Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part I/Q95

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Iª q. 95 pr. Deinde considerandum est de his quae pertinent ad voluntatem primi hominis. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt duo, primo quidem, de gratia et iustitia primi hominis; secundo, de usu iustitiae quantum ad dominium super alia. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo creatus fuerit in gratia. Secundo, utrum in statu innocentiae habuerit animae passiones. Tertio, utrum habuit virtutes omnes. Quarto, utrum opera eius fuissent aeque efficacia ad merendum, sicut modo sunt. Question 95. Things pertaining to the first man's will--namely, grace and righteousnessWas the first man created in grace? In the state of innocence, did he have passions of the soul? Did he have all virtues? Would what he did have been as meritorious as now?
Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit, factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in spiritum vivificantem. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia. Objection 1. It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Corinthians 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus veteris et novi testamenti, quod Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum. Sed quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit creatus in gratia. Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, quod Deus sic ordinavit Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium. Primo ergo condidit hominem et Angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et postmodum eis gratiam contulit. Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, Magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod homini in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non poterat proficere. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia. Objection 4. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, ad hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suae creationis. Objection 5. Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6 Praeterea, natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam. Objection 6. Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummaed. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, homo et Angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed Angelus est creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quod Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam. Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia. On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse. Sed quod etiam fuerit conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle. VII, Deus fecit hominem rectum. Erat enim haec rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Manifestum est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam poenam inobedientiae suae. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur. I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis corporis incoepit in Christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post mortem. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod Angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis. Reply to Objection 3. This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum. Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae. Reply to Objection 4. The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse. Reply to Objection 5. As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.
Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturae. Unde non est similis ratio. Reply to Objection 6. We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae passiones. Objection 1. It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Galatians 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, anima Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones. Objection 2. Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, per virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab eo. Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the soul.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes. I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non erat. Reply to Objection 1. The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad passiones quae impediunt rationem. Reply to Objection 2. The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (97, 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.
Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas, temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet, et quae oportet, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes. Objection 1. It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec huiusmodi virtutes. Objection 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum. Misericordia etiam est quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in statu innocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque huiusmodi virtutes. Objection 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes. Objection 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, fides quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi status repugnare videtur. Objection 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam homilia, princeps vitiorum devicit Adam de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia armatum, temperantia compositum, claritate splendidum. On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."
Iª q. 95 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. Et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam sunt, quae de sui ratione nullam imperfectionem important, ut caritas et iustitia. Et huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de sui ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel ex parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, et spes, quae est eorum quae non habentur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret. Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, contingit studioso solum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod verecundaretur si turpe aliquid committeret. I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above (1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (I-II, 63, 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9).
Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod accidit temperantiae et fortitudini quod superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones superabundantes in subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi virtutibus passiones moderari. Reply to Objection 1. It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illae passiones ad malum ordinatae, repugnant perfectioni primi status, quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status, poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam Daemonum, sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem. Reply to Objection 2. Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt. Reply to Objection 3. appears from what has been said above.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam perseverantiam non habuit. Reply to Objection 4. Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.
Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Reply to Objection 5. appears from what has been said above.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei misericordia datur, quae magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiae. Ergo copiosius infunditur nobis gratia. Quae cum sit radix meriti, opera nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur. Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad meritum requiritur pugna quaedam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad Tim. II, non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit. Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum. Sed nunc est maior pugna et difficultas. Ergo et maior efficacia ad merendum. Objection 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Timothy 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXIV distinctione II libri Sent., quod homo non meruisset, tentationi resistendo; nunc autem meretur qui tentationi resistit. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam in primo statu. Objection 3. Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc, homo esset melioris conditionis post peccatum. On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo, ex radice caritatis et gratiae. Et talis quantitas meriti respondet praemio essentiali, quod consistit in Dei fruitione, qui enim ex maiori caritate aliquid facit, perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis. Quae quidem est duplex, scilicet absoluta, et proportionalis. Vidua enim quae misit duo aera minuta in gazophylacium; minus opus fecit quantitate absoluta, quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt, sed quantitate proportionali vidua plus fecit, secundum sententiam domini, quia magis eius facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti respondet praemio accidentali; quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic igitur dicendum quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas meriti ex parte gratiae; quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo obstaculo in natura humana invento. Similiter etiam, si consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia, cum homo esset maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur. I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis sustentationem. Reply to Objection 1. After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti, secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quae conatur ad id quod est sibi difficile, promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine caritatis. Et tamen potest contingere quod aliquis ita prompta voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas tamen actualis, inquantum est poenalis, habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato. Reply to Objection 2. Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin.
Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet; sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad malum, sicut modo est, unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere tentationi sine gratia, quam modo. Reply to Objection 3. The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace.

Notes

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