Authors/John of Salisbury/Metalogicon/Liber 4/Caput 30

Chapter 30

Latin	English
CAP. XXX. Idem.	Chapter 30. The fact that philology precedes its two sisters. Also what investigation by categories is appropriate in a discussion of reason and truth.
Harum vero philologia prima est, et quae aliarum naturam, vim et consilia indicat: siquidem cum undique probabilia multa occurrant (quia, ut ait Pythagoras, fere de omni re potest in contrarium disputari), rerum certitudinem quaerit, et diligenti cautela declinat errores; et sicut virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima, stultitia caruisse, sic [0933D] quae praecaveret errorem has quae virtutes afferunt naturaliter antecedit: et, ut Iunonis, aut, ut rectius dixerim, Martiani verba ponantur, an quisquam est, qui philologiae se asserat privilegia laborata, et lucubrationum praemium nescire Pallorem, quae etiam deos quiescentes ad se venire inaudita obsecratione compellit: et paulo supra coelum, terram, mare, et quae in eis sunt, prima scrutatur: quae	Among the aforementioned three sisters, Philology comes first, inasmuch as it discloses the nature, power, and counsels of each of the others. Since there are many probabilities on every hand (for, as Pythagoras observes, it is possible to defend the contrary of practically any proposition), Philology strives to attain certitude, and exercises great caution to avoid error. For “Flight from vice is virtue’s initial act, And emancipation from folly is the beginning of wisdom.” Thus the sister which has the function of guarding against error naturally precedes the other two, which confer virtues. To quote Juno, or more precisely Martianus, “Is there anyone who will confess that he is unacquainted with the laborious vigils of Philology and the pallor begotten during persevering toil by lamp light?” By her silent, powerful supplication, Philology constrains even the resting gods to come to her aid. A little before [in Martianus], the first sister [Philology] searches the heavens, earth, and seas, and scrutinizes everything in them:
Pervigil in modico penetrans arcana labore,	Toiling without stint the whole night through, Philology unlocks the secrets of the unknown,
Quae potis est docta totum praevertere cura	And by her learned labors gains the power to foresee all that will come to pass,
Quod superis praescire datum est. Quin crebrius in nos	As do the gods themselves; in fact she frequently not only comes to rule over us [mortals],
Ius habet illa, deos urgens iniussa coactos,	But even compels the very gods to comply with her bidding. Nor is this all,
Et quod nulla queat superum tentare potestas	As she even knows how to accomplish, against the will of mighty Jove,
Invito scit posse Iove.	What none of the other deities, however powerful, would dare attempt.
Siquidem, ut ait alius, non inferior Martiano,	Indeed, as another author, not inferior to Martianus, observes:
[0934A] ..... Labor improbus omnia vincit. (VIRG. Georg., I, 144.)	“Persevering labor overcomes all obstacles.”
Liquet autem ex praecedentibus ad hoc, ut sensus sit, plura concurrere: ut sint exterius offendiculum, in quem impingit spiritus, minister sentiendi, idemque spiritus qui exterioris obstaculi qualitatem ad notitiam animae profert. Ut sint tria, anima quae sentit, spiritus, quo sentit, et offendiculum, quod extrinsecus sentit. His, ut praedictum est, excitatur vis deliberativa, quam supra nominavimus rationem, suumque iudicium exercet, quod itidem ratio appellatur; quod quidem interdum verum, interdum probabile est.	It is evident from what was said above, that many factors concur to produce sensation. These include the external object, with which the spirit, which is sensation’s servant, comes in contact, and the spirit itself, which brings to the attention of the conscious soul the quality of the external object. There are thus three requisites [for sensation]: the conscious soul, the spirit whereby the soul senses, and the external object it perceives. By these, the deliberative force which we have above called “reason,” is, as previously noted, stimulated to action. Whereupon reason exercises its judgment, which is likewise called “reason.” The latter is sometimes [unequivocally] true, sometimes probable.
Sed ratio vera non est, nisi sit certa et firma: eo quod ratio, nomen firmitudinis est. Nam et ratum non dicitur, nisi quod [0934B] firmum est. Ut itaque magno placuit Augustino: Ratio vera solius Dei est, et eorum, quibus ipse certam notitiam firmumque iudicium de rebus habere concessit. Est autem praedicamentalis inspectio, et prima fere philosophandi via, de qualibet re proposita quid sit attendere, itemque quibus proprietatibus ab aliis differat, et quomodo aliis conformetur. Deinde an sit ei quid contrarium, et an ipsum susceptibile sit contrariorum. Quae cum innotuerunt, res familiarius assignata, in notitiam transit. Utique hunc ordinem, etsi pro voto exprimere nequeam, in tantae rei investigatione tamen, quia commodissimus est, placuit imitari. Nec est ubi iustius de rationis veritatisque substantia quaeratur, quam ubi vis logicae discutitur, quae se profitetur [0934C] scientiam veritatis, ut asserit Augustinus, et utinam assequi valeat quod promittit! Constat autem quia plurimum prodest, et inveniendi examinandique rationes, viam et copiam parat.	True reason is sure and unwavering. The word itself, “reason,” signifies certitude. Only that which is firmly established can be called ratum. Consequently, according to the great Augustine: “True reason is possessed only by God, and by those to whom God grants the privilege of genuine certitude and secure judgment.” Investigation by categories, the first step in seeking philosophical [scientific] knowledge of anything, consists in considering what the thing [in question] is; wherein it differs from, or is similar to other things; and whether it has, or can have contraries. Once these questions have been answered, the thing [in question] is more accurately determined, and thus becomes a part of our knowledge. I myself have chosen to imitate this method, because it is so suitable, despite the fact that, in the investigation of such an extensive subject, I have not been able to follow this plan as [closely as] I would have wished. There is no more fitting occasion for an examination of the substance of reason and truth, than when one is discussing the power of logic. For the latter [logic], as Augustine observes, professes to be the science of truth: would that it could [fully] attain what it promises! However [although it falls short of perfection], logic certainly has very great efficacy, and provides both a method and a faculty for the invention and examination of reasoning.