Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q23

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Iª-IIae q. 23 pr. Deinde considerandum est de passionum differentia ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum passiones quae sunt in concupiscibili, sint diversae ab his quae sunt in irascibili. Secundo, utrum contrarietas passionum irascibili sit secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Tertio, utrum sit aliqua passio non habens contrarium. Quarto, utrum sint aliquae passiones differentes specie, in eadem potentia, non contrariae ad invicem. Question 23. How the passions differ from one another Are the passions of the concupiscible part different from those of the irascible part? Is the contrariety of passions in the irascible part based on the contrariety of good and evil? Is there any passion that has no contrary? In the same power, are there any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passiones eaedem sint in irascibili et in concupiscibili. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod passiones animae sunt quas sequitur gaudium et tristitia. Sed gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo omnes passiones sunt in concupiscibili. Non ergo sunt aliae in irascibili, et aliae in concupiscibili. Objection 1. It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Matth. XIII, super illud, simile est regnum caelorum fermento etc., dicit Glossa Hieronymi, in ratione possideamus prudentiam, in irascibili odium vitiorum, in concupiscibili desiderium virtutum. Sed odium est in concupiscibili, sicut et amor, cui contrariatur, ut dicitur in II Topic. Ergo eadem passio est in concupiscibili et irascibili. Objection 2. Further, on the words of Matthew 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, passiones et actus differunt specie secundum obiecta. Sed passionum irascibilis et concupiscibilis eadem obiecta sunt, scilicet bonum et malum. Ergo eaedem sunt passiones irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Objection 3. Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, diversarum potentiarum actus sunt specie diversi, sicut videre et audire. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt duae potentiae dividentes appetitum sensitivum, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo, cum passiones sint motus appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est, passiones quae sunt in irascibili, erunt aliae secundum speciem a passionibus quae sunt in concupiscibili. On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the I, 81, 2. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones quae sunt in irascibili et in concupiscibili, differunt specie. Cum enim diversae potentiae habeant diversa obiecta, ut in primo dictum est, necesse est quod passiones diversarum potentiarum ad diversa obiecta referantur. Unde multo magis passiones diversarum potentiarum specie differunt, maior enim differentia obiecti requiritur ad diversificandam speciem potentiarum, quam ad diversificandam speciem passionum vel actuum. Sicut enim in naturalibus diversitas generis consequitur diversitatem potentiae materiae, diversitas autem speciei diversitatem formae in eadem materia; ita in actibus animae, actus ad diversas potentias pertinentes, sunt non solum specie, sed etiam genere diversi; actus autem vel passiones respicientes diversa obiecta specialia comprehensa sub uno communi obiecto unius potentiae, differunt sicut species illius generis. Ad cognoscendum ergo quae passiones sint in irascibili, et quae in concupiscibili, oportet assumere obiectum utriusque potentiae. Dictum est autem in primo quod obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum. Sed quia necesse est quod interdum anima difficultatem vel pugnam patiatur in adipiscendo aliquod huiusmodi bonum, vel fugiendo aliquod huiusmodi malum, inquantum hoc est quodammodo elevatum supra facilem potestatem animalis; ideo ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irascibilis. Quaecumque ergo passiones respiciunt absolute bonum vel malum, pertinent ad concupiscibilem; ut gaudium, tristitia, amor, odium, et similia. Quaecumque vero passiones respiciunt bonum vel malum sub ratione ardui, prout est aliquid adipiscibile vel fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, pertinent ad irascibilem; ut audacia, timor, spes, et huiusmodi. I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have different objects, as stated in the I, 77, 3, the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus. In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers. For we have stated in the I, 81, 2, that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, ad hoc vis irascibilis data est animalibus, ut tollantur impedimenta quibus concupiscibilis in suum obiectum tendere prohibetur, vel propter difficultatem boni adipiscendi, vel propter difficultatem mali superandi. Et ideo passiones irascibilis omnes terminantur ad passiones concupiscibilis. Et secundum hoc, etiam passiones quae sunt in irascibili, consequitur gaudium et tristitia, quae sunt in concupiscibili. Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the I, 81, 2, the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod odium vitiorum attribuit Hieronymus irascibili, non propter rationem odii, quae proprie competit concupiscibili; sed propter impugnationem, quae pertinet ad irascibilem. Reply to Objection 2. Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum inquantum est delectabile, movet concupiscibilem. Sed si bonum habeat quandam difficultatem ad adipiscendum, ex hoc ipso habet aliquid repugnans concupiscibili. Et ideo necessarium fuit esse aliam potentiam quae in id tenderet. Et eadem ratio est de malis. Et haec potentia est irascibilis. Unde ex consequenti passiones concupiscibilis et irascibilis specie differunt. Reply to Objection 3. Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contrarietas passionum irascibilis non sit nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Passiones enim irascibilis ordinantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est. Sed passiones concupiscibilis non contrariantur nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali; sicut amor et odium, gaudium et tristitia. Ergo nec passiones irascibilis. Objection 1. It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (01, ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the irascible passions.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, passiones differunt secundum obiecta; sicut et motus secundum terminos. Sed contrarietas non est in motibus nisi secundum contrarietatem terminorum, ut patet in V Physic. Ergo neque in passionibus est contrarietas nisi secundum contrarietatem obiectorum. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum vel malum. Ergo in nulla potentia appetitiva potest esse contrarietas passionum nisi secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Objection 2. Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis passio animae attenditur secundum accessum et recessum, ut Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus. Sed accessus causatur ex ratione boni, recessus autem ex ratione mali, quia sicut bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in I Ethic., ita malum est quod omnia fugiunt. Ergo contrarietas in passionibus animae non potest esse nisi secundum bonum et malum. Objection 3. Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, timor et audacia sunt contraria, ut patet in III Ethic. sed timor et audacia non differunt secundum bonum et malum, quia utrumque est respectu aliquorum malorum. Ergo non omnis contrarietas passionum irascibilis est secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passio quidam motus est, ut dicitur in III Physic. Unde oportet contrarietatem passionum accipere secundum contrarietatem motuum vel mutationum. Est autem duplex contrarietas in mutationibus vel motibus, ut dicitur in V Physic. Una quidem secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, quae quidem contrarietas est proprie mutationum, idest generationis, quae est mutatio ad esse, et corruptionis, quae est mutatio ab esse. Alia autem secundum contrarietatem terminorum, quae proprie est contrarietas motuum, sicut dealbatio, quae est motus a nigro in album, opponitur denigrationi, quae est motus ab albo in nigrum. Sic igitur in passionibus animae duplex contrarietas invenitur, una quidem secundum contrarietatem obiectorum, scilicet boni et mali; alia vero secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino. In passionibus quidem concupiscibilis invenitur prima contrarietas tantum, quae scilicet est secundum obiecta, in passionibus autem irascibilis invenitur utraque. Cuius ratio est quia obiectum concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est, est bonum vel malum sensibile absolute. Bonum autem, inquantum bonum, non potest esse terminus ut a quo, sed solum ut ad quem, quia nihil refugit bonum inquantum bonum, sed omnia appetunt ipsum. Similiter nihil appetit malum inquantum huiusmodi, sed omnia fugiunt ipsum, et propter hoc, malum non habet rationem termini ad quem, sed solum termini a quo. Sic igitur omnis passio concupiscibilis respectu boni, est ut in ipsum, sicut amor, desiderium et gaudium, omnis vero passio eius respectu mali, est ut ab ipso, sicut odium, fuga seu abominatio, et tristitia. Unde in passionibus concupiscibilis non potest esse contrarietas secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem obiecto. Sed obiectum irascibilis est sensibile bonum vel malum, non quidem absolute, sed sub ratione difficultatis vel arduitatis, ut supra dictum est. Bonum autem arduum sive difficile habet rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, inquantum est bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem spei; et ut ab ipso recedatur, inquantum est arduum vel difficile, quod pertinet ad passionem desperationis. Similiter malum arduum habet rationem ut vitetur, inquantum est malum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem timoris, habet etiam rationem ut in ipsum tendatur, sicut in quoddam arduum, per quod scilicet aliquid evadit subiectionem mali, et sic tendit in ipsum audacia. Invenitur ergo in passionibus irascibilis contrarietas secundum contrarietatem boni et mali, sicut inter spem et timorem, et iterum secundum accessum et recessum ab eodem termino, sicut inter audaciam et timorem. I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black. Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Article 1), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object. On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 2 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis passio animae habeat aliquid contrarium. Omnis enim passio animae vel est in irascibili vel in concupiscibili, sicut supra dictum est. Sed utraeque passiones habent contrarietatem suo modo. Ergo omnis passio animae habet contrarium. Objection 1. It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Article 1). But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnis passio animae habet vel bonum vel malum pro obiecto, quae sunt obiecta universaliter appetitivae partis. Sed passioni cuius obiectum est bonum, opponitur passio cuius obiectum est malum. Ergo omnis passio habet contrarium. Objection 2. Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis passio animae est secundum accessum vel secundum recessum, ut dictum est. Sed cuilibet accessui contrariatur recessus, et e converso. Ergo omnis passio animae habet contrarium. Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above (Article 2). But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, ira est quaedam passio animae. Sed nulla passio ponitur contraria irae, ut patet in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis passio habet contrarium. On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore not every passion has a contrary.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod singulare est in passione irae, quod non potest habere contrarium, neque secundum accessum et recessum, neque secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Causatur enim ira ex malo difficili iam iniacente. Ad cuius praesentiam, necesse est quod aut appetitus succumbat, et sic non exit terminos tristitiae, quae est passio concupiscibilis, aut habet motum ad invadendum malum laesivum, quod pertinet ad iram. Motum autem ad fugiendum habere non potest, quia iam malum ponitur praesens vel praeteritum. Et sic motui irae non contrariatur aliqua passio secundum contrarietatem accessus et recessus. Similiter etiam nec secundum contrarietatem boni et mali. Quia malo iam iniacenti opponitur bonum iam adeptum, quod iam non potest habere rationem ardui vel difficilis. Nec post adeptionem boni remanet alius motus, nisi quietatio appetitus in bono adepto, quae pertinet ad gaudium, quod est passio concupiscibilis. Unde motus irae non potest habere aliquem motum animae contrarium, sed solummodo opponitur ei cessatio a motu, sicut philosophus dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod mitescere opponitur ei quod est irasci, quod non est oppositum contrarie, sed negative vel privative. I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal. In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty. Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non possint in aliqua potentia esse passiones specie differentes, et non contrariae ad invicem. Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem passionum animae sunt bonum et malum, secundum quorum differentiam passiones habent contrarietatem. Ergo nullae passiones eiusdem potentiae, non habentes contrarietatem ad invicem, differunt specie. Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, differentia speciei est differentia secundum formam. Sed omnis differentia secundum formam, est secundum aliquam contrarietatem, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo passiones eiusdem potentiae quae non sunt contrariae, non differunt specie. Objection 2. Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, cum omnis passio animae consistat in accessu vel recessu ad bonum vel ad malum, necesse videtur quod omnis differentia passionum animae sit vel secundum differentiam boni et mali; vel secundum differentiam accessus et recessus; vel secundum maiorem vel minorem accessum aut recessum. Sed primae duae differentiae inducunt contrarietatem in passionibus animae, ut dictum est. Tertia autem differentia non diversificat speciem, quia sic essent infinitae species passionum animae. Ergo non potest esse quod passiones eiusdem potentiae animae differant specie, et non sint contrariae. Objection 3. Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as stated above (Article 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, amor et gaudium differunt specie, et sunt in concupiscibili. Nec tamen contrariantur ad invicem, quin potius unum est causa alterius. Ergo sunt aliquae passiones eiusdem potentiae quae differunt specie, nec sunt contrariae. On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. Sic igitur patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passiones continentur. I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion. Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness." On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above (Article 3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger." Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion. Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.
Iª-IIae q. 23 a. 4 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. From this the replies to the objections are evident.

Notes

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