Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q115

• Question 115.1 Flattery
• Question 115.2

Latin	English
IIª-IIae q. 115 pr. Deinde considerandum est de vitiis oppositis praedictae virtuti. Et primo, de adulatione; secundo, de litigio. Circa adulationem quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum adulatio sit peccatum. Secundo, utrum sit peccatum mortale.	Question 115. Flattery 1. Is flattery a sin? 2. Is it a mortal sin?
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adulatio non sit peccatum. Adulatio enim consistit in quodam sermone laudis alteri exhibito intentione placendi. Sed laudare aliquem non est malum, secundum illud Prov. ult., surrexerunt filii eius et beatissimam praedicaverunt, vir eius, et laudavit eam. Similiter etiam velle placere aliis non est malum, secundum illud I ad Cor. X, per omnia omnibus placeo. Ergo adulatio non est peccatum.	Objection 1. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Proverbs 31:28, "Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her." Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Corinthians 10:33, "I . . . in all things please all men." Therefore flattery is not a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, bono malum est contrarium, et similiter vituperium laudi. Sed vituperare malum non est peccatum. Ergo neque laudare bonum, quod videtur ad adulationem pertinere. Ergo adulatio non est peccatum.	Objection 2. Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, adulationi detractio contrariatur. Unde Gregorius dicit quod remedium contra adulationem est detractio. Sciendum est, inquit, quod ne immoderatis laudibus elevemur, plerumque nostri rectoris moderamine detractionibus lacerari permittimur, ut quos vox laudantis elevat, lingua detrahentis humiliet. Sed detractio est malum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo adulatio est bonum.	Objection 3. Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. "It must be observed," says he, "that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble." But detraction is an evil, as stated above (73, 2,3). Therefore flattery is a good.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod super illud Ezech. XIII, vae, qui consuunt pulvillos sub omni cubito manus, dicit Glossa, idest, suavem adulationem. Ergo adulatio est peccatum.	On the contrary, A gloss on Ezekiel 13:18, "Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow," says, "that is to say, sweet flattery." Therefore flattery is a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, amicitia praedicta, vel affabilitas, etsi principaliter delectare intendat eos quibus convivit, tamen, ubi necesse est propter aliquod bonum exequendum vel malum vitandum, non veretur contristare. Si ergo aliquis in omnibus velit ad delectationem alteri loqui, excedit modum in delectando, et ideo peccat per excessum. Et si quidem hoc faciat sola intentione delectandi, vocatur placidus, secundum philosophum, si autem hoc faciat intentione alicuius lucri consequendi, vocatur blanditor sive adulator. Communiter tamen nomen adulationis solet attribui omnibus qui supra debitum modum virtutis volunt alios verbis vel factis delectare in communi conversatione.	I answer that, As stated above (114, 1, ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be "complaisant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a "flatterer" or "adulator." As a rule, however, the term "flattery" is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod laudare aliquem contingit et bene et male, prout scilicet debitae circumstantiae vel servantur vel praetermittuntur. Si enim aliquis aliquem velit delectare laudando ut ex hoc eum consoletur ne in tribulationibus deficiat, vel etiam ut in bono proficere studeat, aliis debitis circumstantiis observatis, pertinebit hoc ad praedictam virtutem amicitiae. Pertinet autem ad adulationem si aliquis velit aliquem laudare in quibus non est laudandus, quia forte mala sunt, secundum illud, laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae; vel quia non sunt certa, secundum illud Eccli. XXVII, ante sermonem ne laudes virum, et iterum Eccli. XI, non laudes virum in specie sua; vel etiam si timeri possit ne humana laude ad inanem gloriam provocetur, unde dicitur Eccli. XI, ante mortem ne laudes hominem. Similiter etiam velle placere hominibus propter caritatem nutriendam, et ut in eis homo spiritualiter proficere possit, laudabile est. Quod autem aliquis velit placere hominibus propter inanem gloriam vel propter lucrum, vel etiam in malis, hoc esset peccatum, secundum illud Psalm., Deus dissipavit ossa eorum qui hominibus placent. Et apostolus dicit, ad Galat. I, si adhuc hominibus placerem, Christi servus non essem.	Reply to Objection 1. One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Psalm 9:24, "The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul"; or they may be uncertain, according to Sirach 27:8, "Praise not a man before he speaketh," and again (Sirach 11:2), "Praise not a man for his beauty"; or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written, (Sirach 11:30), "Praise not any man before death." Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to Psalm 52:6, "God hath scattered the bones of them that please men," and according to the words of the Apostle (Galatians 1:10), "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ."
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vituperare malum, si non adhibeantur debitae circumstantiae, est vitiosum. Et similiter laudare bonum.	Reply to Objection 2. Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet duo vitia esse contraria. Et ideo sicut detractio est malum, ita et adulatio. Quae ei contrariatur quantum ad ea quae dicuntur, non autem directe quantum ad finem, quia adulator quaerit delectationem eius cui adulatur; detractor autem non quaerit eius contristationem, cum aliquando occulte detrahat, sed magis quaerit eius infamiam.	Reply to Objection 3. Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adulatio sit peccatum mortale. Quia secundum Augustinum, in Enchirid., malum dicitur quia nocet. Sed adulatio maxime nocet, secundum illud Psalm., quoniam laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, et iniquus benedicitur, exacerbavit dominum peccator. Et Hieronymus dicit quod nihil est quod tam facile corrumpat mentes hominum quam adulatio. Et super illud Psalm., convertantur statim erubescentes, dicit Glossa, plus nocet lingua adulatoris quam gladius persecutoris. Ergo adulatio est gravissimum peccatum.	Objection 1. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), "a thing is evil because it is harmful." But flattery is most harmful, according to Psalm 9:24, "For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord." Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): "Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery": and a gloss on Psalm 69:4, "Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me: 'Tis well, 'Tis well," says: "The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor." Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque verbis alii nocet, non minus nocet sibi quam aliis, unde dicitur in Psalm., gladius eorum intret in corda ipsorum. Sed ille qui alteri adulatur, inducit eum ad peccandum mortaliter, unde super illud Psalm., oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum, dicit Glossa, falsa laus adulatoris mentes a rigore veritatis emollit ad noxia. Ergo multo magis adulator in se mortaliter peccat.	Objection 2. Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written (Psalm 36:15): "Let their sword enter into their own hearts." Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Psalm 140:5, "Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head," says: "The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive of vice." Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in decretis scribitur, dist. XLVI, clericus qui adulationibus et proditionibus vacare deprehenditur, degradetur ab officio. Sed talis poena non infligitur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo adulatio est peccatum mortale.	Objection 3. Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): "The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in Serm. de Purgat., inter peccata minuta numerat, si quis cuiquam maiori personae, aut ex voluntate aut ex necessitate, adulari voluerit.	On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity."
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum mortale est quod contrariatur caritati. Adulatio autem quandoque quidem caritati contrariatur, quandoque autem non. Contrariatur siquidem caritati tripliciter. Uno modo, ratione ipsius materiae, puta cum aliquis laudat alicuius peccatum. Hoc enim contrariatur dilectioni Dei, contra cuius iustitiam homo loquitur, et contra dilectionem proximi, quem in peccato fovet. Unde est peccatum mortale, secundum illud Isaiae V, vae, qui dicunt malum bonum. Alio modo, ratione intentionis, puta cum aliquis adulatur alicui ad hoc quod fraudulenter ei noceat, vel corporaliter vel spiritualiter. Et hoc etiam est peccatum mortale. Et de hoc habetur Prov. XXVII, meliora sunt vulnera diligentis quam fraudulenta odientis oscula. Tertio modo, per occasionem, sicut cum laus adulatoris fit alteri occasio peccandi, et praeter adulatoris intentionem. Et in hoc considerare oportet utrum sit occasio data vel accepta, et qualis ruina subsequatur, sicut potest patere ex his quae supra de scandalo dicta sunt. Si autem aliquis ex sola aviditate delectandi alios, vel etiam ad evitandum aliquod malum vel consequendum aliquid in necessitate, alicui adulatus fuerit, non est contra caritatem. Unde non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale.	I answer that, As stated above (Question 112, Article 2), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Isaiah 5:20. "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Proverbs 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. On this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal (43, 3,4). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritates illae loquuntur de adulatore qui laudat peccatum alicuius. Talis enim adulatio dicitur plus nocere quam gladius persecutoris, quia in potioribus bonis nocet, scilicet in spiritualibus. Non enim nocet ita efficaciter, quia gladius persecutoris effective occidit, quasi sufficiens causa mortis; nullus autem potest esse alteri sufficiens causa peccandi, ut ex supra dictis patet.	Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (43, 1, ad 3; I-II, 73, 8, ad 3; I-II, 80, 1).
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de eo qui adulatur intentione nocendi. Ille enim plus nocet sibi quam aliis, quia sibi nocet tanquam sufficiens causa peccandi, aliis autem occasionaliter tantum.	Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.
IIª-IIae q. 115 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de eo qui proditorie alteri adulatur ut eum decipiat.	Reply to Objection 3. The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.