Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q107

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Iª q. 107 pr. Deinde considerandum est de locutionibus Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum unus Angelus loquatur alii. Secundo, utrum inferior superiori. Tertio, utrum Angelus Deo. Quarto, utrum in locutione Angeli aliquid distantia localis operetur. Quinto, utrum locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant. Question 107. The speech of the angelsDoes one angel speak to another? Does the inferior speak to the superior? Does an angel speak to God? Is the angelic speech subject to local distance? Is all the speech of one angel to another known to all?
Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit enim Gregorius, XVIII Moral., quod in statu resurrectionis uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non abscondit. Multo igitur minus mens unius Angeli absconditur ab altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus Angelus alteri loquatur. Objection 1. It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another.
Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, duplex est locutio, interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur; et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce vel nutu vel aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quae Angelis competere non possunt. Ergo unus Angelus alteri non loquitur. Objection 2. Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suae locutioni. Sed non videtur per quid unus Angelus excitet alium ad attendendum, hoc enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus Angelus non loquitur alteri. Objection 3. Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
Iª q. 107 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, si linguis hominum loquar et Angelorum. On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Corinthians 13:1): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels."
Iª q. 107 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Angelis est aliqua locutio, sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II Moral., dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis intimae suspendatur. Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus Angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est quod, sicut supra diximus cum de actibus et potentiis animae ageretur, voluntas movet intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in intellectu tripliciter, primo quidem, habitualiter, vel secundum memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit; secundo autem, ut in actu consideratum vel conceptum; tertio, ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum est autem quod de primo gradu in secundum transfertur intelligibile per imperium voluntatis, unde in definitione habitus dicitur, quo quis utitur cum voluerit. Similiter autem et de secundo gradu transfertur in tertium per voluntatem, nam per voluntatem conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit alteri, et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare. I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech." To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (82, 4), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.
Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus Deus; secundum illud I Cor. II, quae sunt hominis, nemo novit nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est. Secundo autem clauditur mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis. Unde cum etiam voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, II Moral., alienis oculis intra secretum mentis, quasi post parietem corporis stamus, sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguae ianuam egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus. Hoc autem obstaculum non habet Angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit. Reply to Objection 1. Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 Corinthians 2:11: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.
Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod locutio exterior quae fit per vocem, est nobis necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo, sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua Angelorum metaphorice dicitur ipsa virtus Angeli, qua conceptum suum manifestat. Reply to Objection 2. External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.
Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quantum ad Angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum, quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt quidquid in eo est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturae conditae sibi invicem loqui poterant, et mali Angeli etiam nunc sibi invicem loquuntur; dicendum est quod, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum. Reply to Objection 3. There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inferior Angelus superiori non loquatur. Quia super illud I Cor. XIII, si linguis hominum loquar et Angelorum, dicit Glossa quod locutiones Angelorum sunt illuminationes, quibus superiores illuminant inferiores. Sed inferiores nunquam illuminant superiores, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec inferiores superioribus loquuntur. Objection 1. It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Corinthians 13:1), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (106, 3). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.
Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, supra dictum est quod illuminare nihil est aliud quam illud quod est alicui manifestum, alteri manifestare. Sed hoc idem est loqui. Ergo idem est loqui, et illuminare, et sic idem quod prius. Objection 2. Further, as was said above (106, 1), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.
Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod Deus ad Angelos loquitur, eo ipso quod eorum cordibus occulta sua invisibilia ostendit. Sed hoc ipsum est illuminare. Ergo omnis Dei locutio est illuminatio. Pari ergo ratione, omnis Angeli locutio est illuminatio. Nullo ergo modo Angelus inferior superiori loqui potest. Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.
Iª q. 107 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut Dionysius exponit VII Cael. Hier., inferiores Angeli superioribus dixerunt, quis est iste rex gloriae? On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of Glory?"
Iª q. 107 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod omnis illuminatio est locutio in Angelis, sed non omnis locutio est illuminatio. Quia sicut dictum est, Angelum loqui Angelo nihil aliud est quam conceptum suum ordinare ad hoc ut ei innotescat, per propriam voluntatem. Ea vero quae mente concipiuntur, ad duplex principium referri possunt, scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas; et ad voluntatem intelligentis, per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse Deus; manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod dependet a prima veritate, et locutio est et illuminatio; puta si unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel, homo est animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum; puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel illud facere. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux, nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem, unde communicare ea quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei veritas habeat. Manifestum est autem quod Angeli dicuntur superiores vel inferiores per comparationem ad hoc principium quod est Deus. Et ideo illuminatio, quae dependet a principio quod est Deus, solum per superiores Angelos ad inferiores deducitur. Sed in ordine ad principium quod est voluntas, ipse volens est primus et supremus. Et ideo manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent, per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque. Et quantum ad hoc, et superiores inferioribus, et inferiores superioribus loquuntur. I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said (1), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality. Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.
Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 1 Et per hoc patet solutio ad primum, et ad secundum. From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.
Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis Dei locutio ad Angelos est illuminatio, quia cum voluntas Dei sit regula veritatis, etiam scire quid Deus velit, pertinet ad perfectionem et illuminationem mentis creatae. Sed non est eadem ratio de voluntate Angeli, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above.
Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est ad manifestandum aliquid alteri. Sed Angelus nihil potest manifestare Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo Angelus non loquitur Deo. Objection 1. It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.
Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, loqui est ordinare conceptum intellectus ad alterum, ut dictum est. Sed Angelus semper conceptum suae mentis ordinat in Deum. Si ergo aliquando Deo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur, quod potest videri alicui inconveniens, cum aliquando Angelus Angelo loquatur. Videtur ergo quod Angelus nunquam loquatur Deo. Objection 2. Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above (1). But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to God.
Iª q. 107 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Zachar. I, respondit Angelus domini, et dixit, domine exercituum, usquequo non misereberis Ierusalem? Loquitur ergo Angelus Deo. On the contrary, It is written (Zechariah 1:12): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an angel speaks to God.
Iª q. 107 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus mentis ordinatur ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum dupliciter. Uno modo, ad hoc quod communicet alteri; sicut in rebus naturalibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutione humana doctor ordinatur ad discipulum. Et quantum ad hoc, nullo modo Angelus loquitur Deo, neque de his quae ad rerum veritatem pertinent, neque de his quae dependent a voluntate creata, quia Deus est omnis veritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et conditor. Alio modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid accipiat; sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum. Et hoc modo Angelus loquitur Deo, vel consultando divinam voluntatem de agendis; vel eius excellentiam, quam nunquam comprehendit, admirando; sicut Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod Angeli loquuntur Deo, cum per hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis surgunt. I answer that, As was said above (1,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."
Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro. Reply to Objection 1. Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant illuminari. Reply to Objection 2. The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, Angelus ubi est, ibi operatur. Locutio autem est quaedam operatio Angeli. Cum ergo Angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad determinatam loci distantiam Angelus loqui possit. Objection 1. It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place.
Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isaiae VI dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabat alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur quod in locutione Angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia. Objection 2. Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one to another" (Isaiah 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.
Iª q. 107 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XVI, dives in Inferno positus loquebatur Abrahae, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum. On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
Iª q. 107 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod locutio Angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio Angeli omnino abstracta est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatio est per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte phantasmatum, quae in Angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione Angeli nullum impedimentum facit distantia loci. I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (1,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.
Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod locutio Angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio interior, quae tamen ab alio percipitur, et ideo est in Angelo loquente, et per consequens ubi est Angelus loquens. Sed sicut distantia localis non impedit quin unus Angelus alium videre possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo ad se ordinatur, quod est eius locutionem percipere. Reply to Objection 1. The angelic speech, as above explained (1, ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.
Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeae, qui fit propter distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quae dicebatur, vel magnitudinem affectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, II Moral., tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus desiderat. Reply to Objection 2. The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less one cries out."
Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant. Quod enim unius hominis locutionem non omnes audiant, facit inaequalis loci distantia. Sed in locutione Angeli nihil operatur localis distantia, ut dictum est. Ergo uno Angelo loquente ad alterum, omnes percipiunt. Objection 1. It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained (4). Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.
Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnes Angeli communicant in virtute intelligendi. Si ergo conceptus mentis unius ordinatus ad alterum cognoscitur ab uno, pari ratione cognoscitur ab aliis. Objection 2. Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all.
Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, illuminatio est quaedam species locutionis. Sed illuminatio unius Angeli ab altero, pervenit ad omnes Angelos, quia, ut Dionysius dicit XV cap. Cael. Hier., unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi traditam aliis communicat. Ergo et locutio unius Angeli ad alterum, ad omnes perducitur. Objection 3. Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all.
Iª q. 107 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod unus homo potest alteri soli loqui. Multo igitur magis hoc in Angelis esse potest. On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.
Iª q. 107 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa ordinari aliquid ad unum, et non ad alterum. Et ideo potest conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci, et non ab aliis. Et sic locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque aliis, non quidem impediente distantia locali, sed hoc faciente voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est. I answer that, As above explained (1,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.
Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 1 Unde patet responsio ad primum et secundum. From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.
Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula veritatis, quae est principium commune omnium Angelorum, et ideo illuminationes sunt omnibus communes. Sed locutio potest esse de his quae ordinantur ad principium voluntatis creatae, quod est proprium unicuique Angelo, et ideo non oportet quod huiusmodi locutiones sint omnibus communes. Reply to Objection 3. Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.

Notes

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