Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q69

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IIª-IIae q. 69 pr. Deinde considerandum est de peccatis quae sunt contra iustitiam ex parte rei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum peccet aliquis mortaliter veritatem negando per quam condemnaretur. Secundo, utrum liceat alicui se calumniose defendere. Tertio, utrum liceat alicui iudicium subterfugere appellando. Quarto, utrum liceat alicui condemnato per violentiam se defendere, si adsit facultas. Question 69. Sins committed against justice: of the part of the defendant 1. Is it a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation? 2. Is it lawful to defend oneself with calumnies? 3. Is it lawful to escape condemnation by appealing? 4. Is it lawful for one who has been condemned to defend himself by violence if he be able to do so?
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod absque peccato mortali possit accusatus veritatem negare per quam condemnaretur. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, non tibi dico ut te prodas in publicum, neque apud alium accuses. Sed si veritatem confiteretur in iudicio accusatus, seipsum proderet et accusaret. Non ergo tenetur veritatem dicere. Et ita non peccat mortaliter si in iudicio mentiatur. Objection 1. It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut mendacium officiosum est quando aliquis mentitur ut alium a morte liberet, ita mendacium officiosum esse videtur quando aliquis mentitur ut se liberet a morte, quia plus sibi tenetur quam alteri. Mendacium autem officiosum non ponitur esse peccatum mortale, sed veniale. Ergo si accusatus veritatem in iudicio neget ut se a morte liberet, non peccat mortaliter. Objection 2. Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does not sin mortally.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, omne peccatum mortale est contra caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Sed quod accusatus mentiatur excusando se a peccato sibi imposito, non contrariatur caritati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei neque quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Ergo huiusmodi mendacium non est peccatum mortale. Objection 3. Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above (Question 24, Article 12). But that the accused lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra, omne quod est contrarium divinae gloriae est peccatum mortale, quia ex praecepto tenemur omnia in gloriam Dei facere, ut patet I ad Cor. X. Sed quod reus id quod contra se est confiteatur, pertinet ad gloriam Dei, ut patet per id quod Iosue dixit ad Achar, fili mi, da gloriam domino Deo Israel, et confitere atque indica mihi quid feceris, ne abscondas, ut habetur Iosue VII. Ergo mentiri ad excusandum peccatum est peccatum mortale. On the contrary, Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory of God" (1 Corinthians 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not" (Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover one's guilt.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quicumque facit contra debitum iustitiae, mortaliter peccat, sicut supra dictum est. Pertinet autem ad debitum iustitiae quod aliquis obediat suo superiori in his ad quae ius praelationis se extendit. Iudex autem, ut supra dictum est, superior est respectu eius qui iudicatur. Et ideo ex debito tenetur accusatus iudici veritatem exponere quam ab eo secundum formam iuris exigit. Et ideo si confiteri noluerit veritatem quam dicere tenetur, vel si eam mendaciter negaverit, mortaliter peccat. Si vero iudex hoc exquirat quod non potest secundum ordinem iuris, non tenetur ei accusatus respondere, sed potest vel per appellationem vel aliter licite subterfugere, mendacium tamen dicere non licet. I answer that, Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins mortally, as stated above (Question 59, Article 4). Now it belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above (67, 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: but it is not lawful for him to lie.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quando aliquis secundum ordinem iuris a iudice interrogatur, non ipse se prodit, sed ab alio proditur, dum ei necessitas respondendi imponitur per eum cui obedire tenetur. Reply to Objection 1. When a man is examined by the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one whom he is bound to obey.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod mentiri ad liberandum aliquem a morte cum iniuria alterius, non est mendacium simpliciter officiosum, sed habet aliquid de pernicioso admixtum. Cum autem aliquis mentitur in iudicio ad excusationem sui, iniuriam facit ei cui obedire tenetur, dum sibi denegat quod ei debet, scilicet confessionem veritatis. Reply to Objection 2. To lie, with injury to another person, in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui mentitur in iudicio se excusando, facit et contra dilectionem Dei, cuius est iudicium; et contra dilectionem proximi, tum ex parte iudicis, cui debitum negat; tum ex parte accusatoris, qui punitur si in probatione deficiat. Unde et in Psalm. dicitur, ne declines cor meum in verba malitiae, ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis, ubi dicit Glossa, haec est consuetudo impudentium, ut deprehensi per aliqua falsa se excusent. Et Gregorius, XXII Moral., exponens illud Iob XXXI, si abscondi quasi homo peccatum meum, dicit, usitatum humani generis vitium est et latendo peccatum committere, et commissum negando abscondere, et convictum defendendo multiplicare. Reply to Objection 3. He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Psalm 140:4): "Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on which words a gloss says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding Job 31:33, "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15): "It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the sin by defending oneself."
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod accusato liceat calumniose se defendere. Quia secundum iura civilia, in causa sanguinis licitum est cuilibet adversarium corrumpere. Sed hoc maxime est calumniose se defendere. Ergo non peccat accusatus in causa sanguinis si calumniose se defendat. Objection 1. It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, accusator cum accusato colludens poenam recipit legibus constitutam, ut habetur, II, qu. III, non autem imponitur poena accusato propter hoc quod cum accusatore colludit. Ergo videtur quod liceat accusato calumniose se defendere. Objection 2. Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Prov. XIV dicitur, sapiens timet et declinat a malo, stultus transilit et confidit. Sed illud quod fit per sapientiam non est peccatum. Ergo si aliquis qualitercumque se liberet a malo, non peccat. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Proverbs 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil, he does not sin.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod etiam in causa criminali iuramentum de calumnia est praestandum, ut habetur extra, de iuramento Calum., inhaerentes. Quod non esset si calumniose defendere se liceret. Ergo non est licitum accusato calumniose se defendere. On the contrary, In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap. Onhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliud est veritatem tacere, aliud est falsitatem proponere. Quorum primum in aliquo casu licet. Non enim aliquis tenetur omnem veritatem confiteri, sed illam solum quam ab eo potest et debet requirere iudex secundum ordinem iuris, puta cum praecessit infamia super aliquo crimine, vel aliqua expressa indicia apparuerunt, vel etiam cum praecessit probatio semiplena. Falsitatem tamen proponere in nullo casu licet alicui. Ad id autem quod licitum est potest aliquis procedere vel per vias licitas et fini intento accommodas, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, vel per aliquas vias illicitas et proposito fini incongruas, quod pertinet ad astutiam, quae exercetur per fraudem et dolum, ut ex supradictis patet. Quorum primum est laudabile; secundum vero vitiosum. Sic igitur reo qui accusatur licet se defendere veritatem occultando quam confiteri non tenetur, per aliquos convenientes modos, puta quod non respondeat ad quae respondere non tenetur. Hoc autem non est calumniose se defendere, sed magis prudenter evadere. Non autem licet ei vel falsitatem dicere, vel veritatem tacere quam confiteri tenetur; neque etiam aliquam fraudem vel dolum adhibere, quia fraus et dolus vim mendacii habent. Et hoc est calumniose se defendere. I answer that, It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of him according to the order of justice; as, for instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false declaration. As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile, as shown above (55, 3, seqq.). His conduct in the former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to defend oneself with calumnies.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multa secundum leges humanas impunita relinquuntur quae secundum divinum iudicium sunt peccata, sicut patet in simplici fornicatione, quia lex humana non exigit ab homine omnimodam virtutem, quae paucorum est, et non potest inveniri in tanta multitudine populi quantam lex humana sustinere habet necesse. Quod autem aliquis non velit aliquod peccatum committere ut mortem corporalem evadat, cuius periculum in causa sanguinis imminet reo, est perfectae virtutis, quia omnium temporalium maxime terribile est mors, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo si reus in causa sanguinis corrumpat adversarium suum, peccat quidem inducendo eum ad illicitum, non autem huic peccato lex civilis adhibet poenam. Et pro tanto licitum esse dicitur. Reply to Objection 1. Human laws leave many things unpunished, which according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod accusator, si colludat cum reo qui noxius, est, poenam incurrit, ex quo patet quod peccat. Unde, cum inducere aliquem ad peccandum sit peccatum, vel qualitercumque peccati participem esse, cum apostolus dicat dignos morte eos qui peccantibus consentiunt, manifestum est quod etiam reus peccat cum adversario colludendo. Non tamen secundum leges humanas imponitur sibi poena, propter rationem iam dictam. Reply to Objection 2. If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take part in a sin in any way--for the Apostle says (Romans 1:32), that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who sin--it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sapiens non abscondit se calumniose, sed prudenter. Reply to Objection 3. The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but by exercising prudence.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod reo non liceat iudicium declinare per appellationem. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. XIII, omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Sed reus appellando recusat subiici potestati superiori, scilicet iudici. Ergo peccat. Objection 1. It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Romans 13:1): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, maius est vinculum ordinariae potestatis quam propriae electionis. Sed sicut legitur II, qu. VI, a iudicibus quos communis consensus elegerit non liceat provocari. Ergo multo minus licet appellare a iudicibus ordinariis. Objection 2. Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from ordinary judges.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, illud quod semel est licitum, semper est licitum. Sed non est licitum appellare post decimum diem, neque tertio super eodem. Ergo videtur quod appellatio non sit secundum se licita. Objection 3. Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, qu. 6, nor a third time on the same point [Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Paulus Caesarem appellavit, ut habetur Act. XXV. On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplici de causa contingit aliquem appellare. Uno quidem modo, confidentia iustae causae, quia videlicet iniuste a iudice gravatur. Et sic licitum est appellare, hoc enim est prudenter evadere. Unde II, qu. VI, dicitur, omnis oppressus libere sacerdotum si voluerit appellet iudicium, et a nullo prohibeatur. Alio modo aliquis appellat causa afferendae morae, ne contra eum iusta sententia proferatur. Et hoc est calumniose se defendere, quod est illicitum, sicut dictum est, facit enim iniuriam et iudici, cuius officium impedit, et adversario suo, cuius iustitiam, quantum potest, perturbat. Et ideo sicut dicitur II, qu. VI, omni modo puniendus est cuius iniusta appellatio pronuntiatur. I answer that, There are two motives for which a man appeals. First through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above (Article 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man should be punished if his appeal be declared unjust."
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod potestati inferiori intantum aliquis subiici debet inquantum ordinem superioris servat, a quo si exorbitaverit, ei subiici non oportet, puta si aliud iusserit proconsul, et aliud imperator, ut patet per Glossam Rom. XIII. Cum autem iudex iniuste aliquem gravat, quantum ad hoc relinquit ordinem superioris potestatis, secundum quam necessitas sibi iuste iudicandi imponitur. Et ideo licitum est ei qui contra iustitiam gravatur, ad directionem superioris potestatis recurrere appellando, vel ante sententiam vel post. Et quia non praesumitur esse rectitudo ubi vera fides non est, ideo non licet Catholico ad infidelem iudicem appellare, secundum illud II, qu. VI, Catholicus qui causam suam, sive iustam sive iniustam, ad iudicium alterius fidei iudicis provocaverit, excommunicetur. Nam et apostolus arguit eos qui iudicio contendebant apud infideles. Reply to Objection 1. A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the emperor another," according to a gloss on Romans 13:2. Now when a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according to Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus: "The Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Corinthians 6:6).
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ex proprio defectu vel negligentia procedit quod aliquis sua sponte se alterius iudicio subiiciat de cuius iustitia non confidit. Levis etiam animi esse videtur ut quis non permaneat in eo quod semel approbavit. Et ideo rationabiliter denegatur subsidium appellationis a iudicibus arbitrariis, qui non habent potestatem nisi ex consensu litigantium. Sed potestas iudicis ordinarii non dependet ex consensu illius qui eius iudicio subditur, sed ex auctoritate regis et principis, qui eum instituit. Et ideo contra eius iniustum gravamen lex tribuit appellationis subsidium, ita quod, etiam si sit simul ordinarius et arbitrarius iudex, potest ab eo appellari; quia videtur ordinaria potestas occasio fuisse quod arbiter eligeretur; nec debet ad defectum imputari eius qui consensit sicut in arbitrum in eum quem princeps iudicem ordinarium dedit. Reply to Objection 2. It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordinary judge by the prince.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aequitas iuris ita subvenit uni parti quod altera non gravetur. Et ideo tempus decem dierum concessit ad appellandum, quod sufficiens aestimavit ad deliberandum an expediat appellare. Si vero non esset determinatum tempus in quo appellare liceret, semper certitudo iudicii remaneret in suspenso, et ita pars altera damnaretur. Ideo autem non est concessum ut tertio aliquis appellet super eodem, quia non est probabile toties iudices a recto iudicio declinare. Reply to Objection 3. The equity of the law so guards the interests of the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third time on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly so many times.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod liceat condemnato ad mortem se defendere, si possit. Illud enim ad quod natura inclinat semper est licitum, quasi de iure naturali existens. Sed naturae inclinatio est ad resistendum corrumpentibus, non solum in hominibus et animalibus, sed etiam in insensibilibus rebus. Ergo licet reo condemnato resistere, si potest, ne tradatur in mortem. Objection 1. It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put to death.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut aliquis sententiam mortis contra se latam subterfugit resistendo, ita etiam fugiendo. Sed licitum esse videtur quod aliquis se a morte per fugam liberet, secundum illud Eccli. IX, longe esto ab homine potestatem habente occidendi et non vivificandi. Ergo etiam licitum est resistere. Objection 2. Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Sirach 9:18, "Keep thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]" [The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is also lawful for the accused to resist.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, Prov. XXIV dicitur, erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem, et eos qui trahuntur ad interitum liberare ne cesses. Sed plus tenetur aliquis sibi quam alteri. Ergo licitum est quod aliquis condemnatus seipsum defendat ne in mortem tradatur. Objection 3. Further, it is written (Proverbs 24:11): "Deliver them that are led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to deliver." Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself from being put to death.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XIII, qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit, et ipse sibi damnationem acquirit. Sed condemnatus se defendendo potestati resistit quantum ad hoc in quo est divinitus instituta ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum. Ergo peccat se defendendo. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Romans 13:2): "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God "for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good" [1 Peter 2:14. Therefore he sins in defending himself.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis damnatur ad mortem dupliciter. Uno modo, iuste. Et sic non licet condemnato se defendere, licitum enim est iudici eum resistentem impugnare; unde relinquitur quod ex parte eius sit bellum iniustum. Unde indubitanter peccat. Alio modo condemnatur aliquis iniuste. Et tale iudicium simile est violentiae latronum, secundum illud Ezech. XXII, principes eius in medio eius quasi lupi rapientes praedam ad effundendum sanguinem. Et ideo sicut licet resistere latronibus, ita licet resistere in tali casu malis principibus, nisi forte propter scandalum vitandum, cum ex hoc aliqua gravis turbatio timeretur. I answer that, A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he sins. Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to Ezekiel 22:21, "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood." Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ideo homini data est ratio, ut ea ad quae natura inclinat non passim, sed secundum rationis ordinem exequatur. Et ideo non quaelibet defensio sui est licita, sed quae fit cum debito moderamine. Reply to Objection 1. Reason was given to man that he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus ita condemnatur quod ipse sibi inferat mortem, sed quod ipse mortem patiatur. Et ideo non tenetur facere id unde mors sequatur, quod est manere in loco unde ducatur ad mortem. Tenetur tamen non resistere agenti, quin patiatur quod iustum est eum pati. Sicut etiam si aliquis sit condemnatus ut fame moriatur, non peccat si cibum sibi occulte ministratum sumat, quia non sumere esset seipsum occidere. Reply to Objection 2. When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.
IIª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod per illud dictum sapientis non inducitur aliquis ad liberandum alium a morte contra ordinem iustitiae. Unde nec seipsum contra iustitiam resistendo aliquis debet liberare a morte. Reply to Objection 3. This saying of the wise man does not direct that one should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by resisting against justice.

Notes

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