Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q103

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Iª q. 103 pr. Postquam praemissum est de creatione rerum et distinctione earum, restat nunc tertio considerandum de rerum gubernatione. Et primo, in communi; secundo, in speciali de effectibus gubernationis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum mundus ab aliquo gubernetur. Secundo, quis sit finis gubernationis ipsius. Tertio, utrum gubernetur ab uno. Quarto, de effectibus gubernationis. Quinto, utrum omnia divinae gubernationi subsint. Sexto, utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Septimo, utrum divina gubernatio cassetur in aliquo. Octavo, utrum aliquid divinae providentiae contranitatur. Question 103. The government of things in generalIs the world governed by someone? What is the end of this government? Is the world governed by one? What are the effects of this government? Are all things subject to Divine government? Are all things immediately governed by God? Is the Divine government frustrated in anything? Is anything contrary to the Divine Providence?
Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non gubernatur. Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.
Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, eorum est proprie gubernari, quae ad aliquid moventur. Sed mundus non videtur ad aliquid moveri, sed in se stabilitatem habet. Ergo non gubernatur. Objection 2. Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod in se habet necessitatem qua determinatur ad unum, non indiget exteriori gubernante. Sed principaliores mundi partes quadam necessitate determinantur ad unum in suis actibus et motibus. Ergo mundus gubernatione non indiget. Objection 3. Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
Iª q. 103 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XIV, tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia providentia. Et Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., o qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas. On the contrary, It is written (Wisdom 14:3): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal."
Iª q. 103 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam antiqui philosophi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt, dicentes omnia fortuito agi. Sed haec positio ostenditur esse impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet in ipsis rebus. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est, aut semper aut in pluribus, quod non contingeret, nisi per aliquam providentiam res naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est gubernare. Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum bene ordinatam, ex ipsa domus ordinatione ordinatoris rationem perpenderet; ut, ab Aristotele dictum, Tullius introducit in libro de natura deorum. Secundo autem apparet idem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, per quam res in esse productae sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum enim optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei bonitati quod res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem perducat. Quod est gubernare. I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (44, 4; 65, 2), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.
Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et aliae creaturae rationales, et talium est cognoscere rationem finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Aliquid autem dicitur moveri vel operari propter finem, quasi ab alio actum vel directum in finem, sicut sagitta movetur ad signum directa a sagittante, qui cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione carentium, manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari. Reply to Objection 1. A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris servaretur, ut infra patebit. Reply to Objection 2. In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (104, 1).
Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura; quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae gubernationem. Reply to Objection 3. The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod finis gubernationis mundi non sit aliquid extra mundum existens. Illud enim est finis gubernationis rei, ad quod res gubernata perducitur. Sed illud ad quod res aliqua perducitur, est aliquod bonum in ipsa re, sicut infirmus perducitur ad sanitatem, quae est aliquod bonum in ipso. Ergo finis gubernationis rerum non est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, sed aliquod bonum in ipsis rebus existens. Objection 1. It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, I Ethic., quod finium quidam sunt operationes, quidam opera, idest operata. Sed nihil extrinsecum a toto universo potest esse operatum, operatio autem est in ipsis operantibus. Ergo nihil extrinsecum potest esse finis gubernationis rerum. Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"--i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, bonum multitudinis videtur esse ordo et pax, quae est tranquillitas ordinis. Ut Augustinus dicit XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed mundus in quadam rerum multitudine consistit. Ergo finis gubernationis mundi est pacificus ordo, qui est in ipsis rebus. Non ergo finis gubernationis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Objection 3. Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, universa propter se operatus est dominus. Ipse autem est extra totum ordinem universi. Ergo finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum. On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut, principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet; necesse est quod etiam finis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet. Manifestum est enim quod bonum habet rationem finis. Unde finis particularis alicuius rei est quoddam bonum particulare, finis autem universalis rerum omnium est quoddam bonum universale. Bonum autem universale est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa essentia bonitatis, bonum autem particulare est quod est participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit extrinsecum a toto universo. I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above (44, 1,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum aliquod consequimur multipliciter, uno modo, sicut formam in nobis existentem, ut sanitatem aut scientiam; alio modo, ut aliquid per nos operatum, sicut aedificator consequitur finem faciendo domum; alio modo, sicut aliquod bonum habitum vel possessum, ut ille qui emit, consequitur finem possidendo agrum. Unde nihil prohibet illud ad quod perducitur universum, esse quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Reply to Objection 1. We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de finibus artium, quarum quaedam habent pro finibus operationes ipsas, sicut citharistae finis est citharizare; quaedam vero habent pro fine quoddam operatum, sicut aedificatoris finis non est aedificare, sed domus. Contingit autem aliquid extrinsecum esse finem non solum sicut operatum, sed etiam sicut possessum seu habitum, vel etiam sicut repraesentatum, sicut si dicamus quod Hercules est finis imaginis, quae fit ad eum repraesentandum. Sic igitur potest dici quod bonum extrinsecum a toto universo est finis gubernationis rerum sicut habitum et repraesentatum, quia ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit, ut participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei, quantum potest. Reply to Objection 2. The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in XII Metaphys. Reply to Objection 3. A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab uno. De causa enim per effectus iudicamus. Sed in gubernatione rerum apparet quod res non uniformiter moventur et operantur, quaedam enim contingenter, quaedam vero ex necessitate, et secundum alias diversitates. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno. Objection 1. It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ea quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invicem non dissentiunt nisi propter imperitiam aut impotentiam gubernantis, quae a Deo sunt procul. Sed res creatae a se invicem dissentiunt, et contra se invicem pugnant; ut in contrariis apparet. Non ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno. Objection 2. Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, in natura semper invenitur quod melius est. Sed melius est simul esse duos quam unum, ut dicitur Eccle. IV. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno, sed a pluribus. Objection 3. Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (Ecclesiastes 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod unum Deum et unum dominum confitemur; secundum illud apostoli I ad Cor. VIII, nobis est unus Deus, pater, et dominus unus. Quorum utrumque ad gubernationem pertinet, nam ad dominum pertinet gubernatio subditorum; et Dei nomen ex providentia sumitur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno. On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 8:6): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (13, 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere quod mundus ab uno gubernetur. Cum enim finis gubernationis mundi sit quod est essentialiter bonum, quod est optimum, necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima. Optima autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum. Cuius ratio est, quia gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis; ut Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod. Sicut omnia desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non possunt. Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum. Manifestum est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., entia nolunt disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo princeps. I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Difformitas ergo motuum est ex diversitate mobilium, quam requirit perfectio universi, ut supra dictum est; non ex diversitate gubernantium. Reply to Objection 1. Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (47, 1,2; 48, 2), and not by a diversity of governors.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod contraria, etsi dissentiant quantum ad fines proximos, conveniunt tamen quantum ad finem ultimum, prout concluduntur sub uno ordine universi. Reply to Objection 2. Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.
Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in particularibus bonis duo sunt meliora quam unum, sed ei quod est essentialiter bonum, non potest fieri aliqua additio bonitatis. Reply to Objection 3. If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod effectus gubernationis mundi sit unus tantum, et non plures. Effectus enim gubernationis esse videtur id quod per gubernationem in rebus gubernatis causatur. Hoc autem est unum, scilicet bonum ordinis; ut in exercitu patet. Ergo gubernationis mundi est unus effectus. Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ab uno natum est unum tantum procedere. Sed mundus gubernatur ab uno, ut ostensum est. Ergo et gubernationis effectus est unus tantum. Objection 2. Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved (3). Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si effectus gubernationis non est unus tantum propter unitatem gubernantis, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum multitudinem gubernatorum. Haec autem sunt nobis innumerabilia. Ergo gubernationis effectus non possunt comprehendi sub aliquo certo numero. Objection 3. Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, quod deitas providentia et bonitate perfecta omnia continet, et seipsa implet. Gubernatio autem ad providentiam pertinet. Ergo gubernationis divinae sunt aliqui determinati effectus. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod effectus cuiuslibet actionis ex fine eius pensari potest, nam per operationem efficitur ut pertingatur ad finem. Finis autem gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Effectus igitur gubernationis potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono. Alio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis secundum ea quibus ad Dei assimilationem creatura perducitur. Et sic in generali sunt duo effectus gubernationis. Creatura enim assimilatur Deo quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad id quod Deus bonus est, inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc quod Deus est aliis causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem. Unde duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in bono, et motio earum ad bonum. Tertio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis in particulari, et sic sunt nobis innumerabiles. I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum, quia secundum haec duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur. Reply to Objection 1. The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.
Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 2 Ad alia duo patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia divinae gubernationi subdantur. Dicitur enim Eccle. IX, vidi sub sole nec velocium esse cursum, nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias, nec artificum gratiam, sed tempus casumque in omnibus. Quae autem gubernationi alicuius subsunt, non sunt casualia. Ergo ea quae sunt sub sole, non subduntur divinae gubernationi. Objection 1. It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Ecclesiastes 9:11): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dicit quod non est Deo cura de bobus. Sed unicuique est cura eorum quae gubernantur ab ipso. Non ergo omnia subduntur divinae gubernationi. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 9:9): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod seipsum gubernare potest, non videtur alterius gubernatione indigere. Sed creatura rationalis seipsam gubernare potest, cum habeat dominium sui actus, et per se agat; et non solum agatur ab alio, quod videtur esse eorum quae gubernantur. Ergo non omnia subsunt divinae gubernationi. Objection 3. Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, quod Deus non solum caelum et terram, nec solum hominem et Angelum, sed nec exigui et contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia dereliquit. Omnia ergo eius gubernationi subduntur. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum, et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis, ut supra ostensum est. Unde sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur. Patet etiam hoc idem ex ratione finis. Intantum enim alicuius gubernatio se extendit, inquantum se extendere potest finis gubernationis. Finis autem divinae gubernationis est ipsa sua bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Unde cum nihil esse possit quod non ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, ut ex supra dictis patet; impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi divinae. Stulta igitur fuit opinio dicentium quod haec inferiora corruptibilia, vel etiam singularia, aut etiam res humanae non gubernantur a Deo. Ex quorum persona dicitur Ezech. IX, dereliquit dominus terram. I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above (44, 1,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (44, 4; 65, 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government. Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth" (Ezekiel 9:9).
Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sub sole dicuntur esse ea quae secundum motum solis generantur et corrumpuntur. In quibus omnibus casus invenitur; non ita quod omnia quae in eis fiunt, sint casualia; sed quia in quolibet eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest. Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent, maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus. Unde ad ostendendum quod casualia secundum ordinem alicuius superioris causae proveniunt, non dicit simpliciter quod vidit casum esse in omnibus, sed dicit tempus et casum; quia scilicet secundum aliquem ordinem temporis, casuales defectus inveniuntur in his rebus. Reply to Objection 1. These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a gubernante. Omnis autem motus est actus mobilis a movente, ut dicitur in III Physic. Omnis autem actus proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Et sic oportet quod diversa mobilia diversimode moveantur, etiam secundum motionem unius motoris. Sic igitur secundum unam artem Dei gubernantis, res diversimode gubernantur, secundum earum diversitatem. Quaedam enim secundum suam naturam sunt per se agentia, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et ista gubernantur a Deo non solum per hoc quod moventur ab ipso Deo in eis interius operante, sed etiam per hoc quod ab eo inducuntur ad bonum et retrahuntur a malo per praecepta et prohibitiones, praemia et poenas. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui proprie competit rationali creaturae. Reply to Objection 2. Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.
Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus, indiget gubernari a Deo. Reply to Objection 3. The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit providentiam in tria, primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa terram humanarum actionum. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate a Deo gubernentur. Objection 1. It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, melius est aliquid fieri per unum quam per multa, si sit possibile, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Deus potest per seipsum absque mediis causis omnia gubernare. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate gubernet. Objection 2. Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, nihil in Deo est deficiens et imperfectum. Sed ad defectum gubernatoris pertinere videtur quod mediantibus aliquibus gubernet, sicut rex terrenus, quia non sufficit ad omnia agenda, nec ubique est praesens in suo regno, propter hoc oportet quod habeat suae gubernationis ministros. Ergo Deus immediate omnia gubernat. Objection 3. Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., quemadmodum corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem, et spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
Iª q. 103 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in gubernatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ratio gubernationis, quae est ipsa providentia; et executio. Quantum igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus, sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum particularium rationem gubernationis habeat. Sed cum per gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernatio, quanto maior perfectio a gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat, sicut si aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum doctores. I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others. The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least. But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare. Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est ratio gubernationis. Reply to Objection 1. Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per multa. Reply to Objection 2. If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.
Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non solum pertinet ad imperfectionem regis terreni quod executores habeat suae gubernationis, sed etiam ad regis dignitatem, quia ex ordine ministrorum potestas regia praeclarior redditur. Reply to Objection 3. That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.
Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis contingere possit. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de Consol., quod Deus per bonum cuncta disponit. Si ergo nihil in rebus contingit praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequeretur quod nihil esset malum in rebus. Objection 1. It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.
Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil est casuale quod evenit secundum praeordinationem alicuius gubernantis. Si igitur nihil accidit in rebus praeter ordinem gubernationis divinae, sequitur quod nihil in rebus sit fortuitum et casuale. Objection 2. Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.
Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, ordo divinae gubernationis est certus et immutabilis, quia est secundum rationem aeternam. Si igitur nihil possit contingere in rebus praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequitur quod omnia ex necessitate eveniant, et nihil sit in rebus contingens, quod est inconveniens. Potest igitur in rebus aliquid contingere praeter ordinem gubernationis divinae. Objection 3. Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Esther XIII, domine Deus, rex omnipotens, in ditione tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere tuae voluntati. On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will."
Iª q. 103 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse est reducere in primam causam universalem, sicut indigestio contingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae, ex aliquo impedimento, puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in aliquam aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam primam universalem. Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; impossibile est quod aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sed ex hoc ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam, necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam causam. I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.
Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum, quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset. Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (48, 3). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad divinam providentiam pertinet, nihil fit casu in mundo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Reply to Objection 2. Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui effectus contingentes, per comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere possunt, non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa subiecta gubernationi divinae. Reply to Objection 3. Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid possit reniti contra ordinem gubernationis divinae. Dicitur enim Isaiae III, lingua eorum et adinventiones eorum contra dominum. Objection 1. It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isaiah 3:8): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus rex iuste punit eos qui eius ordinationi non repugnant. Si igitur nihil contraniteretur divinae ordinationi, nullus iuste puniretur a Deo. Objection 2. Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, quaelibet res est subiecta ordini divinae gubernationis. Sed una res ab alia impugnatur. Ergo aliqua sunt quae contranituntur divinae gubernationi. Objection 3. Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government.
Iª q. 103 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., non est aliquid quod summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit; ut dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wisdom 8) of Divine wisdom.
Iª q. 103 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ordo divinae providentiae dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo in generali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur a causa gubernativa totius; alio modo in speciali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur ex aliqua causa particulari, quae est executiva divinae gubernationis. Primo igitur modo, nihil contranititur ordini divinae gubernationis. Quod ex duobus patet. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod ordo divinae gubernationis totaliter in bonum tendit, et unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad bonum, nullus enim respiciens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit. Alio modo apparet idem ex hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnis inclinatio alicuius rei vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente, sicut inclinatio sagittae ad signum determinatum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio a sagittante. Unde omnia quae agunt vel naturaliter vel voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus omnia disponere suaviter. I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government. Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (1, ad 3; 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."
Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui vel cogitare vel loqui vel agere contra Deum, non quia totaliter renitantur ordini divinae gubernationis, quia etiam peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum, sed quia contranituntur cuidam determinato bono, quod est eis conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum. Et ideo puniuntur iuste a Deo. Reply to Objection 1. Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 2 Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Reply to Objection 2 is clear from the above.
Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa particulari, non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali totius. Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

Notes

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