Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q52

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Iª-IIae q. 52 pr. Deinde considerandum est de augmento habituum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum habitus augeantur. Secundo, utrum augeantur per additionem. Tertio, utrum quilibet actus augeat habitum. Question 52. The increase of habits Do habits increase? Do they increase by addition? Does each act increase the habit?
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus augeri non possint. Augmentum enim est circa quantitatem, ut dicitur in V Physic. Sed habitus non sunt in genere quantitatis, sed in genere qualitatis. Ergo circa eos augmentum esse non potest. Objection 1. It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, habitus est perfectio quaedam, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed perfectio, cum importet finem et terminum, non videtur posse recipere magis et minus. Ergo habitus augeri non potest. Objection 2. Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, in his quae recipiunt magis et minus, contingit esse alterationem, alterari enim dicitur quod de minus calido fit magis calidum. Sed in habitibus non est alteratio, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo habitus augeri non possunt. Objection 3. Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod fides est quidam habitus, et tamen augetur, unde discipuli domino dicunt, domine, adauge nobis fidem, ut habetur Luc. XVII. Ergo habitus augentur. On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Luke 17:5): "Lord, increase our faith." Therefore habits increase.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Dicitur autem in quantitatibus corporeis aliquid magnum, secundum quod ad debitam perfectionem quantitatis perducitur, unde aliqua quantitas reputatur magna in homine, quae non reputatur magna in elephante. Unde et in formis dicimus aliquid magnum, ex hoc quod est perfectum. Et quia bonum habet rationem perfecti, propter hoc in his quae non mole magna sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius, ut Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin. Perfectio autem formae dupliciter potest considerari, uno modo, secundum ipsam formam; alio modo, secundum quod subiectum participat formam. Inquantum igitur attenditur perfectio formae secundum ipsam formam, sic dicitur ipsa esse parva vel magna; puta magna vel parva sanitas vel scientia. Inquantum vero attenditur perfectio formae secundum participationem subiecti, dicitur magis et minus; puta magis vel minus album vel sanum. Non autem ista distinctio procedit secundum hoc, quod forma habeat esse praeter materiam aut subiectum, sed quia alia est consideratio eius secundum rationem speciei suae, et alia secundum quod participatur in subiecto. Secundum hoc igitur, circa intensionem et remissionem habituum et formarum, fuerunt quatuor opiniones apud philosophos, ut Simplicius narrat in commento praedicamentorum. Plotinus enim et alii Platonici ponebant ipsas qualitates et habitus suscipere magis et minus, propter hoc quod materiales erant, et ex hoc habebant indeterminationem quandam, propter materiae infinitatem. Alii vero in contrarium ponebant quod ipsae qualitates et habitus secundum se non recipiebant magis et minus; sed qualia dicuntur magis et minus, secundum diversam participationem; puta quod iustitia non dicatur magis et minus, sed iustum. Et hanc opinionem tangit Aristoteles in praedicamentis. Tertia fuit opinio Stoicorum, media inter has. Posuerunt enim quod aliqui habitus secundum se recipiunt magis et minus, sicuti artes; quidam autem non, sicut virtutes. Quarta opinio fuit quorundam dicentium quod qualitates et formae immateriales non recipiunt magis et minus, materiales autem recipiunt. Ut igitur huius rei veritas manifestetur, considerandum est quod illud secundum quod sortitur aliquid speciem, oportet esse fixum et stans, et quasi indivisibile, quaecumque enim ad illud attingunt, sub specie continentur; quaecumque autem recedunt ab illo, vel in plus vel in minus, pertinent ad aliam speciem, vel perfectiorem vel imperfectiorem. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem. Si igitur aliqua forma, vel quaecumque res, secundum seipsam vel secundum aliquid sui, sortiatur rationem speciei; necesse est quod, secundum se considerata, habeat determinatam rationem, quae neque in plus excedere, neque in minus deficere possit. Et huiusmodi sunt calor et albedo, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates quae non dicuntur in ordine ad aliud, et multo magis substantia, quae est per se ens. Illa vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. Sicut motus secundum se est intensior et remissior, et tamen remanet eadem species, propter unitatem termini, ex quo specificatur. Et idem potest considerari in sanitate, nam corpus pertingit ad rationem sanitatis, secundum quod habet dispositionem convenientem naturae animalis, cui possunt dispositiones diversae convenientes esse; unde potest variari dispositio in plus vel in minus, et tamen semper remanet ratio sanitatis. Unde philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod sanitas ipsa recipit magis et minus, non enim eadem est commensuratio in omnibus, neque in uno et eodem semper; sed remissa permanet sanitas usque ad aliquid. Huiusmodi autem diversae dispositiones vel commensurationes sanitatis se habent secundum excedens et excessum, unde si nomen sanitatis esset impositum soli perfectissimae commensurationi, tunc ipsa sanitas non diceretur maior vel minor. Sic igitur patet qualiter aliqua qualitas vel forma possit secundum seipsam augeri vel minui, et qualiter non. Si vero consideremus qualitatem vel formam secundum participationem subiecti, sic etiam inveniuntur quaedam qualitates et formae recipere magis et minus, et quaedam non. Huiusmodi autem diversitatis causam Simplicius assignat ex hoc, quod substantia secundum seipsam non potest recipere magis et minus, quia est ens per se. Et ideo omnis forma quae substantialiter participatur in subiecto, caret intensione et remissione, unde in genere substantiae nihil dicitur secundum magis et minus. Et quia quantitas propinqua est substantiae, et figura etiam consequitur quantitatem; inde est quod neque etiam in istis dicitur aliquid secundum magis aut minus. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod cum aliquid accipit formam et figuram, non dicitur alterari, sed magis fieri. Aliae vero qualitates, quae sunt magis distantes a substantia, et coniunguntur passionibus et actionibus, recipiunt magis et minus secundum participationem subiecti. Potest autem et magis explicari huiusmodi diversitatis ratio. Ut enim dictum est, id a quo aliquid habet speciem, oportet manere fixum et stans in indivisibili. Duobus igitur modis potest contingere quod forma non participatur secundum magis et minus. Uno modo, quia participans habet speciem secundum ipsam. Et inde est quod nulla forma substantialis participatur secundum magis et minus. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod, sicut numerus non habet magis neque minus, sic neque substantia quae est secundum speciem, idest quantum ad participationem formae specificae; sed si quidem quae cum materia, idest, secundum materiales dispositiones invenitur magis et minus in substantia. Alio modo potest contingere ex hoc quod ipsa indivisibilitas est de ratione formae, unde oportet quod, si aliquid participet formam illam, quod participet illam secundum rationem indivisibilitatis. Et inde est quod species numeri non dicuntur secundum magis et minus, quia unaquaeque species in eis constituitur per indivisibilem unitatem. Et eadem ratio est de speciebus quantitatis continuae quae secundum numeros accipiuntur ut bicubitum et tricubitum; et de relationibus, ut duplum et triplum; et de figuris, ut trigonum et tetragonum. Et hanc rationem ponit Aristoteles in praedicamentis, ubi, assignans rationem quare figurae non recipiunt magis et minus, dicit, quae quidem enim recipiunt trigoni rationem et circuli, similiter trigona vel circuli sunt, quia scilicet indivisibilitas est de ipsa eorum ratione, unde quaecumque participant rationem eorum, oportet quod indivisibiliter participent. Sic igitur patet quod, cum habitus et dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid, ut dicitur in VII Physic., dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari. Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad plura vel pauciora se extendit. Alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit indivisibilitatem. Quomodo autem circa virtutes se habeat, infra dicetur. I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore "in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better," as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8). Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be "little" or "great": for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be "more" or "less": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject. In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are. In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so, substance, which is "per se" being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): "Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health." Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot. But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is "per se" being. And therefore every form which is participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the subject. Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, "as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance," that is, in respect of its participation of the specific form: "but in so far as substance may be with matter," i.e. in respect of material dispositions, "more or less are found in substance." Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon. This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: "Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles": to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility. It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility. We shall say further on (66, 1) how it is with the virtues.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut nomen magnitudinis derivatur a quantitatibus corporalibus ad intelligibiles perfectiones formarum; ita etiam et nomen augmenti, cuius terminus est magnum. Reply to Objection 1. As the word "great" is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the word "growth," the term of which is something great.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus quidem perfectio est, non tamen talis perfectio quae sit terminus sui subiecti, puta dans ei esse specificum. Neque etiam in sui ratione terminum includit, sicut species numerorum. Unde nihil prohibet quin recipiat magis et minus. Reply to Objection 2. Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod alteratio primo quidem est in qualitatibus tertiae speciei. In qualitatibus vero primae speciei potest esse alteratio per posterius, facta enim alteratione secundum calidum et frigidum, sequitur animal alterari secundum sanum et aegrum. Et similiter, facta alteratione secundum passiones appetitus sensitivi, vel secundum vires sensitivas apprehensivas, sequitur alteratio secundum scientias et virtutes, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Reply to Objection 3. Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod augmentum habituum fiat per additionem. Nomen enim augmenti, ut dictum est, a quantitatibus corporalibus transfertur ad formas. Sed in quantitatibus corporalibus non fit augmentum sine additione, unde in I de Generat. dicitur quod augmentum est praeexistenti magnitudini additamentum. Ergo et in habitibus non fit augmentum nisi per additionem. Objection 1. It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word "increase," as we have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said that "increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing." Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, habitus non augetur nisi aliquo agente. Sed omne agens aliquid facit in subiecto patiente, sicut calefaciens facit calorem in ipso calefacto. Ergo non potest esse augmentum nisi aliqua fiat additio. Objection 2. Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut id quod non est album, est in potentia ad album; ita id quod est minus album, est in potentia ad magis album. Sed id quod non est album, non fit album nisi per adventum albedinis. Ergo id quod est minus album, non fit magis album nisi per aliquam aliam albedinem supervenientem. Objection 3. Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., ex calido fit magis calidum, nullo facto in materia calido, quod non esset calidum quando erat minus calidum. Ergo, pari ratione, nec in aliis formis quae augentur, est aliqua additio. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): "That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, that was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod huius quaestionis solutio dependet ex praemissa. Dictum est enim supra quod augmentum et diminutio in formis quae intenduntur et remittuntur, accidit uno modo non ex parte ipsius formae secundum se consideratae, sed ex diversa participatione subiecti. Et ideo huiusmodi augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, non fit per additionem formae ad formam; sed fit per hoc quod subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem formam. Et sicut per agens quod est actu, fit aliquid actu calidum, quasi de novo incipiens participare formam, non quod fiat ipsa forma, ut probatur VII Metaphys.; ita per actionem intensam ipsius agentis efficitur magis calidum, tanquam perfectius participans formam, non tanquam formae aliquid addatur. Si enim per additionem intelligeretur huiusmodi augmentum in formis, hoc non posset esse nisi vel ex parte ipsius formae, vel ex parte subiecti. Si autem ex parte ipsius formae, iam dictum est quod talis additio vel subtractio speciem variaret; sicut variatur species coloris, quando de pallido fit album. Si vero huiusmodi additio intelligatur ex parte subiecti, hoc non posset esse nisi vel quia aliqua pars subiecti recipit formam quam prius non habebat, ut si dicatur frigus crescere in homine qui prius frigebat in una parte, quando iam in pluribus partibus friget, vel quia aliquod aliud subiectum additur participans eandem formam, sicut si calidum adiungatur calido, vel album albo. Sed secundum utrumque istorum duorum modorum, non dicitur aliquid magis album vel calidum, sed maius. Sed quia quaedam accidentia augentur secundum seipsa, ut supra dictum est, in quibusdam eorum fieri potest augmentum per additionem. Augetur enim motus per hoc quod ei aliquid additur vel secundum tempus in quo est, vel secundum viam per quam est, et tamen manet eadem species, propter unitatem termini. Augetur etiam nihilominus motus per intensionem, secundum participationem subiecti, inquantum scilicet idem motus potest vel magis vel minus expedite aut prompte fieri. Similiter etiam et scientia potest augeri secundum seipsam per additionem, sicut cum aliquis plures conclusiones geometriae addiscit, augetur in eo habitus eiusdem scientiae secundum speciem. Augetur nihilominus scientia in aliquo, secundum participationem subiecti, per intensionem, prout scilicet expeditius et clarius unus homo se habet alio in eisdem conclusionibus considerandis. In habitibus autem corporalibus non multum videtur fieri augmentum per additionem. Quia non dicitur animal sanum simpliciter, aut pulchrum, nisi secundum omnes partes suas sit tale. Quod autem ad perfectiorem commensurationem perducatur, hoc contingit secundum transmutationem simplicium qualitatum; quae non augentur nisi secundum intensionem, ex parte subiecti participantis. Quomodo autem se habeat circa virtutes, infra dicetur. I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above (Article 1). For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were added to the form. For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated (1) that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing. Since, however, as stated above (Article 1), certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in so far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science increases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions. As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them. How this question affects virtues we shall state further on (66, 1).
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam in magnitudine corporali contingit dupliciter esse augmentum. Uno modo, per additionem subiecti ad subiectum; sicut est in augmento viventium. Alio modo, per solam intensionem, absque omni additione; sicut est in his quae rarefiunt, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Reply to Objection 1. Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys. iv, text. 63.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod causa augens habitum, facit quidem semper aliquid in subiecto, non autem novam formam. Sed facit quod subiectum perfectius participet formam praeexistentem, aut quod amplius se extendat. Reply to Objection 2. The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod id quod nondum est album, est in potentia ad formam ipsam, tanquam nondum habens formam, et ideo agens causat novam formam in subiecto. Sed id quod est minus calidum aut album, non est in potentia ad formam, cum iam actu formam habeat, sed est in potentia ad perfectum participationis modum. Et hoc consequitur per actionem agentis. Reply to Objection 3. What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent's action.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod quilibet actus augeat habitum. Multiplicata enim causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed actus sunt causa habituum aliquorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo habitus augetur, multiplicatis actibus. Objection 1. It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above (Question 51, Article 2). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, de similibus idem est iudicium. Sed omnes actus ab eodem habitu procedentes sunt similes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo, si aliqui actus augeant habitum, quilibet actus augebit ipsum. Objection 2. Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, simile augetur suo simili. Sed quilibet actus est similis habitui a quo procedit. Ergo quilibet actus auget habitum. Objection 3. Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, idem non est contrariorum causa. Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum; utpote cum negligenter fiunt. Ergo non omnis actus habitum auget. On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod similes actus similes habitus causant, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Similitudo autem et dissimilitudo non solum attenditur secundum qualitatem eandem vel diversam; sed etiam secundum eundem vel diversum participationis modum. Est enim dissimile non solum nigrum albo, sed etiam minus album magis albo, nam etiam motus fit a minus albo in magis album, tanquam ex opposito in oppositum, ut dicitur in V Physic. Quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet; sicut contingit quod aliquis habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus. Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat; quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius; ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis. Non enim quodlibet alimentum assumptum actu auget animal, sicut nec quaelibet gutta cavat lapidem, sed, multiplicato alimento, tandem fit augmentum. Ita etiam, multiplicatis actibus, crescit habitus. Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius. I answer that, "Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52. But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (Question 50, Article 5); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
Iª-IIae q. 52 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. From this it is clear how to solve the objections.

Notes

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