Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q43

• Question 43.1 Cause of fear
• Question 43.2

Latin	English
Iª-IIae q. 43 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum causa timoris sit amor. Secundo, utrum causa timoris sit defectus.	Question 43. The cause of fear Is love the cause of fear? Is defect the cause of fear?
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa timoris. Illud enim quod introducit aliquid, est causa eius. Sed timor introducit amorem caritatis, ut Augustinus dicit, super canonicam Ioan. Ergo timor est causa amoris, et non e converso.	Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod illi maxime timentur, a quibus expectamus imminere nobis aliqua mala. Sed per hoc quod ab aliquo expectamus malum, magis provocamur ad odium eius quam ad amorem. Ergo timor magis causatur ab odio quam ab amore.	Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, supra dictum est quod ea quae sunt a nobis ipsis, non habent rationem terribilium. Sed ea quae sunt ex amore, maxime proveniunt ex intimo cordis. Ergo timor ex amore non causatur.	Objection 3. Further, it has been stated above (Question 42, Article 3) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum. Omnis ergo timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus. Amor igitur est causa timoris.	On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently love is the cause of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis. Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum. Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis. Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.	I answer that, The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, timor per se et primo respicit ad malum, quod refugit, quod opponitur alicui bono amato. Et sic per se timor nascitur ex amore. Secundario vero respicit ad id per quod provenit tale malum. Et sic per accidens quandoque timor inducit amorem, inquantum scilicet homo qui timet puniri a Deo, servat mandata eius, et sic incipit sperare, et spes introducit amorem, ut supra dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Question 42, Article 1), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above (Question 40, Article 7).
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille a quo expectantur mala, primo quidem odio habetur, sed postquam ab ipso iam incipiunt sperari bona, tunc incipit amari. Bonum autem cui contrariatur malum quod timetur, a principio amabatur.	Reply to Objection 2. He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod est causa mali terribilis per modum efficientis. Amor autem est causa eius per modum materialis dispositionis, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material disposition, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus non sit causa timoris. Illi enim qui potentiam habent, maxime timentur. Sed defectus contrariatur potentiae. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.	Objection 1. It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, illi qui iam decapitantur, maxime sunt in defectu. Sed tales non timent. Ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.	Objection 2. Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, decertare ex fortitudine provenit, non ex defectu. Sed decertantes timent eos qui pro eisdem decertant, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo defectus non est causa timoris.	Objection 3. Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed divitiae, et robur, et multitudo amicorum, et potestas, excludunt timorem, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo ex defectu horum timor causatur.	On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex causa timoris accipi potest, una quidem per modum materialis dispositionis, ex parte eius qui timet; alia per modum causae efficientis, ex parte eius qui timetur. Quantum igitur ad primum, defectus, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, ex aliquo enim defectu virtutis contingit quod non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum. Sed tamen ad causandum timorem requiritur defectus cum aliqua mensura. Minor enim est defectus qui causat timorem futuri mali, quam defectus consequens malum praesens, de quo est tristitia. Et adhuc esset maior defectus, si totaliter sensus mali auferretur, vel amor boni cuius contrarium timetur. Quantum vero ad secundum, virtus et robur, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, ex hoc enim quod aliquid quod apprehenditur ut nocivum, est virtuosum, contingit quod eius effectus repelli non potest. Contingit tamen per accidens quod aliquis defectus ex ista parte causat timorem, inquantum ex aliquo defectu contingit quod aliquis velit nocumentum inferre, puta propter iniustitiam, vel quia ante laesus fuit, vel quia timet laedi.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is feared, were entirely absent. But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by him.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa timoris ex parte causae efficientis.	Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui iam decapitantur, sunt in passione praesentis mali. Et ideo iste defectus excedit mensuram timoris.	Reply to Objection 2. Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure of fear.
Iª-IIae q. 43 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod decertantes timent non propter potentiam, qua decertare possunt, sed propter defectum potentiae, ex quo contingit quod se superaturos non confidunt.	Reply to Objection 3. Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.