Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q61

• Question 61.1 The distinction between commutative and distributive justice
• Question 61.2
• Question 61.3
• Question 61.4

Latin	English
IIª-IIae q. 61 pr. Deinde considerandum est de partibus iustitiae. Et primo, de partibus subiectivis, quae sunt species iustitiae, scilicet distributiva et commutativa; secundo, de partibus quasi integralibus; tertio, de partibus quasi potentialibus, scilicet de virtutibus adiunctis. Circa primum occurrit duplex consideratio, prima, de ipsis iustitiae partibus; secunda, de vitiis oppositis. Et quia restitutio videtur esse actus commutativae iustitiae, primo considerandum est de distinctione iustitiae commutativae et distributivae, secundo, de restitutione. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum sint duae species iustitiae, iustitia distributiva et commutativa. Secundo, utrum eodem modo in eis medium accipiatur. Tertio, utrum sit earum uniformis vel multiplex materia. Quarto, utrum secundum aliquam earum specierum iustum sit idem quod contrapassum.	Question 61. The parts of Justice 1. Are there two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative? 2. In either case, is the mean taken in the same way? 3. Is their matter uniform or manifold? 4. In any of these species, is the just the same as counter-passion?
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur duae species iustitiae, iustitia distributiva et commutativa. Non enim potest esse iustitiae species quod multitudini nocet, cum iustitia ad bonum commune ordinetur. Sed distribuere bona communia in multos nocet bono communi multitudinis, tum quia exhauriuntur opes communes; tum etiam quia mores hominum corrumpuntur; dicit enim Tullius, in libro de Offic., fit deterior qui accipit, et ad idem semper expectandum paratior. Ergo distributio non pertinet ad aliquam iustitiae speciem.	Objection 1. It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, iustitiae actus est reddere unicuique quod suum est, ut supra habitum est. Sed in distributione non redditur alicui quod suum erat, sed de novo appropriatur sibi id quod erat commune. Ergo hoc ad iustitiam non pertinet.	Objection 2. Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above (Question 58, Article 2). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, iustitia non solum est in principe, sed etiam in subiectis, ut supra habitum est. Sed distribuere semper pertinet ad principem. Ergo distributiva non pertinet ad iustitiam.	Objection 3. Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above (Question 58, Article 6). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, distributivum iustum est bonorum communium, ut dicitur in V Ethic. sed communia pertinent ad iustitiam legalem. Ergo iustitia distributiva non est species iustitiae particularis, sed iustitiae legalis.	Objection 4. Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, unum et multa non diversificant speciem virtutis. Sed iustitia commutativa consistit in hoc quod aliquid redditur uni; iustitia vero distributiva in hoc quod aliquid datur multis. Ergo non sunt diversae species iustitiae.	Objection 5. Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in V Ethic., ponit duas partes iustitiae, et dicit quod una est directiva in distributionibus, alia in commutationibus.	On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other, commutations."
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, iustitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comparatur ad communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Potest autem ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi. Unus quidem partis ad partem, cui similis est ordo unius privatae personae ad aliam. Et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa iustitia, quae consistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. Alius ordo attenditur totius ad partes, et huic ordini assimilatur ordo eius quod est commune ad singulas personas. Quem quidem ordinem dirigit iustitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. Et ideo duae sunt iustitiae species, scilicet commutativa et distributiva.	I answer that, As stated above (58, 7,8), particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. On the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. On the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut in largitionibus privatarum personarum commendatur moderatio, effusio vero culpatur; ita etiam in distributione communium bonorum est moderatio servanda, in quo dirigit iustitia distributiva.	Reply to Objection 1. Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive justice directs.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut pars et totum quodammodo sunt idem, ita id quod est totius quodammodo est partis. Et ita cum ex bonis communibus aliquid in singulos distribuitur, quilibet aliquo modo recipit quod suum est.	Reply to Objection 2. Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod actus distributionis quae est communium bonorum pertinet solum ad praesidentem communibus bonis, sed tamen iustitia distributiva est et in subditis, quibus distribuitur, inquantum scilicet sunt contenti iusta distributione. Quamvis etiam distributio quandoque fiat bonorum communium non quidem civitati, sed uni familiae, quorum distributio fieri potest auctoritate alicuius privatae personae.	Reply to Objection 3. The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod motus accipiunt speciem a termino ad quem. Et ideo ad iustitiam legalem pertinet ordinare ea quae sunt privatarum personarum in bonum commune, sed ordinare e converso bonum commune ad personas particulares per distributionem est iustitiae particularis.	Reply to Objection 4. Movement takes its species from the term "whereunto." Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by way of distribution.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod iustitia distributiva et commutativa non solum distinguuntur secundum unum et multa, sed secundum diversam rationem debiti, alio enim modo debetur alicui id quod est commune, alio modo id quod est proprium.	Reply to Objection 5. Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium eodem modo accipiatur in iustitia distributiva et commutativa. Utraque enim sub iustitia particulari continetur, ut dictum est. Sed in omnibus temperantiae vel fortitudinis partibus accipitur uno modo medium. Ergo etiam eodem modo est accipiendum medium in iustitia distributiva et commutativa.	Objection 1. It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above (Article 1). Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, forma virtutis moralis in medio consistit quod secundum rationem determinatur. Cum ergo unius virtutis sit una forma, videtur quod in utraque sit eodem modo medium accipiendum.	Objection 2. Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, in iustitia distributiva accipitur medium attendendo diversam dignitatem personarum. Sed dignitas personarum attenditur etiam in commutativa iustitia, sicut in punitionibus, plus enim punitur qui percussit principem quam qui percussit privatam personam. Ergo eodem modo accipitur medium in utraque iustitia.	Objection 3. Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person's deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod in iustitia distributiva accipitur medium secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in commutativa autem secundum arithmeticam.	On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to "geometrical proportion," whereas in commutative justice it follows "arithmetical proportion."
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, in distributiva iustitia datur aliquid alicui privatae personae inquantum id quod est totius est debitum parti. Quod quidem tanto maius est quanto ipsa pars maiorem principalitatem habet in toto. Et ideo in distributiva iustitia tanto plus alicui de bonis communibus datur quanto illa persona maiorem principalitatem habet in communitate. Quae quidem principalitas in aristocratica communitate attenditur secundum virtutem, in oligarchica secundum divitias, in democratica secundum libertatem, et in aliis aliter. Et ideo in iustitia distributiva non accipitur medium secundum aequalitatem rei ad rem, sed secundum proportionem rerum ad personas, ut scilicet, sicut una persona excedit aliam, ita etiam res quae datur uni personae excedit rem quae datur alii. Et ideo dicit philosophus quod tale medium est secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in qua attenditur aequale non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum proportionem. Sicut si dicamus quod sicut se habent sex ad quatuor, ita se habent tria ad duo, quia utrobique est sesquialtera proportio, in qua maius habet totum minus et mediam partem eius, non autem est aequalitas excessus secundum quantitatem, quia sex excedunt quatuor in duobus, tria vero excedunt duo in uno. Sed in commutationibus redditur aliquid alicui singulari personae propter rem eius quae accepta est, ut maxime patet in emptione et venditione, in quibus primo invenitur ratio commutationis. Et ideo oportet adaequare rem rei, ut quanto iste plus habet quam suum sit de eo quod est alterius, tantundem restituat ei cuius est. Et sic fit aequalitas secundum arithmeticam medietatem, quae attenditur secundum parem quantitatis excessum, sicut quinque est medium inter sex et quatuor, in unitate enim excedit et exceditur. Si ergo a principio uterque habebat quinque, et unus eorum accepit unum de eo quod est alterius; unus, scilicet accipiens, habebit sex, et alii relinquentur quatuor. Erit ergo iustitia si uterque reducatur ad medium, ut accipiatur unum ab eo qui habet sex, et detur ei qui habet quatuor, sic enim uterque habebit quinque, quod est medium.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), in distributive justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows "geometrical proportion," wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1-1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1. On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is the mean.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in aliis virtutibus moralibus accipitur medium secundum rationem, et non secundum rem. Sed in iustitia accipitur medium rei, et ideo secundum diversitatem rerum diversimode medium accipitur.	Reply to Objection 1. In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod generalis forma iustitiae est aequalitas, in qua convenit iustitia distributiva cum commutativa. In una tamen invenitur aequalitas secundum proportionalitatem geometricam, in alia secundum arithmeticam.	Reply to Objection 2. Equality is the general form of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in actionibus et passionibus conditio personae facit ad quantitatem rei, maior enim est iniuria si percutiatur princeps quam si percutiatur privata persona. Et ita conditio personae in distributiva iustitia attenditur secundum se, in commutativa autem secundum quod per hoc diversificatur res.	Reply to Objection 3. In actions and passions a person's station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod materia utriusque iustitiae non sit diversa. Diversitas enim materiae facit diversitatem virtutis, ut patet in temperantia et fortitudine. Si igitur distributivae iustitiae et commutativae sit diversa materia, videtur quod non contineantur sub una virtute, scilicet sub iustitia.	Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, distributio, quae pertinet ad distributivam iustitiam, est pecuniae vel honoris vel aliorum quaecumque dispertiri possunt inter eos qui communitate communicant; ut dicitur in V Ethic. Quorum etiam est commutatio inter personas ad invicem, quae pertinet ad commutativam iustitiam. Ergo non est diversa materia distributivae et commutativae iustitiae.	Objection 2. Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si sit alia materia distributivae iustitiae et alia materia commutativae propter hoc quod differunt specie, ubi non erit differentia speciei, non debebit esse materiae diversitas. Sed philosophus ponit unam speciem commutativae iustitiae, quae tamen habet multiplicem materiam. Non ergo videtur esse multiplex materia harum specierum.	Objection 3. Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seemingly, not of many kinds.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 s. c. In contrarium est quod dicitur in V Ethic., quod una species iustitiae est directiva in distributionibus, alia in commutationibus.	On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that "one kind of justice directs distributions, and another commutations."
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iustitia est circa quasdam operationes exteriores, scilicet distributionem et commutationem, quae quidem sunt usus quorundam exteriorum, vel rerum vel personarum vel etiam operum, rerum quidem, sicut cum aliquis vel aufert vel restituit alteri suam rem; personarum autem, sicut cum aliquis in ipsam personam hominis iniuriam facit, puta percutiendo vel conviciando, aut etiam cum reverentiam exhibet; operum autem, sicut cum quis iuste ab alio exigit vel alteri reddit aliquod opus. Si igitur accipiamus ut materiam utriusque iustitiae ea quorum operationes sunt usus, eadem est materia distributivae et commutativae iustitiae, nam et res distribui possunt a communi in singulos, et commutari de uno in alium; et etiam est quaedam distributio laboriosorum operum, et recompensatio. Si autem accipiamus ut materiam utriusque iustitiae actiones ipsas principales quibus utimur personis, rebus et operibus, sic invenitur utrobique alia materia. Nam distributiva iustitia est directiva distributionis, commutativa vero iustitia est directiva commutationum quae attendi possunt inter duas personas. Quarum quaedam sunt involuntariae; quaedam vero voluntariae. Involuntariae quidem, quando aliquis utitur re alterius vel persona vel opere, eo invito. Quod quidem contingit quandoque occulte per fraudem; quandoque etiam manifeste per violentiam. Utrumque autem contingit aut in rem aut in personam propriam, aut in personam coniunctam. In rem quidem, si occulte unus rem alterius accipiat, vocatur furtum; si autem manifeste, vocatur rapina. In personam autem propriam, vel quantum ad ipsam consistentiam personae; vel quantum ad dignitatem ipsius. Si autem quantum ad consistentiam personae, sic laeditur aliquis occulte per dolosam occisionem seu percussionem, et per veneni exhibitionem; manifeste autem per occisionem manifestam, aut per incarcerationem aut verberationem seu membri mutilationem. Quantum autem ad dignitatem personae, laeditur aliquis occulte quidem per falsa testimonia seu detractiones, quibus aliquis aufert famam suam, et per alia huiusmodi; manifeste autem per accusationem in iudicio, seu per convicii illationem. Quantum autem ad personam coniunctam, laeditur aliquis in uxore, ut in pluribus occulte, per adulterium; in servo autem, cum aliquis servum seducit, ut a domino discedat; et haec etiam manifeste fieri possunt. Et eadem ratio est de aliis personis coniunctis, in quas etiam possunt omnibus modis iniuriae committi sicut et in personam principalem. Sed adulterium et servi seductio sunt proprie iniuriae circa has personas, tamen, quia servus est possessio quaedam, hoc refertur ad furtum. Voluntariae autem commutationes dicuntur quando aliquis voluntarie transfert rem suam in alterum. Et si quidem simpliciter in alterum transferat rem suam absque debito, sicut in donatione, non est actus iustitiae, sed liberalitatis. Intantum autem ad iustitiam voluntaria translatio pertinet inquantum est ibi aliquid de ratione debiti. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno modo, quando aliquis transfert simpliciter rem suam in alterum pro recompensatione alterius rei, sicut accidit in venditione et emptione. Secundo modo, quando aliquis tradit rem suam alteri concedens ei usum rei cum debito recuperandi rem. Et si quidem gratis concedit usum rei, vocatur ususfructus in rebus quae aliquid fructificant; vel simpliciter mutuum seu accommodatum in rebus quae non fructificant, sicut sunt denarii, vasa et huiusmodi. Si vero nec ipse usus gratis conceditur, vocatur locatio et conductio. Tertio modo aliquis tradit rem suam ut recuperandam, non ratione usus, sed vel ratione conservationis, sicut in deposito; vel ratione obligationis, sicut cum quis rem suam pignori obligat, seu cum aliquis pro alio fideiubet. In omnibus autem huiusmodi actionibus, sive voluntariis sive involuntariis, est eadem ratio accipiendi medium secundum aequalitatem recompensationis. Et ideo omnes istae actiones ad unam speciem iustitiae pertinent, scilicet ad commutativam.	I answer that, As stated above (51, 8,10), justice is about certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works. If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons. of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone uses another man's chattel, person, or work against his will, and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. On either case the offence may be committed against the other man's chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called "theft," if openly, it is called "robbery." If it be against another man's person, it may affect either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man stands security for another. On all these actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same species of justice, namely commutative justice.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 ad arg. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.	And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustum sit simpliciter idem quod contrapassum. Iudicium enim divinum est simpliciter iustum. Sed haec est forma divini iudicii, ut secundum quod aliquis fecit, patiatur, secundum illud Matth. VII, in quo iudicio iudicaveritis, iudicabimini, et in qua mensura mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis. Ergo iustum est simpliciter idem quod contrapassum.	Objection 1. It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to Matthew 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, in utraque iustitiae specie datur aliquid alicui secundum quandam aequalitatem, in respectu quidem ad dignitatem personae in iustitia distributiva, quae quidem personae dignitas maxime videtur attendi secundum opera quibus aliquis communitati servivit; in respectu autem ad rem in qua quis damnificatus est, in iustitia commutativa. Secundum autem utramque aequalitatem aliquis contrapatitur secundum quod fecit. Ergo videtur quod iustum simpliciter sit idem quod contrapassum.	Objection 2. Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone according to a kind of equality. On distributive justice this equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, maxime videtur quod non oporteat aliquem contrapati secundum quod fecit, propter differentiam voluntarii et involuntarii, qui enim involuntarie fecit iniuriam, minus punitur. Sed voluntarium et involuntarium, quae accipiuntur ex parte nostra, non diversificant medium iustitiae, quod est medium rei et non quoad nos. Ergo iustum simpliciter idem esse videtur quod contrapassum.	Objection 3. Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in V Ethic., probat non quodlibet iustum esse contrapassum.	On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur contrapassum importat aequalem recompensationem passionis ad actionem praecedentem. Quod quidem propriissime dicitur in passionibus iniuriosis quibus aliquis personam proximi laedit, puta, si percutit, quod repercutiatur. Et hoc quidem iustum determinatur in lege, Exod. XXI, reddet animam pro anima, oculum pro oculo, et cetera. Et quia etiam auferre rem alterius est quoddam facere, ideo secundario etiam in his dicitur contrapassum, prout scilicet aliquis qui damnum intulit, in re sua ipse etiam damnificatur. Et hoc etiam iustum continetur in lege, Exod. XXII, si quis furatus fuerit bovem aut ovem, et occiderit vel vendiderit, quinque boves pro uno bove restituet, et quatuor oves pro una ove. Tertio vero transfertur nomen contrapassi ad voluntarias commutationes, in quibus utrinque est actio et passio, sed voluntarium diminuit de ratione passionis, ut dictum est. In omnibus autem his debet fieri, secundum rationem iustitiae commutativae, recompensatio secundum aequalitatem, ut scilicet passio recompensata sit aequalis actioni. Non autem semper esset aequalis si idem specie aliquis pateretur quod fecit. Nam primo quidem, cum quis iniuriose laedat alterius personam maiorem, maior est actio quam passio eiusdem speciei quam ipse pateretur. Et ideo ille qui percutit principem non solum repercutitur, sed multo gravius punitur. Similiter etiam cum quis aliquem involuntarium in re sua damnificat, maior est actio quam esset passio si sibi sola res illa auferretur, quia ipse qui damnificavit alium, in re sua nihil damnificaretur. Et ideo punitur in hoc quod multiplicius restituat, quia etiam non solum damnificavit personam privatam, sed rempublicam, eius tutelae securitatem infringendo. Similiter etiam nec in commutationibus voluntariis semper esset aequalis passio si aliquis daret rem suam, accipiens rem alterius, quia forte res alterius est multo maior quam sua. Et ideo oportet secundum quandam proportionatam commensurationem adaequare passionem actioni in commutationibus, ad quod inventa sunt numismata. Et sic contrapassum est commutativum iustum. In distributiva autem iustitia locum non habet. Quia in distributiva iustitia non attenditur aequalitas secundum proportionem rei ad rem, vel passionis ad actionem, unde dicitur contrapassum, sed secundum proportionalitatem rerum ad personas, ut supra dictum est.	I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Exodus 21:23-24): "He shall render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the Law (Exodus 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated above (Question 59, Article 3). In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action. Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only struck back, but is much more severely punished. On like manner when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), but according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above (Article 2).
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa forma divini iudicii attenditur secundum rationem commutativae iustitiae, prout scilicet recompensat praemia meritis et supplicia peccatis.	Reply to Objection 1. This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod si alicui qui communitati servisset retribueretur aliquid pro servitio impenso, non esset hoc distributivae iustitiae, sed commutativae. In distributiva enim iustitia non attenditur aequalitas eius quod quis accipit ad id quod ipse impendit, sed ad id quod alius accipit, secundum modum utriusque personae.	Reply to Objection 2. When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing received by one person and the thing received by another according to the respective conditions of those persons.
IIª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quando actio iniuriosa est voluntaria, excedit iniuria, et sic accipitur ut maior res. Unde oportet maiorem poenam ei recompensari non secundum differentiam quoad nos, sed secundum differentiam rei.	Reply to Objection 3. When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing.