Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIa/Q99

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Iª-IIae q. 99 pr. Deinde considerandum est de praeceptis veteris legis. Et primo, de distinctione ipsorum; secundo, de singulis generibus distinctis. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum legis veteris sint plura praecepta, vel unum tantum. Secundo, utrum lex vetus contineat aliqua praecepta moralia. Tertio, utrum praeter moralia contineat caeremonialia. Quarto, utrum contineat, praeter haec, iudicialia. Quinto, utrum praeter ista tria contineat aliqua alia. Sexto, de modo quo lex inducebat ad observantiam praedictorum. Question 99. The precepts of the old law Does the Old Law contain several precepts or only one? Does the Old Law contain any moral precepts? Does it contain ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts? Besides these, does it contain judicial precepts? Does it contain any others besides these? How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in lege veteri non contineatur nisi unum praeceptum. Lex enim est nihil aliud quam praeceptum, ut supra habitum est. Sed lex vetus est una. Ergo non continet nisi unum praeceptum. Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (90, A2,3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. XIII, si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc verbo instauratur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Sed istud mandatum est unum. Ergo lex vetus non continet nisi unum mandatum. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Romans 13:9): "If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, Matth. VII, dicitur, omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis, haec est enim lex et prophetae. Sed tota lex vetus continetur in lege et prophetis. Ergo tota lex vetus non habet nisi unum praeceptum. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Matthew 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets." But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one commandment.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. II, legem mandatorum decretis evacuans. Et loquitur de lege veteri, ut patet per Glossam ibidem. Ergo lex vetus continet in se multa mandata. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Ephesians 2:15): "Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod praeceptum legis, cum sit obligatorium, est de aliquo quod fieri debet. Quod autem aliquid debeat fieri, hoc provenit ex necessitate alicuius finis. Unde manifestum est quod de ratione praecepti est quod importet ordinem ad finem, inquantum scilicet illud praecipitur quod est necessarium vel expediens ad finem. Contingit autem ad unum finem multa esse necessaria vel expedientia. Et secundum hoc possunt de diversis rebus dari praecepta inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Unde dicendum est quod omnia praecepta legis veteris sunt unum secundum ordinem ad unum finem, sunt tamen multa secundum diversitatem eorum quae ordinantur ad finem illum. I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex vetus dicitur esse una secundum ordinem ad finem unum, et tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum distinctionem eorum quae ordinat ad finem. Sicut etiam ars aedificativa est una secundum unitatem finis, quia tendit ad aedificationem domus, tamen continet diversa praecepta, secundum diversos actus ad hoc ordinatos. Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. I, finis praecepti caritas est, ad hoc enim omnis lex tendit, ut amicitiam constituat vel hominum ad invicem, vel hominis ad Deum. Et ideo tota lex impletur in hoc uno mandato, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum, sicut in quodam fine mandatorum omnium, in dilectione enim proximi includitur etiam Dei dilectio, quando proximus diligitur propter Deum. Unde apostolus hoc unum praeceptum posuit pro duobus quae sunt de dilectione Dei et proximi, de quibus dicit dominus, Matth. XXII, in his duobus mandatis pendet omnis lex et prophetae. Reply to Objection 2. As the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5), "the end of the commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God's sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Matthew 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Ethic., amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum, venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt homini ad seipsum, dum scilicet homo ita se habet ad alterum sicut ad se. Et ideo in hoc quod dicitur, omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis, explicatur quaedam regula dilectionis proximi, quae etiam implicite continetur in hoc quod dicitur, diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Unde est quaedam explicatio istius mandati. Reply to Objection 3. As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them," this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself": so that it is an explanation of this commandment.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta moralia. Lex enim vetus distinguitur a lege naturae, ut supra habitum est. Sed praecepta moralia pertinent ad legem naturae. Ergo non pertinent ad legem veterem. Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above (91, A4,5; 98, 5). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, ibi subvenire debuit homini lex divina, ubi deficit ratio humana, sicut patet in his quae ad fidem pertinent, quae sunt supra rationem. Sed ad praecepta moralia ratio hominis sufficere videtur. Ergo praecepta moralia non sunt de lege veteri, quae est lex divina. Objection 2. Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, lex vetus dicitur littera occidens, ut patet II ad Cor. III. Sed praecepta moralia non occidunt, sed vivificant; secundum illud Psalmi CXVIII, in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, quia in ipsis vivificasti me. Ergo praecepta moralia non pertinent ad veterem legem. Objection 3. Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" (2 Corinthians 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to Psalm 118:93: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, addidit illis disciplinam, et legem vitae haereditavit eos. Disciplina autem pertinet ad mores, dicit enim Glossa ad Heb. XII, super illud, omnis disciplina etc., disciplina est eruditio morum per difficilia. Ergo lex a Deo data, praecepta moralia continebat. On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 17:9): "Moreover, He gave them discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an inheritance." Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Hebrews 12:11: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod lex vetus continebat praecepta quaedam moralia, ut patet Exod. XX, non occides, non furtum facies. Et hoc rationabiliter. Nam sicut intentio principalis legis humanae est ut faciat amicitiam hominum ad invicem; ita intentio legis divinae est ut constituat principaliter amicitiam hominis ad Deum. Cum autem similitudo sit ratio amoris, secundum illud Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simile sibi; impossibile est esse amicitiam hominis ad Deum, qui est optimus, nisi homines boni efficiantur, unde dicitur Levit. XIX, sancti eritis, quoniam ego sanctus sum. Bonitas autem hominis est virtus, quae facit bonum habentem. Et ideo oportuit praecepta legis veteris etiam de actibus virtutum dari. Et haec sunt moralia legis praecepta. I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident from Exodus 20:13-15: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to Sirach 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is written (Leviticus 19:2; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod lex vetus distinguitur a lege naturae non tanquam ab ea omnino aliena, sed tanquam aliquid ei superaddens. Sicut enim gratia praesupponit naturam, ita oportet quod lex divina praesupponat legem naturalem. Reply to Objection 1. The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod legi divinae conveniens erat ut non solum provideret homini in his ad quae ratio non potest, sed etiam in his circa quae contingit rationem hominis impediri. Ratio autem hominis circa praecepta moralia, quantum ad ipsa communissima praecepta legis naturae, non poterat errare in universali, sed tamen, propter consuetudinem peccandi, obscurabatur in particularibus agendis. Circa alia vero praecepta moralia, quae sunt quasi conclusiones deductae ex communibus principiis legis naturae, multorum ratio oberrabat, ita ut quaedam quae secundum se sunt mala, ratio multorum licita iudicaret. Unde oportuit contra utrumque defectum homini subveniri per auctoritatem legis divinae. Sicut etiam inter credenda nobis proponuntur non solum ea ad quae ratio attingere non potest, ut Deum esse trinum; sed etiam ea ad quae ratio recta pertingere potest, ut Deum esse unum; ad excludendum rationis humanae errorem, qui accidebat in multis. Reply to Objection 2. It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat in libro de spiritu et littera, etiam littera legis quantum ad praecepta moralia, occidere dicitur occasionaliter, inquantum scilicet praecipit quod bonum est, non praebens auxilium gratiae ad implendum. Reply to Objection 3. As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non contineat praecepta caeremonialia, praeter moralia. Omnis enim lex quae hominibus datur, est directiva humanorum actuum. Actus autem humani morales dicuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod in lege veteri hominibus data, non debeant contineri nisi praecepta moralia. Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above (Question 1, Article 3). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, praecepta quae dicuntur caeremonialia, videntur ad divinum cultum pertinere. Sed divinus cultus est actus virtutis, scilicet religionis, quae, ut Tullius dicit in sua Rhetoric., divinae naturae cultum caeremoniamque affert. Cum igitur praecepta moralia sint de actibus virtutum, ut dictum est, videtur quod praecepta caeremonialia non sint distinguenda a moralibus. Objection 2. Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated above (Article 2), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, praecepta caeremonialia esse videntur quae figurative aliquid significant. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, in II de Doctr. Christ., verba inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi. Ergo nulla necessitas fuit ut in lege continerentur praecepta caeremonialia de aliquibus actibus figurativis. Objection 3. Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. IV, decem verba scripsit in duabus tabulis lapideis, mihique mandavit in illo tempore ut docerem vos caeremonias et iudicia quae facere deberetis. Sed decem praecepta legis sunt moralia. Ergo praeter praecepta moralia sunt etiam alia praecepta caeremonialia. On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 4:13-14): "Ten words . . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do." But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts there are others which are ceremonial.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, lex divina principaliter instituitur ad ordinandum homines ad Deum; lex autem humana principaliter ad ordinandum homines ad invicem. Et ideo leges humanae non curaverunt aliquid instituere de cultu divino nisi in ordine ad bonum commune hominum, et propter hoc etiam multa confinxerunt circa res divinas, secundum quod videbatur eis expediens ad informandos mores hominum; sicut patet in ritu gentilium. Sed lex divina e converso homines ad invicem ordinavit secundum quod conveniebat ordini qui est in Deum, quem principaliter intendebat. Ordinatur autem homo in Deum non solum per interiores actus mentis, qui sunt credere, sperare et amare; sed etiam per quaedam exteriora opera, quibus homo divinam servitutem profitetur. Et ista opera dicuntur ad cultum Dei pertinere. Qui quidem cultus caeremonia vocatur, quasi munia, idest dona, Caereris, quae dicebatur dea frugum, ut quidam dicunt, eo quod primo ex frugibus oblationes Deo offerebantur. Sive, ut maximus Valerius refert, nomen caeremoniae introductum est ad significandum cultum divinum apud Latinos, a quodam oppido iuxta Romam, quod Caere vocabatur, eo quod, Roma capta a gallis, illuc sacra Romanorum ablata sunt, et reverentissime habita. Sic igitur illa praecepta quae in lege pertinent ad cultum Dei, specialiter caeremonialia dicuntur. I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is these works that are said to belong to the Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states [Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1, the word "ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived from a town near Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially called ceremonial.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod humani actus se extendunt etiam ad cultum divinum. Et ideo etiam de his continet praecepta lex vetus hominibus data. Reply to Objection 1. Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praecepta legis naturae communia sunt, et indigent determinatione. Determinantur autem et per legem humanam, et per legem divinam. Et sicut ipsae determinationes quae fiunt per legem humanam, non dicuntur esse de lege naturae, sed de iure positivo; ita ipsae determinationes praeceptorum legis naturae quae fiunt per legem divinam, distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus, quae pertinent ad legem naturae. Colere ergo Deum, cum sit actus virtutis, pertinet ad praeceptum morale, sed determinatio huius praecepti, ut scilicet colatur talibus hostiis et talibus muneribus, hoc pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia. Et ideo praecepta caeremonialia distinguuntur a praeceptis moralibus. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (Question 91, Article 3), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. Cael. Hier., divina hominibus manifestari non possunt nisi sub aliquibus similitudinibus sensibilibus. Ipsae autem similitudines magis movent animum quando non solum verbo exprimuntur, sed etiam sensui offeruntur. Et ideo divina traduntur in Scripturis non solum per similitudines verbo expressas, sicut patet in metaphoricis locutionibus; sed etiam per similitudines rerum quae visui proponuntur, quod pertinet ad praecepta caeremonialia. Reply to Objection 3. As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, non sint aliqua praecepta iudicialia in veteri lege. Dicit enim Augustinus, contra Faustum, quod in lege veteri sunt praecepta vitae agendae, et praecepta vitae significandae. Sed praecepta vitae agendae sunt moralia; praecepta autem vitae significandae sunt caeremonialia. Ergo praeter haec duo genera praeceptorum, non sunt ponenda in lege alia praecepta iudicialia. Objection 1. It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, super illud Psalmi CXVIII, a iudiciis tuis non declinavi, dicit Glossa, idest ab his quae constituisti regulam vivendi. Sed regula vivendi pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non sunt distinguenda a moralibus. Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Psalm 118:102, "I have not declined from Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, iudicium videtur esse actus iustitiae; secundum illud Psalmi XCIII, quoadusque iustitia convertatur in iudicium. Sed actus iustitiae, sicut et actus ceterarum virtutum, pertinet ad praecepta moralia. Ergo praecepta moralia includunt in se iudicialia, et sic non debent ab eis distingui. Objection 3. Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to Psalm 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae atque iudicia. Praecepta autem antonomastice dicuntur moralia. Ergo praeter praecepta moralia et caeremonialia, sunt etiam iudicialia. On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad legem divinam pertinet ut ordinet homines ad invicem et ad Deum. Utrumque autem horum in communi quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod referuntur moralia praecepta, sed oportet quod determinetur utrumque per legem divinam vel humanam, quia principia naturaliter nota sunt communia tam in speculativis quam in activis. Sicut igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per praecepta caeremonialia, sic et determinatio communis praecepti de iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta iudicialia. Et secundum hoc, oportet tria praecepta legis veteris ponere; scilicet moralia, quae sunt de dictamine legis naturae; caeremonialia, quae sunt determinationes cultus divini; et iudicialia, quae sunt determinationes iustitiae inter homines observandae. Unde cum apostolus, Rom. VII, dixisset quod lex est sancta, subiungit quod mandatum est iustum et sanctum et bonum, iustum quidem, quantum ad iudicialia; sanctum, quantum ad caeremonialia (nam sanctum dicitur quod est Deo dicatum); bonum, idest honestum, quantum ad moralia. I answer that, As stated above (2,3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts. We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; "ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Romans 7:12) after saying that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and good": "just," in respect of the judicial precepts; "holy," with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"--"holy"--is applied to that which is consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod tam praecepta moralia, quam etiam iudicialia, pertinent ad directionem vitae humanae. Et ideo utraque continentur sub uno membro illorum quae ponit Augustinus, scilicet sub praeceptis vitae agendae. Reply to Objection 1. Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the life we have to lead.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium significat executionem iustitiae, quae quidem est secundum applicationem rationis ad aliqua particularia determinate. Unde praecepta iudicialia communicant in aliquo cum moralibus, inquantum scilicet a ratione derivantur; et in aliquo cum caeremonialibus, inquantum scilicet sunt quaedam determinationes communium praeceptorum. Et ideo quandoque sub iudiciis comprehenduntur praecepta iudicialia et moralia, sicut Deut. V, audi, Israel, caeremonias atque iudicia; quandoque vero iudicialia et caeremonialia, sicut Levit. XVIII, facietis iudicia mea, et praecepta mea servabitis, ubi praecepta ad moralia referuntur, iudicia vero ad iudicialia et caeremonialia. Reply to Objection 2. Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments" comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in Deuteronomy 5:1: "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Leviticus 18:4: "You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actus iustitiae in generali pertinet ad praecepta moralia, sed determinatio eius in speciali pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia. Reply to Objection 3. The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliqua alia praecepta contineantur in lege veteri praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia. Iudicialia enim praecepta pertinent ad actum iustitiae, quae est hominis ad hominem; caeremonialia vero pertinent ad actum religionis, qua Deus colitur. Sed praeter has sunt multae aliae virtutes, scilicet temperantia, fortitudo, liberalitas, et aliae plures, ut supra dictum est. Ergo praeter praedicta oportet plura alia in lege veteri contineri. Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above (Question 60, Article 5). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, Deut. XI dicitur, ama dominum Deum tuum, et observa eius praecepta et caeremonias et iudicia atque mandata. Sed praecepta pertinent ad moralia, ut dictum est. Ergo praeter moralia, iudicialia et caeremonialia, adhuc alia continentur in lege, quae dicuntur mandata. Objection 2. Further, it is written (Deuteronomy 11:1): "Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments." [The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.]
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, Deut. VI dicitur, custodi praecepta domini Dei tui, ac testimonia et caeremonias quas tibi praecepi. Ergo praeter omnia praedicta adhuc in lege testimonia continentur. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Deuteronomy 6:17): "Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulgate: 'He hath'] commanded thee." Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises "testimonies."
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, in Psalmo CXVIII dicitur, in aeternum non obliviscar iustificationes tuas, Glossa, idest legem. Ergo praecepta legis veteris non solum sunt moralia, caeremonialia et iudicialia, sed etiam iustificationes. Objection 4. Further, it is written (Psalm 118:93): "Thy justifications (i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications."
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae atque iudicia quae mandavit dominus Deus vobis. Et haec ponuntur in principio legis. Ergo omnia praecepta legis sub his comprehenduntur. On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in lege ponuntur aliqua tanquam praecepta; aliqua vero tanquam ad praeceptorum adimpletionem ordinata. Praecepta quidem sunt de his quae sunt agenda. Ad quorum impletionem ex duobus homo inducitur, scilicet ex auctoritate praecipientis; et ex utilitate impletionis, quae quidem est consecutio alicuius boni utilis, delectabilis vel honesti, aut fuga alicuius mali contrarii. Oportuit igitur in veteri lege proponi quaedam quae auctoritatem Dei praecipientis indicarent, sicut illud Deut. VI, audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est; et illud Gen. I, in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Et huiusmodi dicuntur testimonia. Oportuit etiam quod in lege proponerentur quaedam praemia observantium legem, et poenae transgredientium, ut patet Deut. XXVIII, si audieris vocem domini Dei tui, faciet te excelsiorem cunctis gentibus, et cetera. Et huiusmodi dicuntur iustificationes, secundum quod Deus aliquos iuste punit vel praemiat. Ipsa autem agenda sub praecepto non cadunt nisi inquantum habent aliquam debiti rationem. Est autem duplex debitum, unum quidem secundum regulam rationis, aliud autem secundum regulam legis determinantis; sicut philosophus, in V Ethic., distinguit duplex iustum, scilicet morale et legale. Debitum autem morale est duplex, dictat enim ratio aliquid faciendum vel tanquam necessarium, sine quo non potest esse ordo virtutis; vel tanquam utile ad hoc quod ordo virtutis melius conservetur. Et secundum hoc, quaedam moralium praecise praecipiuntur vel prohibentur in lege, sicut, non occides, non furtum facies. Et haec proprie dicuntur praecepta. Quaedam vero praecipiuntur vel prohibentur, non quasi praecise debita, sed propter melius. Et ista possunt dici mandata, quia quandam inductionem habent et persuasionem. Sicut illud Exod. XXII, si pignus acceperis vestimentum a proximo tuo, ante solis occasum reddas ei; et aliqua similia. Unde Hieronymus dicit quod in praeceptis est iustitia, in mandatis vero caritas. Debitum autem ex determinatione legis, in rebus quidem humanis pertinet ad iudicialia; in rebus autem divinis, ad caeremonialia. Quamvis etiam ea quae pertinent ad poenam vel praemia, dici possint testimonia, inquantum sunt protestationes quaedam divinae iustitiae. Omnia vero praecepta legis possunt dici iustificationes, inquantum sunt quaedam executiones legalis iustitiae. Possunt etiam aliter mandata a praeceptis distingui, ut praecepta dicantur quae Deus per seipsum iussit; mandata autem, quae per alios mandavit, ut ipsum nomen sonare videtur. Ex quibus omnibus apparet quod omnia legis praecepta continentur sub moralibus, caeremonialibus et iudicialibus, alia vero non habent rationem praeceptorum, sed ordinantur ad praeceptorum observationem, ut dictum est. I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. Deuteronomy 6:4: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and Genesis 1:1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Deuteronomy 28: "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly. The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just--moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7). Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in Exodus 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters. Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the very word seems to denote. From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sola iustitia, inter alias virtutes, importat rationem debiti. Et ideo moralia intantum sunt lege determinabilia, inquantum pertinent ad iustitiam, cuius etiam quaedam pars est religio, ut Tullius dicit. Unde iustum legale non potest esse aliquod praeter caeremonialia et iudicialia praecepta. Reply to Objection 1. Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 5 ad 2 Ad alia patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod lex vetus non debuerit inducere ad observantiam praeceptorum per temporales promissiones et comminationes. Intentio enim legis divinae est ut homines Deo subdat per timorem et amorem, unde dicitur Deut. X, et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum, et ambules in viis eius, et diligas eum? Sed cupiditas rerum temporalium abducit a Deo, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod venenum caritatis est cupiditas. Ergo promissiones et comminationes temporales videntur contrariari intentioni legislatoris, quod facit legem reprobabilem, ut patet per philosophum, in II Polit. Objection 1. It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written (Deuteronomy 10:12): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6).
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, lex divina est excellentior quam lex humana. Videmus autem in scientiis quod quanto aliqua est altior, tanto per altiora media procedit. Ergo cum lex humana procedat ad inducendum homines per temporales comminationes et promissiones, lex divina non debuit ex his procedere, sed per aliqua maiora. Objection 2. Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud non potest esse praemium iustitiae vel poena culpae, quod aequaliter evenit et bonis et malis. Sed sicut dicitur Eccle. IX, universa, temporalia, aeque eveniunt iusto et impio, bono et malo, mundo et immundo, immolanti victimas et sacrificia contemnenti. Ergo temporalia bona vel mala non convenienter ponuntur ut poenae vel praemia mandatorum legis divinae. Objection 3. Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Ecclesiastes 9:2, "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae I, si volueritis, et audieritis me, bona terrae comedetis. Quod si nolueritis, et me ad iracundiam provocaveritis, gladius devorabit vos. On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 1:19-20): "If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you."
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in scientiis speculativis inducuntur homines ad assentiendum conclusionibus per media syllogistica, ita etiam in quibuslibet legibus homines inducuntur ad observantias praeceptorum per poenas et praemia. Videmus autem in scientiis speculativis quod media proponuntur auditori secundum eius conditionem, unde oportet ordinate in scientiis procedere, ut ex notioribus disciplina incipiat. Ita etiam oportet eum qui vult inducere hominem ad observantiam praeceptorum, ut ex illis eum movere incipiat quae sunt in eius affectu, sicut pueri provocantur ad aliquid faciendum aliquibus puerilibus munusculis. Dictum est autem supra quod lex vetus disponebat ad Christum sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, unde dabatur populo adhuc imperfecto in comparatione ad perfectionem quae erat futura per Christum, et ideo populus ille comparatur puero sub paedagogo existenti, ut patet Galat. III. Perfectio autem hominis est ut, contemptis temporalibus, spiritualibus inhaereat, ut patet per illud quod apostolus dicit, Philipp. III, quae quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea quae priora sunt me extendo. Quicumque ergo perfecti sumus, hoc sentiamus. Imperfectorum autem est quod temporalia bona desiderent, in ordine tamen ad Deum. Perversorum autem est quod in temporalibus bonis finem constituant. Unde legi veteri conveniebat ut per temporalia, quae erant in affectu hominum imperfectorum, manuduceret homines ad Deum. I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above (98, A1,2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still under a pedagogue (Galatians 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle (Philippians 3:13-15): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulgate: 'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod cupiditas, qua homo constituit finem in temporalibus bonis, est caritatis venenum. Sed consecutio temporalium bonorum quae homo desiderat in ordine ad Deum, est quaedam via inducens imperfectos ad Dei amorem; secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, confitebitur tibi cum benefeceris illi. Reply to Objection 1. Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to Psalm 48:19: "He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him."
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod lex humana inducit homines ex temporalibus praemiis vel poenis per homines inducendis, lex vero divina ex praemiis vel poenis exhibendis per Deum. Et in hoc procedit per media altiora. Reply to Objection 2. Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means.
Iª-IIae q. 99 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut patet historias veteris testamenti revolventi, communis status populi semper sub lege in prosperitate fuit, quandiu legem observabant; et statim declinantes a praeceptis legis, in multas adversitates incidebant. Sed aliquae personae particulares etiam iustitiam legis observantes, in aliquas adversitates incidebant, vel quia iam erant spirituales effecti, ut per hoc magis ab affectu temporalium abstraherentur, et eorum virtus probata redderetur; aut quia, opera legis exterius implentes, cor totum habebant in temporalibus defixum et a Deo elongatum, secundum quod dicitur Isaiae XXIX, populus hic labiis me honorat, cor autem eorum longe est a me. Reply to Objection 3. As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfortunes--either because they had already become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried)--or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to Isaiah 29:13 (Matthew 15:8): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me."

Notes

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