Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q11

• Question 11.1 The will's acts with regard to enjoyment
• Question 11.2
• Question 11.3
• Question 11.4

Latin	English
Iª-IIae q. 11 pr. Deinde considerandum est de fruitione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum frui sit actus appetitivae potentiae. Secundo, utrum soli rationali creaturae conveniat, an etiam animalibus brutis. Tertio, utrum fruitio sit tantum ultimi finis. Quarto, utrum sit solum finis habiti.	Question 11. Enjoyment which is an act of the will Is enjoyment an act of the appetitive power? Does it belong to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals? Is enjoyment only of the last end? Is it only of the end possessed?
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod frui non sit solum appetitivae potentiae. Frui enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam fructum capere. Sed fructum humanae vitae, qui est beatitudo, capit intellectus, in cuius actu beatitudo consistit, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo frui non est appetitivae potentiae, sed intellectus.	Objection 1. It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (Question 3, Article 04), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the intellect.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, quaelibet potentia habet proprium finem, qui est eius perfectio, sicut visus finis est cognoscere visibile, auditus percipere sonos, et sic de aliis. Sed finis rei est fructus eius. Ergo frui est potentiae cuiuslibet, et non solum appetitivae.	Objection 2. Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, fruitio delectationem quandam importat. Sed delectatio sensibilis pertinet ad sensum, qui delectatur in suo obiecto, et eadem ratione, delectatio intellectualis ad intellectum. Ergo fruitio pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam, et non ad appetitivam.	Objection 3. Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, I de Doctr. Christ., et in X de Trin., frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam. Sed amor pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam. Ergo et frui est actus appetitivae potentiae.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake." But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod fruitio et fructus ad idem pertinere videntur, et unum ex altero derivari. Quid autem a quo, nihil ad propositum refert; nisi quod hoc probabile videtur, quod id quod magis est manifestum, prius etiam fuerit nominatum. Sunt autem nobis primo manifesta quae sunt sensibilia magis. Unde a sensibilibus fructibus nomen fruitionis derivatum videtur. Fructus autem sensibilis est id quod ultimum ex arbore expectatur, et cum quadam suavitate percipitur. Unde fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis. Finis autem et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae. Unde manifestum est quod fruitio est actus appetitivae potentiae.	I answer that, "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which, matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word "fruition" is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens fine iam adepto.	Reply to Objection 1. Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod perfectio et finis cuiuslibet alterius potentiae, continetur sub obiecto appetitivae, sicut proprium sub communi, ut dictum est supra. Unde perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae, inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines; et ipsa consequitur finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.	Reply to Objection 2. The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the common, as stated above (Question 9, Article 1). Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in delectatione duo sunt, scilicet perceptio convenientis, quae pertinet ad apprehensivam potentiam; et complacentia eius quod offertur ut conveniens. Et hoc pertinet ad appetitivam potentiam, in qua ratio delectationis completur.	Reply to Objection 3. In delight there are two things: perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod frui solummodo sit hominum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Doct. Christ., quod nos homines sumus qui fruimur et utimur. Non ergo alia animalia frui possunt.	Objection 1. It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, frui est ultimi finis. Sed ad ultimum finem non possunt pertingere bruta animalia. Ergo eorum non est frui.	Objection 2. Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to enjoy.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut appetitus sensitivus est sub intellectivo, ita appetitus naturalis est sub sensitivo. Si igitur frui pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, videtur quod pari ratione possit ad naturalem pertinere. Quod patet esse falsum, quia eius non est delectari. Ergo appetitus sensitivi non est frui. Et ita non convenit brutis animalibus.	Objection 3. Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate, non absurde existimantur et bestiae.	On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis habetur, frui non est actus potentiae pervenientis ad finem sicut exequentis, sed potentiae imperantis executionem, dictum est enim quod est appetitivae potentiae. In rebus autem cognitione carentibus invenitur quidem potentia pertingens ad finem per modum exequentis, sicut qua grave tendit deorsum et leve sursum. Sed potentia ad quam pertineat finis per modum imperantis, non invenitur in eis; sed in aliqua superiori natura, quae sic movet totam naturam per imperium, sicut in habentibus cognitionem appetitus movet alias potentias ad suos actus. Unde manifestum est quod in his quae cognitione carent, quamvis pertingant ad finem, non invenitur fruitio finis; sed solum in his quae cognitionem habent. Sed cognitio finis est duplex, perfecta, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem, qua non solum cognoscitur id quod est finis et bonum, sed universalis ratio finis et boni, et talis cognitio est solius rationalis naturae. Imperfecta autem cognitio est qua cognoscitur particulariter finis et bonum, et talis cognitio est in brutis animalibus. Quorum etiam virtutes appetitivae non sunt imperantes libere; sed secundum naturalem instinctum ad ea quae apprehenduntur, moventur. Unde rationali naturae convenit fruitio secundum rationem perfectam, brutis autem animalibus secundum rationem imperfectam, aliis autem creaturis nullo modo.	I answer that, As was stated above (Article 1) to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge. Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de fruitione perfecta.	Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non oportet quod fruitio sit ultimi finis simpliciter, sed eius quod habetur ab unoquoque pro ultimo fine.	Reply to Objection 2. Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus consequitur aliquam cognitionem, non autem appetitus naturalis, praecipue prout est in his quae cognitione carent.	Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de fruitione imperfecta. Quod ex ipso modo loquendi apparet, dicit enim quod frui non adeo absurde existimantur et bestiae, scilicet sicut uti absurdissime dicerentur.	Reply to Objection 4. Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they "use."
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fruitio non sit tantum ultimi finis. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Philem., ita, frater, ego te fruar in domino. Sed manifestum est quod Paulus non posuerat ultimum suum finem in homine. Ergo frui non tantum est ultimi finis.	Objection 1. It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, fructus est quo aliquis fruitur. Sed apostolus dicit, ad Galat. V, fructus spiritus est caritas, gaudium, pax, et cetera huiusmodi; quae non habent rationem ultimi finis. Non ergo fruitio est tantum ultimi finis.	Objection 2. Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (Galatians 5:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, actus voluntatis supra seipsos reflectuntur, volo enim me velle, et amo me amare. Sed frui est actus voluntatis, voluntas enim est per quam fruimur, ut Augustinus dicit X de Trin. Ergo aliquis fruitur sua fruitione. Sed fruitio non est ultimus finis hominis, sed solum bonum increatum, quod est Deus. Non ergo fruitio est solum ultimi finis.	Objection 3. Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will: since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., non fruitur si quis id quod in facultatem voluntatis assumit, propter aliud appetit. Sed solum ultimus finis est qui non propter aliud appetitur. Ergo solius ultimi finis est fruitio.	On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem fructus duo pertinent, scilicet quod sit ultimum; et quod appetitum quietet quadam dulcedine vel delectatione. Ultimum autem est simpliciter, et secundum quid, simpliciter quidem, quod ad aliud non refertur; sed secundum quid, quod est aliquorum ultimum. Quod ergo est simpliciter ultimum, in quo aliquid delectatur sicut in ultimo fine, hoc proprie dicitur fructus, et eo proprie dicitur aliquis frui. Quod autem in seipso non est delectabile, sed tantum appetitur in ordine ad aliud, sicut potio amara ad sanitatem; nullo modo fructus dici potest. Quod autem in se habet quandam delectationem, ad quam quaedam praecedentia referuntur, potest quidem aliquo modo dici fructus, sed non proprie, et secundum completam rationem fructus, eo dicimur frui. Unde Augustinus, in X de Trin., dicit quod fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas delectata conquiescit. Non autem quiescit simpliciter nisi in ultimo, quia quandiu aliquid expectatur, motus voluntatis remanet in suspenso, licet iam ad aliquid pervenerit. Sicut in motu locali, licet illud quod est medium in magnitudine, sit principium et finis; non tamen accipitur ut finis in actu, nisi quando in eo quiescitur.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 1) the notion of fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as referred to something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful about it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I de Doctr. Christ., si dixisset te fruar, et non addidisset in domino, videretur finem dilectionis in eo posuisse. Sed quia illud addidit, in domino se posuisse finem, atque eo se frui significavit. Ut sic fratre se frui dixerit non tanquam termino, sed tanquam medio.	Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him": as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a means.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fructus aliter comparatur ad arborem producentem, et aliter ad hominem fruentem. Ad arborem quidem producentem comparatur ut effectus ad causam, ad fruentem autem, sicut ultimum expectatum et delectans. Dicuntur igitur ea quae enumerat ibi apostolus, fructus, quia sunt effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis, unde et fructus spiritus dicuntur, non autem ita quod eis fruamur tanquam ultimo fine. Vel aliter dicendum quod dicuntur fructus, secundum Ambrosium, quia propter se petenda sunt, non quidem ita quod ad beatitudinem non referantur; sed quia in seipsis habent unde nobis placere debeant.	Reply to Objection 2. Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called "fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because "we should desire them for their own sake": not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure in them.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est finis dicitur dupliciter, uno modo, ipsa res; alio modo, adeptio rei. Quae quidem non sunt duo fines, sed unus finis, in se consideratus, et alteri applicatus. Deus igitur est ultimus finis sicut res quae ultimo quaeritur, fruitio autem sicut adeptio huius ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non est alius finis Deus, et fruitio Dei; ita eadem ratio fruitionis est qua fruimur Deo, et qua fruimur divina fruitione. Et eadem ratio est de beatitudine creata, quae in fruitione consistit.	Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (1, 8; 2, 7), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fruitio non sit nisi finis habiti. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod frui est cum gaudio uti, non adhuc spei, sed iam rei. Sed quandiu non habetur, non est gaudium rei, sed spei. Ergo fruitio non est nisi finis habiti.	Objection 1. It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut dictum est, fruitio non est proprie nisi ultimi finis, quia solus ultimus finis quietat appetitum. Sed appetitus non quietatur nisi in fine iam habito. Ergo fruitio, proprie loquendo, non est nisi finis habiti.	Objection 2. Further, as stated above (Article 3), enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, frui est capere fructum. Sed non capitur fructus, nisi quando iam finis habetur. Ergo fruitio non est nisi finis habiti.	Objection 3. Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed hoc potest fieri etiam de re non habita. Ergo frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti.	On the contrary, "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod frui importat comparationem quandam voluntatis ad ultimum finem, secundum quod voluntas habet aliquid pro ultimo fine. Habetur autem finis dupliciter, uno modo, perfecte; et alio modo, imperfecte. Perfecte quidem, quando habetur non solum in intentione, sed etiam in re, imperfecte autem, quando habetur in intentione tantum. Est ergo perfecta fruitio finis iam habiti realiter. Sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed in intentione tantum.	I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de fruitione perfecta.	Reply to Objection 1. Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur, uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem. Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis. Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.	Reply to Objection 2. The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
Iª-IIae q. 11 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod finem accipere vel habere dicitur aliquis, non solum secundum rem, sed etiam secundum intentionem, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.