Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q65

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Iª q. 65 pr. Post considerationem spiritualis creaturae, considerandum est de creatura corporali. In cuius productione tria opera Scriptura commemorat, scilicet opus creationis, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, etc.; opus distinctionis, cum dicitur, divisit lucem a tenebris, et aquas quae sunt supra firmamentum, ab aquis quae sunt sub firmamento; et opus ornatus, cum dicitur, fiant luminaria in firmamento et cetera. Primo ergo considerandum est de opere creationis; secundo, de opere distinctionis; tertio, de opere ornatus. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis sit a Deo. Secundo, utrum sit facta propter bonitatem Dei. Tertio, utrum sit facta a Deo mediantibus Angelis. Quarto, utrum formae corporum sint ab Angelis, an immediate a Deo.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit a Deo. Dicitur enim Eccle. III, didici quod omnia quae fecit Deus, perseverant in aeternum. Sed corpora visibilia non perseverant in aeternum, dicitur enim II Cor. IV, quae videntur temporalia sunt; quae autem non videntur, aeterna. Ergo Deus non fecit corpora visibilia. Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said (Ecclesiastes 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (2 Corinthians 4:18): "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God did not make visible bodies.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gen. I, dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona. Sed creaturae corporales sunt malae, experimur enim eas in multis noxias, ut patet in multis serpentibus, in aestu solis, et huiusmodi; ideo autem aliquid dicitur malum, quia nocet. Creaturae igitur corporales non sunt a Deo. Objection 2. Further, it is said (Genesis 1:31): "God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, id quod est a Deo, non retrahit a Deo, sed ducit in ipsum. Sed creaturae corporales retrahunt a Deo, unde apostolus dicit, II Cor. IV, non contemplantibus nobis quae videntur. Ergo creaturae corporales non sunt a Deo. Objection 3. Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2 Corinthians 4:18): "While we look not at the things which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXLV, qui fecit caelum et terram, mare, et omnia quae in eis sunt. On the contrary, It is said (Psalm 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them."
Iª q. 65 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quorundam haereticorum positio est, quod visibilia ista non sunt creata a bono Deo, sed a malo principio. Et ad argumentum sui erroris assumunt quod apostolus dicit II, Cor. IV, Deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium. Haec autem positio est omnino impossibilis. Si enim diversa in aliquo uniantur, necesse est huius unionis causam esse aliquam, non enim diversa secundum se uniuntur. Et inde est quod, quandocumque in diversis invenitur aliquid unum, oportet quod illa diversa illud unum ab aliqua una causa recipiant; sicut diversa corpora calida habent calorem ab igne. Hoc autem quod est esse, communiter invenitur in omnibus rebus, quantumcumque diversis. Necesse est ergo esse unum essendi principium, a quo esse habeant quaecumque sunt quocumque modo, sive sint invisibilia et spiritualia, sive sint visibilia et corporalia. Dicitur autem Diabolus esse Deus huius saeculi, non creatione, sed quia saeculariter viventes ei serviunt; eo modo loquendi quo apostolus loquitur, ad Philipp. III, quorum Deus venter est. I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 4:4), "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god is their belly" (Philippians 3:19).
Iª q. 65 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes creaturae Dei secundum aliquid in aeternum perseverant, ad minus secundum materiam, quia creaturae nunquam in nihilum redigentur, etiam si sint corruptibiles. Sed quanto creaturae magis appropinquant ad Deum, qui est omnino immobilis, tanto magis sunt immobiles. Nam creaturae corruptibiles in perpetuum manent secundum materiam, sed mutantur secundum formam substantialem. Creaturae vero incorruptibiles permanent quidem secundum substantiam, sed sunt mutabiles secundum alia, puta secundum locum, ut corpora caelestia; vel secundum affectiones, ut creaturae spirituales. Quod autem apostolus dicit, quae videntur, temporalia sunt, etsi verum sit etiam quantum ad ipsas res in se consideratas, secundum quod omnis creatura visibilis subiacet tempori, vel secundum suum esse vel secundum suum motum; tamen apostolus intendit loqui de visibilibus secundum quod sunt hominis praemia. Nam praemia hominis quae sunt in istis rebus visibilibus, temporaliter transeunt, quae autem sunt in rebus invisibilibus, permanent in aeternum. Unde et supra praemiserat, aeternum gloriae pondus operatur in nobis. Reply to Objection 1. All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (2 Corinthians 4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory."
Iª q. 65 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod creatura corporalis, secundum suam naturam, est bona, sed non est bonum universale, sed est quoddam bonum particulare et contractum, secundum quam particularitatem et contractionem sequitur in ea contrarietas, per quam unum contrariatur alteri, licet utrumque in se sit bonum. Quidam autem, aestimantes res non ex earum natura, sed ex suo proprio commodo, quaecumque sibi nociva sunt, simpliciter mala arbitrantur non considerantes quod id quod est uni nocivum quantum ad aliquid, vel alteri vel eidem quantum ad aliquid est proficuum. Quod nequaquam esset, si secundum se corpora essent mala et noxia. Reply to Objection 2. Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.
Iª q. 65 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod creaturae, quantum est de se, non retrahunt a Deo, sed in ipsum ducunt, quia invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur, ut dicitur Rom. I. Sed quod avertant a Deo, hoc est ex culpa eorum qui insipienter eis utuntur. Unde dicitur Sap. XIV, quod creaturae factae sunt in muscipulam pedibus insipientium. Et hoc ipsum quod sic a Deo abducunt, attestatur quod sunt a Deo. Non enim abducunt insipientes a Deo, nisi alliciendo secundum aliquid boni in eis existens, quod habent a Deo. Reply to Objection 3. Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wisdom 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Dicitur enim Sap. I, creavit Deus ut essent omnia. Ergo omnia sunt creata propter suum proprium esse, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wisdom 1:14) that God "created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, bonum habet rationem finis. Ergo id quod est magis bonum in rebus, est finis minus boni. Creatura autem spiritualis comparatur ad corporalem, sicut maius bonum ad minus bonum. Ergo creatura corporalis est propter spiritualem, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Objection 2. Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, iustitia non dat inaequalia nisi inaequalibus. Sed Deus est iustus. Ergo ante omnem inaequalitatem a Deo creatam, est inaequalitas a Deo non creata. Sed inaequalitas a Deo non creata, non potest esse nisi quae est ex libero arbitrio. Ergo omnis inaequalitas sequitur ex diversis motibus liberi arbitrii. Creaturae autem corporales sunt inaequales spiritualibus. Ergo creaturae corporales sunt factae propter aliquos motus liberi arbitrii, et non propter Dei bonitatem. Objection 3. Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XVI, universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus. On the contrary, It is said (Proverbs 16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself."
Iª q. 65 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Origenes posuit quod creatura corporalis non est facta ex prima Dei intentione, sed ad poenam creaturae spiritualis peccantis. Posuit enim quod Deus a principio creaturas spirituales solas fecit, et omnes aequales. Quarum, cum essent liberi arbitrii, quaedam conversae sunt in Deum, et secundum quantitatem conversionis sortitae sunt maiorem vel minorem gradum, in sua simplicitate remanentes. Quaedam vero, aversae a Deo, alligatae sunt corporibus diversis, secundum modum aversionis a Deo. Quae quidem positio erronea est. Primo quidem, quia contrariatur Scripturae, quae, enarrata productione cuiuslibet speciei creaturae corporalis subiungit, vidit Deus quia hoc esset bonum; quasi diceret quod unumquodque ideo factum est, quia bonum est ipsum esse. Secundum autem opinionem Origenis, creatura corporalis facta est, non quia bonum est eam esse, sed ut malum alterius puniretur. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod mundi corporalis dispositio quae nunc est, esset a casu. Si enim ideo corpus solis tale factum est, ut congrueret alicui peccato spiritualis creaturae puniendo; si plures creaturae spirituales similiter peccassent sicut illa propter cuius peccatum puniendum ponit solem creatum, sequeretur quod essent plures soles in mundo. Et idem esset de aliis. Haec autem sunt omnino inconvenientia. Unde haec positione remota tanquam erronea, considerandum est quod ex omnibus creaturis constituitur totum universum sicut totum ex partibus. Si autem alicuius totius et partium eius velimus finem assignare, inveniemus primo quidem, quod singulae partes sunt propter suos actus; sicut oculus ad videndum. Secundo vero, quod pars ignobilior est propter nobiliorem; sicut sensus propter intellectum, et pulmo propter cor. Tertio vero, omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam, partes enim sunt quasi materia totius. Ulterius autem, totus homo est propter aliquem finem extrinsecum, puta ut fruatur Deo. Sic igitur et in partibus universi, unaquaeque creatura est propter suum proprium actum et perfectionem. Secundo autem, creaturae ignobiliores sunt propter nobiliores sicut creaturae quae sunt infra hominem, sunt propter hominem. Ulterius autem, singulae creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. Ulterius autem, totum universum, cum singulis suis partibus, ordinatur in Deum sicut in finem, inquantum in eis per quandam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei, quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione, cognoscendo et amando. Et sic patet quod divina bonitas est finis omnium corporalium. I answer that, Origen laid down [Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Genesis 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in hoc ipso quod creatura aliqua habet esse, repraesentat divinum esse et bonitatem eius. Et ideo per hoc quod Deus creavit omnia ut essent, non excluditur quin creaverit omnia propter suam bonitatem. Reply to Objection 1. In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod finis proximus non excludit finem ultimum. Unde per hoc quod creatura corporalis facta est quodammodo propter spiritualem, non removetur quin sit facta propter Dei bonitatem. Reply to Objection 2. The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God's goodness.
Iª q. 65 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aequalitas iustitiae locum habet in retribuendo, iustum enim est quod aequalibus aequalia retribuantur. Non autem habet locum in prima rerum institutione. Sicut enim artifex eiusdem generis lapides in diversis partibus aedificii ponit absque iniustitia, non propter aliquam diversitatem in lapidibus praecedentem, sed attendens ad perfectionem totius aedificii, quae non esset nisi lapides diversimode in aedificio collocarentur; sic et Deus a principio, ut esset perfectio in universo, diversas et inaequales creaturas instituit, secundum suam sapientiam, absque iniustitia, nulla tamen praesupposita meritorum diversitate. Reply to Objection 3. Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis sit producta a Deo mediantibus Angelis. Sicut enim res gubernantur per divinam sapientiam, ita omnia sunt per Dei sapientiam facta; secundum illud Psalmi CIII, omnia in sapientia fecisti. Sed ordinare est sapientis, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Unde in gubernatione rerum, inferiora per superiora reguntur quodam ordine, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo et in rerum productione talis ordo fuit, quod creatura corporalis, tanquam inferior, per spiritualem, tanquam superiorem, est producta. Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, diversitas effectuum demonstrat diversitatem causarum, quia idem semper facit idem. Si ergo omnes creaturae, tam spirituales quam corporales, sunt immediate a Deo productae, nulla esset inter creaturas diversitas, nec una magis distaret a Deo quam alia. Quod patet esse falsum, cum propter longe distare a Deo dicat philosophus quaedam corruptibilia esse. Objection 2. Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Iª q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad producendum effectum finitum, non requiritur virtus infinita. Sed omne corpus finitum est. Ergo per finitam virtutem spiritualis creaturae produci potuit; et productum fuit, quia in talibus non differt esse et posse; praesertim quia nulla dignitas competens alicui secundum suam naturam, ei denegatur, nisi forte ob culpam. Objection 3. Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, per quae creatura corporalis intelligitur. Ergo creatura corporalis est immediate a Deo producta. On the contrary, It is said (Genesis 1:1): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt gradatim res a Deo processisse, ita scilicet quod ab eo immediate processit prima creatura, et illa produxit aliam; et sic inde usque ad creaturam corpoream. Sed haec positio est impossibilis. Quia prima corporalis creaturae productio est per creationem per quam etiam ipsa materia producitur, imperfectum enim est prius quam perfectum in fieri impossibile est autem aliquid creari nisi a solo Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in causando. Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus, invenitur communius quam id quod informat et restringit ipsum, sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere, et materia quam forma. Quanto ergo aliquid est magis substratum, tanto a superiori causa directe procedit. Id ergo quod est primo substratum in omnibus, proprie pertinet ad causalitatem supremae causae. Nulla igitur secunda causa potest aliquid producere, non praesupposito in re producta aliquo quod causatur a superiori causa. Creatio autem est productio alicuius rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum. Unde relinquitur quod nihil potest aliquid creare nisi solus Deus, qui est prima causa. Et ideo ut Moyses ostenderet corpora omnia immediate a Deo creata, dixit, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone. In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
Iª q. 65 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in productione rerum est aliquis ordo, non quidem ut una creatura creetur ab alia (hoc enim impossibile est); sed ita quod ex divina sapientia diversi gradus in creaturis, constituuntur. Reply to Objection 1. In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ipse Deus unus, absque suae simplicitatis detrimento, diversorum cognoscitivus est, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo etiam est, secundum diversa cognita, diversorum productorum causa per suam sapientiam, sicut et artifex, apprehendendo diversas formas, producit diversa artificiata. Reply to Objection 2. God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above (15, 2); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.
Iª q. 65 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quantitas virtutis agentis non solum mensuratur secundum rem factam, sed etiam secundum modum faciendi, quia unum et idem aliter fit et a maiori, et a minori virtute. Producere autem aliquid finitum hoc modo ut nihil praesupponatur, est virtutis infinitae. Unde nulli creaturae competere potest. Reply to Objection 3. The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod formae corporum sint ab Angelis. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Trin., quod a formis quae sunt sine materia, veniunt formae quae sunt in materia. Formae autem quae sunt sine materia, sunt substantiae spirituales, formae autem quae sunt in materia, sunt formae corporum. Ergo formae corporum sunt a spiritualibus substantiis. Objection 1. It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne quod est per participationem, reducitur ad id quod est per essentiam. Sed spirituales substantiae per suam essentiam sunt formae, creaturae autem corporales participant formas. Ergo formae corporalium rerum sunt a spiritualibus substantiis derivatae. Objection 2. Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, spirituales substantiae magis habent virtutem causandi quam corpora caelestia. Sed corpora caelestia causant formas in istis inferioribus, unde dicuntur esse generationis et corruptionis causa. Ergo multo magis a spiritualibus substantiis formae quae sunt in materia, derivantur. Objection 3. Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod non est putandum Angelis ad nutum servire hanc corporalem materiam, sed potius Deo. Illi autem ad nutum dicitur servire corporalis materia, a quo speciem recipit. Non ergo formae corporales sunt ab Angelis, sed a Deo. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod opinio fuit quorundam quod omnes formae corporales deriventur a substantiis spiritualibus quas Angelos dicimus. Et hoc quidem dupliciter aliqui posuerunt. Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, derivari et formari a formis sine materia subsistentibus, per modum participationis cuiusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quendam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis, per modum assimilationis cuiusdam, quam participationem vocabat. Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum, puta quod una substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum; supra quam est quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius quandam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. Avicenna vero et quidam alii non posuerunt formas rerum corporalium in materia per se subsistere, sed solum in intellectu. A formis ergo in intellectu creaturarum spiritualium existentibus (quas quidem ipsi intelligentias, nos autem Angelos dicimus), dicebant procedere omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, sicut a formis quae sunt in mente artificis, procedunt formae artificiatorum. Et in idem videtur redire quod quidam moderni haeretici ponunt, dicentes quidem Deum creatorem omnium, sed materiam corporalem a Diabolo formatam et per varias species distinctam. Omnes autem hae opiniones ex una radice processisse videntur. Quaerebant enim causam formarum, ac si ipsae formae fierent secundum seipsas. Sed sicut probat Aristoteles in VII Metaphys., id quod proprie fit, est compositum, formae autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis generatis aut corruptis, quia etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas, sic enim alicui competit fieri, sicut et esse. Et ideo, cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis; sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo agente composito. Sed quia agens compositum, quod est corpus, movetur a substantia spirituali creata, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin.; sequitur ulterius quod etiam formae corporales a substantiis spiritualibus deriventur, non tanquam influentibus formas, sed tanquam moventibus ad formas. Ulterius autem reducuntur in Deum, sicut in primam causam, etiam species angelici intellectus, quae sunt quaedam seminales rationes corporalium formarum. In prima autem corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua transmutatio de potentia in actum. Et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia, tanquam propriae causae. Unde ad hoc significandum, Moyses singulis operibus praemittit, dixit Deus fiat hoc vel illud; in quo significatur formatio rerum per verbum Dei facta, a quo, secundum Augustinum, est omnis forma et compago et concordia partium. I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species. But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite." Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4, is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."
Iª q. 65 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Boetius intelligit per formas quae sunt sine materia, rationes rerum quae sunt in mente divina, sicut etiam apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, fide credimus aptata esse saecula verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent. Si tamen per formas quae sunt sine materia, intelligit Angelos, dicendum est quod ab eis veniunt formae quae sunt in materia, non per influxum, sed per motum. Reply to Objection 1. By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:3): "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod formae participatae in materia reducuntur, non ad formas aliquas per se subsistentes rationis eiusdem, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed ad formas intelligibiles vel intellectus angelici, a quibus per motum procedunt; vel ulterius ad rationes intellectus divini, a quibus etiam formarum semina sunt rebus creatis indita, ut per motum in actum educi possint. Reply to Objection 2. Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.
Iª q. 65 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod corpora caelestia causant formas in istis inferioribus, non influendo, sed movendo. Reply to Objection 3. The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.

Notes

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