Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q26

• Question 26.1 The Divine Beatitude
• Question 26.2
• Question 26.3
• Question 26.4

Latin	English
Iª q. 26 pr. Ultimo autem, post considerationem eorum quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, considerandum est de divina beatitudine. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum beatitudo Deo competat. Secundo, secundum quid dicitur Deus esse beatus, utrum secundum actum intellectus. Tertio, utrum sit essentialiter beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Quarto, utrum in eius beatitudine omnis beatitudo includatur.
Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo Deo non conveniat. Beatitudo enim, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed aggregatio bonorum non habet locum in Deo, sicut nec compositio. Ergo Deo non convenit beatitudo.	Objection 1. It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.
Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, beatitudo, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, secundum philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed Deo non convenit praemium, sicut nec meritum. Ergo nec beatitudo.	Objection 2. Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.
Iª q. 26 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ultimo, quem suis temporibus ostendet Deus beatus et solus potens, rex regum et dominus dominantium.	On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." (1 Timothy 6:15).
Iª q. 26 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo maxime Deo competit. Nihil enim aliud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae; cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.	I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.
Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (4, 2; 13, 4), in simplicity and unity.
Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod esse praemium virtutis accidit beatitudini vel felicitati, inquantum aliquis beatitudinem acquirit, sicut esse terminum generationis accidit enti, inquantum exit de potentia in actum. Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur; ita habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.	Reply to Objection 2. It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.
Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non dicatur beatus secundum intellectum. Beatitudo enim est summum bonum. Sed bonum dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, quia bonum respicit esse, quod est secundum essentiam, secundum Boetium, in libro de Hebdomad. Ergo et beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, et non secundum intellectum.	Objection 1. It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.
Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, beatitudo habet rationem finis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, sicut et bonum. Ergo beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum voluntatem, et non secundum intellectum.	Objection 2. Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.
Iª q. 26 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XXXII Moralium, ipse gloriosus est, qui, dum seipso perfruitur, accedentis laudis indigens non est. Esse autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum intellectum.	On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.
Iª q. 26 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo, sicut dictum est, significat bonum perfectum intellectualis naturae. Et inde est quod, sicut unaquaeque res appetit suam perfectionem, ita et intellectualis natura naturaliter appetit esse beata. Id autem quod est perfectissimum in qualibet intellectuali natura, est intellectualis operatio, secundum quam capit quodammodo omnia. Unde cuiuslibet intellectualis naturae creatae beatitudo consistit in intelligendo. In Deo autem non est aliud esse et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum intelligentiae rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo secundum intellectum, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem ad beatitudinem ipsius, beati dicuntur.	I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above (1), is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.
Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa ratione probatur quod Deus sit beatus secundum suam essentiam, non autem quod beatitudo ei conveniat secundum rationem essentiae, sed magis secundum rationem intellectus.	Reply to Objection 1. This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.
Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est obiectum voluntatis. Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.	Reply to Objection 2. Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.
Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur de ratione beatitudinis sit, quod sit summum bonum, videtur quod beatitudo non sit aliud quam Deus.	Objection 1. It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (6, 2 and 4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (11, 3). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.
Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, beatitudo est finis rationalis naturae ultimus. Sed esse ultimum finem rationalis naturae, soli Deo convenit. Ergo beatitudo cuiuslibet beati est solus Deus.	Objection 2. Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.
Iª q. 26 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, beatitudo unius est maior beatitudine alterius, secundum illud I Cor. XV, stella differt a stella in claritate. Sed Deo nihil est maius. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid aliud quam Deus.	On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.
Iª q. 26 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo intellectualis naturae consistit in actu intellectus. In quo duo possunt considerari, scilicet obiectum actus, quod est intelligibile; et ipse actus, qui est intelligere. Si igitur beatitudo consideretur ex parte ipsius obiecti, sic solus Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquis beatus, quod Deum intelligit; secundum illud Augustini, in V libro Confess., beatus est qui te novit, etiam si alia ignoret. Sed ex parte actus intelligentis, beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis beatis, in Deo autem est etiam secundum hoc, aliquid increatum.	I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.
Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo, quantum ad obiectum, est summum bonum simpliciter, sed quantum ad actum, in creaturis beatis, est summum bonum, non simpliciter, sed in genere bonorum participabilium a creatura.	Reply to Objection 1. Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.
Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod finis est duplex, scilicet cuius et quo, ut philosophus dicit, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut avaro est finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae. Creaturae igitur rationalis est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata ut usus, vel magis fruitio, rei.	Reply to Objection 2. End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.
Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo divina non complectatur omnes beatitudines. Sunt enim quaedam beatitudines falsae. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse falsum. Ergo divina beatitudo non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.	Objection 1. It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaedam beatitudo, secundum quosdam, consistit in rebus corporalibus, sicut in voluptatibus, divitiis, et huiusmodi, quae quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.	Objection 2. Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.
Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.	On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (4, 2 ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
Iª q. 26 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidquid est desiderabile in quacumque beatitudine, vel vera vel falsa, totum eminentius in divina beatitudine praeexistit. De contemplativa enim felicitate, habet continuam et certissimam contemplationem sui et omnium aliorum, de activa vero, gubernationem totius universi. De terrena vero felicitate, quae consistit in voluptate, divitiis, potestate, dignitate et fama, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., habet gaudium de se et de omnibus aliis, pro delectatione, pro divitiis, habet omnimodam sufficientiam, quam divitiae promittunt, pro potestate, omnipotentiam, pro dignitate, omnium regimen, pro fama vero, admirationem totius creaturae.	I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.
Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod beatitudo aliqua secundum hoc est falsa, secundum quod deficit a ratione verae beatitudinis, et sic non est in Deo. Sed quidquid habet de similitudine, quantumcumque tenui, beatitudinis, totum praeexistit in divina beatitudine.	Reply to Objection 1. A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.
Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.	Reply to Objection 2. The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner. We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.