Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q109
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| IIª-IIae q. 109 pr. Deinde considerandum est de veritate, et vitiis oppositis. Circa veritatem autem quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum veritas sit virtus. Secundo, utrum sit virtus specialis. Tertio, utrum sit pars iustitiae. Quarto, utrum magis declinet ad minus. | Question 109. Truth 1. Is truth a virtue? 2. Is it a special virtue? 3. Is it a part of justice? 4. Does it incline to that which is less? |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit virtus. Prima enim virtutum est fides, cuius obiectum est veritas. Cum igitur obiectum sit prius habitu et actu, videtur quod veritas non sit virtus, sed aliquid prius virtute. | Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., ad veritatem pertinet quod aliquis confiteatur existentia circa seipsum, et neque maiora neque minora. Sed hoc non semper est laudabile, neque in bonis, quia dicitur Prov. XXVII, laudet te alienus, et non os tuum; nec etiam in malis, quia contra quosdam dicitur Isaiae III, peccatum suum quasi Sodoma praedicaverunt, nec absconderunt. Ergo veritas non est virtus. | Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always praiseworthy--neither in good things, since according to Proverbs 27:2, "Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth"--nor even in evil things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Isaiah 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore truth is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omnis virtus aut est theologica, aut intellectualis, aut moralis. Sed veritas non est virtus theologica, quia non habet Deum pro obiecto, sed res temporales; dicit enim Tullius quod veritas est per quam immutata ea quae sunt aut fuerunt aut futura sunt, dicuntur. Similiter etiam non est virtus intellectualis, sed finis earum. Neque etiam est virtus moralis, quia non consistit in medio inter superfluum et diminutum; quanto enim aliquis plus dicit verum, tanto melius est. Ergo veritas non est virtus. | Objection 3. Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by "truth we faithfully represent things as they are were, or will be." Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in II et IV Ethic., ponit veritatem inter ceteras virtutes. | On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod veritas dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo secundum quod veritate aliquid dicitur verum. Et sic veritas non est virtus, sed obiectum vel finis virtutis. Sic enim accepta veritas non est habitus, quod est genus virtutis, sed aequalitas quaedam intellectus vel signi ad rem intellectam et significatam, vel etiam rei ad suam regulam, ut in primo habitum est. Alio modo potest dici veritas qua aliquis verum dicit, secundum quod per eam aliquis dicitur verax. Et talis veritas, sive veracitas, necesse est quod sit virtus, quia hoc ipsum quod est dicere verum est bonus actus; virtus autem est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. | I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in I, 16, 1; I, 21, 2. Secondly, truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good." |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de veritate primo modo dicta. | Reply to Objection 1. This argument takes truth in the first sense. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod confiteri id quod est circa seipsum, inquantum est confessio veri, est bonum ex genere. Sed hoc non sufficit ad hoc quod sit actus virtutis, sed ad hoc requiritur quod ulterius debitis circumstantiis vestiatur, quae si non observentur, erit actus vitiosus. Et secundum hoc, vitiosum est quod aliquis, sine debita causa, laudet seipsum etiam de vero. Vitiosum etiam est quod aliquis peccatum suum publicet, quasi se de hoc laudando, vel qualitercumque inutiliter manifestando. | Reply to Objection 2. To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one's sin, by praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui dicit verum profert aliqua signa conformia rebus, scilicet vel verba, vel aliqua facta exteriora, aut quascumque res exteriores. Circa huiusmodi autem res sunt solae virtutes morales, ad quas etiam usus pertinet exteriorum membrorum, secundum quod fit per imperium voluntatis. Unde veritas non est virtus theologica neque intellectualis, sed moralis. Est autem in medio inter superfluum et diminutum dupliciter, uno quidem modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo, ex parte actus. Ex parte quidem obiecti, quia verum secundum suam rationem importat quandam aequalitatem. Aequale autem est medium inter maius et minus. Unde ex hoc ipso quod aliquis verum dicit de seipso, medium tenet inter eum qui maiora dicit de seipso, et inter eum qui minora. Ex parte autem actus medium tenet, inquantum verum dicit quando oportet, et secundum quod oportet. Superfluum autem convenit illi qui importune ea quae sua sunt manifestat, defectus autem competit illi qui occultat, quando manifestare oportet. | Reply to Objection 3. A person who says what is true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known one's own affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit specialis virtus. Verum enim et bonum convertuntur. Sed bonitas non est specialis virtus, quinimmo omnis virtus est bonitas, quia bonum facit habentem. Ergo veritas non est specialis virtus. | Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because "it makes its possessor good." Therefore truth is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, manifestatio eius quod ad ipsum hominem pertinet, est actus veritatis de qua nunc loquimur. Sed hoc pertinet ad quamlibet virtutem, quilibet enim virtutis habitus manifestatur per proprium actum. Ergo veritas non est specialis virtus. | Objection 2. Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, veritas vitae dicitur qua aliquis recte vivit, de qua dicitur Isaiae XXXVIII, memento, quaeso, quomodo ambulaverim coram te in veritate et in corde perfecto. Sed qualibet virtute recte vivitur, ut patet per definitionem virtutis supra positam. Ergo veritas non est specialis virtus. | Objection 3. Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written (Isaiah 38:3): "I beseech Thee . . . remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart." Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above (I-II, 55, 4). Therefore truth is not a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, veritas videtur idem esse simplicitati, quia utrique opponitur simulatio. Sed simplicitas non est specialis virtus, quia facit intentionem rectam, quod requiritur in omni virtute. Ergo etiam veritas non est specialis virtus. | Objection 4. Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quia in II Ethic. connumeratur aliis virtutibus. | On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii, 7). |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad rationem virtutis humanae pertinet quod opus hominis bonum reddat. Unde ubi in actu hominis invenitur specialis ratio bonitatis, necesse est quod ad hoc disponatur homo per specialem virtutem. Cum autem bonum, secundum Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, consistat in ordine, necesse est specialem rationem boni considerari ex determinato ordine. Est autem specialis quidam ordo secundum quod exteriora nostra vel verba vel facta debite ordinantur ad aliquid sicut signum ad signatum. Et ad hoc perficitur homo per virtutem veritatis. Unde manifestum est quod veritas est specialis virtus. | I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man's deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a special virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum et bonum subiecto quidem convertuntur, quia omne verum est bonum, et omne bonum est verum. Sed secundum rationem, invicem se excedunt, sicut intellectus et voluntas invicem se includunt; nam intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et multa alia, et voluntas appetit ea quae pertinent ad intellectum, et multa alia. Unde verum, secundum rationem propriam, qua est perfectio intellectus, est quoddam particulare bonum, inquantum est appetibile quoddam. Et similiter bonum, secundum propriam rationem, prout est finis appetitus, est quoddam verum, inquantum est quoddam intelligibile. Quia ergo virtus includit rationem bonitatis, potest esse quod veritas sit specialis virtus, sicut verum est speciale bonum. Non autem potest esse quod bonitas sit specialis virtus, cum magis secundum rationem sit genus virtutis. | Reply to Objection 1. The true and the good are convertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the "true" considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the "good" considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be a special virtue, just as the "true" is a special good; yet it is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered logically, it is the genus of virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus virtutum et vitiorum sortiuntur speciem ex eo quod est per se intentum, non autem ab eo quod est per accidens et praeter intentionem. Quod autem aliquis manifestat quod circa ipsum est, pertinet quidem ad virtutem veritatis sicut per se intentum, ad alias autem virtutes potest pertinere ex consequenti, praeter principalem intentionem. Fortis enim intendit fortiter agere, quod autem fortiter agendo aliquis manifestet fortitudinem quam habet, hoc consequitur praeter eius principalem intentionem. | Reply to Objection 2. The habits of virtue and vice take their species from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod veritas vitae est veritas secundum quam aliquid est verum, non veritas secundum quam aliquis dicit verum. Dicitur autem vita vera, sicut etiam quaelibet alia res, ex hoc quod attingit suam regulam et mensuram, scilicet divinam legem, per cuius conformitatem rectitudinem habet. Et talis veritas, sive rectitudo, communis est ad quamlibet virtutem. | Reply to Objection 3. The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod simplicitas dicitur per oppositum duplicitati, qua scilicet aliquis aliud habet in corde, aliud ostendit exterius. Et sic simplicitas ad hanc virtutem pertinet. Facit autem intentionem rectam, non quidem directe, quia hoc pertinet ad omnem virtutem, sed excludendo duplicitatem, qua homo unum praetendit et aliud intendit. | Reply to Objection 4. Simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit pars iustitiae. Iustitiae enim proprium esse videtur quod reddat alteri debitum. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis verum dicit, non videtur alteri debitum reddere, sicut fit in omnibus praemissis iustitiae partibus. Ergo veritas non est iustitiae pars. | Objection 1. It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, veritas pertinet ad intellectum. Iustitia autem est in voluntate, ut supra habitum est. Ergo veritas non est pars iustitiae. | Objection 2. Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is in the will, as stated above (Question 58, Article 4). Therefore truth is not a part of justice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, triplex distinguitur veritas, secundum Hieronymum, scilicet veritas vitae, et veritas iustitiae, et veritas doctrinae. Sed nulla istarum est pars iustitiae. Nam veritas vitae continet in se omnem virtutem, ut dictum est. Veritas autem iustitiae est idem iustitiae, unde non est pars eius. Veritas autem doctrinae pertinet magis ad virtutes intellectuales. Ergo veritas nullo modo est pars iustitiae. | Objection 3. Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, "truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Tullius ponit veritatem inter partes iustitiae. | On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the parts of justice. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ex hoc aliqua virtus iustitiae annectitur sicut secundaria principali, quod partim quidem cum iustitia convenit, partim autem deficit ab eius perfecta ratione. Virtus autem veritatis convenit quidem cum iustitia in duobus. Uno quidem modo, in hoc quod est ad alterum. Manifestatio enim, quam diximus esse actum veritatis, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet ea quae circa ipsum sunt, unus homo alteri manifestat. Alio modo, inquantum iustitia aequalitatem quandam in rebus constituit. Et hoc etiam facit virtus veritatis, adaequat enim signa rebus existentibus circa ipsum. Deficit autem a propria ratione iustitiae quantum ad rationem debiti. Non enim haec virtus attendit debitum legale, quod attendit iustitia, sed potius debitum morale, inquantum scilicet ex honestate unus homo alteri debet veritatis manifestationem. Unde veritas est pars iustitiae, inquantum annectitur ei sicut virtus secundaria principali. | I answer that, As stated above (Article 80), a virtue is annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. On the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern himself. On the second place, justice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quia homo est animal sociale, naturaliter unus homo debet alteri id sine quo societas humana conservari non posset. Non autem possent homines ad invicem convivere nisi sibi invicem crederent, tanquam sibi invicem veritatem manifestantibus. Et ideo virtus veritatis aliquo modo attendit rationem debiti. | Reply to Objection 1. Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod veritas secundum quod est cognita, pertinet ad intellectum. Sed homo per propriam voluntatem, per quam utitur et habitibus et membris, profert exteriora signa ad veritatem manifestandam. Et secundum hoc, manifestatio veritatis est actus voluntatis. | Reply to Objection 2. Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod veritas de qua nunc loquimur, differt a veritate vitae ut dictum est. Veritas autem iustitiae dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa iustitia est rectitudo quaedam regulata secundum regulam divinae legis. Et secundum hoc, differt veritas iustitiae a veritate vitae, quia veritas vitae est secundum quam aliquis recte vivit in seipso; veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quam aliquis rectitudinem legis in iudiciis, quae sunt ad alterum, servat. Et secundum hoc, veritas iustitiae non pertinet ad veritatem de qua nunc loquimur, sicut nec veritas vitae. Alio modo potest intelligi veritas iustitiae secundum quod aliquis ex iustitia veritatem manifestat, puta cum aliquis in iudicio verum confitetur aut verum testimonium dicit. Et haec veritas est quidam particularis actus iustitiae. Et non pertinet directe ad hanc veritatem de qua nunc loquimur, quia scilicet in hac manifestatione veritatis principaliter homo intendit ius suum alteri reddere. Unde philosophus, in IV Ethic., de hac veritate determinans, dicit, non de veridico in confessionibus dicimus, neque quaecumque ad iustitiam vel iniustitiam contendunt. Veritas autem doctrinae consistit in quadam manifestatione verorum de quibus est scientia. Unde nec ista veritas directe pertinet ad hanc virtutem, sed solum veritas qua aliquis et vita et sermone talem se demonstrat qualis est, et non alia quam circa ipsum sint, nec maiora nec minora. Veruntamen quia vera scibilia, inquantum sunt a nobis cognita, circa nos sunt et ad nos pertinent; secundum hoc veritas doctrinae potest ad hanc virtutem pertinere, et quaecumque alia veritas qua quis manifestat verbo vel facto quod cognoscit. | Reply to Objection 3. The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding 2, ad 3. We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. On one way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. On another way the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned." The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus veritatis non declinet in minus. Sicut enim aliquis dicendo maius incurrit falsitatem, ita et dicendo minus, non enim magis est falsum quatuor esse quinque quam quatuor esse tria. Sed omne falsum est secundum se malum et fugiendum, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Ergo veritatis virtus non plus declinat in minus quam in maius. | Objection 1. It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to that which is greater. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, quod una virtus magis declinet ad unum extremum quam ad aliud, contingit ex hoc quod virtutis medium est propinquius uni extremo quam alteri, sicut fortitudo est propinquior audaciae quam timiditati. Sed veritatis medium non est propinquius uni extremo quam alteri, quia veritas, cum sit aequalitas quaedam, in medio punctali consistit. Ergo veritas non magis declinat in minus. | Objection 2. Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to that which is less. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, in minus videtur a veritate recedere qui veritatem negat, in maius autem qui veritati aliquid superaddit. Sed magis repugnat veritati qui veritatem negat quam qui superaddit, quia veritas non compatitur secum negationem veritatis, compatitur autem secum superadditionem. Ergo videtur quod veritas magis debeat declinare in maius quam in minus. | Objection 3. Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than to that which is less. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod homo secundum hanc virtutem magis a vero declinat in minus. | On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is less." |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod declinare in minus a veritate contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, affirmando, puta cum aliquis non manifestat totum bonum quod in ipso est, puta scientiam vel sanctitatem vel aliquid huiusmodi. Quod fit sine praeiudicio veritatis, quia in maiori est etiam minus. Et secundum hoc, haec virtus declinat in minus. Hoc enim, ut philosophus dicit ibidem, videtur esse prudentius, propter onerosas superabundantias esse. Homines enim qui maiora de seipsis dicunt quam sint, sunt aliis onerosi, quasi excellere alios volentes, homines autem qui minora de seipsis dicunt, gratiosi sunt, quasi aliis condescendentes per quandam moderationem. Unde apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. XII, si voluero gloriari, non ero insipiens, veritatem enim dicam. Parco autem, ne quis me existimet supra id quod videt in me, aut audit aliquid ex me. Alio modo potest aliquis declinare in minus negando, scilicet ut neget sibi inesse quod inest. Et sic non pertinet ad hanc virtutem declinare in minus, quia per hoc incurret falsum. Et tamen hoc ipsum esset minus repugnans virtuti, non quidem secundum propriam rationem veritatis, sed secundum rationem prudentiae, quam oportet salvari in omnibus virtutibus. Magis enim repugnat prudentiae, quia periculosius est et onerosius aliis, quod aliquis existimet vel iactet se habere quod non habet, quam quod non existimet, vel dicat se non habere quod habet. | I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), "this seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance." For those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:6): "Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me." Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that what is in us is not. On this way it does not belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one has. |
| IIª-IIae q. 109 a. 4 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. | This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. |
