Authors/Ps-Aquinas/Summa Totius Logicae/TRACTATUS 1/Caput 1

Latin	English
Ignoti Auctoris Summa totius Logicae Aristotelis
Textum Parmae 1864 editum ac automato translatum a Roberto Busa SI in taenias magneticas denuo recognovit Enrique Alarcón atque instruxit. [Copied from the Corpus Thomisticum website and reformatted for the Logic Museum].
PROOEMIUM
Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Scire autem est effectus demonstrationis; est enim demonstratio syllogismus apodicon, idest faciens scire. Ad hoc autem quod tale desiderium naturale compleatur in homine, necessaria est demonstratio: non enim potest esse effectus, in quantum huiusmodi, sine causa.	All men by nature desire to know. However, to know is an effect of demonstration, for demonstration is a 'demonstrative syllogism', that is, making knowing. But in order that such natural desire is completed in men, demonstration is necessary. For it cannot be an effect, insofar as it is an effect without a cause.
Et quia, ut dictum est, demonstratio est syllogismus; ad cognoscendum eam, necesse est praecognoscere syllogismum. Syllogismus autem cum sit quoddam totum aggregatum ex partibus, cognosci non poterit partibus ignoratis. Ad cognoscendum ergo syllogismum oportet primo cognoscere partes eius. Partium autem syllogismi quaedam sunt propinquae, ut propositiones et conclusio quae omnes enuntiationes dicuntur: quaedam vero sunt remotae, ut termini qui sunt partes enuntiationis; ideo ista oportet tractare, scilicet de enuntiatione et de terminis, antequam de syllogismo tractetur.	And because, as was said, demonstration is a syllogism; in order to know it, it is necessary to have prior knowledge of syllogisms. But a syllogism, since it is a sort of whole, aggregated from parts, cannot be known in ignorance of the parts. Therefore to know the syllogism we must first know the parts of it. But of the parts of a syllogism, certain ones are near, as in propositions and the conclusion, which are all called assertions, but certain others are remote, such as the terms which are parts of an assertion. For this reason it is necessary to deal with these, namely of assertions and of terms, before dealing with the syllogism.
Quilibet autem terminus, qui sine complexione dicitur, significat substantiam, aut quantitatem, aut qualitatem, aut aliquid aliorum praedicamentorum; et ideo antequam de enuntiatione tractetur, oportet determinare de praedicamentis.	But any term which is simple signifies a substance, or quantity or quality or any of the other categories, and so before we deal with assertions, we have to define the categories.
Et quia praedicamentum, ut hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam ordinatio praedicabilium in ordine praedicamentali; ideo ad cognoscendum praedicamenta, oportet praecognoscere praedicabilia.	And because a category, as is understood here, is nothing other than the ordering of predicables in categorical order, so in order to know a category it is necessary to know predicables.
Ad hoc ergo ut perveniamus ad ipsum scire ab omnibus naturaliter desideratum, iste debet esse ordo quem cum auxilio Dei tenebimus: ut primo tractetur de quinque praedicabilibus: secundo, de decem praedicamentis: tertio, de enuntiatione: quarto, de syllogismo simpliciter: quinto, de syllogismo applicato ad materiam demonstrativam, seu de demonstratione. De syllogismo vero applicato ad materiam probabilem, qui pertinet ad partem logicae quae dialectica dicitur, de quo tractatur in libro topicorum, et de syllogismo applicato ad materiam sophisticam, qui opponitur syllogismo dialectico, de quo tractatur in libro elenchorum, non intendo me ad praesens intromittere.	Therefore, in order that we may arrive at that knowing which is naturally desired by all, this must be the order which with the help of God we will hold to, so that first we deal with the five predicables, second, of the ten categories, third, of assertion, fourth, of syllogism simpliciter, fifth, of syllogism applied to demonstrative material, or of demonstration. But of syllogism applied to probable material, which pertains to the part of logic which is called dialectic, which is dealt with in the book of the Topics, and of syllogism applied to sophistical material, which is opposed to dialectic syllogism, which is dealt with in the book of the Elenchorum, I do not intend to introduce at present.
TRACTATUS 1
CAPUT 1
Ad cognoscendum quinque universalia, seu praedicabilia, quae Porphyrius ponit, sciendum est quod quia intellectus noster est separatus a materia (non enim est potentia affixa organo corporali seu materiali, et omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur per modum recipientis), ideo illud quod obiective in actu recto intellectui repraesentatur, oportet esse denudatum a materia, et a conditionibus materiae, quae sunt hic et nunc. Et dico hic denudatum a materia, non simpliciter ab omni materia, sed a materia signata: res enim naturales intelliguntur cum materia: et propter hoc dictum est, quod debet esse denudatum a conditionibus materiae.	To know the five universals, or predicables which Porphyry gives, it should be known that because our understanding is separated from matter (for it is not a power affixed to a corporeal or material organ, and everything which is received in someone is received through a mode of the one receiving), therefore that which is objectively represented to the intellect in a right action, has to be denuded from matter, and from the conditions of matter, which are here and now. And I say here 'denuded from matter' not from all matter simpliciter, but from matter signified, for natural things are understood with matter; and because of this it is said that it must be denuded from conditions of matter.
Verbi gratia, in nostra phantasia est phantasia seu forma repraesentans hunc hominem, secundum quod fuit in aliquo sensu exteriori: quae forma virtute intellectus agentis agit in intellectum possibilem, sicut colores virtute luminis agunt in potentiam visivam: et causatur tunc in intellectu possibili quaedam forma, quae dicitur species intelligibilis, vel secundum alios actus intelligendi vel verbum: quae forma repraesentat hominem, non tamen ut est hic et nunc, sed abstractum a talibus conditionibus: et hoc dicitur esse universale.	For example, in our fantasy is a fantasy or form representing this man, according as it was in some exterior sense, which form acts in a possible intellect by virtue of an agent intellect, just as colors by virtue of light act in the power of sight, and a certain form is caused there in a possible intellect, which is called intelligible species, or according to other acts of understanding or according to a word. This form represents a man, yet not as he is here and now, but abstracted from suchconditions, and this is said to be a universal.
Unde in homine sic intellecto, est duo considerare: scilicet ipsam naturam humanam, seu habens eam, et ipsam universalitatem, seu abstractionem a dictis conditionibus materiae.	Hence in a man understood in this way, there are two things to considerations, namely that human nature (or having it) and that universality, or abstraction from the said material conditions.
Quantum ad primum homo dicit rem, quantum vero ad secundum dicit intentionem: non enim in re invenitur homo qui non sit hic et nunc. Et ipsa natura, ut sic, dicitur esse prima intentio. Sed quia intellectus reflectitur supra se ipsum, et supra ea quae in eo sunt sive subiective sive obiective, considerat iterum hominem sic a se intellectum sine conditionibus materiae: et videt quod talis natura cum tali universalitate seu abstractione intellecta potest attribui huic et illi individuo, et quod realiter est in hoc et illo individuo: ideo format secundam intentionem de tali natura, et hanc vocat universale, seu praedicabile vel huiusmodi.	With regard to the first, man means a thing, but with regard to the second it means an intention, for a man who is not here and now is not found in reality. And this nature, as such, is said to be the first intention. But because the understanding reflects upon itself, and upon those things which are either subjective or objective in it, it considers man again understood by himself without material conditions: and it sees that such nature with such universaity or understood abstraction can be attributed to this and that individual, and that it really is in this and that indidivual. Therefore, it forms the second intention concerning such nature, and it calls this a universal or predicable or suchlike.
Secundum ergo praedicta, res ut est intellecta dicitur universalis; secundum autem quod intellectus talem universalitatem considerat, secundum hoc attribuit sibi aliquid, scilicet esse in pluribus, vel dici de pluribus: et sic dicitur secunda intentio. De quibus secundis intentionibus nunc dicemus: scilicet, de quinque universalibus, seu praedicabilibus. Quae universalia dicuntur prout intellectus attribuit eis esse in pluribus: praedicabilia vero dicuntur prout intellectus attribuit eis dici de pluribus. Sunt autem haec: genus, species, differentia, proprium et accidens.	Therefore, according to what was said, a thing as it is understood is called universal, but according as the undestanding considers such universality, according to this it attributes to it something, namely to be in several things, or to be said of several things, and thus it is called a second intention. Concerning such second intentions we will now speak, namely of the five universals or predicables. These are called universals according as the understanding attributes being in several things to them, but they are called predicables according as the understanding attributes being said of several things to them. And they are: genus, species, difference, property, and accident.