Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q8
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Jump to navigationJump to search- Question 8.1 The Existence of God in Things
- Question 8.2
- Question 8.3
- Question 8.4
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| Iª q. 8 pr. Quia vero infinito convenire videtur quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto, utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei. | |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, excelsus super omnes gentes dominus, et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus. | Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (Psalm 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quod est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus, sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi. | Objection 2. Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any place." |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, quanto aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet quod sit in omnibus. | Objection 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus. | Objection 4. Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Corinthians 6:14). Therefore God is not in all things. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus, secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus. | On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Is. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime. | I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (7, 1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae, et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso. | Reply to Objection 2. Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit. Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat. Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae naturae. | Reply to Objection 3. No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione, inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse. | Reply to Objection 4. In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est ubique. | Objection 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia. Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus locis. Et ita non est ubique. | Objection 2. Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, quod est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique. | Objection 3. Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, caelum et terram ego impleo. | On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jeremiah 23:24). |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per modum proprium loci, sicut locata sunt in loco. Utroque autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est in omni loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, sic enim est in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item, locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum, et Deus omnem locum replet. Non sicut corpus, corpus enim dicitur replere locum, inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent omnia loca. | I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum virtutis. | Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis. Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet determinatum situm, non potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel in pluribus locis, et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus, quia habet determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest esse in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est, quod est extra totum genus continui, et hoc modo substantiae incorporeae, ut Deus, Angelus et anima, dicuntur esse indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad continuum sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua virtute. Unde secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et in loco parvo vel magno. | Reply to Objection 2. The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars, scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci. Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, si autem accipiatur totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et singulis. | Reply to Objection 3. A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus, non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. | Objection 1. It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, hoc est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. | Objection 2. Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam. | Objection 3. Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum in rebus. | Objection 4. Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence in things. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod Deus communi modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam. | On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)]. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam. In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam, licet non sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam, dicitur aliquid esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius sunt; sicut omnia quae sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse praesentia alicui, qui tamen non est secundum substantiam suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum vero substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo eius substantia habetur. Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei, qui dixerunt divinae potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam. Fuerunt vero alii, qui licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, circa cardines caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat. Et contra hos oportuit dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam. Fuerunt vero alii, qui licet dicerent omnia ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam. Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est. | I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (12). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power. But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things [Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence. Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence. Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam, quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni, scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam. | Reply to Objection 2. A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero. | Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo modo suo loco agetur. | Reply to Objection 4. No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (III). |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei. Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper, materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique. Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse ubique non est proprium Dei. | Objection 1. It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above (3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto universo, et ita ubique. | Objection 2. Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wisdom 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, totum universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique. | Objection 3. Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, si aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum. Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium Dei. | Objection 4. Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, anima, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte. Si ergo non esset in mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non est proprium Dei. | Objection 5. Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6 Praeterea, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, anima ubi videt, ibi sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est. Sed anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum. Ergo anima est ubique. | Objection 6. Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, quis audeat creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium? | On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?" |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non esset primo ubique, quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae, non convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per se dico id cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens, propter aliquam suppositionem factam, quia sic granum milii esset ubique, supposito quod nullum aliud corpus esset. Per se igitur convenit esse ubique alicui, quando tale est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque loca ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae sunt, oporteret in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum. | I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed non secundum idem esse. | Reply to Objection 1. The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se ubique. | Reply to Objection 2. Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis. | Reply to Objection 3. The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas partes. | Reply to Objection 4. If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo quidem, sed per accidens. | Reply to Objection 5. Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally. |
| Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod, dum caelum videt, in caelo videt, et eadem ratione in caelo sentit. Non tamen sequitur quod in caelo vivat vel sit, quia vivere et esse non important actum transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo potest intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum videntis, secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi. Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique. | Reply to Objection 6. When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.
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