Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q47

• Question 47.1 The distinction of things in general
• Question 47.2
• Question 47.3

Latin	English
Iª q. 47 pr. Post productionem creaturarum in esse, considerandum est de distinctione earum. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita. Nam primo considerabimus de distinctione rerum in communi; secundo, de distinctione boni et mali; tertio, de distinctione spiritualis et corporalis creaturae. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, de ipsa rerum multitudine seu distinctione. Secundo, de earum inaequalitate. Tertio, de unitate mundi.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod rerum multitudo et distinctio non sit a Deo. Unum enim semper natum est unum facere. Sed Deus est maxime unus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo non producit nisi unum effectum.	Objection 1. It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (11, 4). Therefore He produces but one effect.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, exemplatum assimilatur suo exemplari. Sed Deus est causa exemplaris sui effectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo, cum Deus sit unus, effectus eius est unus tantum, et non distinctus.	Objection 2. Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (44, 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae sunt ad finem, proportionantur fini. Sed finis creaturae est unus, scilicet divina bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo effectus Dei non est nisi unus.	Objection 3. Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above (44 , 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, quod Deus distinxit lucem a tenebris, et divisit aquas ab aquis. Ergo distinctio et multitudo rerum est a Deo.	On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:4,7) that God "divided the light from the darkness," and "divided waters from waters." Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod causam distinctionis rerum multipliciter aliqui assignaverunt. Quidam enim attribuerunt eam materiae, vel soli, vel simul cum agente. Soli quidem materiae, sicut Democritus, et omnes antiqui naturales, ponentes solam causam materialem, secundum quos distinctio rerum provenit a casu, secundum motum materiae. Materiae vero et agenti simul distinctionem et multitudinem rerum attribuit Anaxagoras, qui posuit intellectum distinguentem res, extrahendo quod erat permixtum in materia. Sed hoc non potest stare propter duo. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est quod etiam ipsa materia a Deo creata est. Unde oportet et distinctionem, si qua est ex parte materiae, in altiorem causam reducere. Secundo, quia materia est propter formam, et non e converso. Distinctio autem rerum est per formas proprias. Non ergo distinctio est in rebus propter materiam, sed potius e converso in materia creata est difformitas, ut esset diversis formis accommodata. Quidam vero attribuerunt distinctionem rerum secundis agentibus. Sicut Avicenna, qui dixit quod Deus, intelligendo se, produxit intelligentiam primam, in qua, quia non est suum esse, ex necessitate incidit compositio potentiae et actus, ut infra patebit. Sic igitur prima intelligentia, inquantum intelligit causam primam, produxit secundam intelligentiam; inquantum autem intelligit se secundum quod est in potentia, produxit corpus caeli, quod movet; inquantum vero intelligit se secundum illud quod habet de actu, produxit animam caeli. Sed hoc non potest stare propter duo. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est quod creare solius Dei est. Unde ea quae non possunt causari nisi per creationem, a solo Deo producuntur, et haec sunt omnia quae non subiacent generationi et corruptioni. Secundo, quia secundum hanc positionem, non proveniret ex intentione primi agentis universitas rerum, sed ex concursu multarum causarum agentium. Tale autem dicimus provenire a casu. Sic igitur complementum universi, quod in diversitate rerum consistit, esset a casu, quod est impossibile. Unde dicendum est quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia, nam bonitas quae in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem, et repraesentat eam, totum universum, quam alia quaecumque creatura. Et quia ex divina sapientia est causa distinctionis rerum, ideo Moyses dicit res esse distinctas verbo Dei, quod est conceptio sapientiae. Et hoc est quod dicitur Gen. I, dixit Deus, fiat lux. Et divisit lucem a tenebris.	I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter. But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above (44, 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms. Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear later (50, 3). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens. But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above (45, 5) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone--viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible. Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever. And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn. 1:3,4: "God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the darkness."
Iª q. 47 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod agens per naturam agit per formam per quam est, quae unius tantum est una, et ideo non agit nisi unum. Agens autem voluntarium, quale est Deus, ut supra ostensum est, agit per formam intellectam. Cum igitur Deum multa intelligere non repugnet unitati et simplicitati ipsius, ut supra ostensum est, relinquitur quod, licet sit unus, possit multa facere.	Reply to Objection 1. The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above (19, 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above (15, 2), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many things.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa teneret de exemplato quod perfecte repraesentat exemplar, quod non multiplicatur nisi materialiter. Unde imago increata, quae est perfecta, est una tantum. Sed nulla creatura repraesentat perfecte exemplar primum, quod est divina essentia. Et ideo potest per multa repraesentari. Et tamen secundum quod ideae dicuntur exemplaria, pluralitati rerum correspondet in mente divina pluralitas idearum.	Reply to Objection 2. This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things.
Iª q. 47 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in speculativis medium demonstrationis, quod perfecte demonstrat conclusionem, est unum tantum, sed media probabilia sunt multa. Et similiter in operativis, quando id quod est ad finem adaequat, ut ita dixerim, finem, non requiritur quod sit nisi unum tantum. Sed creatura non sic se habet ad finem qui est Deus. Unde oportuit creaturas multiplicari.	Reply to Objection 3. In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.
Iª q. 47 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inaequalitas rerum non sit a Deo. Optimi enim est optima adducere. Sed inter optima unum non est maius altero. Ergo Dei, qui est optimus, est omnia aequalia facere.	Objection 1. It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.
Iª q. 47 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, aequalitas est effectus unitatis, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Sed Deus est unus. Ergo fecit omnia aequalia.	Objection 2. Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.
Iª q. 47 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, iustitiae est inaequalia inaequalibus dare. Sed Deus est iustus in omnibus operibus suis. Cum ergo operationi eius, qua esse rebus communicat, non praesupponatur aliqua inaequalitas rerum, videtur quod fecerit omnia aequalia.	Objection 3. Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.
Iª q. 47 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, quare dies diem superat, et iterum lux lucem, et annus annum, sol solem? A domini scientia separata sunt.	On the contrary, It is said (Sirach 33:7): "Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished."
Iª q. 47 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes, volens excludere positionem ponentium distinctionem in rebus ex contrarietate principiorum boni et mali, posuit a Deo a principio omnia creata esse aequalia. Dicit enim quod Deus primo creavit creaturas rationales tantum, et omnes aequales, in quibus primo exorta est inaequalitas ex libero arbitrio, quibusdam conversis in Deum secundum magis et minus, quibusdam etiam secundum magis et minus a Deo aversis. Illae igitur rationales creaturae quae ad Deum per liberum arbitrium conversae sunt, promotae sunt ad diversos ordines Angelorum, pro diversitate meritorum. Illae autem quae aversae sunt a Deo, sunt corporibus alligatae diversis, secundum diversitatem peccati, et hanc causam dicit esse creationis et diversitatis corporum. Sed secundum hoc, universitas corporalium creaturarum non esset propter bonitatem Dei communicandam creaturis, sed ad puniendum peccatum. Quod est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Et ut Augustinus dicit, XI de Civ. Dei, quid stultius dici potest, quam istum solem, ut in uno mundo unus esset, non decori pulchritudinis, vel saluti rerum corporalium consuluisse artificem Deum; sed hoc potius evenisse, quia una anima sic peccaverat? Ac per hoc, si centum animae peccassent, centum soles haberet hic mundus. Et ideo dicendum est quod, sicut sapientia Dei est causa distinctionis rerum, ita et inaequalitatis. Quod sic patet. Duplex enim distinctio invenitur in rebus, una formalis, in his quae differunt specie; alia vero materialis, in his quae differunt numero tantum. Cum autem materia sit propter formam, distinctio materialis est propter formalem. Unde videmus quod in rebus incorruptibilibus non est nisi unum individuum unius speciei, quia species sufficienter conservatur in uno, in generabilibus autem et corruptibilibus, sunt multa individua unius speciei, ad conservationem speciei. Ex quo patet quod principalior est distinctio formalis quam materialis. Distinctio autem formalis semper requirit inaequalitatem, quia, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys., formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus species variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Unde in rebus naturalibus gradatim species ordinatae esse videntur, sicut mixta perfectiora sunt elementis, et plantae corporibus mineralibus, et animalia plantis, et homines aliis animalibus; et in singulis horum una species perfectior aliis invenitur. Sicut ergo divina sapientia causa est distinctionis rerum propter perfectionem universi, ita et inaequalitatis. Non enim esset perfectum universum, si tantum unus gradus bonitatis inveniretur in rebus.	I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Genesis 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): "What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred suns in the world?" Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.
Iª q. 47 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod optimi agentis est producere totum effectum suum optimum, non tamen quod quamlibet partem totius faciat optimam simpliciter, sed optimam secundum proportionem ad totum, tolleretur enim bonitas animalis, si quaelibet pars eius oculi haberet dignitatem. Sic igitur et Deus totum universum constituit optimum, secundum modum creaturae, non autem singulas creaturas, sed unam alia meliorem. Et ideo de singulis creaturis dicitur Gen. I, vidit Deus lucem quod esset bona, et similiter de singulis, sed de omnibus simul dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona.	Reply to Objection 1. It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, "God saw the light that it was good" (Genesis 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good" (Genesis 1:31).
Iª q. 47 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod primum quod procedit ab unitate, est aequalitas; et deinde procedit multiplicitas. Et ideo a patre, cui, secundum Augustinum, appropriatur unitas, processit filius, cui appropriatur aequalitas; et deinde creatura, cui competit inaequalitas. Sed tamen etiam a creaturis participatur quaedam aequalitas, scilicet proportionis.	Reply to Objection 2. The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality--namely, of proportion.
Iª q. 47 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa est quae movit Origenem, sed non habet locum nisi in retributione praemiorum, quorum inaequalitas debetur inaequalibus meritis. Sed in constitutione rerum non est inaequalitas partium per quamcumque inaequalitatem praecedentem vel meritorum vel etiam dispositionis materiae; sed propter perfectionem totius. Ut patet etiam in operibus artis, non enim propter hoc differt tectum a fundamento, quia habet diversam materiam; sed ut sit domus perfecta ex diversis partibus, quaerit artifex diversam materiam, et faceret eam si posset.	Reply to Objection 3. This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he would make such material if he could.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit unus mundus tantum, sed plures. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., inconveniens est dicere quod Deus sine ratione res creavit. Sed ea ratione qua creavit unum, potuit creare multos, cum eius potentia non sit limitata ad unius mundi creationem, sed est infinita, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo Deus plures mundos produxit.	Objection 1. It would seem that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above (25, 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, natura facit quod melius est, et multo magis Deus. Sed melius esset esse plures mundos quam unum, quia plura bona paucioribus meliora sunt. Ergo plures mundi facti sunt a Deo.	Objection 2. Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne quod habet formam in materia, potest multiplicari secundum numerum, manente eadem specie, quia multiplicatio secundum numerum est ex materia. Sed mundus habet formam in materia, sicut enim cum dico homo, significo formam, cum autem dico hic homo, significo formam in materia; ita, cum dicitur mundus, significatur forma, cum autem dicitur hic mundus, significatur forma in materia. Ergo nihil prohibet esse plures mundos.	Objection 3. Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say "man" I mean the form, and when I say "this man," I mean the form in matter; so when we say "world," the form is signified, and when we say "this world," the form in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, mundus per ipsum factus est; ubi singulariter mundum nominavit, quasi uno solo mundo existente.	On the contrary, It is said (John 1:10): "The world was made by Him," where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ipse ordo in rebus sic a Deo creatis existens, unitatem mundi manifestat. Mundus enim iste unus dicitur unitate ordinis, secundum quod quaedam ad alia ordinantur. Quaecumque autem sunt a Deo, ordinem habent ad invicem et ad ipsum Deum, ut supra ostensum est. Unde necesse est quod omnia ad unum mundum pertineant. Et ideo illi potuerunt ponere plures mundos, qui causam mundi non posuerunt aliquam sapientiam ordinantem, sed casum; ut Democritus, qui dixit ex concursu atomorum factum esse hunc mundum, et alios infinitos.	I answer that, The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown above (11, 3; 21, 1). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod haec ratio est quare mundus est unus, quia debent omnia esse ordinata uno ordine, et ad unum. Propter quod Aristoteles, in XII Metaphys., ex unitate ordinis in rebus existentis concludit unitatem Dei gubernantis. Et Plato ex unitate exemplaris probat unitatem mundi, quasi exemplati.	Reply to Objection 1. This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nullum agens intendit pluralitatem materialem ut finem, quia materialis multitudo non habet certum terminum, sed de se tendit in infinitum; infinitum autem repugnat rationi finis. Cum autem dicitur plures mundos esse meliores quam unum, hoc dicitur secundum multitudinem materialem. Tale autem melius non est de intentione Dei agentis, quia eadem ratione dici posset quod, si fecisset duos, melius esset quod essent tres; et sic in infinitum.	Reply to Objection 2. No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three; and so on to infinite.
Iª q. 47 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod mundus constat ex sua tota materia. Non enim est possibile esse aliam terram quam istam, quia omnis terra ferretur naturaliter ad hoc medium, ubicumque esset. Et eadem ratio est de aliis corporibus quae sunt partes mundi.	Reply to Objection 3. The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.