Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q80

• Question 80.1 The external causes of sin: the devil
• Question 80.2
• Question 80.3
• Question 80.4

Latin	English
Iª-IIae q. 80 pr. Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati ex parte Diaboli. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Diabolus sit directe causa peccati. Secundo, utrum Diabolus inducat ad peccandum interius persuadendo. Tertio, utrum possit necessitatem peccandi inducere. Quarto, utrum omnia peccata ex Diaboli suggestione proveniant.	Question 80. The cause of sin, as regards the devil Is the devil directly the cause of sin? Does the devil induce us to sin, by persuading us inwardly? Can he make us sin of necessity? Are all sins due to the devil's suggestion?
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus sit homini directe causa peccandi. Peccatum enim directe in affectu consistit. Sed Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod Diabolus suae societati malignos affectus inspirat. Et Beda, super Act., dicit quod Diabolus animam in affectum malitiae trahit. Et Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod Diabolus corda hominum occultis cupiditatibus replet. Ergo Diabolus directe est causa peccati.	Objection 1. It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod sicut Deus est perfector boni, ita Diabolus est perfector mali. Sed Deus est directe causa bonorum nostrorum. Ergo Diabolus est directe causa peccatorum nostrorum.	Objection 2. Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus probat, in quodam cap. Ethicae Eudemicae, quod oportet esse quoddam principium extrinsecum humani consilii. Consilium autem humanum non solum est de bonis, sed etiam de malis. Ergo sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum, et per hoc directe est causa boni; ita Diabolus movet hominem ad consilium malum, et per hoc sequitur quod Diabolus directe sit causa peccati.	Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus probat, in I et III de Lib. Arb., quod nulla alia re fit mens hominis serva libidinis, nisi propria voluntate. Sed homo non fit servus libidinis nisi per peccatum. Ergo causa peccati non potest esse Diabolus, sed sola propria voluntas.	On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will alone.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum actus quidam est. Unde hoc modo potest esse aliquid directe causa peccati, per quem modum aliquis directe est causa alicuius actus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi per hoc quod proprium principium illius actus movet ad agendum. Proprium autem principium actus peccati est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium. Unde nihil potest directe esse causa peccati, nisi quod potest movere voluntatem ad agendum. Voluntas autem, sicut supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto, sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum est. Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati, ut dictum est. Relinquitur ergo quod ex hac parte sola voluntas hominis sit directe causa peccati eius. Ex parte autem obiecti, potest intelligi quod aliquid moveat voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo, ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliqualiter proponit proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel apparens. Primo igitur modo, res sensibiles exterius apparentes movent voluntatem hominis ad peccandum, secundo autem et tertio modo, vel Diabolus, vel etiam homo, potest incitare ad peccandum, vel offerendo aliquid appetibile sensui, vel persuadendo rationi. Sed nullo istorum trium modorum potest aliquid esse directa causa peccati, quia voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ab aliquo obiecto nisi ab ultimo fine, ut supra dictum est; unde non est sufficiens causa peccati neque res exterius oblata, neque ille qui eam proponit, neque ille qui persuadet. Unde sequitur quod Diabolus non sit causa peccati directe et sufficienter; sed solum per modum persuadentis, vel proponentis appetibile.	I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act. Now the will, as stated above (9, A3,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown above (9, A3,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (Question 79, Article 1). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin. As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as stated above (10, A1,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates, et si quae similes inveniantur, sunt referendae ad hoc quod Diabolus suggerendo, vel aliqua appetibilia proponendo, inducit in affectum peccati.	Reply to Objection 1. All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo illa est attendenda quantum ad hoc, quod Diabolus quodammodo est causa peccatorum nostrorum, sicut Deus est aliquo modo causa bonorum nostrorum. Non tamen attenditur quantum ad modum causandi, nam Deus causat bona interius movendo voluntatem, quod Diabolo convenire non potest.	Reply to Objection 2. This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus humani, sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis.	Reply to Objection 3. God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non possit inducere ad peccandum interius instigando. Interiores enim motus animae sunt quaedam opera vitae. Sed nullum opus vitae potest esse nisi a principio intrinseco; nec etiam opus animae vegetabilis, quod est infimum inter opera vitae. Ergo Diabolus secundum interiores motus non potest hominem instigare ad malum.	Objection 1. It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, omnes interiores motus, secundum ordinem naturae, a sensibus exterioribus oriuntur. Sed praeter ordinem naturae aliquid operari est solius Dei, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo Diabolus non potest in interioribus motibus hominis aliquid operari, nisi secundum ea quae exterioribus sensibus apparent.	Objection 2. Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the I, 110, 4. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, interiores actus animae sunt intelligere et imaginari. Sed quantum ad neutrum horum potest Diabolus aliquid operari. Quia, ut in primo habitum est, Diabolus non imprimit in intellectum humanum. In phantasiam etiam videtur quod imprimere non possit, quia formae imaginatae, tanquam magis spirituales, sunt digniores quam formae quae sunt in materia sensibili; quas tamen Diabolus imprimere non potest, ut patet ex his quae in primo habita sunt. Ergo Diabolus non potest secundum interiores motus inducere hominem ad peccatum.	Objection 3. Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as stated in the I, 111, A2,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the I, 110, 2; I, 111, A2,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quia secundum hoc nunquam tentaret hominem nisi visibiliter apparendo. Quod patet esse falsum.	On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva. Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem. Et de voluntate quidem iam dictum est quomodo ad eam Diabolus se habet. Intellectus autem per se quidem movetur ab aliquo illuminante ipsum ad cognitionem veritatis, quod Diabolus circa hominem non intendit, sed magis obtenebrare rationem ipsius ad consentiendum peccato. Quae quidem obtenebratio provenit ex phantasia et appetitu sensitivo. Unde tota interior operatio Diaboli esse videtur circa phantasiam et appetitum sensitivum. Quorum utrumque commovendo, potest inducere ad peccatum, potest enim operari ad hoc quod imaginationi aliquae formae imaginariae praesententur; potest etiam facere quod appetitus sensitivus concitetur ad aliquam passionem. Dictum est enim in primo libro quod natura corporalis spirituali naturaliter obedit ad motum localem. Unde et Diabolus omnia illa causare potest quae ex motu locali corporum inferiorum provenire possunt, nisi virtute divina reprimatur. Quod autem aliquae formae repraesententur imaginationi, consequitur quandoque ad motum localem. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de somno et vigilia, quod cum animal dormierit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, sive impressiones relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in sensibilibus speciebus conservantur, et movent principium apprehensivum, ita quod apparent ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus immutaretur. Unde talis motus localis spirituum vel humorum potest procurari a Daemonibus, sive dormiant sive vigilent homines, et sic sequitur quod homo aliqua imaginetur. Similiter etiam appetitus sensitivus concitatur ad aliquas passiones secundum quendam determinatum motum cordis et spirituum. Unde ad hoc etiam Diabolus potest cooperari. Et ex hoc quod passiones aliquae concitantur in appetitu sensitivo, sequitur quod et motum sive intentionem sensibilem praedicto modo reductam ad principium apprehensivum, magis homo percipiat, quia, ut philosophus in eodem libro dicit, amantes modica similitudine in apprehensionem rei amatae moventur. Contingit etiam ex hoc quod passio est concitata, ut id quod proponitur imaginationi, iudicetur prosequendum, quia ei qui a passione detinetur, videtur esse bonum id ad quod per passionem inclinatur. Et per hunc modum Diabolus interius inducit ad peccandum.	I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated (1; I, 111, 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other. The reason of this is, that as stated in the I, 110, 3, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play. In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opera vitae semper etsi sint ab aliquo principio intrinseco, tamen ad ea potest cooperari aliquod exterius agens, sicut etiam ad opera animae vegetabilis operatur calor exterior, ut facilius digeratur cibus.	Reply to Objection 1. Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi apparitio formarum imaginabilium non est omnino praeter ordinem naturae. Nec est per solum imperium, sed per motum localem, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 2. This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 3 Unde patet responsio ad tertium, quia formae illae sunt a sensibus acceptae primordialiter.	Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus possit necessitatem inferre ad peccandum. Potestas enim maior potest necessitatem inferre minori. Sed de Diabolo dicitur Iob XLI, non est potestas super terram quae ei valeat comparari. Ergo potest homini terreno necessitatem inferre ad peccandum.	Objection 1. It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job 41:24) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, ratio hominis non potest moveri nisi secundum ea quae exterius sensibus proponuntur et imaginationi repraesentantur, quia omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, et non est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Sed Diabolus potest movere imaginationem hominis, ut dictum est, et etiam exteriores sensus, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod serpit hoc malum, scilicet quod est a Diabolo, per omnes aditus sensuales; dat se figuris, accommodat coloribus, adhaeret sonis, infundit saporibus. Ergo potest rationem hominis ex necessitate inclinare ad peccandum.	Objection 2. Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above (Article 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, nonnullum peccatum est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed concupiscentiam carnis Diabolus potest causare, sicut et ceteras passiones, eo modo quo supra dictum est. Ergo ex necessitate potest inducere ad peccandum.	Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above (Article 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Petr. ult., adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite fortes in fide. Frustra autem talis admonitio daretur, si homo ei ex necessitate succumberet. Non ergo potest homini necessitatem inducere ad peccandum.	On the contrary, It is written (1 Peter 5:8): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity. Further, it is likewise written (James 4:7): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Diabolus propria virtute, nisi refraenetur a Deo, potest aliquem inducere ex necessitate ad faciendum aliquem actum qui de suo genere peccatum est, non autem potest inducere necessitatem peccandi. Quod patet ex hoc quod homo motivo ad peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem, cuius usum totaliter impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum sensitivum, sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quidquid homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed si ratio non sit totaliter ligata, ex ea parte qua est libera, potest resistere peccato, sicut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod Diabolus nullo modo potest necessitatem inducere homini ad peccandum.	I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Question 77, Article 7). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet potestas maior homine, potest movere voluntatem hominis, sed solus Deus, ut supra habitum est.	Reply to Objection 1. Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above (Question 9, Article 6).
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est apprehensum per sensum vel imaginationem, non ex necessitate movet voluntatem, si homo habeat usum rationis. Nec semper huiusmodi apprehensio ligat rationem.	Reply to Objection 2. That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae virtutis. Quod autem ratio ei non resistat, non est in potestate Diaboli. Et ideo non potest inducere necessitatem peccati.	Reply to Objection 3. The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata hominum sint ex suggestione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod multitudo Daemonum causa est omnium malorum et sibi et aliis.	Objection 1. It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque peccat mortaliter, efficitur servus Diaboli; secundum illud Ioan. VIII, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed ei aliquis in servitutem addicitur, a quo superatus est, ut dicitur II Petr. II. Ergo quicumque facit peccatum, superatus est a Diabolo.	Objection 2. Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to John 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave" (2 Peter 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit quod peccatum Diaboli est irreparabile, quia cecidit nullo suggerente. Si igitur aliqui homines peccarent per liberum arbitrium, nullo suggerente, eorum peccatum esset irremediabile, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo omnia peccata humana a Diabolo suggeruntur.	Objection 3. Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, non omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt.	On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will."
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod occasionaliter quidem et indirecte Diabolus est causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, inquantum induxit primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato intantum vitiata est humana natura, ut omnes simus ad peccandum proclives, sicut diceretur esse causa combustionis lignorum qui ligna siccaret, ex quo sequeretur quod facile incenderentur. Directe autem non est causa omnium peccatorum humanorum, ita quod singula peccata persuadeat. Quod Origenes probat ex hoc, quia etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent appetitum cibi et venereorum et similium, qui posset esse inordinatus nisi ratione ordinaretur, quod subiacet libero arbitrio.	I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum nostrorum secundum primam originem, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum fit servus alicuius qui ab eo superatur, sed etiam qui se ei voluntarie subiicit. Et hoc modo fit servus Diaboli qui motu proprio peccat.	Reply to Objection 2. A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.
Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum Diaboli fuit irremediabile, quia nec aliquo suggerente peccavit, nec habuit aliquam pronitatem ad peccandum ex praecedenti suggestione causatam. Quod de nullo hominis peccato dici potest.	Reply to Objection 3. The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.