Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q154

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IIª-IIae q. 154 pr. Deinde considerandum est de luxuriae partibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, de divisione partium luxuriae. Secundo, utrum fornicatio simplex sit peccatum mortale. Tertio, utrum sit maximum peccatorum. Quarto, utrum in tactibus et osculis et aliis huiusmodi illecebris consistat peccatum mortale. Quinto, utrum nocturna pollutio sit peccatum. Sexto, de stupro. Septimo, de raptu. Octavo, de adulterio. Nono, de incestu. Decimo, de sacrilegio. Undecimo, de peccato contra naturam. Duodecimo, de ordine gravitatis in praedictis speciebus. Question 154. The parts of Lust 1. Into what parts is lust divided? 2. Is simple fornication a mortal sin? 3. Is it the greatest of sins? 4. Is there mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction? 5. Is nocturnal pollution a mortal sin? 6. Seduction 7. Rape 8. Adultery 9. Incest 10. Sacrilege 11. The sin against nature 12. The order of gravity in the aforesaid sins
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur sex species luxuriae, scilicet, fornicatio simplex, adulterium, incestus, stuprum, raptus et vitium contra naturam. Diversitas enim materiae non diversificat speciem. Sed praedicta divisio sumitur secundum materiae diversitatem, prout scilicet aliquis commiscetur coniugatae, vel virgini, vel alterius conditionis mulieri. Ergo videtur quod per hoc species luxuriae non diversificentur. Objection 1. It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, "simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice." For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, species vitii unius non videntur diversificari per ea quae pertinent ad aliud vitium. Sed adulterium non differt a simplici fornicatione nisi in hoc quod aliquis accedit ad eam quae est alterius, et sic iniustitiam committit. Ergo videtur quod adulterium non debet poni species luxuriae. Objection 2. Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another's, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut contingit quod aliquis commiscetur mulieri quae est alteri viro per matrimonium obligata, ita etiam contingit quod aliquis commiscetur mulieri quae est obligata Deo per votum. Sicut ergo adulterium ponitur species luxuriae, ita et sacrilegium species luxuriae poni debet. Objection 3. Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, ille qui est matrimonio iunctus non solum peccat si ad aliam mulierem accedat, sed etiam si sua coniuge inordinate utatur. Sed hoc peccatum sub luxuria continetur. Ergo deberet inter species luxuriae computari. Objection 4. Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, apostolus, II ad Cor. XII, dicit, ne iterum, cum venero, humiliet me Deus apud vos, et lugeam multos ex his qui ante peccaverunt, et non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicatione et impudicitia quam gesserunt. Ergo videtur quod etiam immunditia et impudicitia debeant poni species luxuriae, sicut et fornicatio. Objection 5. Further, the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:21): "Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them that sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed." Therefore it seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 arg. 6 Praeterea, divisum non condividitur dividentibus. Sed luxuria condividitur praedictis, dicitur enim Galat. V, manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia, luxuria. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter fornicatio ponatur species luxuriae. Objection 6. Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written (Galatians 5:19): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: 'luxury']." Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod praedicta divisio ponitur in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I. On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccatum luxuriae consistit in hoc quod aliquis non secundum rectam rationem delectatione venerea utitur. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter, uno modo, secundum materiam in qua huiusmodi delectationem quaerit; alio modo, secundum quod, materia debita existente, non observantur aliae debitae conditiones. Et quia circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, non dat speciem actui morali, sed eius species sumitur ab obiecto, quod est materia actus; ideo oportuit species luxuriae assignari ex parte materiae vel obiecti. Quae quidem potest non convenire rationi rectae dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet repugnantiam ad finem venerei actus. Et sic, inquantum impeditur generatio prolis, est vitium contra naturam, quod est in omni actu venereo ex quo generatio sequi non potest. Inquantum autem impeditur debita educatio et promotio prolis natae, est fornicatio simplex, quae est soluti cum soluta. Alio modo materia in qua exercetur actus venereus, potest esse non conveniens rationi rectae per comparationem ad alios homines. Et hoc dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte ipsius feminae cui aliquis commiscetur, quia ei debitus honor non servatur. Et sic est incestus, qui consistit in abusu mulierum consanguinitate vel affinitate iunctarum. Secundo, ex parte eius in cuius potestate est femina. Quia si est in potestate viri, est adulterium, si autem est in potestate patris, est stuprum, si non inferatur violentia; raptus autem, si inferatur. Diversificantur autem istae species magis ex parte feminae quam viri. Quia in actu venereo femina se habet sicut patiens et per modum materiae, vir autem per modum agentis. Dictum est autem quod praedictae species secundum differentiam materiae assignantur. I answer that As stated above (Question 153, Article 3), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object. Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. On this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the "vice against nature," which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is "simple fornication," which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is "incest," which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is "adultery," if under the authority of her father, it is "seduction," in the absence of violence, and "rape" if violence be employed. These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (Objection 1) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod praedicta diversitas materiae habet annexam diversitatem formalem obiecti, quae accipitur secundum diversos modos repugnantiae ad rationem rectam, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet in eodem actu diversorum vitiorum deformitates concurrere, ut supra dictum est. Et hoc modo adulterium continetur sub luxuria et sub iniustitia. Nec deformitas iniustitiae omnino per accidens se habet ad luxuriam. Ostenditur enim luxuria gravior quae in tantum concupiscentiam sequitur quod etiam in iniustitiam ducat. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (I-II, 18, 07), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod mulier vovens continentiam quoddam spirituale matrimonium facit cum Deo. Et ideo sacrilegium quod committitur in violatione talis mulieris, est quoddam adulterium spirituale. Et similiter alii modi sacrilegii reducuntur ad alias species luxuriae. Reply to Objection 3. Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. On like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum coniugati cum sua uxore non est secundum indebitam materiam, sed secundum alias circumstantias quae non constituunt speciem moralis actus, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 4. The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above (I-II, 18, 2).
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut dicit Glossa ibidem, immunditia ponitur pro luxuria contra naturam. Impudicitia autem est quae fit cum liberis a viro, unde videtur ad stuprum pertinere. Vel potest dici quod impudicitia pertinet ad quosdam actus circumstantes actum venereum, sicut sunt oscula, tactus et alia huiusmodi. Reply to Objection 5. As a gloss says on this passage, "uncleanness" stands for lust against nature, while "lasciviousness" is a man's abuse of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that "lasciviousness" relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 1 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod luxuria sumitur ibidem pro quacumque superfluitate, ut Glossa ibidem dicit. Reply to Objection 6. According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there signifies any kind of excess.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fornicatio simplex non sit peccatum mortale. Ea enim quae simul connumerantur, videntur esse unius rationis. Sed fornicatio connumeratur quibusdam quae non sunt peccata mortalia, dicitur enim Act. XV, abstineatis vos ab immolatis simulacrorum, et sanguine et suffocato, et fornicatione; illorum autem usus non est peccatum mortale, secundum illud I ad Tim. IV, nihil reiiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur. Ergo fornicatio non est peccatum mortale. Objection 1. It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): "That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." But there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Timothy 4:4, "Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullum peccatum mortale cadit sub praecepto divino. Sed Osee I praecipitur a domino, vade, sume tibi uxorem fornicationum, et fac filios fornicationum. Ergo fornicatio non est peccatum mortale. Objection 2. Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (Hosea 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, nullum peccatum mortale in Scriptura sacra absque reprehensione commemoratur. Sed fornicatio simplex commemoratur in Scriptura in antiquis patribus sine reprehensione, sicut legitur Gen. XVI de Abraham quod accessit ad Agar, ancillam suam; et infra, XXX, legitur de Iacob quod accessit ad ancillas uxorum suarum Balam et Zelpham; et infra, XXXVIII, legitur quod Iudas accessit ad Thamar, quam aestimavit meretricem. Ergo fornicatio simplex non est peccatum mortale. Objection 3. Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (Genesis 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on (Genesis 30:5-9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again (Genesis 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati. Sed fornicatio simplex non contrariatur caritati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei, quia non est directe peccatum contra Deum; nec etiam quantum ad dilectionem proximi, quia per hoc homo nulli homini facit iniuriam. Ergo fornicatio simplex non est peccatum mortale. Objection 4. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale ducit in perditionem aeternam. Hoc autem non facit fornicatio simplex, quia super illud I ad Tim. IV, pietas ad omnia utilis est, dicit Glossa Ambrosii, omnis summa disciplinae Christianae in misericordia et pietate est. Quam aliquis sequens, si lubricum carnis patitur, sine dubio vapulabit, sed non peribit. Ergo fornicatio simplex non est peccatum mortale. Objection 5. Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose [The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Timothy 4:8, "Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish." Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Bon. Coniug., quod est cibus ad salutem corporis, hoc est concubitus ad salutem generis. Sed non omnis inordinatus usus ciborum est peccatum mortale. Ergo nec omnis inordinatus concubitus. Quod maxime videtur de fornicatione simplici, quae minima est inter species enumeratas. Objection 6. Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that "what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race." But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 s. c. 1 Sed contra est quod dicitur Tobiae IV, attende tibi ab omni fornicatione, et praeter uxorem tuam, non patiaris crimen scire. Crimen autem importat peccatum mortale. Ergo fornicatio, et omnis concubitus qui est praeter uxorem, est peccatum mortale. On the contrary, It is written (Tobit 4:13): "Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime." Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one's wife is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 s. c. 2 Praeterea, nihil excludit a regno Dei nisi peccatum mortale. Fornicatio autem excludit, ut patet per apostolum, Galat. V, ubi, praemissa fornicatione, et quibusdam aliis vitiis, subdit, qui talia agunt, regnum Dei non possidebunt. Ergo fornicatio simplex est peccatum mortale. Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God's kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Galatians 5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: "They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 s. c. 3 Praeterea, in decretis dicitur, XXII Caus., qu. I, nosse debent talem de periurio poenitentiam imponi debere qualem de adulterio et fornicatione, et de homicidio sponte commisso, et de ceteris criminalibus vitiis. Ergo fornicatio simplex est peccatum criminale, sive mortale. Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): "They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses." Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod absque omni dubio tenendum est quod fornicatio simplex sit peccatum mortale, non obstante quod Deut. XXIII, super illud, non erit meretrix etc., dicit Glossa, ad eas prohibet accedere quarum est venialis turpitudo. Non enim debet dici venialis, sed venalis, quod est proprium meretricum. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod peccatum mortale est omne peccatum quod committitur directe contra vitam hominis. Fornicatio autem simplex importat inordinationem quae vergit in nocumentum vitae eius qui est ex tali concubitu nasciturus. Videmus enim in omnibus animalibus in quibus ad educationem prolis requiritur cura maris et feminae, quod in eis non est vagus concubitus, sed maris ad certam feminam, unam vel plures, sicut patet in omnibus avibus. Secus autem est in animalibus in quibus sola femina sufficit ad educationem fetus in quibus est vagus concubitus, ut patet in canibus et aliis huiusmodi animalibus. Manifestum est autem quod ad educationem hominis non solum requiritur cura matris, a qua nutritur, sed multo magis cura patris, a quo est instruendus et defendendus, et in bonis tam interioribus quam exterioribus promovendus. Et ideo contra naturam hominis est quod utatur vago concubitu, sed oportet quod sit maris ad determinatam feminam, cum qua permaneat, non per modicum tempus, sed diu, vel etiam per totam vitam. Et inde est quod naturaliter est maribus in specie humana sollicitudo de certitudine prolis, quia eis imminet educatio prolis. Haec autem certitudo tolleretur si esset vagus concubitus. Haec autem determinatio certae feminae matrimonium vocatur. Et ideo dicitur esse de iure naturali. Sed quia concubitus ordinatur ad bonum commune totius humani generis; bona autem communia cadunt sub determinatione legis, ut supra habitum est, consequens est quod ista coniunctio maris ad feminam, quae matrimonium dicitur, lege aliqua determinetur. Qualiter autem sit apud nos determinatum, in tertia parte huius operis agetur, cum de matrimonii sacramento tractabitur. Unde, cum fornicatio sit concubitus vagus, utpote praeter matrimonium existens, est contra bonum prolis educandae. Et ideo est peccatum mortale. Nec obstat si aliquis fornicando aliquam cognoscens, sufficienter provideat proli de educatione. Quia id quod cadit sub legis determinatione, iudicatur secundum id quod communiter accidit, et non secundum id quod in aliquo casu potest accidere. I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37 on Deuteronomy 23:17, says: "This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial." For instead of "venial" it should be "venal," since such is the wanton's trade. On order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring's upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother's care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate. This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above (I-II, 90, 2), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (Supplement,050, seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin. Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fornicatio illis connumeratur, non quia habeat eandem rationem culpae cum aliis, sed quantum ad hoc, quod ex his quae ibi ponuntur similiter poterat dissidium generari inter Iudaeos et gentiles, et eorum unanimis consensus impediri. Quia apud gentiles fornicatio simplex non reputabatur illicita, propter corruptionem naturalis rationis, Iudaei autem, ex lege divina instructi, eam illicitam reputabant. Alia vero quae ibi ponuntur, Iudaei abominabantur propter consuetudinem legalis conversationis. Unde apostoli ea gentilibus interdixerunt, non quasi secundum se illicita, sed quasi Iudaeis abominabilia, ut etiam supra dictum est. Reply to Objection 1. Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above (I-II, 103, 4, ad 3).
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod fornicatio dicitur esse peccatum, inquantum est contra rationem rectam. Ratio autem hominis recta est secundum quod regulatur voluntate divina, quae est prima et summa regula. Et ideo quod homo facit ex voluntate Dei, eius praecepto obediens, non est contra rationem rectam, quamvis videatur esse contra communem ordinem rationis, sicut etiam non est contra naturam quod miraculose fit virtute divina, quamvis sit contra communem cursum naturae. Et ideo, sicut Abraham non peccavit filium innocentem volendo occidere, propter hoc quod obedivit Deo, quamvis hoc, secundum se consideratum, sit communiter contra rectitudinem rationis humanae; ita etiam Osee non peccavit fornicando ex praecepto divino. Nec talis concubitus proprie fornicatio debet dici, quamvis fornicatio nominetur referendo ad cursum communem. Unde Augustinus dicit, III Confess., cum Deus aliquid contra morem aut pactum quorumlibet iubet, etsi nunquam ibi factum est, faciendum est. Et postea subdit, sicut enim in potestatibus societatis humanae maior potestas minori ad obediendum praeponitur, ita Deus omnibus. Reply to Objection 2. Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man's reason is right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God's will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God's command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done"; and afterwards he adds: "For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Abraham et Iacob ad ancillas accesserunt non quasi fornicario concubitu, ut infra patebit, cum de matrimonio agetur. Iudam autem non est necessarium a peccato excusare, qui etiam auctor fuit venditionis Ioseph. Reply to Objection 3. Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony (Supplement,065, 5, ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod fornicatio simplex contrariatur dilectioni proximi quantum ad hoc, quod repugnat bono prolis nasciturae, ut ostensum est, dum scilicet dat operam generationi non secundum quod convenit proli nasciturae. Reply to Objection 4. Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod per opera pietatis ille qui lubricum carnis patitur liberatur a perditione aeterna, inquantum per huiusmodi opera disponitur ad hoc quod gratiam consequatur per quam poeniteat, et inquantum per huiusmodi opera satisfacit de lubrico carnis commisso. Non autem ita quod, si in lubrico carnis perseveret impoenitens usque ad mortem, per pietatis opera liberetur. Reply to Objection 5. A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum quod ex uno concubitu potest unus homo generari. Et ideo inordinatio concubitus, quae impedit bonum prolis nasciturae, ex ipso genere actus est peccatum mortale, et non solum ex inordinatione concupiscentiae. Ex una autem comestione non impeditur bonum totius vitae unius hominis, et ideo actus gulae ex suo genere non est peccatum mortale. Esset tamen si quis scienter cibum comederet qui totam conditionem vitae eius immutaret, sicut patet de Adam. Nec tamen fornicatio est minimum peccatorum quae sub luxuria continentur. Minus enim est concubitus cum uxore qui fit ex libidine. Reply to Objection 6. One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man's whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam. Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fornicatio sit gravissimum peccatum. Tanto enim videtur peccatum gravius, quanto ex maiori libidine procedit. Sed maxima libido est in fornicatione dicitur enim in Glossa, I ad Cor. VI, quod ardor libidinis in luxuria est maximus. Ergo videtur quod fornicatio sit gravissimum peccatum. Objection 1. It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Corinthians 7:9 says that the "flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust." Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in rem sibi magis coniunctam delinquit, sicut gravius peccat qui percutit patrem quam qui percutit extraneum. Sed sicut dicitur I Cor. VI, qui fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat, quod est homini coniunctissimum. Ergo videtur quod fornicatio sit gravissimum peccatum. Objection 2. Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1 Corinthians 6:18, "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body," which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, quanto aliquod bonum est maius, tanto peccatum quod contra illud committitur videtur esse gravius. Sed peccatum fornicationis videtur esse contra bonum totius humani generis, ut ex praedictis patet. Est etiam contra Christum, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, tollens membra Christi, faciam membra meretricis? Ergo fornicatio est gravissimum peccatum. Objection 3. Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6:15, "Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?" Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris culpae quam peccata spiritualia. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod gravitas peccati alicuius attendi potest dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum accidens. Secundum se quidem attenditur gravitas peccati ex ratione suae speciei, quae consideratur secundum bonum cui peccatum opponitur. Fornicatio autem est contra bonum hominis nascituri. Et ideo est gravius peccatum secundum speciem suam peccatis quae sunt contra bona exteriora, sicut est furtum et alia huiusmodi, minus autem peccatis quae sunt directe contra Deum, et peccato quod est contra vitam hominis iam nati, sicut est homicidium. I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod libido quae aggravat peccatum est quae consistit in inclinatione voluntatis. Libido autem quae est in appetitu sensitivo diminuit peccatum, quia quanto aliquis ex maiori passione impulsus peccat, tanto levius est peccatum. Et hoc modo in fornicatione libido est maxima. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de agone Christiano, quod inter omnia Christianorum certamina, duriora sunt praelia castitatis, ubi est quotidiana pugna, sed rara victoria. Et Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod magis per carnis luxuriam humanum genus subditur Diabolo quam per aliquod aliud, quia scilicet difficilius est vincere vehementiam huius passionis. Reply to Objection 1. The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui fornicatur dicitur peccare in corpus suum, non solum quia fornicationis delectatio consummatur in carne, quod etiam in gula accidit, sed etiam quia contra bonum proprii corporis agit qui fornicatur, inquantum scilicet indebite illud resolvit et inquinat, et alteri commiscet. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod fornicatio sit peccatum gravissimum, quia ratio in homine praevalet corpori; unde, si sit peccatum magis repugnans rationi, gravius erit. Reply to Objection 2. The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum fornicationis est contra bonum speciei humanae inquantum impedit generationem singularem unius hominis nascituri. Magis autem pertingit ad rationem speciei qui actu iam participat speciem quam qui est potentia homo. Et secundum hoc etiam homicidium est gravius quam fornicatio et omnes luxuriae species, tanquam magis bono speciei humanae repugnans. Bonum etiam divinum est maius bono speciei humanae. Et ideo etiam peccata quae sunt contra Deum, sunt maiora. Nec fornicatio est directe peccatum in Deum, quasi fornicator Dei offensam intendat, sed ex consequenti, sicut et omnia peccata mortalia. Sicut enim membra corporis nostri sunt membra Christi, ita etiam et spiritus noster est unum cum Christo, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Unde etiam peccata spiritualia sunt magis contra Christum quam fornicatio. Reply to Objection 3. The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Corinthians 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in tactibus et osculis non consistat peccatum mortale. Apostolus enim, ad Ephes. V, dicit, fornicatio autem et omnis immunditia, aut avaritia, ne nominetur in vobis, sicut decet sanctos. Subdit autem, aut turpitudo, Glossa, ut in osculis et amplexibus; aut stultiloquium, ut blanda verba; aut scurrilitas, quae a stultis curialitas dicitur, idest iocularitas. Postea autem subdit, hoc enim scitote, intelligentes, quod omnis fornicator aut immundus aut avarus, quod est idolorum servitus, non habet haereditatem in regno Christi et Dei, ubi non replicat de turpitudine, sicut nec de stultiloquio aut scurrilitate. Ergo ista non sunt peccata mortalia. Objection 1. It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Ephesians 5:3): "Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints," then he adds: "Or obscenity" (which a gloss refers to "kissing and fondling"), "or foolish talking" (as "soft speeches"), "or scurrility" (which "fools call geniality--i.e. jocularity"), and afterwards he continues (Ephesians 5:5): "For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God," thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, fornicatio dicitur esse peccatum mortale ex hoc quod per eam impeditur bonum prolis generandae et educandae. Sed ad hoc nihil operantur oscula et tactus, sive amplexus. Ergo in his non contingit esse peccatum mortale. Objection 2. Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child's begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, illa quae sunt secundum se peccata mortalia, nunquam possunt bene fieri. Sed oscula et tactus et huiusmodi possunt quandoque fieri absque peccato. Ergo non sunt secundum se peccata mortalia. Objection 3. Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 s. c. 1 Sed contra, minus est aspectus libidinosus quam tactus, amplexus vel osculum. Sed aspectus libidinosus est peccatum mortale, secundum illud Matth. V, qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo. Ergo multo magis osculum libidinosum, et alia huiusmodi, sunt peccata mortalia. On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to Matthew 5:28, "Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 s. c. 2 Praeterea, Cyprianus, ad Pomponium de virginitate, dicit, certe ipse concubitus, ipse amplexus, ipsa confabulatio et osculatio, et coniacentium duorum turpis et foeda dormitio, quantum dedecoris et criminis confitentur. Ergo per praedicta homo fit reus criminis, idest peccati mortalis. Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), "By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime." Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse peccatum mortale dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum speciem suam. Et hoc modo osculum, amplexus vel tactus, secundum suam rationem non nominant peccatum mortale. Possunt enim haec absque libidine fieri, vel propter consuetudinem patriae, vel propter aliquam necessitatem aut rationabilem causam. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse peccatum mortale ex sua causa, sicut ille qui dat eleemosynam ut aliquem inducat ad haeresim, mortaliter peccat propter intentionem corruptam. Dictum est autem supra quod consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis est peccatum mortale, et non solum consensus in actum. Et ideo, cum fornicatio sit peccatum mortale, et multo magis aliae luxuriae species, consequens est quod consensus in delectationem talis peccati sit peccatum mortale, et non solum consensus in actum. Et ideo, cum oscula et amplexus et huiusmodi propter delectationem huiusmodi fiant, consequens est quod sint peccata mortalia. Et sic solum dicuntur libidinosa. Unde huiusmodi, secundum quod libidinosa sunt, sunt peccata mortalia. I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one's country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above (I-II, 74, 8), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin. Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ideo non resumit illa tria, quia non habent rationem peccati nisi secundum quod ordinantur ad praecedentia. Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod oscula et tactus, quamvis secundum se non impediant bonum prolis humanae, procedunt tamen ex libidine, quae est radix huius impedimenti. Et ex hoc habent rationem peccati mortalis. Reply to Objection 2. Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod huiusmodi non sunt peccata secundum suam speciem. Reply to Objection 3. This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nocturna pollutio sit peccatum. Meritum enim et demeritum habent fieri circa idem. Sed dormiens potest mereri, sicut patet de Salomone, qui dormiens a domino donum sapientiae impetravit, ut dicitur III Reg. III, et II Paralip. I. Ergo in dormiendo potest aliquis demereri. Et ita videtur quod nocturna pollutio sit peccatum. Objection 1. It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (1 Samuel 3:5). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque habet usum rationis, potest peccare. Sed in dormiendo aliquis habet usum rationis, quia frequenter aliquis in somnis ratiocinatur, et praeeligit unum alteri, consentiens vel dissentiens. Ergo in dormiendo potest aliquis peccare. Et ita propter somnum nocturna pollutio non impeditur quin sit peccatum, cum ex genere actus sit peccatum. Objection 2. Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, frustra increpatur et instruitur qui non potest vel agere secundum rationem vel contra rationem. Sed homo in somnis instruitur a Deo et increpatur, secundum illud Iob XXXIII, per somnium, in visione nocturna, quando sopor solet occupare homines, tunc aperit aures virorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplina. Ergo in somnis potest aliquis agere secundum rationem vel contra rationem, quod est bene agere vel peccare. Et sic videtur quod pollutio nocturna sit peccatum. Objection 3. Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15-16, "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [Vulgate: 'When deep sleep falleth upon men.' St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above, 95, 6, Objection 1 . . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn." Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ipsa phantasia quae fit in cogitatione sermocinantis, cum expressa fuerit in visione somniantis, ut inter illam et veram coniunctionem corporum non discernatur, continue movetur caro et sequitur quod eum motum sequi solet, cum hoc tam sine peccato fiat, quam sine peccato a vigilantibus dicitur quod, ut diceretur, sine dubio cogitatum est. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): "When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nocturna pollutio dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum se. Et hoc modo non habet rationem peccati. Omne enim peccatum dependet ex iudicio rationis, quia etiam primus motus sensualitatis non habet quod sit peccatum nisi inquantum iudicio rationis reprimi potest. Et ideo, sublato iudicio rationis, tollitur ratio peccati. In dormiendo autem ratio non habet liberum iudicium, nullus enim est dormiens qui non intendat aliquibus similitudinibus phantasmatum velut rebus ipsis, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Et ideo id quod agit homo dormiens, qui non habet liberum iudicium rationis, non imputatur ei ad culpam, sicut nec illud quod agit furiosus aut amens. Alio modo potest considerari nocturna pollutio per comparationem ad suam causam. Quae potest esse triplex. Una quidem corporalis. Cum enim humor seminalis superabundat in corpore; vel cum facta est humoris resolutio, vel per nimiam calefactionem corporis, vel per quamcumque aliam commotionem; somniat dormiens ea quae pertinent ad expulsionem huiusmodi humoris abundantis vel resoluti, sicut etiam accidit quando natura gravatur ex aliqua alia superfluitate; ita quod quandoque formantur in imaginatione phantasmata pertinentia ad emissionem talium superfluitatum. Si igitur superabundantia talis humoris sit ex causa culpabili, puta cum est ex superfluitate cibi vel potus; tunc nocturna pollutio habet rationem culpae ex sua causa. Si autem superabundantia vel resolutio talis humoris non sit ex aliqua causa culpabili, tunc nocturna pollutio non est culpabilis, nec in se nec in causa sua. Alia vero causa nocturnae pollutionis potest esse animalis interior, puta cum ex cogitatione praecedenti contingit aliquem dormientem pollui. Cogitatio autem quae in vigilia praecessit, quandoque est pure speculativa, puta cum aliquis causa disputationis cogitat de peccatis carnalibus, quandoque autem est cum aliqua affectione vel concupiscentiae vel horroris. Contingit autem magis pollutio nocturna ex cogitatione carnalium vitiorum quae fuit cum concupiscentia talium delectationum, quia ex hoc remanet quoddam vestigium et inclinatio in anima, ita quod dormiens facilius inducitur in sua imaginatione ad assentiendum actibus ex quibus sequitur pollutio. Secundum hoc philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod inquantum paulatim pertranseunt quidam motus a vigilantibus ad dormientes, meliora fiunt phantasmata studiosorum quam quorumlibet, et Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod propter bonam animae affectionem, quaedam eius merita etiam in somnis clarent. Et sic patet quod nocturna pollutio habet rationem culpae ex parte suae causae. Quandoque tamen contingit quod ex praecedenti cogitatione carnalium actuum etiam speculativa, vel si sit cum horrore, sequitur in somnis pollutio. Et tunc non habet rationem culpae, nec in se nec in sua causa. Tertia vero causa est spiritualis extrinseca, puta cum ex operatione Daemonis commoventur phantasmata dormientis in ordine ad talem effectum. Et hoc quidem quandoque est cum peccato praecedenti, scilicet negligentia praeparandi se contra Daemonis illusiones, unde et in sero cantatur, hostemque nostrum comprime, ne polluantur corpora. Quandoque vero est absque omni culpa hominis, ex sola nequitia Daemonis, sicut in collationibus patrum legitur de quodam quod semper in diebus festis pollutionem nocturnam patiebatur, hoc Diabolo procurante, ut impediretur a sacra communione. Sic igitur patet quod nocturna pollutio nunquam est peccatum, quandoque tamen est sequela peccati praecedentis. I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason's judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in I, 84, 8, ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason's judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile. Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause. A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause. The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know" [Translation W. K. Blount]. On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Salomon non meruit in dormiendo sapientiam a Deo, sed fuit signum praecedentis desiderii, propter quod dicitur talis petitio Deo placuisse, ut Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt. Reply to Objection 1. Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (1 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum quod vires sensitivae interiores magis vel minus opprimuntur a somno, propter vaporis turbulentiam vel puritatem, secundum hoc usus rationis magis vel minus impeditur in dormiendo. Semper tamen quantum ad aliquid impeditur, ut non possit omnino liberum iudicium habere, ut in prima parte dictum est. Et ideo non imputatur ei ad culpam quod tunc agit. Reply to Objection 2. The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in I, 84, 8, ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod apprehensio rationis non ita impeditur in somno sicut eius iudicium, quod perficitur per conversionem ad sensibilia, quae sunt prima principia cognitionis humanae. Et ideo nihil prohibet hominem secundum rationem apprehendere aliquid de novo in dormiendo, vel ex ipsis reliquiis praecedentium cogitationum et phantasmatibus oblatis, vel etiam ex revelatione divina, aut immissione Angeli boni vel mali. Reply to Objection 3. Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod stuprum non debeat poni una species luxuriae. Stuprum enim importat illicitam virginum deflorationem; ut habetur in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I. Sed hoc potest esse soluti cum soluta, quod pertinet ad fornicationem. Ergo stuprum non debet poni species luxuriae a fornicatione distincta. Objection 1. It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, Ambrosius dicit, in libro de patriarchis, nemo sibi blandiatur de legibus hominum, omne stuprum adulterium est. Sed specierum ex opposito divisarum una non continetur sub alia. Cum ergo adulterium ponatur species luxuriae, videtur quod stuprum species luxuriae poni non debet. Objection 2. Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [De Abraham i, 4): "Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, inferre alicui iniuriam videtur magis ad iniustitiam quam ad luxuriam pertinere. Sed ille qui stuprum committit, iniuriam facit alteri, scilicet patri puellae quam corrumpit, qui potest ad animum suam iniuriam revocare, et agere actione iniuriarum contra stupratorem. Ergo stuprum non debet poni species luxuriae. Objection 3. Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal to himself" [Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod stuprum proprie consistit in actu venereo quo virgo defloratur. Cum igitur luxuria proprie sit circa venerea, videtur quod stuprum sit species luxuriae. On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ubi circa materiam alicuius vitii occurrit aliqua specialis deformitas, ibi debet poni determinata species illius vitii. Luxuria autem est peccatum circa venerea existens, ut supra dictum est. In virgine autem sub custodia patris existente quaedam deformitas specialis occurrit si corrumpatur. Tum ex parte puellae, quae, ex hoc quod violatur, nulla pactione coniugali praecedente, impeditur a legitimo matrimonio consequendo et ponitur in via meretricandi, a quo retrahebatur ne signaculum virginitatis amitteret. Tum etiam ex parte patris, qui de eius custodia sollicitudinem gerit, secundum illud Eccli. XLII, super filiam luxuriosam confirma custodiam, nequando faciat te in opprobrium venire inimicis. Et ideo manifestum est quod stuprum, quod importat illicitam virginum deflorationem sub cura parentum existentium, est determinate luxuriae species. I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above (Question 153, Article 1). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father's care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Sirach 42:11, "Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies." Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quamvis virgo sit soluta a vinculo matrimoniali, non tamen est soluta a patria potestate. Habet etiam speciale impedimentum fornicarii concubitus virginitatis signum, quod non debet nisi per matrimonium auferri. Unde stuprum non est fornicatio simplex, sed concubitus qui fit cum meretricibus, idest mulieribus iam corruptis, ut patet per Glossam, II ad Cor. XII, super illud, qui non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicatione et cetera. Reply to Objection 1. Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father's power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Corinthians 12, "And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication," etc.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod Ambrosius ibi aliter accipit stuprum, prout scilicet communiter sumitur pro omni peccato luxuriae. Unde stuprum ibi nominat concubitum viri coniugati cum quacumque alia muliere praeter uxorem. Quod patet ex hoc quod subdit, nec viro licet quod mulieri non licet. Et hoc modo etiam accipitur Num. V, ubi dicitur, si latet adulterium, et testibus argui non potest, quia non est inventa in stupro, et cetera. Reply to Objection 2. Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: "Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not." On this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Numbers 5:13: "If [Vulgate: 'But'] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery [stupro]."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum peccatum ex adiunctione alterius deformius fieri. Fit autem deformius peccatum luxuriae ex peccato iniustitiae, quia videtur concupiscentia esse inordinatior quae a delectabili non abstinet ut iniuriam vitet. Habet autem duplicem iniuriam annexam. Unam quidem ex parte virginis, quam etsi non vi corrumpat, tamen eam seducit; et sic tenetur ei satisfacere. Unde dicitur Exod. XXII, si seduxerit quis virginem nondum desponsatam, dormieritque cum ea, dotabit eam, et habebit uxorem. Si autem pater virginis dare noluerit, reddet pecuniam iuxta modum dotis quam virgines accipere consueverunt. Aliam vero iniuriam facit patri puellae. Unde et ei secundum legem tenetur ad poenam. Dicitur enim Deut. XXII, si invenerit vir puellam virginem, quae non habet sponsum, et apprehendens concubuerit cum illa, et res ad iudicium venerit, dabit qui dormivit cum ea patri puellae quinquaginta siclos argenti, et habebit eam uxorem, et quia humiliavit illam, non poterit dimittere eam cunctis diebus vitae suae. Et hoc ideo, ne videatur ludibrium fecisse, ut Augustinus dicit. Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. On fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Exodus 22:16-17): "If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid's father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive." The other injury is done to the maid's father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Deuteronomy 22:28-29): "If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life": and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes. [QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod raptus non sit species luxuriae distincta a stupro. Dicit enim Isidorus, in libro Etymol., quod stuprum, idest raptus, proprie est illicitus coitus, a corrumpendo dictus, unde et qui raptu potitur, stupro fruitur. Ergo videtur quod raptus non debeat poni species luxuriae distincta a stupro. Objection 1. It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that "seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer." Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from seduction.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, raptus videtur quandam violentiam importare, dicitur enim in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I, quod raptus committitur cum puella violenter a domo patris abducitur, ut, corrupta, in uxorem habeatur. Sed hoc quod violentia alicui inferatur, per accidens se habet ad luxuriam, quae per se respicit delectationem concubitus. Ergo videtur quod raptus non debeat poni determinata species luxuriae. Objection 2. Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father's house that after being violated she may be taken to wife." But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, peccatum luxuriae per matrimonium cohibetur, dicitur enim I ad Cor. VII, propter fornicationem, unusquisque suam habeat. Sed raptus impedit matrimonium sequens, dicitur enim in Concilio Meldensi, placuit ut hi qui rapiunt feminas, vel furantur vel seducunt, eas nullatenus habeant uxores, quamvis eas postmodum nuptialiter cum consensu parentum suorum susceperint. Ergo raptus non est determinata species luxuriae a stupro distincta. Objection 3. Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written (1 Corinthians 7:2): "For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife." Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: "We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents." Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, aliquis potest cognoscere suam sponsam absque peccato luxuriae. Sed raptus potest committi si aliquis violenter sponsam suam auferat de domo parentum et eam carnaliter cognoscat. Ergo raptus non debet poni determinata species luxuriae. Objection 4. Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents' house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod raptus est illicitus coitus, ut Isidorus dicit. Sed hoc pertinet ad peccatum luxuriae. Ergo raptus est species luxuriae. On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod raptus, prout nunc de eo loquimur, est species luxuriae. Et quandoque quidem in idem concurrit cum stupro; quandoque autem invenitur raptus sine stupro; quandoque vero stuprum sine raptu. Concurrunt quidem in idem, quando aliquis violentiam infert ad virginem illicite deflorandam. Quae quidem violentia quandoque infertur tam ipsi virgini quam patri, quandoque autem infertur patri, sed non virgini, puta cum ipsa consentit ut per violentiam de domo patris abstrahatur. Differt etiam violentia raptus alio modo, quia quandoque puella violenter abducitur a domo parentum et violenter corrumpitur; quandoque autem, etsi violenter abducatur, non tamen violenter corrumpitur, sed de voluntate virginis, sive corrumpatur fornicario concubitu, sive matrimoniali. Qualitercumque enim violentia adsit, salvatur ratio raptus. Invenitur autem raptus sine stupro, puta si aliquis rapiat viduam vel puellam corruptam. Unde Symmachus Papa dicit, raptores viduarum vel virginum, ob immanitatem facinoris tanti, detestamur. Stuprum vero sine raptu invenitur, quando aliquis absque violentiae illatione virginem illicite deflorat. I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape. They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father's house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents' house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2, "We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime." There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia raptus plerumque cum stupro in idem concurrit, ideo quandoque unum pro alio ponitur. Reply to Objection 1. Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod illatio violentiae videtur procedere ex magnitudine concupiscentiae, ex qua aliquis non refugit periculo se iniicere violentiae inferendae. Reply to Objection 2. The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliter est dicendum in raptu puellarum quae sunt aliis desponsatae, et aliter de raptu illarum quae non sunt aliis desponsatae. Illae enim quae sunt aliis desponsatae restituendae sunt sponsis, qui in eis ex ipsa desponsatione ius habent. Illae autem quae non sunt aliis desponsatae, restituendae sunt primo patriae potestati, et tunc, de voluntate parentum, licite possunt eas in uxores accipere. Si tamen aliter fiat, illicite matrimonium contrahitur, tenetur enim quicumque rem rapit ad eius restitutionem. Nec tamen raptus dirimit matrimonium iam contractum, etsi impediat contrahendum. Quod autem dicitur in praedicto Concilio, dictum est in detestationem illius criminis, et est abrogatum. Unde Hieronymus contrarium dicit. Tria, inquit, legitima coniugia in Scripturis leguntur. Primum est, virgo casta in virginitate viro data legitime. Secundum est, virgo in civitate deprehensa a viro et illi per vim copulata, si voluerit pater eius, dotabit eam iste vir quantum iudicaverit pater, et dabit pretium pudicitiae eius. Tertium autem est, quando aufertur ei et alteri traditur de voluntate patris. Vel potest intelligi de illis quae sunt aliis desponsatae, et maxime per verba de praesenti. Reply to Objection 3. The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father's care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents' consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2 declares the contrary: "Three kinds of lawful marriage," says he, "are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father's estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [Cf. Deuteronomy 22:23-29. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father's will." We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod sponsus ex ipsa desponsatione habet aliquod ius in sua sponsa. Et ideo, quamvis peccet violentiam inferendo, excusatur tamen a crimine raptus. Unde Gelasius Papa dicit, lex illa praeteritorum principum ibi raptum dixit esse commissum, ubi puella de cuius nuptiis nihil actum fuerat, videbatur abducta. Reply to Objection 4. The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says [Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: "This law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod adulterium non sit determinata species luxuriae ab aliis distincta. Dicitur enim adulterium ex eo quod aliquis ad alteram accedit praeter suam, sicut dicit quaedam Glossa super Exodum. Sed alia mulier praeter suam potest esse diversarum conditionum, scilicet vel virgo in potestate patris existens, vel meretrix, vel cuiuscumque alterius conditionis. Ergo videtur quod adulterium non sit species luxuriae ab aliis distincta. Objection 1. It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse "with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram]," according to a gloss [St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on Exodus 20:14. Now a woman who is not one's own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father's care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod nihil interest ex qua causa quis insaniat. Unde Sixtus Pythagoricus, adulter, inquit, est amator ardentior in suam uxorem. Et pari ratione, in quamlibet aliam mulierem. Sed in omni luxuria est amor ardentior debito. Ergo adulterium invenitur in omni luxuria. Non ergo debet poni luxuriae species. Objection 2. Further, Jerome says [Contra Jovin. i]: "It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer," and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, ubi est eadem ratio deformitatis, ibi non videtur esse alia species peccati. Sed in stupro et adulterio videtur esse eadem ratio deformitatis, quia utrobique violatur mulier alienae potestati subiecta. Ergo adulterium non est determinata species luxuriae ab aliis distincta. Objection 3. Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person's authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod Leo Papa dicit quod adulterium committitur cum, propriae libidinis instinctu vel alienae consensu, cum altero vel altera contra pactum coniugale concumbitur. Sed hoc importat specialem deformitatem luxuriae. Ergo adulterium est determinata species luxuriae. On the contrary, Pope Leo [St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5 says that "adultery is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one's own lust, or with the consent of the other party." Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod adulterium, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, est accessus ad alienum torum. In quo quidem dupliciter contra castitatem et humanae generationis bonum aliquis delinquit, primo quidem, inquantum accedit ad mulierem non sibi matrimonio copulatam, quod requiritur ad bonum prolis propriae educandae; alio modo, quia accedit ad mulierem alteri per matrimonium copulatam, et sic impedit bonum prolis alienae. Eadem ratio est de muliere coniugata quae per adulterium corrumpitur. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIII, omnis mulier relinquens virum suum, peccabit, primo enim, in lege altissimi incredibilis fuit, in qua scilicet praecipitur, non moechaberis; et secundo, virum suum derelinquit, in quo facit contra certitudinem prolis eius; tertio, in adulterio fornicata est, et ex alio viro filios statuit sibi, quod est contra bonum propriae prolis. Sed primum est commune in omnibus peccatis mortalibus, alia vero duo specialiter pertinent ad deformitatem adulterii. Unde manifestum est quod adulterium est determinata species luxuriae, utpote specialem deformitatem habens circa actus venereos. I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, "is access to another's marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]" [Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another's children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Sirach 23:32-33): "Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High" (since there it is commanded: "Thou shalt not commit adultery"); "and secondly, she hath offended against her husband," by making it uncertain that the children are his: "thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man," which is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui habet uxorem, si ad aliam accedit, peccatum eius potest denominari vel ex parte sua, et sic semper est adulterium, quia contra fidem matrimonii agit, vel ex parte mulieris ad quam accedit. Et sic quandoque est adulterium, puta cum coniugatus accedit ad uxorem alterius, quandoque autem habet rationem stupri, vel alicuius alterius, secundum diversas conditiones mulierum ad quas accedit. Dictum est autem supra quod species luxuriae accipiuntur secundum diversas mulierum conditiones. Reply to Objection 1. If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another's wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above (Article 1) that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod matrimonium specialiter est ordinatum ad bonum humanae prolis, sicut dictum est. Adulterium autem specialiter matrimonio contrariatur, inquantum violat matrimonii fidem, quam quis coniugi debet. Et quia ille qui est ardentior amator uxoris, facit contra bonum matrimonii, inhoneste eo utens, licet fidem non violet; ideo aliqualiter potest adulter nominari; et magis quam ille qui est ardentior amator alterius mulieris. Reply to Objection 2. Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above (Article 2). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod uxor est in potestate viri sicut ei matrimonio copulata, puella autem est sub potestate patris sicut per eum matrimonio copulanda. Et ideo alio modo contra bonum matrimonii est peccatum adulterii, et alio modo peccatum stupri. Et propter hoc ponuntur diversae luxuriae species. De aliis autem ad adulterium pertinentibus dicetur in tertia parte, cum de matrimonio tractabitur. Reply to Objection 3. The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part [Supplement, 59, 3; Supplement, 60,62] when we treat of matrimony.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod incestus non sit species determinata luxuriae. Incestus enim dicitur per privationem castitatis. Sed castitati universaliter opponitur luxuria. Ergo videtur quod incestus non sit species luxuriae, sed sit universaliter ipsa luxuria. Objection 1. It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest ['Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste'] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, in decretis dicitur, XXXVI, qu. I, quod incestus est consanguinearum vel affinium abusus. Sed affinitas differt a consanguinitate. Ergo incestus non est una species luxuriae, sed plures. Objection 2. Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod de se non importat aliquam deformitatem, non constituit aliquam determinatam speciem vitii. Sed accedere ad consanguineas vel affines non est secundum se deforme, alias, nullo tempore licuisset. Ergo incestus non est determinata species luxuriae. Objection 3. Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod species luxuriae distinguuntur secundum conditiones mulierum quibus aliqui abutuntur. Sed incestu importatur specialis conditio mulierum, quia est abusus consanguinearum vel affinium, ut dictum est. Ergo incestus est determinata species luxuriae. On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse. Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity as stated (Objection 2). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ibi necesse est inveniri determinatam speciem luxuriae, ubi invenitur aliquid repugnans debito usui venereorum. In usu autem consanguinearum vel affinium invenitur aliquid incongruum commixtioni venereae, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia naturaliter homo debet quandam honorificentiam parentibus, et per consequens aliis consanguineis, qui ex eisdem parentibus de propinquo originem trahunt, in tantum quod apud antiquos, ut maximus Valerius refert, non erat fas filium simul cum patre balneari, ne scilicet se invicem nudos conspicerent. Manifestum est autem secundum praedicta quod in actibus venereis maxime consistit quaedam turpitudo honorificentiae contraria, unde de his homines verecundantur. Et ideo incongruum est quod commixtio venerea fiat talium personarum ad invicem. Et haec causa videtur exprimi Levit. XVIII, ubi dicitur, mater tua est, non revelabis turpitudinem eius. Et idem postea dicit in aliis. Secunda ratio est quia personas sanguine coniunctas necesse est ad invicem simul conversari. Unde si homines non arcerentur a commixtione venerea, nimia opportunitas daretur hominibus venereae commixtionis, et sic animi hominum nimis emollescerent per luxuriam. Et ideo in veteri lege illae personae specialiter videntur esse prohibitae quas necesse est simul commorari. Tertia ratio est quia per hoc impediretur multiplicatio amicorum, dum enim homo uxorem extraneam accipit, iunguntur sibi quadam speciali amicitia omnes consanguinei uxoris, ac si essent consanguinei sui. Unde Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, habita est ratio rectissima caritatis ut homines, quibus esset utilis atque honesta concordia, diversarum vicissitudinum vinculis necterentur, nec unus in uno multas haberet, sed singulae spargerentur in singulos. Addit autem Aristoteles quartam rationem, in II Politic., quia cum naturaliter homo consanguineam diligat, si adderetur amor qui est ex commixtione venerea, fieret nimius ardor amoris, et maximum libidinis incentivum; quod castitati repugnat. Unde manifestum est quod incestus est determinata luxuriae species. I answer that, As stated above (A1,6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1, it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (142, 4; 151, 4), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated (Leviticus 18:7) where we read: "She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness," and the same is expressed further on with regard to others. The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men's minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law [Leviticus 18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together. The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife's relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): "The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one." Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abusus coniunctarum personarum maxime induceret corruptelam castitatis, tum propter opportunitatem; tum etiam propter nimium ardorem amoris, ut dictum est. Et ideo antonomastice abusus talium personarum vocatur incestus. Reply to Objection 1. Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod persona affinis coniungitur alicui propter personam consanguinitate coniunctam. Et ideo, quia unum est propter alterum, eiusdem rationis inconvenientiam facit consanguinitas et affinitas. Reply to Objection 2. Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in commixtione personarum coniunctarum aliquid est quod est secundum se indecens et repugnans naturali rationi, sicut quod commixtio fiat inter parentes et filios, quorum est per se et immediata cognatio, nam filii naturaliter honorem debent parentibus. Unde philosophus dicit, in IX de Animal., quod quidam equus, quia deceptus fuit ut matri commisceretur, seipsum praecipitavit, quasi prae horrore, eo quod etiam animalibus aliquibus inest naturalis reverentia ad parentes. Aliae vero personae quae non coniunguntur secundum seipsas, sed per ordinem ad parentes, non habent ita ex seipsis indecentiam sed variatur circa hoc decentia vel indecentia secundum consuetudinem et legem humanam vel divinam. Quia, ut dictum est, usus venereorum, quia ordinatur ad bonum commune, subiacet legi. Et ideo, sicut Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, commixtio sororum et fratrum, quanto fuit antiquior, compellente necessitate, tanto postea facta est damnabilior, religione prohibente. Reply to Objection 3. There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above (Article 2), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacrilegium non possit esse species luxuriae. Eadem enim species non invenitur sub diversis generibus non subalternatim positis. Sed sacrilegium est species irreligiositatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo sacrilegium non potest poni species luxuriae. Objection 1. It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above (Question 99, Article 2). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, in decretis, XXXVI Caus., qu. I, sacrilegium non ponitur inter alia quae ponuntur species luxuriae. Ergo videtur quod non sit luxuriae species. Objection 2. Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut per luxuriam contingit aliquid fieri contra aliquam rem sacram, ita etiam per alia vitiorum genera. Sed sacrilegium non ponitur species gulae, aut alterius alicuius huiusmodi vitii. Ergo etiam non debet poni species luxuriae. Objection 3. Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XV de Civ. Dei, quod sicut iniquum est aviditate possidendi transgredi limitem agrorum, ita etiam iniquum est libidine concumbendi subvertere limitem morum. Sed transgredi limitem agrorum in rebus sacris est peccatum sacrilegii. Ergo, pari ratione, subvertere limitem morum libidine concumbendi in rebus sacris, facit sacrilegii vitium. Sed libido concumbendi pertinet ad luxuriam. Ergo sacrilegium est luxuriae species. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that "if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one's earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!" Now to go beyond one's earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus unius virtutis vel vitii ordinatus ad finem alterius, assumit speciem illius, sicut furtum quod propter adulterium committitur, transit in speciem adulterii. Manifestum est autem quod observatio castitatis secundum quod ordinatur ad cultum Dei, sit actus religionis, ut patet in illis qui vovent et servant virginitatem, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de virginitate. Unde manifestum est quod etiam luxuria, secundum quod violat aliquid ad divinum cultum pertinens, pertinet ad speciem sacrilegii. Et secundum hoc, sacrilegium potest poni species luxuriae. I answer that, As stated above (I-II, 18, 6,7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter's species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod luxuria secundum quod ordinatur ad finem alterius vitii, efficitur illius vitii species. Et sic aliqua luxuriae species potest etiam esse species irreligiositatis, sicut cuiusdam superioris generis. Reply to Objection 1. Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ibi enumerantur illa quae sunt species luxuriae secundum seipsa, sacrilegium autem est species luxuriae secundum quod ordinatur ad finem alterius vitii. Et potest concurrere cum diversis speciebus luxuriae. Si enim aliquis abutatur persona coniuncta sibi secundum spiritualem cognationem, committit sacrilegium ad modum incestus. Si autem abutatur virgine Deo sacrata, inquantum est sponsa Christi, est sacrilegium per modum adulterii; inquantum vero est sub spiritualis patris cura constituta, erit quoddam spirituale stuprum; et si violentia inferatur, erit spiritualis raptus, qui etiam secundum leges civiles gravius punitur quam alius raptus. Unde Iustinianus imperator dicit, si quis, non dicam rapere, sed attentare tantummodo, matrimonii iungendi causa, sacratissimas virgines ausus fuerit, capitali poena feriatur. Reply to Objection 2. The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father's authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5: "If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sacrilegium committitur in re sacrata. Res autem sacrata est vel persona sacrata quae concupiscitur ad concubitum, et sic pertinet ad luxuriam. Vel quae concupiscitur ad possidendum, et sic pertinet ad iniustitiam. Potest etiam ad iram pertinere sacrilegium, puta si aliquis ex ira iniuriam inferat personae sacrae. Vel, si gulose cibum sacratum assumat, sacrilegium committit. Specialius tamen sacrilegium attribuitur luxuriae, quae opponitur castitati, ad cuius observantiam aliquae personae specialiter consecrantur. Reply to Objection 3. Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium contra naturam non sit species luxuriae. Quia in praedicta enumeratione specierum luxuriae nulla fit mentio de vitio contra naturam. Ergo non est species luxuriae. Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration given above (1, Objection 1). Therefore it is not a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, luxuria opponitur virtuti, et ita sub malitia continetur. Sed vitium contra naturam non continetur sub malitia, sed sub bestialitate, ut patet per philosophum, in VII Ethic. Ergo vitium contra naturam non est species luxuriae. Objection 2. Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, luxuria consistit circa actus ad generationem humanam ordinatos, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed vitium contra naturam consistit circa actus ex quibus non potest generatio sequi. Ergo vitium contra naturam non est species luxuriae. Objection 3. Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above (Question 153, Article 2): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod, II ad Cor. XII, connumeratur aliis luxuriae speciebus, ubi dicitur, non egerunt poenitentiam super immunditia et fornicatione et impudicitia, ubi dicit Glossa, immunditia, idest, luxuria contra naturam. On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust (2 Corinthians 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says: "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ibi est determinata luxuriae species ubi specialis ratio deformitatis occurrit quae facit indecentem actum venereum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, quia repugnat rationi rectae, quod est commune in omni vitio luxuriae. Alio modo, quia etiam, super hoc, repugnat ipsi ordini naturali venerei actus qui convenit humanae speciei, quod dicitur vitium contra naturam. Quod quidem potest pluribus modis contingere. Uno quidem modo, si absque omni concubitu, causa delectationis venereae, pollutio procuretur, quod pertinet ad peccatum immunditiae, quam quidam mollitiem vocant. Alio modo, si fiat per concubitum ad rem non eiusdem speciei, quod vocatur bestialitas. Tertio modo, si fiat per concubitum ad non debitum sexum, puta masculi ad masculum vel feminae ad feminam, ut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, quod dicitur sodomiticum vitium. Quarto, si non servetur naturalis modus concumbendi, aut quantum ad instrumentum non debitum; aut quantum ad alios monstruosos et bestiales concumbendi modos. I answer that, As stated above (A6,9) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of "uncleanness" which some call "effeminacy." Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called "bestiality." Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Romans 1:27): and this is called the "vice of sodomy." Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ibi enumerantur species luxuriae quae non repugnant humanae naturae. Et ideo praetermittitur vitium contra naturam. Reply to Objection 1. There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bestialitas differt a malitia, quae humanae virtuti opponitur, per quendam excessum circa eandem materiam. Et ideo ad idem genus reduci potest. Reply to Objection 2. Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod luxuriosus non intendit generationem humanam, sed delectationem veneream, quam potest aliquis experiri sine actibus ex quibus sequitur humana generatio. Et hoc est quod quaeritur in vitio contra naturam. Reply to Objection 3. The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium contra naturam non sit maximum peccatum inter species luxuriae. Tanto enim aliquod peccatum est gravius, quanto magis contrariatur caritati. Sed magis videntur contrariari caritati proximi adulterium et stuprum et raptus, quae vergunt in iniuriam proximi, quam peccata contra naturam, per quae nullus alteri iniuriatur. Ergo peccatum contra naturam non est maximum inter species luxuriae. Objection 1. It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, illa peccata videntur esse gravissima quae contra Deum committuntur. Sed sacrilegium directe committitur contra Deum, quia vergit in iniuriam divini cultus. Ergo sacrilegium est gravius peccatum quam vitium contra naturam. Objection 2. Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, tanto aliquod peccatum videtur esse gravius, quanto exercetur in personam quam magis diligere debemus. Sed secundum ordinem caritatis magis debemus diligere personas nobis coniunctas, quae polluuntur per incestum, quam personas extraneas, quae interdum polluuntur per vitium contra naturam. Ergo incestus est gravius peccatum quam vitium contra naturam. Objection 3. Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him--and such are those whom he defiles by incest--than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 arg. 4 Praeterea, si vitium contra naturam est gravissimum, videtur quod tanto est gravius quanto est magis contra naturam. Sed maxime videtur esse contra naturam peccatum immunditiae seu mollitiei, quia hoc maxime videtur esse secundum naturam, ut alterum sit agens et alterum patiens. Ergo, secundum hoc, immunditia esset gravissimum inter vitia contra naturam. Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo vitia contra naturam sunt gravissima inter peccata luxuriae. Objection 4. Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Adulterin. coniugiis, quod omnium horum, peccatorum scilicet quae ad luxuriam pertinent, pessimum est quod contra naturam fit. On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that which is against nature is the worst."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in quolibet genere pessima est principii corruptio, ex quo alia dependent. Principia autem rationis sunt ea quae sunt secundum naturam, nam ratio, praesuppositis his quae sunt a natura determinata, disponit alia secundum quod convenit. Et hoc apparet tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Et ideo, sicut in speculativis error circa ea quorum cognitio est homini naturaliter indita, est gravissimus et turpissimus; ita in agendis agere contra ea quae sunt secundum naturam determinata, est gravissimum et turpissimum. Quia ergo in vitiis quae sunt contra naturam transgreditur homo id quod est secundum naturam determinatum circa usum venereum, inde est quod in tali materia hoc peccatum est gravissimum. Post quod est incestus, qui, sicut dictum est, est contra naturalem reverentiam quam personis coniunctis debemus. Per alias autem luxuriae species praeteritur solum id quod est secundum rationem rectam determinatum, ex praesuppositione tamen naturalium principiorum. Magis autem repugnat rationi quod aliquis venereis utatur non solum contra id quod convenit proli generandae, sed etiam cum iniuria alterius. Et ideo fornicatio simplex, quae committitur sine iniuria alterius personae, est minima inter species luxuriae. Maior autem iniuria est si quis abutatur muliere alterius potestati subiecta ad usum generationis, quam ad solam custodiam. Et ideo adulterium est gravius quam stuprum. Et utrumque aggravatur per violentiam. Propter quod, raptus virginis est gravius quam stuprum, et raptus uxoris quam adulterium. Et haec etiam omnia aggravantur secundum rationem sacrilegii, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above (Article 9), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related to us. With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (10, ad 2).
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ordo rationis rectae est ab homine, ita ordo naturae est ab ipso Deo. Et ideo in peccatis contra naturam, in quibus ipse ordo naturae violatur, fit iniuria ipsi Deo, ordinatori naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, III Confess., flagitia quae sunt contra naturam, ubique ac semper detestanda atque punienda sunt, qualia Sodomitarum fuerunt, quae si omnes gentes facerent, eodem criminis reatu divina lege tenerentur, quae non sic fecit homines ut se illo uterentur modo. Violatur quippe ipsa societas quae cum Deo nobis esse debet, cum eadem natura cuius ille auctor est, libidinis perversitate polluitur. Reply to Objection 1. Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): "Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust."
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam vitia contra naturam sunt contra Deum, ut dictum est. Et tanto sunt graviora quam sacrilegii corruptela, quanto ordo naturae humanae inditus est prior et stabilior quam quilibet alius ordo superadditus. Reply to Objection 2. Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod unicuique individuo magis est coniuncta natura speciei quam quodcumque aliud individuum. Et ideo peccata quae fiunt contra naturam speciei, sunt graviora. Reply to Objection 3. The nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature are more grievous.
IIª-IIae q. 154 a. 12 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod gravitas in peccato magis attenditur ex abusu alicuius rei quam ex omissione debiti usus. Et ideo inter vitia contra naturam infimum locum tenet peccatum immunditiae, quod consistit in sola omissione concubitus ad alterum. Gravissimum autem est peccatum bestialitatis, ubi non servatur debita species. Unde super illud Gen. XXXVII, accusavit fratres suos crimine pessimo, dicit Glossa, quod cum pecoribus miscebantur. Post hoc autem est vitium sodomiticum, ubi non servatur debitus sexus. Post hoc autem est peccatum ex eo quod non servatur debitus modus concumbendi. Magis autem si non sit debitum vas, quam si sit inordinatio secundum aliqua alia pertinentia ad modum concubitus. Reply to Objection 4. Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Genesis 37:2, "He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime," says that "they copulated with cattle." After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the "vas" than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.

Notes

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