Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 6

Latin	English
[2.06 DE PROPOSITIONIBUS UNIVERSALIBUS IN QUIBUS SIGNUM DISTRIBUIT PRO PARTIBUS INTEGRALIBUS, CUIUSMODI EST HOC SIGNUM 'TOTUS']	6: On Universal Propositions in which the Sign Distributes for Integral Parts, e.g. the Sign 'Whole'
De signo distributivo pro partibus integralibus, cuiusmodi ponitur hoc signum 'totus', est sciendum quod hoc signum 'totus' potest aliquando sumi categorematice, aliquando syncategorematice. Si sumatur categorematice, tunc significat idem quod 'perfectum' vel 'compositum ex omnibus suis partibus'; et sic quantum ad veritatem sermonis tantum valeret non addere quantum addere. Unde quidquid dicitur de termino sumpto cum 'totus' categorematice sumpto, dicitur de illo sumpto sine 'totus'; sicut si totus Sortes currit, Sortes currit, et si totus homo est animal, homo est animal.	On a sign which distributes for integral parts, of which kind is the sign 'whole', it should be known that the sign 'whole' can sometimes be taken categorematically, sometimes syncategorematically. If it is taken categorematically, then it signifies the same thing as signified by 'complete' or 'composed of all its parts', and when so taken then, insofar as the truth of what is stated, not to add it would be as valid as to add it. Hence, whatever is said of a term taken with 'whole', understood categorematically, is said of that [term] taken without 'whole'. For example, if the whole Socrates runs, then Socrates runs; and if a whole man is an animal, a man is an animal.
Tamen posset dici quod non convenienter additur nisi termino importanti aliquo modo aliquid compositum, et ideo forte non est proprie dictum 'totus Deus videtur', quia hoc videtur importare Deum componi ex partibus. Et tunc non sequitur consequentia a termino sumpto sine 'totus' ad terminum sumptum cum 'totus', sicut non sequitur 'Deus videtur, igitur totus Deus videtur', quia tunc in consequente implicaretur Deum componi ex aliquibus distinctis.	Nevertheless, it could be said that it is not appropriately added unless to a term conveying in some way something composite, and so, perhaps, it is not proper to say: ‘The whole God is seen’, for this seems to convey that God is composed from parts. And then there does not follow a consequence from a term taken without 'whole' to the term taken with 'whole'. For example, 'God is seen; therefore the whole of God is seen' does not follow, for then in the consequent it would be implied that God is composed of several distinct things.
Si autem li 'totus' teneatur syncategorematice, sic est unum signum distributivum pro partibus integralibus, immo pro partibus proprie dictis ipsius importati per terminum cui additur; ut ista propositio 'totus Sortes est minor Sorte' aequivaleat isti 'quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte, et ista 'totus Sortes currit' aequivaleat isti 'quaelibet pars Sortis currit'. Et tunc quaelibet talis propositio non posset esse vera nisi praedicatum conveniret cuilibet parti illius totius importati per terminum cui additur; et tunc proprie est signum et dicitur distribuere pro partibus integralibus, et alia signa pro partibus subiectivis. Quod sic est intelligendum quod alia signa distribuunt pro contentis sub termino, quae non sunt proprie partes sed tantum large et extensive accipiendo partes. Sed hoc signum 'totus' distribuit pro partibus proprie loquendo de partibus, sive sint partes eiusdem rationis sive alterius rationis; et hoc pro partibus illius quod importatur per illum terminum cui additur hoc signum 'totus'. Sicut in ista 'totus Sortes est pars Sortis' fit distributio pro qualibet parte Sortis, scilicet pro materia et forma, et pro manibus et pedibus, et sic de omnibus aliis.	But if the word ‘whole’ is taken syncategorematically, it is in this way a single sign distributive for integral parts, indeed for the parts properly said of that thing conveyed by the term to which it is added, so that ‘all of [totus] Socrates is less than Socrates’ is equivalent to 'each part of Socrates is less than Socrates', and 'all Socrates runs' is equivalent to 'each part of Socrates runs'. And then every such proposition could not be true unless the predicate agreed with each part of that whole conveyed by the term to which the sign is added, and then it is properly a sign and is said to distribute for integral parts, and other signs [to distribute] for subjective parts. Which should be understood as that these other signs distribute for things contained under a term, which are not properly parts, but understanding 'parts' only in a broad and extended sense. But the sign 'whole' distributes for parts, in the proper sense of 'parts', whether they are parts with the same ratio or of another ratio, and this [distribution] is for the parts of what is conveyed by the term to which the sign 'whole' is added. For example, in 'the whole of Socrates is a part of Socrates ' a distribution is made for every part of Socrates, namely, for his matter and form, for his hands and feet, and so on.
Verumtamen sciendum quod aliquando, sive de virtute sermonis sive ex usu vel placito alicuius utentis, non curo, 'totus' tantum distribuit pro partibus integralibus, non pro partibus essentialibus, cuiusmodi vocantur materia et forma, quandoque autem distribuit pro omnibus partibus, sive sint integrales sive essentiales sive qualescumque.	Nevertheless, it should be known that sometimes (I don't care whether it is literally, or from use, or from the choice of a user) 'whole' distributes only for integral parts and not essential parts, the latter of which are called matter and form. Sometimes, however, it distributes for all parts, whether they are integral or essential or whatever kind.
De signis autem quae dicuntur distributiva accidentium, sciendum quod talia 'qualelibet' et huiusmodi non sunt proprie signa, sed sunt aequivalentia uni composito ex signo et aliis, sicut 'qualelibet' idem est quod 'habens de omni specie qualitatis aliquam qualitatem; et ideo convenienter sibi additur aliquod signum, ut dicatur 'quilibet qualelibet currit', sicut convenienter dicitur 'quilibet habens de omni specie qualitatis aliquam qualitatem currit'. Et tunc patet quid requiritur et sufficit ad veritatem talis propositionis.	But of signs which are said to be distributive of accidents it should be known that such terms as 'any kind' and others of this type are not properly signs, but are equivalent to a composite of a sign and other terms. For example, 'any kind' is the same as 'having some [one] quality from any species of quality ', and so it is appropriate for some sign to be added to it, such as 'any thing of any kind runs'. For example, it is appropriate to say 'any thing that has some [one] quality from every species of quality is running'. And then it is clear what is requisite, and what is sufficient, for the truth of such a proposition.
Ista non sunt multum usitata in theologia, ideo pertranseo de eis.	Such signs are not used much in theology, so I pass over them.