Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 11

Latin	English
[2.11 DE PROPOSITIONIBUS AEQUIVALENTIBUS HYPOTHETICIS QUAE SECUNDUM VOCEM SUNT CATEGORICAE]	11: On Propositions which, though Categorical in Form, are Equivalent to Hypotheticals
Dicto de propositionibus categoricis, quasi simplicibus, dicendum est de propositionibus aequivalentibus propositionibus hypotheticis.	Having discussed categorical propositions (simple ones, as it were), we must speak of propositions equivalent to hypothetical propositions.
Et est sciendum quod quaelibet categorica ex qua sequuntur plures propositiones categoricae tamquam exponentes eam, hoc est exprimentes quid illa propositio ex forma sua importat, potest dici propositio aequivalens propositioni hypotheticae. Huiusmodi sunt, sicut dictum est prius', propositiones exclusivae et exceptivae et reduplicativae. Huiusmodi etiam sunt omnes propositiones in quibus ponuntur termini connotativi et relativi, sicut istae propositiones 'aliquod album currit', 'omne album est corpus', 'omne agens producit aliquid', 'omnis quantitas est in loco'. 'Omnis similitudo est qualitas' et huiusmodi. Ideo de istis est primo dicendum.	And it should be known that every categorical proposition from which there follow several categorical propositions, as it, were expounding it, that is expressing what that proposition conveys from its form, can be called a proposition equivalent to a hypothetical proposition. Of this sort are, as said above, exclusive, exceptive, and reduplicative propositions. Also of this sort are propositions in which connotative or relative terms occur, for example 'some white thing runs', 'every white thing is a body', 'every agent produces something', 'every quantity is in a place', 'every likeness is a quality', and so on. Therefore, we must first speak of these.
Circa quod sciendum est quod, sicut dictum est, ille terminus dicitur proprie connotativus vel relativus qui habet quid nominis, hoc est definitionem unam exprimentem quid nominis, ita quod non potest sciri quid nominis ipsius nisi habendo orationem. Et tunc semper aliquid significat principaliter et aliquid secundario, sicut patet de istis 'album', calidum'; nam definitio 'albi' exprimens quid nominis est 'habens albe- dinem' vel 'informatum albedine' vel huiusmodi. Ita quod 'album' pro aliquo supponit quod est significatum vel consignificatum ipsius, et aliquid significat vel consignificat pro quo tamen non supponit, vel non oportet quod supponat pro eo etiam si distribuatur signo universali, et hoc quantum est ex virtute distributionis. Et ita universaliter quando aliquid per aliquem terminum connotatur vel consignificatur, pro quo tamen talis terminus supponere non potest, quia nec de tali verificatur semper, talis terminus vel est connotativus vel relativus.	About which it should be known that, as was said, a term is properly called connotative or relative which has a nominal definition, i.e. one definition which expresses what the name means, so that what that name means cannot be known except by having a expression. And then it always signifies something primarily and something secondarily, as is clear with 'white', 'hot', for the definition of 'white' expressing the nominal definition is 'having whiteness' or 'informed by whiteness' or something of this sort, so that 'white' supposits for something that is a significate or co-significate of it, and it signifies or co-signifies something for which, nevertheless, it does not supposit, or does not have to supposit for it even if it is distributed with the universal sign, and this so far as it is in virtue of the distribution. And so in general, when something is connoted or co-signified through some term, for which, nevertheless, it cannot supposit, because it is not always verified of such a thing, such a term is either connotative or relative.
Sicut iste terminus 'album' secundum unum modum dicendi significat principaliter albedinem, et tamen non supponit pro albedine sicut nec verificatur de albedine, nam haec est falsa 'albedo est alba' ideo iste terminus album est connotativus vel relativus. Similiter 'creans' significat vel consignificat creaturam pro qua non supponit; haec enim est falsa 'creatura est creans', ideo iste terminus 'creans' est connotativus vel relativus. Similiter dicendum est de 'simo' et 'cavo' et 'quantitate' et huiusmodi, secundum opinionem Aristotelis. Omnia enim ista connotant vel important aliquo modo aliqua pro quibus non supponunt. 'Quantitas' enim importat unam partem distingui loco et situ ab alia parte, et tamen pro tali loco vel situ non supponit; si tamen supponat, hoc accidit propter hoc quod quaelibet pars quanti est quanta.	For example, the term 'white', according to one way of speaking, principally signifies whiteness, and yet it does not supposit for whiteness, just as it is not verified of whiteness, for 'whiteness is white' is false, therefore the term 'white' is connotative or relative. Likewise, 'creating being' signifies or co-signifies a creature for which it does not supposit, for 'a creature is a creating being' is false, therefore the term 'creating being ' is connotative or relative. We should say something similar of 'snubnosed', 'concave', 'quantity', and so on, on Aristotle's view. For all these terms connote or convey in some way certain things which they do not supposit for. For 'quantity' conveys that one part is to be distinguished in place and position from another part, and yet 'quantity' does not supposit for such a place or position. Yet if it does supposit, this happens because each part of a quantum is quantified.
Quae autem sit proprie differentia inter nomen relativum et connotativum, alias forte ostendetur.	But what is the proper difference between a relative and a connotative name, will perhaps be shown elsewhere.
Istis suppositis sciendum est quod quaelibet propositio quae habet talem terminum, est habens exponentes exprimentes quid importatur per talem propositionem. Sed diversae propositiones habent diversas exponentes propter diversos terminos connotativos vel relativos, et ideo sufficiet dicere de aliquibus, quia per illas potest sciri, proportionaliter, de aliis quomodo exponantur.	With these points supposed, it should be known that any proposition which has such a term, has exponents which express what is conveyed by such a proposition. But diverse propositions have diverse exponents because of the diverse connotative or relative terms, and therefore it will suffice to speak of some of them, because through those it can be known, correspondingly, how others are expounded.
Unde sciendum est quod quandocumque in propositione ponitur concretum cui correspondet abstractum, importans rem informantem aliam rem, semper ad veritatem talis propositionis requiruntur duae propositiones, quae possunt vocari exponentes ipsius; et una debet esse in recto et alia in obliquo. Sicut ad veritatem istius 'Sortes est albus' requiritur quod haec sit vera 'Sortes est' et quod haec sit vera 'Sorti inest albedo'. Similiter, ad veritatem istius 'album currit' requiruntur istae duae 'aliquid currit' et 'illi inest albedo'. Et ita est de aliis.	Hence it should be known that whenever there occurs in a proposition a concrete term to which there corresponds to an abstract term conveying a thing that informs another thing, always for the truth of such a proposition there are required two propositions which can be called its exponents, and one should be in the nominative case, and the other should be a in an oblique case. For example, for the truth of 'Socrates is white' it is required that 'Socrates exists' be true and that 'whiteness is in Socrates' is true. Likewise, for the truth of 'a white thing runs' are required these two propositions: 'Something runs' and 'whiteness is in that thing'. And so it is in the other cases.
Similiter, quando ponitur aliquod relativium in propositione, requiruntur veritates plurium propositionum. Sicut ad veritateni istius 'Sortes est similis Platoni' requiritur quod Sortes habeat aliquam qualitatem et quod qualitatem eiusdem speciei habeat Plato. Unde ex hoc ipso quod Sortes est albus et Plato est albus, Sortes est similis Platoni et e converso. Similiter, si uterque sit niger vel calidus, sine omni alio addito ipsi sunt similes. Similiter, ad veritatem istius 'homo est quantitas' requiritur ista quod homo habeat partes et quod una pars distinguatur loco et situ ab alia. Sed potest dubitari an quaelibet propositio universalis habeat tales exponentes. Videtur quod sic, quia habet multas singulares:	Likewise, when some relative term occurs in a proposition, the truth of several propositions is required. For example, for the truth of 'Socrates is similar to Plato' it is required that Socrates has some quality and that Plato has a quality of the same species. Hence, from the fact that Socrates is white and Plato is white, Socrates is similar to Plato and conversely. Likewise, if both are black or cold, they are similar without any further addition. Likewise, for the truth of 'a man is a quantity' it is required that a man has parts and that one part be distinguished in place and in site from another. But it can be doubted whether every universal proposition has such exponents. It seems that it does, because it has many singulars.
Dicendum quod propositio universalis in qua ponitur hoc signum 'uterque' vel 'neuter' ex virtute propositionis aequivalet propositioni hypotheticae; sed illa in qua ponitur hoc signum 'nullus' vel 'omnis' vel 'quilibet' non sic, quia quamvis habeat frequenter multas singulares, non tamen est hoc necessarium, quia sicut declaratum est prius, haec est vera 'omnis phoenix est', quamvis non sit nisi una phoenix.	It should be said that a universal proposition in which occurs the sign 'both' or the sign 'neither' is, in virtue of the proposition, equivalent to a hypothetical proposition, but one in which the signs 'no' or 'every' or 'any' occur is not so, because, although often it may have many singulars, yet this is not necessary, because as was claimed above, 'every phoenix exists' is true, even though there is but one phoenix.
Proportionaliter praedictis debet dici de istis propositionibus 'nasus est simus', 'homo est similitudo', 'homo est causa', et sic universaliter alia connotativa et relativa exprimendo.	Something corresponding to the previous points ought to be said about 'a nose is snubbed', 'a man is a likeness', 'a man is a cause', and, in general, by expressing other connotative and relative terms.
Idem etiam potest dici de nominibus collectivis, cuiusmodi sunt 'numerus', 'motus', 'tempus', 'populus', 'exercitus' et huiusmodi, quia talia requiriunt veritatem plurium propositionum.	The same can also be said of collective names like 'number', 'motion', 'time', 'people', 'army', and so on, because such terms require the truth of several propositions.
Et est unum sciendum, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod nullus talis terminus, scilicet nec connotativus nec relativus nec collectivus nec negativus praedicatur per se vel in quid de pronomine demonstrante aliquam rem per se unam, tamen aliqua illorum, vel omnia, sunt species et per se in genere, sicut numerus est per se in genere quantitatis.	And one thing to be known, according to Aristotle's view, is that no such term, namely, no connotative or relative or collective or negative term, is predicated per se or in quid of a pronoun indicating some thing that is per se one thing, yet some of these terms, or all of them, are species and per se in a genus, just as 'number' is per se in the genus of quantity.
Et quamvis talia, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, non praedicentur per se de pronomine demonstrante unam rem, tamen praedicantur in quid de pronomine demonstrativo, sumpto cum termino illo communi. Sicut si haec sit per se et in quid 'Sortes est homo', ita erit haec per se et in quid 'iste numerus est numerus'. Et similiter est de istis 'haec similitudo est similitudo', 'iste motus est motus', et sic de aliis.	And although such terms, on Aristotle's view, are not predicated per se of a pronoun indicating one thing, yet they are predicated in quid of a demonstrative pronoun taken with that common term. For example, if 'Socrates is a man' is per se and in quid, then so will 'This number is a number' be per se and in quid. And it is similar for 'this likeness is a likeness', 'this motion is a motion', and so on.
Tamen intelligendum est quod proprie et stricte accipiendo 'praedicari per se et in quid', quod scilicet est necessario praedicari, sic nulla talis species 'homo', 'asinus', 'numerus' et huiusmodi praedicatur de aliquo per se et in quid, maxime in propositione de inesse et de praesenti, et hoc quia nulla talis est necessaria 'Sortes est homo', 'iste asinus est asinus', 'iste numerus est numerus', 'iste motus est motus'. Sed accipiendo large praedicationem in quid et per se, quando scilicet praedicatum non connotat aliquid extrinsecum illi quod connotatur per subiectum, sic tales praedicationes sunt per se et in quid 'iste homo est homo' 'iste asinus est asinus', ista similitudo est similitudo', et sic de aliis.	Yet it should be understood that if we take 'to be predicated per se and in quid' properly and strictly, namely as 'is predicated necessarily', then no such species as 'man', 'animal', 'number', etc., is predicated of anything per se and in quid, particularly not in an assertoric and present tense proposition, and this [is] because no such proposition as 'Socrates is a man', 'This donkey is a donkey', 'This number is a number', 'This motion is a motion' is necessary. But in taking predication in quid and per se broadly, namely when the predicate does not connote anything extrinsic to what is connoted by the subject, then such predications as 'this man is a man', 'this donkey is a donkey', 'this likeness is a likeness', and so on, are per se and in quid.
Sic igitur dicendum est quod ubicumque ponitur terminus connotativus vel relativus vel collectivus, semper talis propositio aequivalet alicui propositioni hypotheticae et potest exponi per plures exponentes.	So, therefore, it should be said that whenever a connotative or relative or collective term occurs, always such a proposition is equivalent to some hypothetical proposition and that it can be expounded by several exponents.