Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q109

• Question 109.1 The hierarchies of evil spirits.
• Question 109.2
• Question 109.3
• Question 109.4

Latin	English
Iª q. 109 pr. Deinde considerandum est de ordinatione malorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ordines sint in Daemonibus. Secundo, utrum in eis sit praelatio. Tertio, utrum unus illuminet alium. Quarto, utrum subiiciantur praelationi bonorum Angelorum.	Question 109. The ordering of the bad angelsAre there orders among the demons? Is there precedence among them? Does one enlighten another? Are they subject to the precedence of the good angels?
Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non sint in Daemonibus. Ordo enim pertinet ad rationem boni, sicut et modus et species, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; et e contrario inordinatio pertinet ad rationem mali. Sed in bonis Angelis nihil est inordinatum. Ergo in malis Angelis non sunt aliqui ordines.	Objection 1. It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.
Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ordines angelici sub aliqua hierarchia continentur. Sed Daemones non sunt sub aliqua hierarchia, quae est sacer principatus, cum ab omni sanctitate sint vacui. Ergo in Daemonibus non sunt ordines.	Objection 2. Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.
Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Daemones de singulis ordinibus Angelorum ceciderunt, ut communiter dicitur. Si ergo aliqui Daemones dicuntur esse alicuius ordinis, quia de illo ordine ceciderunt; videtur quod deberent eis attribui nomina singulorum ordinum. Nunquam autem invenitur quod dicantur Seraphim, vel throni, vel dominationes. Ergo, pari ratione, non sunt in aliquibus ordinibus.	Objection 3. Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.
Iª q. 109 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. ult., quod est nobis colluctatio adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum.	On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephesians 6:12): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness."
Iª q. 109 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae. Gratia vero habet duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae. Si ergo considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt. Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae, sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse. Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.	I answer that, As explained above (108, 4,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummae glory. If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (62, 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum potest inveniri sine malo; sed malum non potest inveniri sine bono, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Daemones, inquantum habent naturam bonam, ordinati sunt.	Reply to Objection 1. Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (49, 3); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.
Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ordinatio Daemonum, si consideretur ex parte Dei ordinantis, est sacra, utitur enim Daemonibus propter seipsum. Sed ex parte voluntatis Daemonum, non est sacra, quia abutuntur sua natura ad malum.	Reply to Objection 2. If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.
Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore caritatis, nomen autem thronorum ab inhabitatione divina, nomen autem dominationum importat libertatem quandam, quae omnia opponuntur peccato. Et ideo peccantibus Angelis huiusmodi nomina non attribuuntur.	Reply to Objection 3. The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit praelatio. Omnis enim praelatio est secundum aliquem ordinem iustitiae. Sed Daemones totaliter a iustitia ceciderunt. Ergo in eis non est praelatio.	Objection 1. It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.
Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ubi non est obedientia et subiectio, non est praelatio. Haec autem sine concordia esse non possunt; quae in Daemonibus nulla est, secundum illud Prov. XIII, inter superbos semper sunt iurgia. Ergo in Daemonibus non est praelatio.	Objection 2. Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" (Proverbs 13:10). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si in eis est aliqua praelatio, aut hoc pertinet ad eorum naturam, aut ad eorum culpam vel poenam. Sed non ad eorum naturam, quia subiectio et servitus non est ex natura, sed est ex peccato subsecuta. Nec pertinet ad culpam vel poenam, quia sic superiores Daemones, qui magis peccaverunt, inferioribus subderentur. Non ergo est praelatio in Daemonibus.	Objection 3. If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
Iª q. 109 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Glossa, I ad Cor. XV, quandiu durat mundus, Angeli Angelis, homines hominibus, et Daemones Daemonibus praesunt.	On the contrary, On 1 Corinthians 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."
Iª q. 109 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum actio sequatur naturam rei, quorumcumque naturae sunt ordinatae, oportet quod etiam actiones sub invicem ordinentur. Sicut patet in rebus corporalibus, quia enim inferiora corpora naturali ordine sunt infra corpora caelestia actiones et motus eorum subduntur actionibus et motibus caelestium corporum. Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod Daemonum quidam naturali ordine sub aliis constituuntur. Unde et actiones eorum sub actionibus superiorum sunt. Et hoc est quod rationem praelationis facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati. Sic igitur ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis praelatio. Convenit etiam hoc divinae sapientiae, quae nihil in universo inordinatum relinquit, quae attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter, ut dicitur Sap. VIII.	I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (1), that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wisdom 8:1).
Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praelatio Daemonum non fundatur super eorum iustitia, sed super iustitia Dei cuncta ordinantis.	Reply to Objection 1. The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.	Reply to Objection 2. The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in eis est naturalis praelatio. Quod in hominibus non contingit, qui natura sunt pares. Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur, non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est esse magis miserum.	Reply to Objection 3. The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.
Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus sit illuminatio. Illuminatio enim consistit in manifestatione veritatis. Sed unus Daemon potest alteri veritatem manifestare, quia superiores magis acumine naturalis scientiae vigent. Ergo superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.	Objection 1. It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, corpus quod superabundat in lumine, potest illuminare corpus quod in lumine deficit; sicut sol lunam. Sed superiores Daemones magis abundant in participatione luminis naturalis. Ergo videtur quod superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.	Objection 2. Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
Iª q. 109 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, illuminatio cum purgatione est et perfectione, ut supra dictum est. Sed purgare non convenit Daemonibus; secundum illud Eccli. XXXIV, ab immundo quid mundabitur? Ergo etiam neque illuminare.	On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (106, 1). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" (Sirach 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
Iª q. 109 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie. Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis, secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem intellectum. Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio; sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat. Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum locutionis intimare potest.	I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (107, 2), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.
Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet veritatis manifestatio habet rationem illuminationis, sed solum quae dicta est.	Reply to Objection 1. Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent, non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.	Reply to Objection 2. According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained (55, 2; 58, 2; 79, 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod boni Angeli non habeant praelationem super malos. Praelatio enim Angelorum praecipue attenditur secundum illuminationes. Sed mali Angeli, cum sint tenebrae, non illuminantur a bonis. Ergo boni Angeli non habent praelationem super malos.	Objection 1. It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad negligentiam praesidentis pertinere videntur ea quae per subditos male fiunt. Sed Daemones multa mala faciunt. Si igitur subsunt praelationi bonorum Angelorum, videtur in Angelis bonis esse aliqua negligentia. Quod est inconveniens.	Objection 2. Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, praelatio Angelorum sequitur naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Sed si Daemones de singulis ordinibus ceciderunt, ut communiter dicitur, multi Daemones multis bonis Angelis sunt superiores ordine naturae. Non ergo boni Angeli praelationem habent super omnes malos.	Objection 3. Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained (2). But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod spiritus vitae desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium et iustum. Et Gregorius dicit quod potestates dicuntur Angeli quorum ditioni virtutes adversae subiectae sunt.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."
Iª q. 109 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod totus ordo praelationis primo et originaliter est in Deo, et participatur a creaturis secundum quod Deo magis appropinquant, illae enim creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt perfectiores et Deo propinquiores. Maxima autem perfectio, et per quam maxime Deo appropinquatur, est creaturarum fruentium Deo, sicut sunt sancti Angeli, qua perfectione Daemones privantur. Et ideo boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos reguntur.	I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per sanctos Angelos multa de divinis mysteriis Daemonibus revelantur, cum divina iustitia exigit ut per Daemones aliqua fiant vel ad punitionem malorum, vel ad exercitationem bonorum, sicut in rebus humanis assessores iudicis revelant tortoribus eius sententiam. Huiusmodi autem revelationes, si ad Angelos revelantes comparentur, illuminationes sunt, quia ordinant eas ad Deum. Ex parte vero Daemonum, non sunt illuminationes, quia eas in Deum non ordinant, sed ad expletionem propriae iniquitatis.	Reply to Objection 1. Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.	Reply to Objection 2. The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Angelus qui est inferior ordine naturae, praeest Daemonibus, quamvis superioribus ordine naturae; quia virtus divinae iustitiae, cui inhaerent boni Angeli, potior est quam virtus naturalis Angelorum. Unde et apud homines, spiritualis iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et philosophus dicit, in libro Ethic., quod virtuosus est regula et mensura omnium humanorum actuum.	Reply to Objection 3. An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Corinthians 2:15), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts."