perfectior cognitio de Deo quam cognitio alicuius proprietatis attributalis, quae se habet ut passio huius naturae, secundum Damascenum libro I cap. 4.	161. Against the other position about the idea of attribute [n.158] one could argue through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through certain special reasons. First, because cognition of a thing according to its essence is the most perfect cognition, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of God’s essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributable property which is related to his nature as a characteristic of it, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.4.
162 Secundo, quia si illae proprietates re differrent ab essentia, essentia esset realiter causa earum; igitur sicut differunt ratione, ita essentia de ratione sua habet rationem incausati, aliae autem licet propter identitatem cum essentia sint incausatae, non tamen secundum rationem formalem primo includunt incausationem sui. ƿ	162. Second, because if those properties differ really from God’s essence, his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea from the essence, so the essence in its idea has the idea of being uncaused but these other properties, although, because of their identity with the essence, they are uncaused, yet, in their formal idea, do not include as a primary datum their own being uncaused.
163 Tertio, quia illud secundum suam rationem propriam videtur esse actualius in se cui magis repugnat communicabilitas ad plura ad extra; sed essentiae de se repugnat communicabilitas ad plura ad extra, et nulli proprietati attributali, nisi quatenus est istius essentiae, vel idem isti essentiae in quantum infinitae. Si dicatur quod quaelibet proprietas est infinita, et ideo incommunicabilis, contra: infinitas illa est propter infinitatem et identitatem cum essentia sicut ex radice et fundamento omnis perfectionis intrinsecae.	163. Third, because that thing, according to its own proper idea, seems to be more actual in itself which has a greater repugnance to being communicable with many things extrinsic to it; but communicability with many things extrinsic to it is repugnant to essence in itself and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as that essence as infinite. If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: its infinity is because of an infinity and identity with the essence as with the root source and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.
164 Contra etiam viam de respectibus ad extra potest sic argui sicut contra alias duas vias, sed facio rationes speciales. Primo, quia respectus ad extra est respectus rationis; sed scientia non considerans subiectum suum sub ratione reali non est realis, sicut nec logica est realis licet consideret de rebus ut eis attribuuntur intentiones secundae; igitur theologia non esset realis scientia, quod est falsum.	164. Against the way also about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] one can make the same arguments as against the other two ways, but I have special reasons. First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason; but a science that does not consider its subject under its idea as real is not a science of real things, just as neither is logic a science of real things, although it considers things as having second intentions attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science of real things, which is false.
165 Secundo, quia absolutum et respectus non faciunt aliquem unum conceptum per se; igitur conceptus aggregans ista duo in se est conceptus unus per accidens. Nulla scientia prima est de conceptu ƿ uno per accidens, quia talis praesupponit scientias de utraque parte; et ideo si scientia subalternata sit de aliquo uno per accidens, praesupponit duas scientias tractantes de partibus illius totius separatim. Igitur si theologia esset de tali uno per accidens, posset esse alia prior ea, quae esset de conceptu uno per se.	165. Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form a concept that is per se one; therefore a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept that is per accidens one. But no primary science is of a concept that is per accidens one, because such a concept presupposes the sciences of both its parts; and therefore, if a subalternate science is about anything that is per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that separately treat of the parts of the whole. Therefore if theology were of such a per accidens unity, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept that is one per se.
166 Tertio: nullus respectus ad extra ostenditur Deo necessario convenire; igitur nihil theologicum necessario sibi conveniet ut est subiectum theologiae, quod est falsum. - Probatio consequentiae: quod convenit alicui sub ratione non necessario inhaerentis, non convenit ei necessario; sed omnis respectus ad extra est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Et ita nulla veritas theologica est necessaria. Et haec conclusio probatur per primam rationem et secundam positas ad primam quaestionem, scilicet de ratione primi subiecti et de notis soli Deo naturaliter.	166. Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God; therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to God as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: that which belongs to anything under a reason for inherence that is not necessary does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And thus no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question, namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only by God.
167 Concedo igitur quartum membrum, videlicet quod theologia est de Deo sub ratione qua scilicet est haec essentia, sicut perfectissima scientia de homine esset de homine si esset de eo secundum quod homo, non autem sub aliqua ratione universali vel accidentali. ƿ	167. I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], that is, that theology is of God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him as he is man, but not if it were of him under some universal or accidental idea.
168 Ad primam quaestionem de theologia nostra dico quod quando habitus est in aliquo intellectu habens evidentiam ex obiecto, tunc primum obiectum illius habitus ut est illius non tantum continet virtualiter illum habitum, sed ut notum intellectui ipsi continet illum habitum ita quod notitia obiecti in isto intellectu continet evidentiam habitus ut in isto intellectu. In habitu vero non habente evidentiam ex obiecto sed causatam aliunde non oportet dare primum obiectum eius habere duas dictas eius condiciones; immo neutram oportet dare, quia perinde est habitui ut in hoc ac si esset de contingentibus, quae neutro modo habent obiectum primum. Tali igitur habitui non evidenti ex obiecto datur subiectum primum de aliquo primo noto, id est perfectissimo primo, id est cui immediate insunt veritates primae illius habitus. - Theologia nostra est habitus non habens evidentiam ex obiecto; et etiam illa quae est in nobis de theologicis necessariis ƿ non magis ut in nobis habet evidentiam ex obiecto cognito quam illa quae est de contingentibus; igitur theologiae nostrae ut nostra est non oportet dare nisi obiectum primum notum, de quo immediate cognoscantur primae veritates. Illud primum est ens infinitum, quia iste est conceptus perfectissimus quem possumus habere de illo quod est in se primum subiectum, quod tamen neutram praedictam condicionem habet, quia non continet virtualiter habitum nostrum in se, nec multo magis ut nobis notum continet ipsum habitum. Tamen quia theologia nostra de necessariis est de eisdem ƿ de quibus est theologia in se, ideo sibi assignatur primum obiectum quoad hoc quod est continere veritates in se, et hoc idem quod est primum subiectum theologiae in se; sed quia illud non est nobis evidens, ideo non est continens istas ut nobis notum, immo non est nobis notum. Cum igitur arguis 'ergo non est primum obiectum nostri habitus', respondeo: verum est quod non est primum obiectum dans evidentiam nobis, sed est primum subiectum continens omnes veritates in se, natum vel potens dare evidentiam sufficienter si ipsum cognosceretur. Haec dicta sunt ad quaestionem vel ad duas quaestiones de theologia necessariorum.	168. To the first question about our theology [nn.124, 141] I say that when a habit exists in an intellect which gets evidence from the object, then the first object of that habit, as it belongs to the habit, does not only contain the habit virtually but, as known to the intellect, it contains the habit in such a way that the knowledge of the object in the intellect contains, as it is in the intellect, the evidence of the habit. But in a habit that does not get evidence from the object, but gets it caused in some other way, one must not grant that its first object has the two conditions just stated; nay rather one should not grant either condition, because it is just like a habit that would in this respect be about things contingent, which contingent things do not have the first object in either way. To such a habit, then, which does not get evidence from the object, there is given a first subject about some first known thing, that is, some most perfectly first thing, that is, in which the first truths of the habit immediately inhere. – Our theology is a habit which does not get evidence from the object; and also the theology that is in us about necessary theological matters, as it exists in us, does not more get evidence from the known object than the theology that is about contingent theological matters does; therefore to our theology, as it is ours, one should only give a first known object that has first truths immediately known about it. That first object is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept which we can have about what is in itself the first subject, which subject, however, has neither foresaid condition, because it does not virtually contain our habit in itself, and much less does it, as known to us, contain the habit itself. Yet because our theology about necessary things is about the same as what theology in itself is about, therefore to it is assigned an object that is first to the extent of containing the truths in itself, and this object is the same as the first subject of theology in itself; but because it is not evident to us, therefore it does not contain those truths as it is known to us, indeed rather it is not known to us. When you argue, then, that “therefore it is not the first object of our habit” [n.146], I reply: it is true that it is not a first object that gives evidence to us, but it is a first object that contains all the truths in itself, naturally fit or capable of sufficiently giving evidence, were it known. These things are said to the question, or to the two questions, about the theology of necessary things [nn.124, 133, 141, 151-168].