Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q31

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Iª-IIae q. 31 pr. Deinde considerandum est de delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de bonitate et malitia ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum delectatio sit passio. Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. Tertio, utrum differat a gaudio. Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu intellectivo. Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. Sexto, de comparatione delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum sit aliqua delectatio non naturalis. Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse contraria delectationi. Question 31. Pleasure considered in itself Is pleasure a passion? Is pleasure subject to time? Does it differ from joy? Is it in the intellectual appetite? The pleasures of the higher appetite compared with the pleasure of the lower Sensible pleasures compared with one another Is any pleasure non-natural? Can one pleasure be contrary to another?
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit passio. Damascenus enim, in II libro, distinguit operationem a passione, dicens quod operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est motus contra naturam. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut philosophus dicit, in VII et X Ethic. Ergo delectatio non est passio. Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, pati est moveri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed delectatio non consistit in moveri, sed in motum esse, causatur enim delectatio ex bono iam adepto. Ergo delectatio non est passio. Objection 2. Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, delectatio consistit in quadam perfectione delectati, perficit enim operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed perfici non est pati vel alterari, ut dicitur in VII Physic. et in II de anima. Ergo delectatio non est passio. Objection 3. Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae. On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi. Nam, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod, sicut contingit in rebus naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod delectatio est motus animae, ponitur in genere. Per hoc autem quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam, idest in id quod existit in natura rei, ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni. Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino motus, non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Per hoc autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio. Sic ergo patet quod, cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae. I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing." In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [Phileb. 32,33 maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio connaturalis non impedita, est perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam. Reply to Objection 1. Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest, unus secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem licet ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est. Reply to Objection 2. A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus, sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima; tamen etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio. Reply to Objection 3. Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (23, 1,4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore. Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in tempore. Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio. Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens. I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time. Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore. Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod per accidens est in tempore. Reply to Objection 2. Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore. Reply to Objection 3. Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gaudium sit omnino idem quod delectatio. Passiones enim animae differunt secundum obiecta. Sed idem est obiectum gaudii et delectationis, scilicet bonum adeptum. Ergo gaudium est omnino idem quod delectatio. Objection 1. It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, unus motus non terminatur ad duos terminos. Sed idem est motus qui terminatur ad gaudium et delectationem, scilicet concupiscentia. Ergo delectatio et gaudium sunt omnino idem. Objection 2. Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si gaudium est aliud a delectatione, videtur quod, pari ratione, et laetitia et exultatio et iucunditas significent aliquid aliud a delectatione, et sic erunt omnes diversae passiones. Quod videtur esse falsum. Non ergo gaudium differt a delectatione. Objection 3. Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from delight.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod in brutis animalibus non dicimus gaudium. Sed in eis dicimus delectationem. Non ergo est idem gaudium et delectatio. On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod gaudium, ut Avicenna dicit in libro suo de anima, est quaedam species delectationis. Est enim considerandum quod, sicut sunt quaedam concupiscentiae naturales, quaedam autem non naturales, sed consequuntur rationem, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam delectationum quaedam sunt naturales, et quaedam non naturales, quae sunt cum ratione. Vel, sicut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam animales, quod in idem redit. Delectamur enim et in his quae naturaliter concupiscimus, ea adipiscentes; et in his quae concupiscimus secundum rationem. Sed nomen gaudii non habet locum nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem, unde gaudium non attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis. Omne autem quod concupiscimus secundum naturam, possumus etiam cum delectatione rationis concupiscere, sed non e converso. Unde de omnibus de quibus est delectatio, potest etiam esse gaudium in habentibus rationem. Quamvis non semper de omnibus sit gaudium, quandoque enim aliquis sentit aliquam delectationem secundum corpus, de qua tamen non gaudet secundum rationem. Et secundum hoc, patet quod delectatio est in plus quam gaudium. I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above (Question 30, Article 3), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight. Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum obiectum appetitus animalis sit bonum apprehensum, diversitas apprehensionis pertinet quodammodo ad diversitatem obiecti. Et sic delectationes animales, quae dicuntur etiam gaudia, distinguuntur a delectationibus corporalibus, quae dicuntur solum delectationes, sicut et de concupiscentiis supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences (30, 3, ad 2).
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similis differentia invenitur etiam in concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae, et gaudium respondeat desiderio, quod magis videtur pertinere ad concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est etiam differentia quietis. Reply to Objection 2. A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt imposita ab effectibus delectationis, nam laetitia imponitur a dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis rationalibus. Reply to Objection 3. These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit in appetitu intellectivo. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Rhetoric., quod delectatio est motus quidam sensibilis. Sed motus sensibilis non est in parte intellectiva. Ergo delectatio non est in parte intellectiva. Objection 1. It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, delectatio est passio quaedam. Sed omnis passio est in appetitu sensitivo. Ergo delectatio non est nisi in appetitu sensitivo. Objection 2. Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, delectatio est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo non est nisi in parte quae nobis et brutis communis est. Objection 3. Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common with irrational animals.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod in Psalmo XXXVI, dicitur, delectare in domino. Sed ad Deum non potest extendi appetitus sensitivus, sed solum intellectivus. Ergo delectatio potest esse in appetitu intellectivo. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 36:4): "Delight in the Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, delectatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem delectatio corporalis. Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus. I answer that, As stated above (Article 3), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight. However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in illa definitione philosophi, sensibile ponitur communiter pro quacumque apprehensione. Dicit enim philosophus in X Ethic., quod secundum omnem sensum est delectatio; similiter autem et secundum intellectum et speculationem. Vel potest dici quod ipse definit delectationem appetitus sensitivi. Reply to Objection 1. In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum, sic enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod Angeli non sunt susceptibiles nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum incorruptionis laetitiam. Reply to Objection 2. Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption."
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem Dionysius dicit quod sancti homines multoties fiunt in participatione delectationum angelicarum. Et ita in nobis est delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum Angelis. Reply to Objection 3. In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes corporales et sensibiles sint maiores delectationibus spiritualibus intelligibilibus. Omnes enim aliquam delectationem sequuntur, secundum philosophum, in X Ethic. Sed plures sequuntur delectationes sensibiles, quam delectationes spirituales intelligibiles. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores. Objection 1. It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, magnitudo causae ex effectu cognoscitur. Sed delectationes corporales habent fortiores effectus, transmutant enim corpus, et quibusdam insanias faciunt, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt fortiores. Objection 2. Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, delectationes corporales oportet temperare et refraenare, propter earum vehementiam. Sed delectationes spirituales non oportet refraenare. Ergo delectationes corporales sunt maiores. Objection 3. Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua, super mel ori meo. Et philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod maxima delectatio est quae est secundum operationem sapientiae. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom."
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, delectatio provenit ex coniunctione convenientis quae sentitur vel cognoscitur. In operibus autem animae, praecipue sensitivae et intellectivae, est hoc considerandum, quod, cum non transeant in materiam exteriorem, sunt actus vel perfectiones operantis, scilicet intelligere, sentire, velle, et huiusmodi, nam actiones quae transeunt in exteriorem materiam, magis sunt actiones et perfectiones materiae transmutatae; motus enim est actus mobilis a movente. Sic igitur praedictae actiones animae sensitivae et intellectivae, et ipsae sunt quoddam bonum operantis, et sunt etiam cognitae per sensum vel intellectum. Unde etiam ex ipsis consurgit delectatio, et non solum ex eorum obiectis. Si igitur comparentur delectationes intelligibiles delectationibus sensibilibus, secundum quod delectamur in ipsis actionibus, puta in cognitione sensus et in cognitione intellectus; non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles. Multo enim magis delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo. Quia intellectualis cognitio et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur, quia intellectus magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus. Est etiam cognitio intellectiva magis dilecta, nullus enim est qui non magis vellet carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei. Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. Similiter etiam ipsa pars intellectiva est multo nobilior, et magis cognoscitiva, quam pars sensitiva. Coniunctio etiam utriusque est magis intima, et magis perfecta, et magis firma. Intimior quidem est, quia sensus sistit circa exteriora accidentia rei, intellectus vero penetrat usque ad rei essentiam; obiectum enim intellectus est quod quid est. Perfectior autem est, quia coniunctioni sensibilis ad sensum adiungitur motus, qui est actus imperfectus, unde et delectationes sensibiles non sunt totae simul, sed in eis aliquid pertransit, et aliquid expectatur consummandum, ut patet in delectatione ciborum et venereorum. Sed intelligibilia sunt absque motu, unde delectationes tales sunt totae simul. Est etiam firmior, quia delectabilia corporalia sunt corruptibilia, et cito deficiunt; bona vero spiritualia sunt incorruptibilia. Sed quoad nos, delectationes corporales sunt magis vehementes, propter tria. Primo, quia sensibilia sunt magis nota, quoad nos, quam intelligibilia. Secundo etiam, quia delectationes sensibiles, cum sint passiones sensitivi appetitus, sunt cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Quod non contingit in delectationibus spiritualibus, nisi per quandam redundantiam a superiori appetitu in inferiorem. Tertio, quia delectationes corporales appetuntur ut medicinae quaedam contra corporales defectus vel molestias, ex quibus tristitiae quaedam consequuntur. Unde delectationes corporales, tristitiis huiusmodi supervenientes, magis sentiuntur, et per consequens magis acceptantur, quam delectationes spirituales quae non habent tristitias contrarias, ut infra dicetur. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible. On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on (35, 5).
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales, quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices dolores et tristitias, et cum plures hominum non possint attingere ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum, consequens et quod declinent ad corporales. Reply to Objection 1. The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod transmutatio corporis magis contingit ex delectationibus corporalibus, inquantum sunt passiones appetitus sensitivi. Reply to Objection 2. Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod delectationes corporales sunt secundum partem sensitivam, quae regulatur ratione, et ideo indigent temperari et refraenari per rationem. Sed delectationes spirituales sunt secundum mentem, quae est ipsa regula, unde sunt secundum seipsas sobriae et moderatae. Reply to Objection 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, non sint maiores delectationibus quae sunt secundum alios sensus. Illa enim delectatio videtur esse maxima, qua exclusa, omne gaudium cessat. Sed talis est delectatio quae est secundum visum, dicitur enim Tobiae V, quale gaudium erit mihi, qui in tenebris sedeo, et lumen caeli non video? Ergo delectatio quae est per visum, est maxima inter sensibiles delectationes. Objection 1. It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tobit 5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, unicuique fit delectabile illud quod amat, ut philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric. Sed inter alios sensus maxime diligitur visus. Ergo delectatio quae est secundum visum, est maxima. Objection 2. Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is loved most" [Metaph. i, 1. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, principium amicitiae delectabilis maxime est visio. Sed causa talis amicitiae est delectatio. Ergo secundum visum videtur esse maxime delectatio. Objection 3. Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae delectationes sunt secundum tactum. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque, inquantum amatur, efficitur delectabile. Sensus autem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys., propter duo diliguntur, scilicet propter cognitionem, et propter utilitatem. Unde et utroque modo contingit esse delectationem secundum sensum. Sed quia apprehendere ipsam cognitionem tanquam bonum quoddam, proprium est hominis; ideo primae delectationes sensuum, quae scilicet sunt secundum cognitionem, sunt propriae hominum, delectationes autem sensuum inquantum diliguntur propter utilitatem, sunt communes omnibus animalibus. Si igitur loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est ratione cognitionis, manifestum est quod secundum visum est maior delectatio quam secundum aliquem alium sensum. Si autem loquamur de delectatione sensus quae est ratione utilitatis, sic maxima delectatio est secundum tactum. Utilitas enim sensibilium attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal, scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc, delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini propinquiores. Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus, neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Cum igitur delectatio tactus sit maxima ratione utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites sensibilis delectationis. Quia manifestum est quod id quod est naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum. Huiusmodi autem delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi. Sed si consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit intellectui; sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus. I answer that, As stated above (25, 2, ad 1; 27, 4, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals. If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10). Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gaudium, sicut supra dictum est, significat animalem delectationem, et haec maxime pertinet ad visum. Sed delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum. Reply to Objection 1. Joy, as stated above (Article 3), denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit, ut ibidem dicitur. Reply to Objection 2. The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, 1).
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis, visio autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et ad concupiscendum eius delectationem. Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him to love it and to seek its delight.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla delectatio sit innaturalis. Delectatio enim in affectibus animae proportionatur quieti in corporibus. Sed appetitus corporis naturalis non quiescit nisi in loco connaturali. Ergo nec quies appetitus animalis, quae est delectatio, potest esse nisi in aliquo connaturali. Nulla ergo delectatio est non naturalis. Objection 1. It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est contra naturam, est violentum. Sed omne violentum est contristans, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo nihil quod est contra naturam, potest esse delectabile. Objection 2. Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is unnatural can give pleasure.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, constitui in propriam naturam, cum sentitur, causat delectationem; ut patet ex definitione philosophi supra posita. Sed constitui in naturam, unicuique est naturale, quia motus naturalis est qui est ad terminum naturalem. Ergo omnis delectatio est naturalis. Objection 3. Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the Philosopher's definition quoted above (Article 1). But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease."
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod naturale dicitur quod est secundum naturam, ut dicitur in II Physic. Natura autem in homine dupliciter sumi potest. Uno modo, prout intellectus et ratio est potissime hominis natura, quia secundum eam homo in specie constituitur. Et secundum hoc, naturales delectationes hominum dici possunt quae sunt in eo quod convenit homini secundum rationem, sicut delectari in contemplatione veritatis, et in actibus virtutum, est naturale homini. Alio modo potest sumi natura in homine secundum quod condividitur rationi, id scilicet quod est commune homini et aliis, praecipue quod rationi non obedit. Et secundum hoc, ea quae pertinent ad conservationem corporis, vel secundum individuum, ut cibus, potus, lectus, et huiusmodi, vel secundum speciem, sicut venereorum usus, dicuntur homini delectabilia naturaliter. Secundum utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid. Contingit enim in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium speciei; et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est naturale quod calefaciat. Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem. Quae quidem corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis, sive ex aegritudine, sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso; sive propter malam complexionem, sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, vel etiam ex parte animae, sicut propter consuetudinem aliqui, delectantur in comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam. I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this corruption may be either on the part of the body--from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa--or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in accord with human nature.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 7 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the answers to the objections.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectationi non sit delectatio contraria. Passiones enim animae speciem et contrarietatem recipiunt secundum obiecta. Obiectum autem delectationis est bonum. Cum igitur bonum non sit contrarium bono, sed bonum malo contrarietur, et malum malo, ut dicitur in praedicamentis; videtur quod delectatio non sit contraria delectationi. Objection 1. It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, uni unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed delectationi contraria est tristitia. Non ergo delectationi contraria est delectatio. Objection 2. Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, si delectationi contraria est delectatio hoc non est nisi propter contrarietatem eorum in quibus aliquis delectatur. Sed haec differentia est materialis, contrarietas autem est differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo contrarietas non est delectationis ad delectationem. Objection 3. Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, ea quae se impediunt, in eodem genere existentia, secundum philosophum, sunt contraria. Sed quaedam delectationes se invicem impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo aliquae delectationes sunt contrariae. On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio in affectionibus animae, sicut dictum est, proportionatur quieti in corporibus naturalibus. Dicuntur autem duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; sicut quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum, ut dicitur V Physic. Unde et contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes esse contrarias. I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi est intelligendum secundum quod bonum et malum accipitur in virtutibus et vitiis, nam inveniuntur duo contraria vitia, non autem invenitur virtus contraria virtuti. In aliis autem nil prohibet duo bona esse ad invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum igni, alterum aquae. Et per hunc modum delectatio potest esse delectationi contraria. Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem. Reply to Objection 1. This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one thing--i.e. the reason.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi connaturali. Tristitia autem se habet sicut quies violenta, tristabile enim repugnat appetitui animali, sicut locus quietis violentae appetitui naturali. Quieti autem naturali opponitur et quies violenta eiusdem corporis, et quies naturalis alterius, ut dicitur in V Physic. Unde delectationi opponitur et delectatio et tristitia. Reply to Objection 2. Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.
Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis patet. Reply to Objection 3. The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and passions, as stated above (23, 1,4; 30, 2).

Notes

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