Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q1
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- Proemium Introduction
- Question 1.1 The object of faith
- Question 1.2
- Question 1.3
- Question 1.4
- Question 1.5
- Question 1.6
- Question 1.7
- Question 1.8
- Question 1.9
- Question 1.10
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| IIª-IIae pr. Post communem considerationem de virtutibus et vitiis et aliis ad materiam moralem pertinentibus, necesse est considerare singula in speciali, sermones enim morales universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt. Potest autem aliquid in speciali considerari circa moralia dupliciter, uno modo, ex parte ipsius materiae moralis, puta cum consideratur de hac virtute vel hoc vitio; alio modo, quantum ad speciales status hominum, puta cum consideratur de subditis et praelatis, de activis et contemplativis, vel quibuscumque aliis differentiis hominum. Primo ergo considerabimus specialiter de his quae pertinent ad omnes hominum status; secundo vero, specialiter de his quae pertinent ad determinatos status. Est autem considerandum circa primum quod, si seorsum determinaremus de virtutibus, donis, vitiis et praeceptis, oporteret idem multoties dicere, qui enim sufficienter vult tractare de hoc praecepto, non moechaberis, necesse habet inquirere de adulterio, quod est quoddam peccatum, cuius etiam cognitio dependet ex cognitione oppositae virtutis. Erit igitur compendiosior et expeditior considerationis via si simul sub eodem tractatu consideratio procedit de virtute et dono sibi correspondente, et vitiis oppositis, et praeceptis affirmativis vel negativis. Erit autem hic considerationis modus conveniens ipsis vitiis secundum propriam speciem, ostensum est enim supra quod vitia et peccata diversificantur specie secundum materiam vel obiectum, non autem secundum alias differentias peccatorum, puta cordis, oris et operis, vel secundum infirmitatem, ignorantiam et malitiam, et alias huiusmodi differentias; est autem eadem materia circa quam et virtus recte operatur et vitia opposita a rectitudine recedunt. Sic igitur tota materia morali ad considerationem virtutum reducta, omnes virtutes sunt ulterius reducendae ad septem, quarum tres sunt theologicae, de quibus primo est agendum; aliae vero quatuor sunt cardinales, de quibus posterius agetur. Virtutum autem intellectualium una quidem est prudentia, quae inter cardinales virtutes continetur et numeratur; ars vero non pertinet ad moralem, quae circa agibilia versatur, cum ars sit recta ratio factibilium, ut supra dictum est; aliae vero tres intellectuales virtutes, scilicet sapientia, intellectus et scientia, communicant etiam in nomine cum donis quibusdam spiritus sancti, unde simul etiam de eis considerabitur in consideratione donorum virtutibus correspondentium. Aliae vero virtutes morales omnes aliqualiter reducuntur ad virtutes cardinales, ut ex supradictis patet, unde in consideratione alicuius virtutis cardinalis considerabuntur etiam omnes virtutes ad eam qualitercumque pertinentes et vitia opposita. Et sic nihil moralium erit praetermissum. | |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 pr. Circa virtutes igitur theologicas primo erit considerandum de fide; secundo, de spe; tertio, de caritate. Circa fidem vero quadruplex consideratio occurrit, prima quidem de ipsa fide; secunda de donis intellectus et scientiae sibi correspondentibus; tertia de vitiis oppositis; quarta de praeceptis ad hanc virtutem pertinentibus. Circa fidem vero primo erit considerandum de eius obiecto; secundo, de eius actu; tertio, de ipso habitu fidei. Circa primum quaeruntur decem. Primo, utrum obiectum fidei sit veritas prima. Secundo, utrum obiectum fidei sit aliquid complexum vel incomplexum, idest res aut enuntiabile. Tertio, utrum fidei possit subesse falsum. Quarto, utrum obiectum fidei possit esse aliquid visum. Quinto, utrum possit esse aliquid scitum. Sexto, utrum credibilia debeant distingui per certos articulos. Septimo, utrum iidem articuli subsint fidei secundum omne tempus. Octavo, de numero articulorum. Nono, de modo tradendi articulos in symbolo. Decimo, cuius sit fidei symbolum constituere. | Question 1. Faith Is the object of faith the First Truth? Is the object of faith something complex or incomplex, i.e. is it a thing or a proposition? Can anything false come under faith? Can the object of faith be anything seen? Can it be anything known? Should the things to be believed be divided into a certain number of articles? These articles: are they of faith for all times? The number of articles The manner of embodying the articles in a symbol Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith? |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum fidei non sit veritas prima. Illud enim videtur esse obiectum fidei quod nobis proponitur ad credendum. Sed non solum proponuntur nobis ad credendum ea quae pertinent ad divinitatem, quae est veritas prima; sed etiam ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem Christi et Ecclesiae sacramenta et creaturarum conditionem. Ergo non solum veritas prima est fidei obiectum. | Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, fides et infidelitas sunt circa idem, cum sint opposita. Sed circa omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur potest esse infidelitas, quidquid enim horum homo negaverit, infidelis reputatur. Ergo etiam fides est circa omnia quae in sacra Scriptura continentur. Sed ibi multa continentur de hominibus et de aliis rebus creatis. Ergo obiectum fidei non solum est veritas prima, sed etiam veritas creata. | Objection 2. Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, fides caritati condividitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed caritate non solum diligimus Deum, qui est summa bonitas, sed etiam diligimus proximum. Ergo fidei obiectum non est solum veritas prima. | Objection 3. Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (I-II, 62, 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the First Truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod fides est circa simplicem et semper existentem veritatem. Haec autem est veritas prima. Ergo obiectum fidei est veritas prima. | On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod cuiuslibet cognoscitivi habitus obiectum duo habet, scilicet id quod materialiter cognoscitur, quod est sicut materiale obiectum; et id per quod cognoscitur, quod est formalis ratio obiecti. Sicut in scientia geometriae materialiter scita sunt conclusiones; formalis vero ratio sciendi sunt media demonstrationis, per quae conclusiones cognoscuntur. Sic igitur in fide, si consideremus formalem rationem obiecti, nihil est aliud quam veritas prima, non enim fides de qua loquimur assentit alicui nisi quia est a Deo revelatum; unde ipsi veritati divinae innititur tanquam medio. Si vero consideremus materialiter ea quibus fides assentit, non solum est ipse Deus, sed etiam multa alia. Quae tamen sub assensu fidei non cadunt nisi secundum quod habent aliquem ordinem ad Deum, prout scilicet per aliquos divinitatis effectus homo adiuvatur ad tendendum in divinam fruitionem. Et ideo etiam ex hac parte obiectum fidei est quodammodo veritas prima, inquantum nihil cadit sub fide nisi in ordine ad Deum, sicut etiam obiectum medicinae est sanitas, quia nihil medicina considerat nisi in ordine ad sanitatem. | I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known. Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad humanitatem Christi et ad sacramenta Ecclesiae vel ad quascumque creaturas cadunt sub fide inquantum per haec ordinamur ad Deum. Et eis etiam assentimus propter divinam veritatem. | Reply to Objection 1. Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 2 Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum, de omnibus illis quae in sacra Scriptura traduntur. | The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam caritas diligit proximum propter Deum; et sic obiectum eius proprie est ipse Deus, ut infra dicetur. | Reply to Objection 3. Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on (25, 1). |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum fidei non sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Obiectum enim fidei est veritas prima, sicut dictum est. Sed prima veritas est aliquid incomplexum. Ergo obiectum fidei non est aliquid complexum. | Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above (Article 1). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, expositio fidei in symbolo continetur. Sed in symbolo non ponuntur enuntiabilia, sed res, non enim dicitur ibi quod Deus sit omnipotens, sed, credo in Deum omnipotentem. Ergo obiectum fidei non est enuntiabile, sed res. | Objection 2. Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . . almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, fidei succedit visio, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Sed visio patriae est de incomplexo, cum sit ipsius divinae essentiae. Ergo etiam fides viae. | Objection 3. Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra, fides est media inter scientiam et opinionem. Medium autem et extrema sunt eiusdem generis. Cum igitur scientia et opinio sint circa enuntiabilia, videtur quod similiter fides sit circa enuntiabilia. Et ita obiectum fidei, cum fides sit circa enuntiabilia, est aliquid complexum. | On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Est autem modus proprius humani intellectus ut componendo et dividendo veritatem cognoscat, sicut in primo dictum est. Et ideo ea quae sunt secundum se simplicia intellectus humanus cognoscit secundum quandam complexionem, sicut e converso intellectus divinus incomplexe cognoscit ea quae sunt secundum se complexa. Sic igitur obiectum fidei dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius rei creditae, et sic obiectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, scilicet res ipsa de qua fides habetur. Alio modo, ex parte credentis, et secundum hoc obiectum fidei est aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Et ideo utrumque vere opinatum fuit apud antiquos, et secundum aliquid utrumque est verum. | I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in I, 85, 5. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves. Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition. Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of truth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de obiecto fidei ex parte ipsius rei creditae. | Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the object of faith on the part of the thing believed. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in symbolo tanguntur ea de quibus est fides inquantum ad ea terminatur actus credentis, ut ex ipso modo loquendi apparet. Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem, non enim formamus enuntiabilia nisi ut per ea de rebus cognitionem habeamus, sicut in scientia, ita et in fide. | Reply to Objection 2. The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod visio patriae erit veritatis primae secundum quod in se est, secundum illud I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus et videbimus eum sicuti est. Et ideo visio illa erit non per modum enuntiabilis, sed per modum simplicis intelligentiae. Sed per fidem non apprehendimus veritatem primam sicut in se est. Unde non est similis ratio. | Reply to Objection 3. The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: "We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fidei possit subesse falsum. Fides enim condividitur spei et caritati. Sed spei potest aliquid subesse falsum, multi enim sperant se habituros vitam aeternam qui non habebunt. Similiter etiam et caritati, multi enim diliguntur tanquam boni qui tamen boni non sunt. Ergo etiam fidei potest aliquid subesse falsum. | Objection 1. It would seem that something false can come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object of faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Abraham credidit Christum nasciturum, secundum illud Ioan. VIII, Abraham, pater vester, exultavit ut videret diem meum. Sed post tempus Abrahae Deus poterat non incarnari, sola enim sua voluntate carnem accepit, et ita esset falsum quod Abraham de Christo credidit. Ergo fidei potest subesse falsum. | Objection 2. Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to John 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, fides antiquorum fuit quod Christus esset nasciturus, et haec fides duravit in multis usque ad praedicationem Evangelii. Sed Christo iam nato, antequam praedicare inciperet, falsum erat Christum nasciturum. Ergo fidei potest subesse falsum. | Objection 3. Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false can come under faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, unum de pertinentibus ad fidem est ut aliquis credat sub sacramento altaris verum corpus Christi contineri. Potest autem contingere, quando non recte consecratur, quod non est ibi verum corpus Christi, sed solum panis. Ergo fidei potest subesse falsum. | Objection 4. Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra, nulla virtus perficiens intellectum se habet ad falsum secundum quod est malum intellectus, ut patet per philosophum, in VI Ethic. Sed fides est quaedam virtus perficiens intellectum, ut infra patebit. Ergo ei non potest subesse falsum. | On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (4, 2,5). Therefore nothing false can come under it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil subest alicui potentiae vel habitui aut etiam actui, nisi mediante ratione formali obiecti, sicut color videri non potest nisi per lucem, et conclusio sciri non potest nisi per medium demonstrationis. Dictum est autem quod ratio formalis obiecti fidei est veritas prima. Unde nihil potest cadere sub fide nisi inquantum stat sub veritate prima. Sub qua nullum falsum stare potest, sicut nec non ens sub ente, nec malum sub bonitate. Unde relinquitur quod fidei non potest subesse aliquod falsum. | I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (1) that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come under faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia verum est bonum intellectus, non autem est bonum appetitivae virtutis, ideo omnes virtutes quae perficiunt intellectum excludunt totaliter falsum, quia de ratione virtutis est quod se habeat solum ad bonum. Virtutes autem perficientes partem appetitivam non excludunt totaliter falsum, potest enim aliquis secundum iustitiam aut temperantiam agere aliquam falsam opinionem habens de eo circa quod agit. Et ita, cum fides perficiat intellectum, spes autem et caritas appetitivam partem, non est similis ratio de eis. Et tamen neque etiam spei subest falsum. Non enim aliquis sperat se habiturum vitam aeternam secundum propriam potestatem (hoc enim esset praesumptionis), sed secundum auxilium gratiae, in qua si perseveraverit, omnino infallibiliter vitam aeternam consequetur. Similiter etiam ad caritatem pertinet diligere Deum in quocumque fuerit. Unde non refert ad caritatem utrum in isto sit Deus qui propter Deum diligitur. | Reply to Objection 1. Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails. Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly. In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom we love for God's sake. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Deum non incarnari, secundum se consideratum, fuit possibile etiam post tempus Abrahae. Sed secundum quod cadit sub praescientia divina, habet quandam necessitatem infallibilitatis, ut in primo dictum est. Et hoc modo cadit sub fide. Unde prout cadit sub fide, non potest esse falsum. | Reply to Objection 2. That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained in I, 14, 13 and 15: and it is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ad fidem credentis pertinebat post Christi nativitatem quod crederet eum quandoque nasci. Sed illa determinatio temporis, in qua decipiebatur, non erat ex fide, sed ex coniectura humana. Possibile est enim hominem fidelem ex coniectura humana falsum aliquid aestimare. Sed quod ex fide falsum aestimet, hoc est impossibile. | Reply to Objection 3. After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the outcome of faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod fides credentis non refertur ad has species panis vel illas, sed ad hoc quod verum corpus Christi sit sub speciebus panis sensibilis quando recte fuerit consecratum. Unde si non sit recte consecratum, fidei non suberit propter hoc falsum. | Reply to Objection 4. The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false comes under faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod obiectum fidei sit aliquid visum. Dicit enim dominus Thomae, Ioan. XX, quia vidisti me, credidisti. Ergo et de eodem est visio et fides. | Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith regard the same object. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, dicit, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate. Et loquitur de cognitione fidei. Ergo id quod creditur videtur. | Objection 2. Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith, says (1 Corinthians 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore what is believed is seen. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, fides est quoddam spirituale lumen. Sed quolibet lumine aliquid videtur. Ergo fides est de rebus visis. | Objection 3. Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, quilibet sensus visus nominatur, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Verb. Dom. Sed fides est de auditis, secundum illud ad Rom. X, fides ex auditu. Ergo fides est de rebus visis. | Objection 4. Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according to Romans 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore faith is of things seen. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, quod fides est argumentum non apparentium. | On the contrary, The Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1) that "faith is the evidence of things that appear not." |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod fides importat assensum intellectus ad id quod creditur. Assentit autem alicui intellectus dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ad hoc movetur ab ipso obiecto, quod est vel per seipsum cognitum, sicut patet in principiis primis, quorum est intellectus; vel est per aliud cognitum, sicut patet de conclusionibus, quarum est scientia. Alio modo intellectus assentit alicui non quia sufficienter moveatur ab obiecto proprio, sed per quandam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam. Et si quidem hoc fit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis, erit opinio, si autem fit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides. Illa autem videri dicuntur quae per seipsa movent intellectum nostrum vel sensum ad sui cognitionem. Unde manifestum est quod nec fides nec opinio potest esse de visis aut secundum sensum aut secundum intellectum. | I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith. Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the intellect. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Thomas aliud vidit et aliud credidit. Hominem vidit et Deum credens confessus est, cum dixit, dominus meus et Deus meus. | Reply to Objection 1. Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God." |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ea quae subsunt fidei dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, in speciali, et sic non possunt esse simul visa et credita, sicut dictum est. Alio modo, in generali, scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis. Et sic sunt visa ab eo qui credit, non enim crederet nisi videret ea esse credenda, vel propter evidentiam signorum vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. | Reply to Objection 2. Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod lumen fidei facit videre ea quae creduntur. Sicut enim per alios habitus virtutum homo videt illud quod est sibi conveniens secundum habitum illum, ita etiam per habitum fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis. | Reply to Objection 3. The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and not to assent to others. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod auditus est verborum significantium ea quae sunt fidei, non autem est ipsarum rerum de quibus est fides. Et sic non oportet ut huiusmodi res sint visae. | Reply to Objection 4. Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow that these things are seen. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae sunt fidei possint esse scita. Ea enim quae non sciuntur videntur esse ignorata, quia ignorantia scientiae opponitur. Sed ea quae sunt fidei non sunt ignorata, horum enim ignorantia ad infidelitatem pertinet, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, ignorans feci in incredulitate mea. Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita. | Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Timothy 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, scientia per rationes acquiritur. Sed ad ea quae sunt fidei a sacris auctoribus rationes inducuntur. Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita. | Objection 2. Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of science. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, ea quae demonstrative probantur sunt scita, quia demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Sed quaedam quae in fide continentur sunt demonstrative probata a philosophis, sicut Deum esse, et Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi. Ergo ea quae sunt fidei possunt esse scita. | Objection 3. Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 arg. 4 Praeterea, opinio plus distat a scientia quam fides, cum fides dicatur esse media inter opinionem et scientiam. Sed opinio et scientia possunt esse aliquo modo de eodem, ut dicitur in I Poster. Ergo etiam fides et scientia. | Objection 4. Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod apparentia non habent fidem, sed agnitionem. Ea ergo de quibus est fides agnitionem non habent. Sed ea quae sunt scita habent agnitionem. Ergo de his quae sunt scita non potest esse fides. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod omnis scientia habetur per aliqua principia per se nota, et per consequens visa. Et ideo oportet quaecumque sunt scita aliquo modo esse visa. Non autem est possibile quod idem ab eodem sit creditum et visum, sicut supra dictum est. Unde etiam impossibile est quod ab eodem idem sit scitum et creditum. Potest tamen contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno, sit creditum ab alio. Ea enim quae de Trinitate credimus nos visuros speramus, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIII, videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem, quam quidem visionem iam Angeli habent, unde quod nos credimus illi vident. Et similiter potest contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno homine, etiam in statu viae, sit ab alio creditum, qui hoc demonstrative non novit. Id tamen quod communiter omnibus hominibus proponitur ut credendum est communiter non scitum. Et ista sunt quae simpliciter fidei subsunt. Et ideo fides et scientia non sunt de eodem. | I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen. Now as stated above (Article 4), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. On like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration. Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod infideles eorum quae sunt fidei ignorantiam habent, quia nec vident aut sciunt ea in seipsis, nec cognoscunt ea esse credibilia. Sed per hunc modum fideles habent eorum notitiam, non quasi demonstrative, sed inquantum per lumen fidei videntur esse credenda, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 1. Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (4, ad 2,3). |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes quae inducuntur a sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur. Vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, scilicet ex auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae, sicut Dionysius dicit, II cap. de Div. Nom. Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes. Unde etiam theologia scientia est, ut in principio operis dictum est. | Reply to Objection 2. The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (I, 1, 2). |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae demonstrative probari possunt inter credenda numerantur, non quia de ipsis sit simpliciter fides apud omnes, sed quia praeexiguntur ad ea quae sunt fidei, et oportet ea saltem per fidem praesupponi ab his qui horum demonstrationem non habent. | Reply to Objection 3. Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, a diversis hominibus de eodem omnino potest haberi scientia et opinio, sicut et nunc dictum est de scientia et fide. Sed ab uno et eodem potest quidem haberi fides et scientia de eodem secundum quid, scilicet subiecto, sed non secundum idem, potest enim esse quod de una et eadem re aliquis aliquid sciat et aliquid aliud opinetur; et similiter de Deo potest aliquis demonstrative scire quod sit unus, et credere quod sit trinus. Sed de eodem secundum idem non potest esse simul in uno homine scientia nec cum opinione nec cum fide, alia tamen et alia ratione. Scientia enim cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem, quia de ratione scientiae est quod id quod scitur existimetur esse impossibile aliter se habere; de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod quis existimat, existimet possibile aliter se habere. Sed id quod fide tenetur, propter fidei certitudinem, existimatur etiam impossibile aliter se habere, sed ea ratione non potest simul idem et secundum idem esse scitum et creditum, quia scitum est visum et creditum est non visum, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 4. As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod credibilia non sint per certos articulos distinguenda. Eorum enim omnium quae in sacra Scriptura continentur est fides habenda. Sed illa non possunt reduci ad aliquem certum numerum, propter sui multitudinem. Ergo superfluum videtur articulos fidei distinguere. | Objection 1. It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, materialis distinctio, cum in infinitum fieri possit, est ab arte praetermittenda. Sed formalis ratio obiecti credibilis est una et indivisibilis, ut supra dictum est, scilicet veritas prima, et sic secundum rationem formalem credibilia distingui non possunt. Ergo praetermittenda est credibilium materialis distinctio per articulos. | Objection 2. Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above (Article 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into articles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut a quibusdam dicitur, articulus est indivisibilis veritas de Deo arctans nos ad credendum. Sed credere est voluntarium, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, nullus credit nisi volens. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur credibilia per articulos. | Objection 3. Further, it has been said by some [Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into articles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, articulus est perceptio divinae veritatis tendens in ipsam. Sed perceptio divinae veritatis competit nobis secundum distinctionem quandam, quae enim in Deo unum sunt in nostro intellectu multiplicantur. Ergo credibilia debent per articulos distingui. | On the contrary, Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nomen articuli ex Graeco videtur esse derivatum. Arthron enim in Graeco, quod in Latino articulus dicitur, significat quandam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum. Et ideo particulae corporis sibi invicem coaptatae dicuntur membrorum articuli. Et similiter in grammatica apud Graecos dicuntur articuli quaedam partes orationis coaptatae aliis dictionibus ad exprimendum earum genus, numerum vel casum. Et similiter in rhetorica articuli dicuntur quaedam partium coaptationes, dicit enim Tullius, in IV Rhet., quod articulus dicitur cum singula verba intervallis distinguuntur caesa oratione, hoc modo, acrimonia, voce, vultu adversarios perterruisti. Unde et credibilia fidei Christianae dicuntur per articulos distingui inquantum in quasdam partes dividuntur habentes aliquam coaptationem ad invicem. Est autem obiectum fidei aliquid non visum circa divina, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ubi occurrit aliquid speciali ratione non visum, ibi est specialis articulus, ubi autem multa secundum eandem rationem sunt incognita, ibi non sunt articuli distinguendi. Sicut aliam difficultatem habet ad videndum quod Deus sit passus, et aliam quod mortuus resurrexerit, et ideo distinguitur articulus resurrectionis ab articulo passionis. Sed quod sit passus, mortuus et sepultus, unam et eandem difficultatem habent, ita quod, uno suscepto, non est difficile alia suscipere, et propter hoc omnia haec pertinent ad unum articulum. | I answer that, the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek arthron [Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes." Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated above (Article 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua sunt credibilia de quibus est fides secundum se; aliqua vero sunt credibilia de quibus non est fides secundum se, sed solum in ordine ad alia, sicut etiam in aliis scientiis quaedam proponuntur ut per se intenta, et quaedam ad manifestationem aliorum. Quia vero fides principaliter est de his quae videnda speramus in patria, secundum illud Heb. XI, fides est substantia sperandarum rerum; ideo per se ad fidem pertinent illa quae directe nos ordinant ad vitam aeternam, sicut sunt tres personae, omnipotentia Dei, mysterium incarnationis Christi, et alia huiusmodi. Et secundum ista distinguuntur articuli fidei. Quaedam vero proponuntur in sacra Scriptura ut credenda non quasi principaliter intenta, sed ad praedictorum manifestationem, sicut quod Abraham habuit duos filios, quod ad tactum ossium Elisaei suscitatus est mortuus, et alia huiusmodi, quae narrantur in sacra Scriptura in ordine ad manifestationem divinae maiestatis vel incarnationis Christi. Et secundum talia non oportet articulos distinguere. | Reply to Objection 1. Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Hebrews 11:2: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct articles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio formalis obiecti fidei potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius rei creditae. Et sic ratio formalis omnium credibilium est una, scilicet veritas prima. Et ex hac parte articuli non distinguuntur. Alio modo potest accipi formalis ratio credibilium ex parte nostra. Et sic ratio formalis credibilis est ut sit non visum. Et ex hac parte articuli fidei distinguuntur, ut visum est. | Reply to Objection 2. The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa definitio datur de articulo magis secundum quandam etymologiam nominis prout habet derivationem Latinam, quam secundum eius veram significationem prout a Graeco derivatur. Unde non est magni ponderis. Potest tamen dici quod, licet ad credendum necessitate coactionis nullus arctetur, cum credere sit voluntarium; arctatur tamen necessitate finis, quia accedentem ad Deum oportet credere, et sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, ut apostolus dicit, Heb. XI. | Reply to Objection 3. This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and "without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 11:6). |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod articuli fidei non creverint secundum temporum successionem. Quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, fides est substantia sperandarum rerum. Sed omni tempore sunt eadem speranda. Ergo omni tempore sunt eadem credenda. | Objection 1. It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to be believed. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, in scientiis humanitus ordinatis per successionem temporum augmentum factum est propter defectum cognitionis in primis qui scientias invenerunt, ut patet per philosophum, in II Metaphys. Sed doctrina fidei non est inventa humanitus, sed tradita a Deo. Dei enim donum est, ut dicitur Ephes. II. Cum igitur in Deum nullus defectus scientiae cadat, videtur quod a principio cognitio credibilium fuerit perfecta, et quod non creverit secundum successionem temporum. | Objection 2. Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Ephesians 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, operatio gratiae non minus ordinate procedit quam operatio naturae. Sed natura semper initium sumit a perfectis ut Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol. Ergo etiam videtur quod operatio gratiae a perfectis initium sumpserit, ita quod illi qui primo tradiderunt fidem perfectissime eam cognoverunt. | Objection 3. Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut per apostolos ad nos fides Christi pervenit, ita etiam in veteri testamento per priores patres ad posteriores devenit cognitio fidei, secundum illud Deut. XXXII, interroga patrem tuum et annuntiabit tibi. Sed apostoli plenissime fuerunt instructi de mysteriis, acceperunt enim, sicut tempore prius, ita et ceteris abundantius, ut dicit Glossa, super illud Rom. VIII, nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes. Ergo videtur quod cognitio credibilium non creverit per temporum successionem. | Objection 4. Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to Deuteronomy 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as they received them earlier," as a gloss says on Romans 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod secundum incrementa temporum crevit scientia sanctorum patrum, et quanto viciniores adventui salvatoris fuerunt, tanto sacramenta salutis plenius perceperunt. | On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the mysteries of salvation." |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ita se habent in doctrina fidei articuli fidei sicut principia per se nota in doctrina quae per rationem naturalem habetur. In quibus principiis ordo quidam invenitur, ut quaedam in aliis implicite contineantur, sicut omnia principia reducuntur ad hoc sicut ad primum, impossibile est simul affirmare et negare, ut patet per philosophum, in IV Metaphys. Et similiter omnes articuli implicite continentur in aliquibus primis credibilibus, scilicet ut credatur Deus esse et providentiam habere circa hominum salutem, secundum illud ad Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est, et quod inquirentibus se remunerator sit. In esse enim divino includuntur omnia quae credimus in Deo aeternaliter existere, in quibus nostra beatitudo consistit, in fide autem providentiae includuntur omnia quae temporaliter a Deo dispensantur ad hominum salutem, quae sunt via in beatitudinem. Et per hunc etiam modum aliorum subsequentium articulorum quidam in aliis continentur, sicut in fide redemptionis humanae implicite continetur et incarnatio Christi et eius passio et omnia huiusmodi. Sic igitur dicendum est quod, quantum ad substantiam articulorum fidei, non est factum eorum augmentum per temporum successionem, quia quaecumque posteriores crediderunt continebantur in fide praecedentium patrum, licet implicite. Sed quantum ad explicationem, crevit numerus articulorum, quia quaedam explicite cognita sunt a posterioribus quae a prioribus non cognoscebantur explicite. Unde dominus Moysi dicit, Exod. VI, ego sum Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac, Deus Iacob, et nomen meum Adonai non indicavi eis. Et David dicit, super senes intellexi. Et apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. III, aliis generationibus non est agnitum mysterium Christi sicut nunc revelatum est sanctis apostolis eius et prophetis. | I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). On like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to Hebrews 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth. Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Exodus 6:2-3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [Vulgate: 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Psalm 118:100): "I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (Ephesians 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets." |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod semper fuerunt eadem speranda apud omnes. Quia tamen ad haec speranda homines non pervenerunt nisi per Christum, quanto a Christo fuerunt remotiores secundum tempus, tanto a consecutione sperandorum longinquiores, unde apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, iuxta fidem defuncti sunt omnes isti, non acceptis repromissionibus, sed a longe eas respicientes. Quanto autem aliquid a longinquioribus videtur, tanto minus distincte videtur. Et ideo bona speranda distinctius cognoverunt qui fuerunt adventui Christi vicini. | Reply to Objection 1. Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod profectus cognitionis dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, ex parte docentis, qui in cognitione proficit, sive unus sive plures, per temporum successionem. Et ista est ratio augmenti in scientiis per rationem humanam inventis. Alio modo, ex parte addiscentis, sicut magister qui novit totam artem non statim a principio tradit eam discipulo, quia capere non posset, sed paulatim, condescendens eius capacitati. Et hac ratione profecerunt homines in cognitione fidei per temporum successionem. Unde apostolus, ad Gal. III, comparat statum veteris testamenti pueritiae. | Reply to Objection 2. Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Galatians 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ad generationem naturalem duae causae praeexiguntur, scilicet agens et materia. Secundum igitur ordinem causae agentis, naturaliter prius est quod est perfectius, et sic natura a perfectis sumit exordium, quia imperfecta non ducuntur ad perfectionem nisi per aliqua perfecta praeexistentia. Secundum vero ordinem causae materialis, prius est quod est imperfectius, et secundum hoc natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum. In manifestatione autem fidei Deus est sicut agens, qui habet perfectam scientiam ab aeterno, homo autem est sicut materia recipiens influxum Dei agentis. Et ideo oportuit quod ab imperfectis ad perfectum procederet cognitio fidei in hominibus. Et licet in hominibus quidam se habuerint per modum causae agentis, quia fuerunt fidei doctores; tamen manifestatio spiritus datur talibus ad utilitatem communem, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XII. Et ideo tantum dabatur patribus qui erant instructores fidei de cognitione fidei, quantum oportebat pro tempore illo populo tradi vel nude vel in figura. | Reply to Objection 3. Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. On the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1 Corinthians 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ultima consummatio gratiae facta est per Christum, unde et tempus eius dicitur tempus plenitudinis, ad Gal. IV. Et ideo illi qui fuerunt propinquiores Christo vel ante, sicut Ioannes Baptista, vel post, sicut apostoli, plenius mysteria fidei cognoverunt. Quia et circa statum hominis hoc videmus, quod perfectio est in iuventute, et tanto habet homo perfectiorem statum vel ante vel post, quanto est iuventuti propinquior. | Reply to Objection 4. The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of fulness [Vulgate: 'fulness of time']" (Galatians 4:4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter articuli fidei enumerentur. Ea enim quae possunt ratione demonstrativa sciri non pertinent ad fidem ut apud omnes sint credibilia, sicut supra dictum est. Sed Deum esse unum potest esse scitum per demonstrationem, unde et philosophus hoc in XII Metaphys. probat, et multi alii philosophi ad hoc demonstrationes induxerunt. Ergo Deum esse unum non debet poni unus articulus fidei. | Objection 1. It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above (Article 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut de necessitate fidei est quod credamus Deum omnipotentem, ita etiam quod credamus eum omnia scientem et omnibus providentem; et circa utrumque eorum aliqui erraverunt. Debuit ergo inter articulos fidei fieri mentio de sapientia et providentia divina, sicut et de omnipotentia. | Objection 2. Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, eadem est notitia patris et filii, secundum illud Ioan. XIV, qui videt me videt et patrem. Ergo unus tantum articulus debet esse de patre et filio; et, eadem ratione, de spiritu sancto. | Objection 3. Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the Son, according to John 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 4 Praeterea, persona patris non est minor quam filii et spiritus sancti. Sed plures articuli ponuntur circa personam spiritus sancti, et similiter circa personam filii. Ergo plures articuli debent poni circa personam patris. | Objection 4. Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 5 Praeterea, sicuti personae patris et personae spiritus sancti aliquid appropriatur, ita et personae filii secundum divinitatem. Sed in articulis ponitur aliquod opus appropriatum patri, scilicet opus creationis; et similiter aliquod opus appropriatum spiritui sancto, scilicet quod locutus est per prophetas. Ergo etiam inter articulos fidei debet aliquod opus appropriari filio secundum divinitatem. | Objection 5. Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets." Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 arg. 6 Praeterea, sacramentum Eucharistiae specialem habet difficultatem prae multis articulis. Ergo de ea debuit poni specialis articulus. Non videtur ergo quod articuli sufficienter enumerentur. | Objection 6. Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there is not a sufficient number of articles. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 s. c. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Ecclesiae sic enumerantis. | On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the articles thus. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illa per se pertinent ad fidem quorum visione in vita aeterna perfruemur, et per quae ducemur in vitam aeternam. Duo autem nobis ibi videnda proponuntur, scilicet occultum divinitatis, cuius visio nos beatos facit; et mysterium humanitatis Christi, per quem in gloriam filiorum Dei accessum habemus, ut dicitur ad Rom. V. Unde dicitur Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum, et quem misisti Iesum Christum. Et ideo prima distinctio credibilium est quod quaedam pertinent ad maiestatem divinitatis; quaedam vero pertinent ad mysterium humanitatis Christi, quod est pietatis sacramentum, ut dicitur I ad Tim. III. Circa maiestatem autem divinitatis tria nobis credenda proponuntur. Primo quidem, unitas divinitatis, et ad hoc pertinet primus articulus. Secundo, Trinitas personarum, et de hoc sunt tres articuli secundum tres personas. Tertio vero proponuntur nobis opera divinitatis propria. Quorum primum pertinet ad esse naturae, et sic proponitur nobis articulus creationis. Secundum vero pertinet ad esse gratiae, et sic proponuntur nobis sub uno articulo omnia pertinentia ad sanctificationem humanam. Tertium vero pertinet ad esse gloriae, et sic ponitur alius articulus de resurrectione carnis et de vita aeterna. Et ita sunt septem articuli ad divinitatem pertinentes. Similiter etiam circa humanitatem Christi ponuntur septem articuli. Quorum primus est de incarnatione sive de conceptione Christi; secundus de nativitate eius ex virgine; tertius de passione eius et morte et sepultura; quartus est de descensu ad Inferos; quintus est de resurrectione; sextus de ascensione; septimus de adventu ad iudicium. Et sic in universo sunt quatuordecim. Quidam tamen distinguunt duodecim articulos fidei, sex pertinentes ad divinitatem et sex pertinentes ad humanitatem. Tres enim articulos trium personarum comprehendunt sub uno, quia eadem est cognitio trium personarum. Articulum vero de opere glorificationis distinguunt in duos, scilicet in resurrectionem carnis et gloriam animae. Similiter articulum conceptionis et nativitatis coniungunt in unum. | I answer that, As stated above (4,6), to faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons of God, according to Romans 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Timothy 3:16). Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead. In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles. Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multa per fidem tenemus de Deo quae naturali ratione investigare philosophi non potuerunt, puta circa providentiam eius et omnipotentiam, et quod ipse solus sit colendus. Quae omnia continentur sub articulo unitatis Dei. | Reply to Objection 1. By faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ipsum nomen divinitatis importat provisionem quandam, ut in primo libro dictum est. Potentia autem in habentibus intellectum non operatur nisi secundum voluntatem et cognitionem. Et ideo omnipotentia Dei includit quodammodo omnium scientiam et providentiam, non enim posset omnia quae vellet in istis inferioribus agere nisi ea cognosceret et eorum providentiam haberet. | Reply to Objection 2. The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in I, 13, 8. Now in beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence over them. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod patris et filii et spiritus sancti est una cognitio quantum ad unitatem essentiae, quae pertinet ad primum articulum. Quantum vero ad distinctionem personarum, quae est per relationes originis, quodammodo in cognitione patris includitur cognitio filii, non enim esset pater si filium non haberet, quorum nexus est spiritus sanctus. Et quantum ad hoc bene moti sunt qui posuerunt unum articulum trium personarum. Sed quia circa singulas personas sunt aliqua attendenda circa quae contingit esse errorem, quantum ad hoc de tribus personis possunt poni tres articuli. Arius enim credidit patrem omnipotentem et aeternum, sed non credidit filium coaequalem et consubstantialem patri, et ideo necessarium fuit apponere articulum de persona filii ad hoc determinandum. Et eadem ratione contra Macedonium necesse fuit ponere articulum tertium de persona spiritus sancti. Et similiter etiam conceptio Christi et nativitas, et etiam resurrectio et vita aeterna, secundum unam rationem possunt comprehendi sub uno articulo, inquantum ad unum ordinantur, et secundum aliam rationem possunt distingui, inquantum seorsum habent speciales difficultates. | Reply to Objection 3. We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. On like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. On the same way Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special difficulty. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod filio et spiritui sancto convenit mitti ad sanctificandam creaturam, circa quod plura credenda occurrunt. Et ideo circa personam filii et spiritus sancti plures articuli multiplicantur quam circa personam patris, qui nunquam mittitur, ut in primo dictum est. | Reply to Objection 4. It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we stated in I, 43, 4. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod sanctificatio creaturae per gratiam et consummatio per gloriam fit etiam per donum caritatis, quod appropriatur spiritui sancto, et per donum sapientiae, quod appropriatur filio. Et ideo utrumque opus pertinet et ad filium et ad spiritum sanctum per appropriationem secundum rationes diversas. | Reply to Objection 5. The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 8 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod in sacramento Eucharistiae duo possunt considerari. Unum scilicet quod sacramentum est, et hoc habet eandem rationem cum aliis effectibus gratiae sanctificantis. Aliud est quod miraculose ibi corpus Christi continetur, et sic concluditur sub omnipotentia, sicut et omnia alia miracula, quae omnipotentiae attribuuntur. | Reply to Objection 6. Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to God's almighty power. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter articuli fidei in symbolo ponantur. Sacra enim Scriptura est regula fidei, cui nec addere nec subtrahere licet, dicitur enim Deut. IV, non addetis ad verbum quod vobis loquor, neque auferetis ab eo. Ergo illicitum fuit aliquod symbolum constituere quasi regulam fidei, post sacram Scripturam editam. | Objection 1. It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Deuteronomy 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. IV, una est fides. Sed symbolum est professio fidei. Ergo inconvenienter traditur multiplex symbolum. | Objection 2. Further, according to the Apostle (Ephesians 4:5) there is but "one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, confessio fidei quae in symbolo continetur pertinet ad omnes fideles. Sed non omnibus fidelibus convenit credere in Deum, sed solum illis qui habent fidem formatam. Ergo inconvenienter symbolum fidei traditur sub hac forma verborum, credo in unum Deum. | Objection 3. Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: "I believe in one God." |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 arg. 4 Praeterea, descensus ad Inferos est unus de articulis fidei, sicut supra dictum est. Sed in symbolo patrum non fit mentio de descensu ad Inferos. Ergo videtur insufficienter collectum. | Objection 4. Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith, as stated above (Article 8). But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 arg. 5 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, exponens illud Ioan. XIV, creditis in Deum, et in me credite, Petro aut Paulo credimus, sed non dicimur credere nisi in Deum. Cum igitur Ecclesia Catholica sit pure aliquid creatum, videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur, in unam sanctam, Catholicam et apostolicam Ecclesiam. | Objection 5. Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says: "We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church." |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 arg. 6 Praeterea, symbolum ad hoc traditur ut sit regula fidei. Sed regula fidei debet omnibus proponi et publice. Quodlibet igitur symbolum deberet in Missa cantari, sicut symbolum patrum. Non videtur ergo esse conveniens editio articulorum fidei in symbolo. | Objection 6. Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a symbol. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ecclesia universalis non potest errare, quia spiritu sancto gubernatur, qui est spiritus veritatis, hoc enim promisit dominus discipulis, Ioan. XVI, dicens, cum venerit ille spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Sed symbolum est auctoritate universalis Ecclesiae editum. Nihil ergo inconveniens in eo continetur. | On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing defective. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere. Credere autem non potest aliquis nisi ei veritas quam credat proponatur. Et ideo necessarium fuit veritatem fidei in unum colligi, ut facilius posset omnibus proponi, ne aliquis per ignorantiam a fidei veritate deficeret. Et ab huiusmodi collectione sententiarum fidei nomen symboli est acceptum. | I answer that, As the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:6), "he that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of faith that the symbol [The Greek symballein] takes its name. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura diffuse continetur et variis modis, et in quibusdam obscure; ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex sacra Scriptura requiritur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenire omnes illi quibus necessarium est cognoscere fidei veritatem, quorum plerique, aliis negotiis occupati, studio vacare non possunt. Et ideo fuit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae Scripturae aliquid manifestum summarie colligeretur quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, sed potius ex sacra Scriptura assumptum. | Reply to Objection 1. The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in omnibus symbolis eadem fidei veritas docetur. Sed ibi oportet populum diligentius instrui de fidei veritate ubi errores insurgunt, ne fides simplicium per haereticos corrumpatur. Et haec fuit causa quare necesse fuit edere plura symbola. Quae in nullo alio differunt nisi quod in uno plenius explicantur quae in alio continentur implicite, secundum quod exigebat haereticorum instantia. | Reply to Objection 2. The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod confessio fidei traditur in symbolo quasi ex persona totius Ecclesiae, quae per fidem unitur. Fides autem Ecclesiae est fides formata, talis enim fides invenitur in omnibus illis qui sunt numero et merito de Ecclesia. Et ideo confessio fidei in symbolo traditur secundum quod convenit fidei formatae, ut etiam si qui fideles fidem formatam non habent, ad hanc formam pertingere studeant. | Reply to Objection 3. The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they should endeavor to acquire it. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod de descensu ad Inferos nullus error erat exortus apud haereticos, et ideo non fuit necessarium aliquam explicationem circa hoc fieri. Et propter hoc non reiteratur in symbolo patrum, sed supponitur tanquam praedeterminatum in symbolo apostolorum. Non enim symbolum sequens abolet praecedens, sed potius illud exponit, ut dictum est. | Reply to Objection 4. No error about the descent into hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2). |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, si dicatur in sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, est hoc intelligendum secundum quod fides nostra refertur ad spiritum sanctum, qui sanctificat Ecclesiam, ut sit sensus, credo in spiritum sanctum sanctificantem Ecclesiam. Sed melius est et secundum communiorem usum, ut non ponatur ibi in, sed simpliciter dicatur sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam, sicut etiam Leo Papa dicit. | Reply to Objection 5. If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 9 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod, quia symbolum patrum est declarativum symboli apostolorum, et etiam fuit conditum fide iam manifestata et Ecclesia pacem habente, propter hoc publice in Missa cantatur. Symbolum autem apostolorum, quod tempore persecutionis editum fuit, fide nondum publicata, occulte dicitur in prima et in completorio, quasi contra tenebras errorum praeteritorum et futurorum. | Reply to Objection 6. Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non pertineat ad summum pontificem fidei symbolum ordinare. Nova enim editio symboli necessaria est propter explicationem articulorum fidei, sicut dictum est. Sed in veteri testamento articuli fidei magis ac magis explicabantur secundum temporum successionem propter hoc quod veritas fidei magis manifestabatur secundum maiorem propinquitatem ad Christum, ut supra dictum est. Cessante ergo tali causa in nova lege, non debet fieri maior ac maior explicatio articulorum fidei. Ergo non videtur ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinere nova symboli editio. | Objection 1. It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above (Article 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above (Article 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est sub anathemate interdictum ab universali Ecclesia non subest potestati alicuius hominis. Sed nova symboli editio interdicta est sub anathemate auctoritate universalis Ecclesiae. Dicitur enim in gestis primae Ephesinae synodi quod, perlecto symbolo Nicaenae synodi, decrevit sancta synodus aliam fidem nulli licere proferre vel conscribere vel componere praeter definitam a sanctis patribus qui in Nicaea congregati sunt cum spiritu sancto, et subditur anathematis poena; et idem etiam reiteratur in gestis Chalcedonensis synodi. Ergo videtur quod non pertineat ad auctoritatem summi pontificis nova editio symboli. | Objection 2. Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first council of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this under pain of anathema. St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope. The same was repeated in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, Athanasius non fuit summus pontifex, sed Alexandrinus patriarcha. Et tamen symbolum constituit quod in Ecclesia cantatur. Ergo non magis videtur pertinere editio symboli ad summum pontificem quam ad alios. | Objection 3. Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod editio symboli facta est in synodo generali. Sed huiusmodi synodus auctoritate solius summi pontificis potest congregari, ut habetur in decretis, dist. XVII. Ergo editio symboli ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet. | On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, nova editio symboli necessaria est ad vitandum insurgentes errores. Ad illius ergo auctoritatem pertinet editio symboli ad cuius auctoritatem pertinet sententialiter determinare ea quae sunt fidei, ut ab omnibus inconcussa fide teneantur. Hoc autem pertinet ad auctoritatem summi pontificis, ad quem maiores et difficiliores Ecclesiae quaestiones referuntur ut dicitur in decretis, dist. XVII. Unde et dominus, Luc. XXII, Petro dixit, quem summum pontificem constituit, ego pro te rogavi, Petre, ut non deficiat fides tua, et tu aliquando conversus confirma fratres tuos. Et huius ratio est quia una fides debet esse totius Ecclesiae, secundum illud I ad Cor. I, idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata. Quod servari non posset nisi quaestio fidei de fide exorta determinaretur per eum qui toti Ecclesiae praeest, ut sic eius sententia a tota Ecclesia firmiter teneatur. Et ideo ad solam auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet nova editio symboli, sicut et omnia alia quae pertinent ad totam Ecclesiam, ut congregare synodum generalem et alia huiusmodi. | I answer that, As stated above (Objection 1), a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as stated in the Decretals [Dist. xvii, Can. 5. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Corinthians 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general council and so forth. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in doctrina Christi et apostolorum veritas fidei est sufficienter explicata. Sed quia perversi homines apostolicam doctrinam et ceteras Scripturas pervertunt ad sui ipsorum perditionem, sicut dicitur II Pet. ult.; ideo necessaria est, temporibus procedentibus, explanatio fidei contra insurgentes errores. | Reply to Objection 1. The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Peter 3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prohibitio et sententia synodi se extendit ad privatas personas, quarum non est determinare de fide. Non enim per huiusmodi sententiam synodi generalis ablata est potestas sequenti synodo novam editionem symboli facere, non quidem aliam fidem continentem, sed eandem magis expositam. Sic enim quaelibet synodus observavit, ut sequens synodus aliquid exponeret supra id quod praecedens synodus exposuerat, propter necessitatem alicuius haeresis insurgentis. Unde pertinet ad summum pontificem, cuius auctoritate synodus congregatur et eius sententia confirmatur. | Reply to Objection 2. This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed. |
| IIª-IIae q. 1 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Athanasius non composuit manifestationem fidei per modum symboli, sed magis per modum cuiusdam doctrinae, ut ex ipso modo loquendi apparet. Sed quia integram fidei veritatem eius doctrina breviter continebat, auctoritate summi pontificis est recepta, ut quasi regula fidei habeatur. | Reply to Objection 3. Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith. |
