Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio II (Quaracchi)/D3/Question 1

QUESTION 1: Whether material substance is individual or singular from itself, or from its nature?

Material substance from its nature is not of itself a this, for then the understanding could not understand it under the opposite (universal) aspect, unless it understood its object in a manner repugnant to its nature. Furthermore, anything whose proper and sufficient unity is less than numerical unity, is not one of itself by a numerical unity, nor is it this of itself. But (as Scotus argues) there can be a real unity less than numerical unity.

• Distinction III: purpose and division
• First main argument (for the affirmative)
• Views holding a nature to be singular from itself
• First argument against this theory
• Second argument against the theory
• Proofs that there can be a real unity less than numerical unity
• Reply to the main question: material substance from its nature is not individual
• How a nature could be understood to be of itself indifferent to singular unity
• Reply to the positive main argument
• Reply to the argument for Marston’s view

Question

Latin	English
[1] [Distinctionis III. obiectum et divisio]	Distinction III: purpose and division
Circa distinctionem tertiam quaero primo de distinctione personali in Angelis. Et ad videndum de ista distinctione in eis, primo quaerendum est de distinctione individuali in substantiis materialibus. De qua sicut diversi diversimodi dicunt, ita consequenter dicunt de pluralitate individuorum in eadem specie angelica, et etiam de implurificabilitate. Et ut videatur de diversis opinionibus distincte quae quaeruntur de distinctione vel indistinctione substantiae materialis, quaero singillatim de diversis modis ponendi.	Concerning the third distinction, I ask first about personal distinction in the Angels. And for seeing this distinction in them, first we must ask about individual distinction in material substances. About which, just as diverse persons speak in different ways, so consequently they speak of the plurality of individuals in the same angelic species, and also of ‘implurifiability’. And so that the different opinions which are asked about the distinction or non-distinction of material substance are distinctly visible, I ask individually about the diverse modes of giving the distinction.
[2] Quaestio 1. [Proponitur quaestio]. Primo: Utrum materialis substantia ex se sive ex natura sua sit individua vel singularis?	Question 1. [Proposing the question] First, whether material substance is individual or singular from itself, or from its nature?
[3] [Argumentum principale 1]	First main argument [argument for the affirmative]
Videtur quod sic: Philos. VII. Metaph., contra Platonem, probat quod substantia cuiuscumque rei est propria illi cuius est, et non inest alii; igitur substantia materialis ex natura sua, circumscripto omni alio, est propria ei cui inest, ita quod ex natura sua non potest inesse alii; ergo ex natura sua est individua.	It seems that it is. The philosopher proves against Plato that the substance of any thing is proper to that of which it is, and does not inhere in another. Accordingly, material substance is from its nature – ignoring all else - proper to that in which it inheres, so that from its nature it cannot inhere in another thing. Therefore from its own nature it is individual.
[4] Contra: Quidquid inest alicui ex natura sua per se inest ei in quocumque; igitur si natura lapidis de se est haec in quocumque est lapidis natura, ista natura esset hic lapis. Consequens est inconveniens, loquendo de singularitate determinata, de qua est quaestio.	Against. Whatever from its own nature inheres in something per se, inheres in it in any [circumstance]. Accordingly, if the nature of a stone is ‘this’ of itself, [then] whatever the nature of a stone is in, that nature would be this stone. The consequence is absurd, in speaking of determinate singularity (which the question is about).
Praeterea, cui de se convenit unum oppositum, ei de se repugnat aliud oppositum; igitur si natura de se sit una numero, ex se repugnat ei multitudo numeralis.	Furthermore, what one opposite belongs to of itself, the other opposite is repugnant to of itself. Accordingly, if a nature is one in number of itself, numerical multitude is of itself repugnant to it.
[5] [Exponitur sententia tenens naturam esse ex se singularem]	[Views holding a nature to be singular from itself]
Hic dicitur quod sicut natura ex se formaliter est natura, ita ex se est singularis, ita quod non oportet quaerere aliam causam singularitatis a causa naturae, quasi natura prius tempore vel natura sit natura antequam sit singularis, et tunc per aliquid adveniens contrahatur ut fiat singularis.	Here it is said [by some persons] that just as a nature of itself is formally a nature, so from itself it is singular, so that one must not seek another cause of singularity than the cause of the nature, as if a nature were a nature prior (in time or in nature), before it was singular, and then through something applied to it, it is contracted so as to become singular.
[6] Quod probatur per simile: quia sicut natura habet ex se verum esse extra animam, non autem habet esse in anima nisi ab alio, id est ab ipsamet anima (et ratio est, quia esse verum convenit ei simpliciter, esse autem in anima est esse eius secundum quid), ita universalitas non convenit rei nisi secundum quod habet esse secundum quid, scilicet in anima; singularitas autem convenit rei secundum verum esse, et ita ex se et simpliciter.	Which is proved by similar [reasoning]: for just as a nature has of itself true being outside the soul, but does not have being in the soul except from another (i.e. from the soul itself – the reason being that true being belongs to it without qualification, but being in the soul is being in a qualified sense), so universality does not belong to a thing except according as it has being in a qualified sense, namely in the soul. But singularity belongs to a thing according to true being, and so from itself and without qualification.
Est ergo quaerenda causa, quare natura est universalis, et dandus est intellectus pro causa; non autem quaerenda est aliqua causa, quare natura est singularis alia a natura rei, medians inter ipsam et singularitatem eius: sed quae sunt causae unitatis (a) rei sunt et causae singularitatis rei; igitur &c.	Therefore we must seek a cause why nature is universal – and the understanding is to be given as [such] a cause. But some cause is not to be sought why a nature is singular, other than the nature of the thing, mediating itself and its singularity. But what are the causes of the unity of a thing are [also] the causes of its singularity, therefore &c.
[7] [Impugnatur primo]	[First argument against this theory]
Contra istud arguitur sic: in obiecto in quantum obiectum est prius naturaliter ipso actu; et in illo priori, per te, obiectum est de se singulare, quia hoc semper convenit naturae non acceptae secundum quid, sive secundum esse quod habet in anima; igitur intellectus intelligens illud obiectum sub ratione universalis intelligit ipsum sub ratione opposita suae rationi; nam (b) ut praecedit actum determinatur ex se ad oppositum illius rationis; non igitur in quantum obiectum est, ut scilicet praecederet actum, determinatur ex se ad actum illius rationis, scilicet universalis.	Against that, is argued as follows. In the object (insofar as it is object) it is naturally prior to the actuality itself. And in that priority, according to you, the object is of itself singular, for this always belongs to a nature not taken in a qualified sense, or according to the being that it has in the soul. Accordingly, the understanding, understanding that object under the aspect (ratio) of a universal, understands it under an aspect opposite to its aspect. For, as it precedes the actuality, it is determined of itself to the opposite of that aspect, hence it is determined not insofar as it is an object, i.e. as it would precede actuality, [but] from itself to the actuality of that aspect, namely of the universal.
[8] [Impugnatur secundo]	[Second argument against the theory]
Praeterea, cuiuscumque unitas realis propria et sufficiens est minor unitate numerali, illud non est de se unum unitate numerali, sive non est de se hoc: sed naturae lapidis exsistentis in isto lapide unitas propria realis sive sufficiens est minor unitate numerali; ergo, &c.	Furthermore, anything whose real proper and sufficient unity is less than numerical unity, is not one of itself by a numerical unity, or is not this of itself. But of the nature of a stone existing in this stone, the real proper or sufficient unity is less than numerical unity, therefore &c.
[9] [225] Maior de se patet, quia nihil est de se unum unitate maiori unitate sibi sufficiente; nam si propria unitas quae debetur alicui de se sit minor unitate numerali, unitas numeralis non convenit sibi ex natura sua et secundum se, aliter praecise ex natura sua haberet maiorem et minorem unitatem, quae circa idem et secundum idem sunt opposita, quia cum unitate minori, sine contradictione, stare potest multitudo opposita maiori unitati, quae multitudo non potest stare cum unitate maiori, quia sibi repugnat; igitur &c.	The major premiss is clear of itself, because nothing is of itself one by a unity greater than a unity sufficient to it, for if a proper unity which is appropriate to something of itself is less than numerical unity, numerical unity does not belong to it from its nature, and according to itself, otherwise precisely from its nature it would have a greater and lesser unity, which are opposites concerning the same thing, and according to the same thing. For with a lesser unity, without contradiction, there can stand a multitude opposed to a greater unity [??], which multitude cannot stand with a lesser unity, because it is repugnant to it, therefore &c.
[10] Probatio minoris; quia si nulla est unitas realis naturae minor singularitate, sed omnis unitas alia ab unitate singularis est unitas rationis tantum, igitur nulla erit unitas realis minor unitate numerali: consequens est falsum: quod probabo quinque vel sex viis; ergo &c.	Proof of the minor premiss, because if nothing is a real unity of nature less than singularity, and every unity other than singular unity is a unity of reason only, then nothing will be a real unity less than numerical unity. The consequent is false, which I will prove in five or six ways, therefore &c.
[11] [Ostenditur multipliciter aliquam esse unitatem realem minorem unitate numerali]	[It is shown in a number of ways that something is a real unity less than numerical unity]
Prima via est talis: secundum Philos. X Metaph., in omni genere est unum primum, quod est metrum et mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis;	The first way is this. According to the Philosopher (), in every genus there is [something] one and primary, which is the metric and measure of all things which are of that genus.
[12] ista unitas primi mensurantis est realis, quia Philosophus probat quod uni convenit prima ratio mensurae; et declarat per ordinem quomodo illud est unum cui convenit ratio mensurandi in omni genere: ista autem unitas est alicuius in quantum est primum in genere; ergo est realis, quia mensurata sunt realia et realiter mensurata: ens autem reale non potest realiter mensurari ab ente rationis; igitur unitas illius primi est realis.	That unity of the first measure is real, because the Philosopher proves that the primary logical nature of a measure belongs to the One, and he clarifies in an orderly way how that thing is one which the reason of measuring in every genus belongs to. But that unity belongs to something insofar as it is the first in the genus, therefore it is real, because the things measured are real, and are really measured. But a real being cannot really be measured by a being of reason, accordingly the unity of that first thing is real.
[13] Ista autem unitas non est unitas singularis vel numeralis simpliciter, quia nullum est singulare in genere quod sit mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere; nam, secundum Philos. III. Metaph., in individuis eiusdem speciei non est hoc prius, illud posterius; quod prius,	But that unity is not a singular or numerical unity without qualification, for nothing in a genus is singular that is the measure of all those things which are in that genus, for according to the Philosopher, in individuals of the same species, this [one] is not prior, that one posterior.
[14] licet Comment. exponat de priori constituente posterius, tamen nihil ad B, quia Philos. intendit ibi assignare rationem quare Plato posuit rationem speciei separatam, et non generis, quia in speciebus est ordo essentialis, propter quod posterius potest reduci ad prius.	Although the Commentator explains ‘prior’ as constituting a posterior, still that is not [an argument] against b, because the Philosopher there means to assign a reason why Plato postulated the logical nature of the species, but not the genus, to be separate, because in species there is an essential ordering, on account of which the posterior can be reduced to the prior.
Et ideo, secundum eum, non oportet ponere ideam generis, per cuius participationem species sunt illud quod sunt, sed ideam speciei, ad quam omnes aliae reducuntur. Sed in individuis, secundum Platonem et secundum Philosophum recitantem, non [p226 ] est talis ordo; igitur &c.	And for that reason, according to him [Plato], we do not have to suppose an idea of the genus, through whose participation the species are that thing which they are, but [only have to suppose] the idea of the species, to which all the other [species in the genus] are reduced. But in individuals, according to Plato and according to the Philosopher who is reporting him, there is no such order, therefore &c.
[15] Est ergo intentio Philosophi ibi, in quo concordat cum Platone, quod in individuis eiusdem speciei non est ordo essentialis; nullum ergo individuum est per se mensura eorum quae sunt in specie sua; igitur nec unitas individualis, nec numeralis.	It is therefore the intention of the Philosopher there, in which he agrees with Plato, that in individuals of the same species there is no essential ordering. Therefore no individual is the measure per se of those that are in its species, therefore neither an individual unity, nor numerical.
[16] Praeterea secundo probo quod idem consequens est falsum: quia secundum Philos. VII. Physic., in specie atoma fit comparatio, quia est una natura; non autem in genere, quia genus non habet talem unitatem.	Furthermore, second, I prove that the same consequent is false, for according to the Philosopher, in an indivisible species a comparison happens, because it is one nature. But not in the genus, because the genus does not have such a unity.
[17] Ista vero unitas non est unitas rationis, quia conceptus generis est ita unus apud intellectum sicut conceptus speciei, alioquin nullus conceptus diceretur in quid de multis speciebus, et ita nullus conceptus esset genus, si (a) tot essent conceptus dicti de speciebus, quot sunt conceptus specierum, quia tunc in singulis praedicationibus idem praedicaretur de se. Similiter unitas conceptus vel non conceptus nihil ad intentionem Philosophi ibi, scilicet ad comparationem, vel non. Ergo Philosophus intendit naturam specificam ibi esse unam unitate naturae specificae, non autem intendit ipsam sic esse unam unitate numerali, quia in unitate numerali non fit comparatio; igitur &c.	But that unity is not the unity of reason, because the concept of a genus is in this way one in the understanding, just like the concept of the species, otherwise no concept would be predicated in quid of many species, and so no concept would be a genus if there were as many concepts predicated of the species, as there are concepts of species, because then in individual predications the same would be predicated of itself. Similarly, the unity of the concept or of a non-concept [is] not the intention of the Philosopher there, namely for comparison, or not. Therefore the Philosopher meant there that a specific nature is one by a unity of specific nature, but he did not mean that [nature] to be one by numerical unity, for in numerical unity there is no comparison made, therefore &c.
[18] Item tertio, secundum Philos., V. Metaph. cap. de ad aliquid, idem, simile et aequale fundantur supra unum, ita quod licet similitudo habeat pro fundamento rem de genere qualitatis, relatio tamen non est realis, nisi habeat fundamentum reale et rationem proximam fundandi realem; ergo unitas quae requiritur in fundamento similitudinis relationis est realis: non autem est numeralis, quia nihil unum et idem est simile et aequale sibi ipsi.	Likewise, third, according to the Philosopher, in the chapter on relation, the same, the similar and the equal are based upon the One, so that although similitude has as a basis a thing of the genus of quality, nonetheless relation is not real, unless it has a real basis and a real proximate rationale of the basis. Therefore the unity which is required in the basis of the relation of similitude is real, but it is not numerical, because nothing that is one and the same is similar or equal to itself.
[19] Praeterea quarto, unius oppositionis realis sunt duo extrema realia: contrarietas est oppositio realis; quod patet, quia realiter unum destruit et corrumpit aliud, circumscripto omni opere intellectus, et non nisi quia sunt contraria; igitur utrumque primum extremum istius oppositionis realis, ut est extremum, est unum aliqua unitate reali: non autem unitate numerali, quia tunc praecise hoc album esset primum contrarium huic nigro, vel praecise aliud album: quod est inconveniens, quia tunc esset tot contrarietates primae quot individua contraria; igitur &c. [p227]	Furthermore, fourth, there are two real extremes of a single real opposition. Contrariety is real opposition, which is clear because one thing really destroys and corrupts another (ignoring every operation of the understanding) and only because they are contraries. Accordingly both primary extremes of the real opposition, so far as they are extremes, are one by a real unity, but not by a numerical unity, because then precisely this white object would be the primary contrary to this black, which is an absurdity. For then there would be as many primary contraries as individual contraries, therefore &c.
[20] Praeterea quinto, unius actionis sensus est unum obiectum secundum aliquam unitatem realem:	Furthermore fifth, of one action of the sense there is one object according to some real unity.
[21] sed non numeralem; ergo est aliqua alia unitas realis quam unitas numeralis. Probatio minoris: quia potentia cognoscens obiectum sic, in quantum scilicet hac unitate unum, cognoscit ipsum in quantum distinctum a quolibet quod non est hac unitate unum: sed sensus non cognoscit obiectum in quantum est distinctum a quolibet quod non est unum ista unitate numerali; quod patet, quia nullus sensus distinguit hunc radium Solis differre numeraliter ab illo radio, cum tamen sint diversi per motum Solis, si circumscribantur omnia sensibilia communia, puta diversitas loci vel situs; et si ponerentur duo quanta simul omnino per potentiam divinam, quae essent omnino similia et aequalia in albedine et quantitate, visus non distingueret ibi esse duo alba; si tamen cognosceret alterum istorum, in quantum est unum unitate numerali, cognosceret ipsum in quantum distinctum numeraliter a quolibet alio.	But not numerical, therefore there is some other real unity other than numerical unity. Proof of the minor: because the power knowing the object in this way, namely insofar as [it is] one by this unity, knows it insofar it is distinct from whatever that is not one by this unity. But sense does not know an object insofar as it is distinct from whatever is not one by that numerical unity, which is clear, because no sense distinguishes this ray of the sun to differ numerically from that ray, even though they are diverse through the motion of the sun, if all common sensibilia are set aside (such as diversity of place or position). And if two quanta were supposed to be exactly together by divine power, which were entirely similar and equal in whiteness and quantity, sight would not distinguish two white things to be there. If nevertheless it were to know one or the other of those, insofar as it is one by numerical unity, it would know it insofar as [it is] distinct numerically from any other.
[22] Posset etiam iuxta hoc argui de primo obiecto sensus, quod est unum in se aliqua unitate reali; quia sicut obiectum huius potentiae in quantum obiectum praecedit intellectum, ita etiam secundum unitatem suam realem praecedit omnem actum intellectus.	One could also argue in connection with this, concerning the primary object of sense, that it is one in itself by some real unity, for just as the object of this power (insofar as [it is an] object) precedes the understanding, so also according to its real unity it precedes every actuality of the understanding.
Sed ista ratio non ita concludit sicut praecedens; posset enim poni aliquod primum obiectum ut est adaequatum potentiae esse aliquod commune abstractum ab omnibus obiectis particularibus, et ita non habere unitatem nisi communitatis ad ista plura obiecta particularia; sed de uno obiecto unius actus sentiendi non videtur vere posse negari quin necessario haberet unitatem realem, et minorem unitate numerali.	But that reasoning is not conclusive as is the preceding one, for it could be supposed that some primary object, as far as it is adequate to the potentiality, is something common abstracted from all particular objects, and thus does not have a unity, unless the unity of commonality with those several particular objects. But of a single object of a single act of sensing it does not seem able to be denied but that it would necessarily have a real unity, and less than a numerical unity.
[23] Item sexto, quia si omnis unitas realis est numeralis, ergo omnis diversitas realis est numeralis: sed consequens est falsum, quia omnis diversitas numeralis in quantum numeralis est aequalis, et ita omnia essent aeque distincta, et tunc sequitur quod non plus potest intellectus abstrahere a Socrate et Platone aliquod commune quam a Socrate et linea, et esset quodlibet universale purum figmentum.	Likewise, sixth, because if every real unity is numerical, then every real diversity is numerical. But the consequent is false, because every numerical diversity, insofar as numerical, is equal, and so all would be equally distinct, and then it would follow that the understanding could no more abstract something common from Socrates and from Plato than from Socrates and a line, and anything universal would be a mere figment.
[24] Prima consequentia probatur dupliciter: Primo, quia unum et multa, idem et diversum sunt opposita, X Metaph.: toties autem dicitur unum oppositum quoties et reliquum, ex [p. 228] I. Topic.; ergo cuilibet unitati correspondet sua propria diversitas.	The first consequence is proved in two ways. First, because one and many, the same and diverse are opposite. But one opposite is predicated as many times as the other. Therefore to any unity there corresponds its proper diversity.
[25] Praeterea secundo, quia cuiuslibet diversitatis utrumque extremum est in se unum; et eodem modo quo est unum in se, eodem modo videtur diversum a reliquo extremo, ita quod unitas extremi unius potest per se esse ratio diversitatis alterius extremi.	Furthermore, second, because of any diversity each extreme is in itself one, and in the same way by which it is one in itself, in the same way it seems diverse from the other extreme, so that the unity of one extreme can be per se the reason of diversity of the other extreme.
[26] Confirmatur, quia si tantum est in hac re unitas realis numeralis, quaecumque entitas (a) est in re, illa est ex se una numero; ergo istud et illud secundum omnem entitatem in eis sunt primo diversa, et (b) in nullo aliquo modo convenientia.	This is confirmed, because if real numerical unity is only in this thing, whatever entity is in the thing, is from itself one in number. Therefore one thing and another are primarily diverse according to every entity in them, and agree in nothing in any way.
[27] Confirmatur etiam per hoc, quia diversitas numeralis est hoc singulare non esse illud singulare, supposita tamen entitate utriusque extremi: sed talis unitas est necessario alterius extremi.	This is also confirmed by the fact that numerical diversity is this singular not being that singular (supposing the being of each extreme). But such a unity necessarily belongs to the other extreme.
[28] Item septimo, nullo existente intellectu, ignis causaret ignem, et corrumperet aquam, et esset aliqua unitas realis generantis ad genitum secundum formam, propter quam generatio esset univoca; intellectus enim considerans non facit generationem esse univocam, sed cognoscit eam esse univocam.	Likewise, seventh, with no understanding existing, fire would cause fire, and would corrupt water, and would be some real unity of the one generating to the one generated according to form, on account of which generation would be univocal, for the understanding considering does not make generation univocal, but knows it to be univocal.
[29] [Ostenditur substantiam materialem ex natura sua non esse individuam]	[Reply to the main question. It is shown that material substance from its nature is not individual]
Ad quaestionem igitur concedo conclusionem istarum rationum, et dico quod substantia materialis ex natura sua non est de se haec; quia tunc, sicut deducit prima ratio, non posset intellectus intelligere ipsam sub opposito, nisi intelligeret obiectum suum sub ratione intelligendi repugnanti rationi talis obiecti.	To the question accordingly I concede the conclusion of those reasonings, and I say that material substance from its nature is not of itself this, because then, just as the first reasoning deduces, the understanding could not understand it under the opposite [aspect], unless it understood its object under an aspect of understanding repugnant to the logical aspect of such an object
[30] Sicut etiam deducit secunda ratio cum suis probationis omnibus, aliqua est unitas in re realis, absque omni operatione intellectus, minor unitate numerali sive unitate propria singularis, quae unitas est naturae secundum se; et secundum istam unitatem propriam naturae, ut natura est, natura est indifferens ad unitatem singularem; non ergo de se est sic una unitate illa, scilicet unitate singularitatis.	Also, just as the second reasoning concludes with all its proofs, there is some unity in a thing that is real, without any operation of the understanding, that is less than numerical unity (or than the proper unity of a singular), which unity belongs to a nature according to itself. And according to that proper unity of a nature, as it is a nature, a nature is indifferent to singular unity. Therefore, it is not thus of itself one by that unity, i.e. by the unity of singularity.
[31] [Explicatur qualiter possit intelligi naturam esse de se indifferentem ad unitatem singularem]	[It is explained how a nature could be understood to be of itself indifferent to singular unity]
Qualiter autem potest hoc intelligi, potest aequaliter videri per dictum Avicennae, V. Metaph., ubi vult quod equinitas sit tantum equinitas, nec ex se una, nec plures, nec universalis, nec par[p229]ticularis. Intellige, non est ex se una unitate numerali; nec plures, pluralitate opposita illi unitati: nec universalis actu, eo modo, quo aliquid est universale factum ab intellectu, non ut obiectum intellectus; nec est particularis de se	And how this can be understood, can be seen equally through the saying of Avicenna, where he would have it that ‘Equinity is only equinity, nor from itself one, nor several, nor universal, nor particular. Understand that it is not of itself one by a numerical unity, nor plural by a plurality opposite to that unity, nor universal in actuality in that way by which something is made universal by the understanding, nor as an object of the understanding. Nor is it particular of itself.
[32] Licet enim nunquam sit realiter sine aliquo istorum, non tamen est de se aliquod istorum, sed est prius naturaliter omnibus istis. Et secundum istam prioritatem naturalem est quod quid est et per se obiectum intellectus, et per se ut sic consideratur a Metaphysico, et exprimitur per definitionem : et propositiones per se (a) primo modo sunt verae ratione quidditatis sic acceptae, quia nihil dicitur de quidditate per se primo modo, nisi quod includitur in ea essentialiter in quantum ipsa abstrahitur ab omnibus istis, quae sunt posteriora ipsa naturaliter.	For although it never really exists without one of those things, nevertheless it is not of itself one of those things, but is naturally prior to all of them. And according to that natural priority it is what-something-is and per se an object of the understanding, and per se as such is considered by the metaphysician, and is expressed by a definition, and propositions per se in the first mode are true by reason of the quiddity thus taken, for nothing is predicated of a quiddity per se in the first mode, except what is involved in it essentially insofar as it is abstracted from all of those things, which are posterior to it naturally.
[33] Non solum autem ipsa natura est de se indifferens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc ad esse universale et singulare: sed et ipsa habens esse in intellectu, non habet primo ex se universalitatem; licet enim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitate ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam : tamen universalitas non est pars conceptus eius primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici.	But not only is the nature itself of itself indifferent to being in the understanding and in the particular, and through this [indifferent] to being universal and singular, but also that which has being in the understanding does not primarily of itself have universality. For although it is understood under [the aspect of] universality as under the mode of understanding it, nevertheless universality is not part of its primary concept, because it is not the concept of the metaphysician, but of the logician.
Logicus enim considerat secundas intentiones applicatas primis, secundum ipsum Avicennam. Prima ergo intellectio est naturae, ut ei non cointelligitur aliquis modus, neque qui est eius in intellectu, neque qui est eius extra intellectum, licet illius intellecti modus intelligendi sit universalitas, sed non modus intellecti, id est rei intellectae.	For the logician considers second intentions applied to first [ones], according to Avicenna himself. Therefore the first understanding [intellectio] is of a nature, [such] that no mode is understood together with it, either which belongs to it in the understanding, or outside the understanding, although the mode of understanding of what is understood is universality, but not the mode of what is understood, i.e. of the thing understood.
[34] Et sicut secundum illud esse non est natura de se universalis, sed quasi universalitas accidit illi naturae secundum primam rationem eius, secundum quam est obiectum, ita etiam in re extra, ubi natura est cum singularitate, non est natura illa de se determinata ad singularitatem, sed est prior naturaliter illa ratione contrahente ipsam ad singularitatem illam; et in quantum est prior naturaliter ipso contrahente, non repugnat sibi esse sine illo contrahente.	And just as, according to that being, a nature is not of itself universal, but as if universality befalls that nature according to its primary logical nature, according to which it is an object, so also in the thing outside, where the nature is with singularity, that nature is not of itself determined to singularity, but is naturally prior to that logical nature contracting it to that singularity. And insofar as it is naturally prior to that one contracting, it is not self-repugnant to be without the one contracting.
Et sicut obiectum in intellectu secundum illam entitatem eius et universalitatem habet vere esse intelligibile, ita etiam in rerum natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum [p 230] esse extra animam reale; et secundum illam entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionabilem, quae est indifferens ad singularitatem, ita quod non repugnat illi unitati de se quod cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur.	And just as the object in the intellect, according to that entity and universality belonging to it, truly has intelligible being, so also in reality [in re], the nature according to that entity has true real being outside the soul. And according to that entity it has a unity proportionate to it, which is indifferent to singularity, so that it is not repugnant to that unity of itself that it is posited with any unity of singularity.
[Corollarium] - Hoc ergo modo intelligo naturam habere unitatem realem minorem unitate numerali; et licet non habeat eam de se, ita quod sit intra rationem naturae, quia equinitas est tantum equinitas, secundum Avicen. V. Metaph., tamen illa unitas est passio propria naturae secundum suam entitatem primam, et per consequens nec est ex se haec intranee, nec secundum entitatem xxxxx propriam necessario inclusam in ipsa natura secundum primam entitatem suam.	[Corollary] Therefore, in this way I understand a nature to have a real unity less than numerical unity, and although it does not have it of itself, so that it is within the rationale of the nature, because ‘equinity is only equinity’, according to Avicenna, nevertheless that unity is a proper affection [passio] of a nature according to its primary entity, and as a consequence it is not this of itself intrinsically, nor according to the proper entity, necessarily included in that nature according to its primary entity.
[35] [Obiectiones] - Sed contra istud videntur esse duae obiectiones: Una, quia videtur ponere universale esse aliquid reale in re: quod est contra Comment. I. De Anima, com. 8., qui dicit quod intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus, ita quod non existit nisi per ipsum, et sic est ens tantum rationis. – Probatio consequentiae: nam ista natura, secundum quod est ens in isto lapide, prior tamen naturaliter singularitate lapidis, est, ex dictis, indifferens ad hoc singulare et ad illud.	[Objections] But against this there appear to be two objections. One, because it seems to suppose a universal to be something real in reality, which is contrary to the Commentator who says that ‘the understanding creates universality in things, so that it does not exist except through it [the understanding]’, and so it is a being of reason only. Proof of the consequence: for that nature, according as it is a being in that stone, yet prior naturally to the singularity of the stone, is, from what was said, indifferent to this singularity and to that.
[36] Praeterea, Damascenus, cap. 8. Oportet, inquit, scire quod aliud est rem considerare, et aliud ratione et cogitatione; igitur in omnibus creaturis hypostasum quidem divisio re consideratur; communitas autem et copulatio intellectu consideratur. Intelligimus enim intellectu, quoniam Petrus et Paulus unius sunt naturae, et communem habent naturam, neque enim hae hypostases in se invicem sunt; seorsum enim unaquaeque et secundum partem, id est, secundum se ipsum separata. Et post: In increata vero et supersubstantiali et incomprehensibili Trinatate est e converso; illic enim commune quidem et unum re consideratur, cognitione vero est divisum.	Furthermore, Damascene says ‘one should know that it is one thing to consider a thing, and another [to consider] by reason and thought. Accordingly, in all created things a division of subsistents is considered in reality. But the communality and connection is considered by the understanding. For we understand by the understanding that Peter and Paul are of a single nature, and have a common nature, for these subsistents are not one within another, but each by part and separately, i.e. separated according to itself. And afterwards, ‘But in the uncreated and supersubstantial and incomprehensible Trinity it is the converse. For there the common is considered as one in reality, but in thought it is divided’.
[37] Solvuntur. Ad primum dico quod universale in actu est illud quod aliquam unitatem habet indifferentem, secundum quam ipsum idem est in potentia proxima ut dicatur de quolibet supposito; quia I. Poster.: Universale est quod est unum in multis et de multis. Nihil enim secundum quamlibet unitatem in re est tale, quod secundum ipsam unitatem [p 231] praecisam sit in potentia proxima ad quodlibet suppositum, ut dicatur de quolibet supposito praedicatione dicente hoc est hoc; quia licet alicui existenti in re non repugnet esse in alia singularitate ab illa in qua est, non tamen illud vere dici potest de quolibet inferiori, quod quodlibet est ipsum, hoc est enim solum possibile de obiecto eodem indifferenti actu considerato ab intellectu; quod quidem ut intellectum habet unitatem etiam numeralem obiecti (a), secundum quam ipsum idem est praedicabile de omni singulari, dicendo quod hoc est hoc.	To the first: I say that the universal in actuality is that which has some indifferent unity according to which it is itself, as the same, in proximate potentiality to being predicated of any suppositum. For, according to the Philosopher, the universal is what is one in many and [said] of many. Indeed, nothing in a thing—according to any unity whatsoever – is such that according to that precise unity it is in proximate potentiality to any suppositum whatsoever by a predication saying “This is this.” For although, to something existing in reality it is not repugnant to be in another singularity than that in which it is, yet it cannot be truly said of any inferior that ‘any given one is it.’ This is only possible of an object the same indifferently, actually considered by the intellect. This [object], as understood, has the numerical unity also of the object, according to which that same thing predicable of every singular by saying “This is this.”
[38] Ex hoc apparet improbatio illius dicti, quod intellectus agens facit universalitatem in rebus, per hoc quod denudat ipsum quod quid est in phantasmate existens; nam ubicumque est, antequam in intellectu possibili habeat esse obiective, sive in re sive in phantasmate, sive habeat esse certum, sive deductum per rationem, et si sit non per aliquod lumen, sed semper sit talis natura ex se, cui non repugnet esse in alio; non tamen est tale cui potentia proxima conveniat dici de quolibet, sed tantum est in potentia proxima ut est in intellectu possibili ; est ergo in re commune quod non est de se hoc, et per consequens ei de se non repugnat esse non hoc.	From is apparent the disproof of what was said, that “the active understanding creates universality in things”., by the fact that it makes bare thethe [agent intellect] lays bare the what-something-is existing in the phantasm. For no matter where it is before it has objective being in a possible understanding, whether in reality or in a phantasm, whether it has definite being or deduced by reason (and if it exists not by some lightbut is always of itself such a nature to which it is not repugnant to be in another, yet, it is not such that being said of anything whatsoever belongs to it by a proximate potentiality, but is only in a proximate potentiality as it exists in a possible understanding. Therefore, in reality there is a common [thing] that is not of itself this, and as a consequence, [ it is not repugnant to it to be non-this.
Sed tale commune non est universale in actu, quia deficit ei illa indifferentia, secundum quam completive universale est universale, secundum quam scilicet ipsum idem aliqua identitate est praedicabile de quolibet individuo, ita quod quodlibet sit ipsum.	But such a common [item] is not the universal in actuality, because it lacks that indifference according to which the universal is completely universal, namely that indifference according to which it is the same by some identity, predicable of any individual whatsoever so that anything is that thing.
[39] Ad secundam instantiam de Damasceno dico quod eo modo quo in Divinis commune est unum reale, eodem modo commune in creaturis non est unum reale; ibi enim commune est singulare et individuum, quia ipsa natura divina de se est haec. Et eodem modo manifestum est quod nullum universale in creaturis est realiter unum; hoc enim ponendo esset ponere quod aliqua natura creata non divisa praedicaretur de multis individuis praedicatione dicente hoc est hoc, sicut dicitur Pater est Deus et Filius est idem Deus.	To the second counter-example of Damascene: I say that in the way in which what is common in the divine persons is a single real thing, the common in creatures is not in the same way a single real thing. For in the first case, the common is singular and individual, since the Divine Nature is of itself this. And it is manifest that no universal in creatures is reallyin the same way . For postulating this would be to postulate that some undivided created nature were predicated of many individuals by a predication saying “This is this,” just as it is said that the Father is God and the Son is the same God.
Tamen in creaturis est aliquod commune unum unitate reali minori unitate numerali; et illud quidem commune non est ita com[p232]mune quod sit praedicabile de multis, licet sit ita commune quod non repugnet sibi esse in alio quam in eo in quo est.	Yet in creatures, there is something common that is one by a real unity less than numerical unity. That common is not common such that it is predicable of many, although it is common such that being in another than that in which it is is not repugnant to it.
[40] Dupliciter igitur patet quomodo auctoritas non est contra me: primo quia loquitur de unitate singularitatis in Divinis; et hoc modo non solum universale creatum non est unum, sed nec commune in creaturis: secundo quia loquitur de communi praedicabili, non praecise de communi quod determinatum est de facto, licet non repugnet sibi esse in alio, quale commune praecise potest poni in creatura realiter.	Therefore, it is clear in two ways how the authority [of Damascene] does not go against me. First, he is speaking of the unity of singularity in the divine, and in this way not only is the created universal not one, neither is common in creatures. Second, he is speaking about what is common predicable, not precisely about a common that is determined as fact, although it is not repugnant to it to be in another, in the way that the common can be precisely postulated in a creature in reality.
[41] [Solvitur argumentum principale]	[Reply to the Positive Main Argument]
Et per hoc patet ad illud argumentum principale; quia Philosophus improbat illam fictionem quam imponit Platoni, quod scilicet non possit hic homo per se existens, qui ponitur idea, per se esse universale omni homini; quia omnis substantia per se existens est propria ei cuius est, hoc est, vel ex seipsa, vel est propria per aliquod contrahens facta propria, quo contrahente posito, non potest inesse alteri, licet non repugnat ei ex se inesse alii.	And from this the [reply] to the main argument is clear. For the Philosopher disproves the fiction he attributes to Plato namely , that it is impossible that‘man’ existing per se,which is postulated to be an Idea [by Plato],could be per se universal to every man. For every substance existing per se is proper to that to which it belongs,that is, either [proper] from itself, or else is made proper by something that contracts it. With the contracting [item] postulated, it cannot be in another, although inhering in another is not repugnant to it of itself.
Ista etiam glossa vera est, loquendo de substantia secundum quod sumitur pro natura; et tunc sequitur quod idea non erit substantia Socratis, quia nec natura Socratis, quia nec ex se propria, nec appropriata Socrati, ut sit tantum in eo, sed etiam in alio secundum ipsum.	[Aristotle’s] gloss is even true speaking of ‘substance’ according as it is taken for a nature. In And then it follows that the Idea will not be the substance of Socrates, for it is not the nature of Socrates. For it is neither proper to Socrates from itself, nor made proper to Socrates such that only in him; rather, also in another, according to him [Plato].
Si autem accipiatur substantia pro substantia prima, tunc verum est quod quaelibet substantia est ex se propria illi cuius est; et tunc multo magis sequitur quod illa idea quae ponitur substantia per se existens isto modo non possit esse substantia Socratis vel Platonis. – Sed primum membrum ad propositum sufficit.	If, however, ‘substance’ is taken for primary substance, then it is true that any substance is proper to that which it belongs to. And then it follows even more that the Idea, which is postulated to be a substance existing per se, cannot be the substance of Socrates or Plato in this mode. But the first gloss is sufficient for the case in question.
[42] [Solvitur argumentum prioris opinionis]	[Reply to the Argument for Marston’s View ]
Ad confirmationem opinionis patet; quia non ita se habet communitas et singularitas ad naturam sicut esse in intellectu et esse verum extra animam, quia communitas convenit naturae extra intellectum, et similiter singularitas; et communitas convenit ex se naturae, singularitas autem convenit naturae per aliquid in re contrahens ipsam; sed universalitas non convenit rei ex se. – Et ideo concedo quod quaerenda est causa universalitatis, non tamen quaerenda est causa communitatis alia ab ipsa natura; et posita communitate in ipsa natura secundum propriam entitatem et unitatem, necessario oportet quaerere causam singularitatis, quae superaddit aliquid illi naturae cuius est.	To the confirmation of the view it is clear, for commonness and singularity are not related to the nature as being in the intellect and true being outside the soul, for commonness is appropriate to the nature outside the understanding, and likewise singularity, and commonness is appropriate to the nature from itself, but singularity is appropriate to the nature through something in reality that contracts [the nature]. But universality is not appropriate to the reality from itself. And therefore I concede that a cause of universality should be sought. Nevertheless, no cause of commonness other than the nature itself need be sought, and when commonness is postulated in the nature itself according to its proper entity and unity, one must necessarily seek the cause of singularity, which adds something to the nature to which it belongs.