Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q83

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IIª-IIae q. 83 pr. Deinde considerandum est de oratione. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem et septem. Primo, utrum oratio sit actus appetitivae virtutis vel cognitivae. Secundo, utrum conveniens sit orare. Tertio, utrum oratio sit actus religionis. Quarto, utrum solus Deus sit orandus. Quinto, utrum in oratione sit aliquid determinate petendum. Sexto, utrum orando debeamus temporalia petere. Septimo, utrum pro aliis orare debeamus. Octavo, utrum debeamus orare pro inimicis. Nono, de septem petitionibus orationis dominicae. Decimo, utrum orare sit proprium rationalis creaturae. Undecimo, utrum sancti in patria orent pro nobis. Duodecimo, utrum, oratio debeat esse vocalis. Tertiodecimo, utrum attentio requiratur ad orationem. Quartodecimo, utrum oratio debeat esse diuturna. Quintodecimo, utrum oratio sit efficax ad impetrandum quod petitur. Sextodecimo, utrum sit meritoria. Septimodecimo, de speciebus orationis. Question 83. Prayer 1. Is prayer an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power? 2. Is it fitting to pray to God? 3. Is prayer an act of religion? 4. Should we pray to God alone? 5. Should we ask for something definite when we pray? 6. Should we ask for temporal things when we pray? 7. Should we pray for others? 8. Should we pray for our enemies? 9. The seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer 10. Is prayer proper to the rational creature? 11. Do the saints in heaven pray for us? 12. Should prayer be vocal? 13. Is attention requisite in prayer? 14. Should prayer last a long time? 15. Is prayer meritorious? [*Article 16] 16. Do sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Article 15] 17. The different kinds of prayer
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio sit actus appetitivae virtutis. Orationis enim est exaudiri. Sed desiderium est quod exauditur a Deo, secundum illud Psalm., desiderium pauperum exaudivit dominus. Ergo oratio est desiderium. Sed desiderium est actus appetitivae virtutis. Ergo et oratio. Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard by God, according to Psalm 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, in III cap. de Div. Nom., ante omnia ab oratione incipere est utile, sicut Deo nosipsos tradentes et unientes. Sed unio ad Deum per amorem fit, qui pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ergo oratio ad vim appetitivam pertinet. Objection 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the appetitive power.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus, in III de anima, ponit duas operationes intellectivae partis, quarum prima est indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam scilicet apprehendimus de unoquoque quid est; secunda vero est compositio et divisio, per quam scilicet apprehenditur aliquid esse vel non esse. Quibus tertia additur ratiocinari, procedendo scilicet de notis ad ignota. Sed oratio ad nullam istarum operationum reducitur. Ergo non est actus intellectivae virtutis, sed appetitivae. Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis," whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations. Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appetitive power.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in libro Etymol., quod orare idem est quod dicere. Sed dictio pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo oratio non est actus appetitivae virtutis, sed intellectivae. On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak." Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the appetitive, but of the intellective power.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum Cassiodorum, oratio dicitur quasi oris ratio. Ratio autem speculativa et practica in hoc differunt quod ratio speculativa est apprehensiva solum rerum; ratio vero practica est non solum apprehensiva, sed etiam causativa. Est autem aliquid alterius causa dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, perfecte, necessitatem inducendo, et hoc contingit quando effectus totaliter subditur potestati causae. Alio vero modo, imperfecte, solum disponendo, quando scilicet effectus non subditur totaliter potestati causae. Sic igitur et ratio dupliciter est causa aliquorum. Uno quidem modo, sicut necessitatem imponens, et hoc modo ad rationem pertinet imperare non solum inferioribus potentiis et membris corporis, sed etiam hominibus subiectis, quod quidem fit imperando. Alio modo, sicut inducens et quodammodo disponens, et hoc modo ratio petit aliquid fieri ab his qui ei non subiiciuntur, sive sint aequales sive sint superiores. Utrumque autem horum, scilicet imperare et petere sive deprecari, ordinationem quandam important, prout scilicet homo disponit aliquid per aliud esse faciendum. Unde pertinent ad rationem, cuius est ordinare, propter quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod ad optima deprecatur ratio. Sic autem nunc loquimur de oratione, prout significat quandam deprecationem vel petitionem, secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Verb. Dom., quod oratio petitio quaedam est; et Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod oratio est petitio decentium a Deo. Sic ergo patet quod oratio de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis actus. I answer that, According to Cassiodorus [Comment. in Psalm 38:13 "prayer [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio]." Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best." Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [This last paragraph refers to the Latin word 'oratio' [prayer] which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,' 'oris' (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense Augustine [Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14: says (De Verb. Dom.) that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod desiderium pauperum dicitur dominus exaudire, vel quia desiderium est causa petendi, cum petitio sit quodammodo desiderii interpres. Vel hoc dicitur ad ostendendum exauditionis velocitatem, quia scilicet dum adhuc aliquid in desiderio pauperum est, Deus exaudit, antequam orationem proponant; secundum illud Isaiae LXV, eritque, antequam clament, ego exaudiam. Reply to Objection 1. The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Isaiah 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas movet rationem ad suum finem. Unde nihil prohibet, movente voluntate, actum rationis tendere in finem caritatis, qui est Deo uniri. Tendit autem oratio in Deum quasi a voluntate caritatis mota, dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, ex parte eius quod petitur, quia hoc praecipue est in oratione petendum, ut Deo uniamur; secundum illud Psalm., unam petii a domino, hanc requiram, ut inhabitem in domo domini omnibus diebus vitae meae. Alio modo, ex parte ipsius petentis, quem oportet accedere ad eum a quo petit, vel loco, sicut ad hominem; vel mente, sicut ad Deum. Unde dicit ibidem quod, quando orationibus invocamus Deum, revelata mente adsumus ipsi. Et secundum hoc etiam Damascenus dicit quod oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (I, 82, 4; I-II, 9, 1, ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God, according to Psalm 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of the mind to God."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illi tres actus pertinent ad rationem speculativam. Sed ulterius ad rationem practicam pertinet causare aliquid per modum imperii vel per modum petitionis, ut dictum est. Reply to Objection 3. These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of command or of petition, as stated above.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens orare. Oratio enim videtur esse necessaria ad hoc quod intimemus ei a quo petimus id quo indigemus. Sed, sicut dicitur Matth. VI, scit pater vester quia his indigetis. Ergo non est conveniens Deum orare. Objection 1. It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. But according to Matthew 6:32, "Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things." Therefore it is not becoming to pray to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, per orationem flectitur animus eius qui oratur ut faciat quod ab eo petitur. Sed animus Dei est immutabilis et inflexibilis, secundum illud I Reg. XV, porro triumphator in Israel non parcet, nec poenitudine flectetur. Ergo non est conveniens quod Deum oremus. Objection 2. Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God's mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Samuel 15:29, "But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance." Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, liberalius est dare aliquid non petenti quam dare petenti, quia, sicut Seneca dicit, nulla res carius emitur quam quae precibus empta est. Sed Deus est liberalissimus. Ergo non videtur esse conveniens quod Deum oremus. Objection 3. Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), "nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers." But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. XVIII, oportet orare, et non deficere. On the contrary, It is written (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod triplex fuit circa orationem antiquorum error. Quidam enim posuerunt quod res humanae non reguntur divina providentia. Ex quo sequitur quod vanum sit orare, et omnino Deum colere. Et de his dicitur Malach. III, dixistis, vanus est qui servit Deo. Secunda fuit opinio ponentium omnia, etiam in rebus humanis, ex necessitate contingere, sive ex immutabilitate divinae providentiae, sive ex necessitate stellarum, sive ex connexione causarum. Et secundum hos etiam excluditur orationis utilitas. Tertia fuit opinio ponentium quidem res humanas divina providentia regi, et quod res humanae non proveniunt ex necessitate, sed dicebant similiter dispositionem divinae providentiae variabilem esse, et quod orationibus et aliis quae ad divinum cultum pertinent dispositio divinae providentiae immutatur. Haec autem omnia in primo libro improbata sunt. Et ideo oportet sic inducere orationis utilitatem ut neque rebus humanis, divinae providentiae subiectis, necessitatem imponamus; neque etiam divinam dispositionem mutabilem aestimemus. Ad huius ergo evidentiam, considerandum est quod ex divina providentia non solum disponitur qui effectus fiant, sed etiam ex quibus causis et quo ordine proveniant. Inter alias autem causas sunt etiam quorundam causae actus humani. Unde oportet homines agere aliqua, non ut per suos actus divinam dispositionem immutent, sed ut per actus suos impleant quosdam effectus secundum ordinem a Deo dispositum. Et idem etiam est in naturalibus causis. Et simile est etiam de oratione. Non enim propter hoc oramus ut divinam dispositionem immutemus, sed ut id impetremus quod Deus disposuit per orationes sanctorum esse implendum; ut scilicet homines postulando mereantur accipere quod eis omnipotens Deus ante saecula disposuit donare, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro dialogorum. I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malachi 3:14): "You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God." Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in I, 19, 7,8; I, 22, 2,4; I, 115, 6; I, 116. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition. In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions. not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8)
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est necessarium nos Deo preces porrigere ut ei nostras indigentias vel desideria manifestemus, sed ut nosipsi consideremus in his ad divinum auxilium esse recurrendum. Reply to Objection 1. We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oratio nostra non ordinatur ad immutationem divinae dispositionis, sed ut obtineatur nostris precibus quod Deus disposuit. Reply to Objection 2. As stated above, our motive in praying is, not Divine disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus multa nobis praestat ex sua liberalitate etiam non petita. Sed quod aliqua vult praestare nobis petentibus, hoc est propter nostram utilitatem, ut scilicet fiduciam quandam accipiamus recurrendi ad Deum, et ut recognoscamus eum esse bonorum nostrorum auctorem. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, considera quanta est tibi concessa felicitas, quanta gloria attributa, orationibus fabulari cum Deo, cum Christo miscere colloquia, optare quod velis, quod desideras postulare. Reply to Objection 3. God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says [Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes.]; Cf. Caten. Aur. on Luke 18: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio non sit actus religionis. Religio enim, cum sit pars iustitiae, est in voluntate sicut in subiecto. Sed oratio pertinet ad partem intellectivam, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo oratio non videtur esse actus religionis, sed doni intellectus, per quod mens ascendit in Deum. Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its subject.But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, actus latriae cadit sub necessitate praecepti. Sed oratio non videtur cadere sub necessitate praecepti, sed ex mera voluntate procedere, cum nihil aliud sit quam volitorum petitio. Ergo oratio non videtur esse religionis actus. Objection 2. Further, the act of "latria" falls under a necessity of precept.But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad religionem pertinere videtur ut quis divinae naturae cultum caeremoniamque afferat. Sed oratio non videtur aliquid Deo afferre, sed magis aliquid obtinendum ab eo petere. Ergo oratio non est religionis actus. Objection 3. Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalm., dirigatur oratio mea sicut incensum in conspectu tuo, ubi dicit Glossa quod in huius figuram, in veteri lege incensum dicebatur offerri in odorem suavem domino. Sed hoc pertinet ad religionem. Ergo oratio est religionis actus. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 140:2): "Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says that "it was to signify this that under the old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad religionem proprie pertinet reverentiam et honorem Deo exhibere. Et ideo omnia illa per quae Deo reverentia exhibetur pertinent ad religionem. Per orationem autem homo Deo reverentiam exhibet, inquantum scilicet se ei subiicit, et profitetur orando se eo indigere sicut auctore suorum bonorum. Unde manifestum est quod oratio est proprie religionis actus. I answer that, As stated above (81, 2,4), it belongs properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas movet alias potentias animae in suum finem, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo religio, quae est in voluntate, ordinat actus aliarum potentiarum ad Dei reverentiam. Inter alias autem potentias animae, intellectus altior est et voluntati propinquior. Et ideo post devotionem, quae pertinet ad ipsam voluntatem, oratio, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam, est praecipua inter actus religionis, per quam religio intellectum hominis movet in Deum. Reply to Objection 1. The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as stated above (82, 1, ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion directs man's intellect to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum petere quae desideramus, sed etiam recte aliquid desiderare sub praecepto cadit. Sed desiderare quidem cadit sub praecepto caritatis, petere autem sub praecepto religionis. Quod quidem praeceptum ponitur Matth. VII, ubi dicitur, petite, et accipietis. Reply to Objection 2. It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Matthew 7:7, where it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [Vulgate: 'Ask and it shall be given you.'].
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod orando tradit homo mentem suam Deo, quam ei per reverentiam subiicit et quodammodo praesentat, ut patet ex auctoritate Dionysii prius inducta. Et ideo sicut mens humana praeeminet exterioribus vel corporalibus membris, vel exterioribus rebus quae ad Dei servitium applicantur, ita etiam oratio praeeminet aliis actibus religionis. Reply to Objection 3. By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (1, Objection 1). Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God's service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod solus Deus debeat orari. Oratio enim est actus religionis, ut dictum est. Sed solus Deus est religione colendus. Ergo solus Deus est orandus. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above (Article 3). But God alone is to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, frustra porrigitur oratio ad eum qui orationem non cognoscit. Sed solius Dei est orationem cognoscere. Tum quia plerumque oratio magis agitur interiori actu, quem solus Deus cognoscit, quam voce, secundum illud quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIV, orabo spiritu, orabo et mente. Tum etiam quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant vivi, etiam eorum filii. Ergo oratio non est nisi Deo porrigenda. Objection 2. Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one's prayer, both because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 14:15), "I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding": and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the "dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing." Therefore we ought to pray to God alone.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, si aliquibus sanctis orationem porrigimus, hoc non est nisi inquantum sunt Deo coniuncti. Sed quidam in hoc mundo viventes, vel etiam in Purgatorio existentes, sunt multum Deo coniuncti per gratiam. Ad eos autem non porrigitur oratio. Ergo nec ad sanctos qui sunt in Paradiso debemus orationem porrigere. Objection 3. Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are in Paradise.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob V, voca, si est qui tibi respondeat, et ad aliquem sanctorum convertere. On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), "Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod oratio porrigitur alicui dupliciter, uno modo, quasi per ipsum implenda; alio modo, sicut per ipsum impetranda. Primo quidem modo soli Deo orationem porrigimus, quia omnes orationes nostrae ordinari debent ad gratiam et gloriam consequendam, quae solus Deus dat, secundum illud Psalm., gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus. Sed secundo modo orationem porrigimus sanctis Angelis et hominibus, non ut per eos Deus nostras petitiones cognoscat, sed ut eorum precibus et meritis orationes nostrae sortiantur effectum. Et ideo dicitur Apoc. VIII quod ascendit fumus aromatum, idest orationes sanctorum, de manu Angeli coram domino. Et hoc etiam patet ex ipso modo quo Ecclesia utitur in orando. Nam a sancta Trinitate petimus ut nostri misereatur, ab aliis autem sanctis quibuscumque petimus ut orent pro nobis. I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. On the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone gives, according to Psalm 83:12, "The Lord will give grace and glory." But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written (Apocalypse 8:4) that "the smoke of the incense," namely "the prayers of the saints ascended up before God." This is also clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity "to have mercy on us," while we ask any of the saints "to pray for us."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illi soli impendimus orando religionis cultum a quo quaerimus obtinere quod oramus, quia in hoc protestamur eum bonorum nostrorum auctorem, non autem eis quos requirimus quasi interpellatores nostros apud Deum. Reply to Objection 1. To Him alone do we offer religious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod mortui ea quae in hoc mundo aguntur, considerata eorum naturali conditione, non cognoscunt, et praecipue interiores motus cordis. Sed beatis, ut Gregorius dicit, in XII Moral., in verbo manifestatur illud quod decet eos cognoscere de eis quae circa nos aguntur, etiam quantum ad interiores motus cordis. Maxime autem eorum excellentiam decet ut cognoscant petitiones ad eos factas vel voce vel corde. Et ideo petitiones quas ad eos dirigimus, Deo manifestante, cognoscunt. Reply to Objection 2. The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through Divine manifestation.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt in hoc mundo aut in Purgatorio, nondum fruuntur visione verbi, ut possint cognoscere ea quae nos cogitamus vel dicimus. Et ideo eorum suffragia non imploramus orando, sed a vivis petimus colloquendo. Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in oratione nihil determinate a Deo petere debeamus. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, oratio est petitio decentium a Deo. Unde inefficax est oratio per quam petitur id quod non expedit, secundum illud Iac. IV, petitis et non accipitis, eo quod male petatis. Sed sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Nam quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus. Ergo non debemus aliquid orando determinate petere. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God"; wherefore it is useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, "You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss." Now according to Romans 8:26, "we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Therefore we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, quicumque aliquid determinate ab alio petit, nititur voluntatem ipsius inclinare ad faciendum id quod ipse vult. Non autem ad hoc tendere debemus ut Deus velit quod nos volumus, sed magis ut nos velimus quod Deus vult, ut dicit Glossa, super illud Psalm., exultate, iusti, in domino. Ergo non debemus aliquid determinatum a Deo petere. Objection 2. Further, those who ask another person for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Psalm 32:1, "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just." Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite when we pray.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, mala a Deo petenda non sunt, ad bona autem Deus ipse nos invitat. Frustra autem ab aliquo petitur ad quod accipiendum invitatur. Ergo non est determinate aliquid a Deo in oratione petendum. Objection 3. Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dominus, Matth. VI et Luc. XI, docuit discipulos determinate petere ea quae continentur in petitionibus orationis dominicae. On the contrary, our Lord (Matthew 6 and Luke 11) taught His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut maximus Valerius refert, Socrates nihil ultra petendum a diis immortalibus arbitrabatur quam ut bona tribuerent, quia hi demum scirent quid unicuique esset utile; nos autem plerumque id votis expetere quod non impetrasse melius foret. Quae quidem sententia aliqualiter vera est, quantum ad illa quae possunt malum eventum habere, quibus etiam homo potest male et bene uti, sicut divitiae, quae, ut ibidem dicitur, multis exitio fuere; honores, qui complures pessumdederunt; regna, quorum exitus saepe miserabiles cernuntur; splendida coniugia, quae nonnunquam funditus domos evertunt. Sunt tamen quaedam bona quibus homo male uti non potest, quae scilicet malum eventum habere non possunt. Haec autem sunt quibus beatificamur et quibus beatitudinem meremur. Quae quidem sancti orando absolute petunt, secundum illud, ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus; et iterum, deduc me in semitam mandatorum tuorum. I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus [Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2, "Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain." This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as "riches, by which," as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2), "many have come to an evil end; honors, which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family." Nevertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Psalm 79:4, "Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved," and again in Psalm 118:35, "Lead me into the path of Thy commandments."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet homo ex se scire non possit quid orare debeat, spiritus tamen, ut ibidem dicitur, in hoc adiuvat infirmitatem nostram quod, inspirando nobis sancta desideria, recte postulare nos facit. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. IV, quod veros adoratores adorare oportet in spiritu et veritate. Reply to Objection 1. Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray for, "the Spirit," as stated in the same passage, "helpeth our infirmity," since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is right. Hence our Lord said (John 4:24) that true adorers "must adore . . . in spirit and in truth."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod cum orando petimus aliqua quae pertinent ad nostram salutem, conformamus voluntatem nostram voluntati Dei, de quo dicitur, I ad Tim. II, quod vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Reply to Objection 2. When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will to God's, of Whom it is written (1 Timothy 2:4) that "He will have all men to be saved."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sic ad bona Deus nos invitat quod ad ea non passibus corporis, sed piis desideriis et devotis orationibus accedamus. Reply to Objection 3. God so invites us to take good things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and devout prayers.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non debeat temporalia petere a Deo orando. Quae enim orando petimus, quaerimus. Sed temporalia non debemus quaerere, dicitur enim Matth. VI, primum quaerite regnum Dei et iustitiam eius, et haec omnia adiicientur vobis, scilicet temporalia; quae non quaerenda dicit, sed adiicienda quaesitis. Ergo temporalia non sunt in oratione a Deo petenda. Objection 1. It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Matthew 6:33): "Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things shall be added unto you," that is to say, temporal things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, nullus petit nisi ea de quibus est sollicitus. Sed de temporalibus sollicitudinem habere non debemus, secundum quod dicitur Matth. VI, nolite solliciti esse animae vestrae, quid manducetis. Ergo temporalia petere orando non debemus. Objection 2. Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, according to the saying of Matthew 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat." Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, per orationem nostram mens debet elevari in Deum. Sed petendo temporalia descendit ad ea quae infra se sunt, contra id quod apostolus dicebat, II ad Cor. IV, non contemplantibus nobis quae videntur, sed quae non videntur, quae enim videntur, temporalia sunt; quae autem non videntur, aeterna. Ergo non debet homo temporalia in oratione a Deo petere. Objection 3. Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 4:18), "While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, homo non debet petere a Deo nisi bona et utilia. Sed quandoque temporalia habita sunt nociva, non solum spiritualiter, sed etiam temporaliter. Ergo non sunt a Deo in oratione petenda. Objection 4. Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov. XXX, tribue tantum victui meo necessaria. On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 30:8): "Give me only the necessaries of life."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, de orando Deum, hoc licet orare quod licet desiderare. Temporalia autem licet desiderare, non quidem principaliter, ut in eis finem constituamus; sed sicut quaedam adminicula quibus adiuvamur ad tendendum in beatitudinem, inquantum scilicet per ea vita corporalis sustentatur, et inquantum nobis organice deserviunt ad actus virtutum, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in I Ethic. Et ideo pro temporalibus licet orare. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, sufficientiam vitae non indecenter vult quisquis eam vult et non amplius. Quae quidem non appetitur propter seipsam, sed propter salutem corporis et congruentem habitum personae hominis, ut non sit inconveniens eis cum quibus vivendum est. Ista ergo, cum habentur, ut teneantur; cum non habentur, ut habeantur, orandum est. I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 12): "It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire." Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7) when he states that "it is not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way befitting one's station, so as not to be out of keeping with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that we may gain possession of them."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod temporalia non sunt quaerenda principaliter, sed secundario. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, cum dixit, illud primo quaerendum est, scilicet regnum Dei, significavit quia hoc, scilicet temporale bonum, posterius quaerendum est, non tempore, sed dignitate, illud tanquam bonum nostrum, hoc tanquam necessarium nostrum. Reply to Objection 1. We should seek temporal things not in the first but in the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 16): "When He says that this" (i.e. the kingdom of God) "is to be sought first, He implies that the other" (i.e. temporal goods) "is to be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our good, the other as our need."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod non quaelibet sollicitudo rerum temporalium est prohibita, sed superflua et inordinata, ut supra habitum est. Reply to Objection 2. Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above (Question 55, Article 6).
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quando mens nostra intendit temporalibus rebus ut in eis quiescat, remanet in eis depressa. Sed quando intendit eis in ordine ad beatitudinem consequendam, non ab eis deprimitur, sed magis ea elevat sursum. Reply to Objection 3. When our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ex quo non petimus temporalia tanquam principaliter quaesita, sed in ordine ad aliud, eo tenore a Deo petimus ipsa ut nobis concedantur secundum quod expediunt ad salutem. Reply to Objection 4. From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debeamus pro aliis orare. In orando enim sequi debemus formam quam dominus tradidit. Sed in oratione dominica petitiones pro nobis facimus, non pro aliis, dicentes, panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie, et cetera huiusmodi. Ergo non debemus pro aliis orare. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. On praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in the Lord's Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," etc. Therefore we should not pray for others.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad hoc oratio fit quod exaudiatur. Sed una de conditionibus quae requiruntur ad hoc quod oratio sit audibilis, est ut aliquis oret pro seipso, unde super illud Ioan. XVI, si quid petieritis patrem in nomine meo, dabit vobis, Augustinus dicit, exaudiuntur omnes pro seipsis, non autem pro omnibus. Unde non utcumque dictum est, dabit, sed, dabit vobis. Ergo videtur quod non debeamus pro aliis orare, sed solum pro nobis. Objection 2. Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 16:23, "If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you," says (Tract. cii): "Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply 'He will give it,' but 'He will give it you. '" Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but only for ourselves.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, pro aliis, si sunt mali, prohibemur orare, secundum illud Ierem. VII, tu ergo noli orare pro populo hoc, et non obsistas mihi, quia non exaudiam te. Pro bonis autem non oportet orare, quia ipsi pro seipsis orantes exaudiuntur. Ergo videtur quod non debeamus pro aliis orare. Objection 3. Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are wicked, according to Jeremiah 7:16, "Therefore do not then pray for this people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee." On the other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. V, orate pro invicem, ut salvemini. On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): "Pray one for another, that you may be saved."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, illud debemus orando petere quod debemus desiderare. Desiderare autem debemus bona non solum nobis, sed etiam aliis, hoc enim pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, quam proximis debemus impendere, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo caritas hoc requirit, ut pro aliis oremus. Unde Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., pro se orare necessitas cogit, pro altero autem, caritas fraternitatis hortatur. Dulcior autem ante Deum est oratio, non quam necessitas transmittit, sed quam caritas fraternitatis commendat. I answer that, As stated above (Article 6), when we pray we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (25, 1 and 2; 27, 2; 31, 1). Therefore charity requires us to pray for others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: "Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the outcome of necessity."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Cyprianus dicit, in libro de Orat. dominica, ideo non dicimus, pater meus, sed noster; nec, da mihi, sed, da nobis, quia unitatis magister noluit privatim precem fieri, ut scilicet quis pro se tantum precetur. Unum enim orare pro omnibus voluit, quo modo in uno omnes ipse portavit. Reply to Objection 1. As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), "We say 'Our Father' and not 'My Father,' 'Give us' and not 'Give me,' because the Master of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself bore all in one."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod pro se orare ponitur conditio orationis, non quidem necessaria ad effectum merendi, sed sicut necessaria ad indeficientiam impetrandi. Contingit enim quandoque quod oratio pro alio facta non impetrat, etiam si fiat pie et perseveranter et de pertinentibus ad salutem, propter impedimentum quod est ex parte eius pro quo oratur, secundum illud Ierem. XV, si steterit Moyses et Samuel coram me, non est anima mea ad populum istum. Nihilominus tamen oratio meritoria erit oranti, qui ex caritate orat, secundum illud Psalm., oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur, Glossa, idest, etsi non eis profuit, ego tamen non sum frustratus mea mercede. Reply to Objection 2. It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself: not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious, but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jeremiah 15:1, "If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people." And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person who prays thus out of charity, according to Psalm 34:13, "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am not deprived of my reward," as the gloss expounds it.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam pro peccatoribus orandum est, ut convertantur, et pro iustis, ut perseverent et proficiant. Orantes tamen non pro omnibus peccatoribus exaudiuntur, sed pro quibusdam, exaudiuntur enim pro praedestinatis, non autem pro praescitis ad mortem. Sicut etiam correctio qua fratres corrigimus, effectum habet in praedestinatis, non in reprobatis, secundum illud Eccle. VII, nemo potest corrigere quem Deus despexerit. Et ideo dicitur I Ioan. V, qui scit fratrem suum peccare peccato non ad mortem, petat, et dabitur ei vita peccanti peccatum non ad mortem. Sed sicut nulli, quandiu hic vivit, subtrahendum est correctionis beneficium, quia non possumus distinguere praedestinatos a reprobatis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Corr. et gratia; ita etiam nulli est denegandum orationis suffragium. Pro iustis etiam est orandum, triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia multorum preces facilius exaudiuntur. Unde Rom. XV, super illud, adiuvetis me in orationibus vestris, dicit Glossa, bene rogat apostolus minores pro se orare. Multi enim minimi, dum congregantur unanimes, fiunt magni, et multorum preces impossibile est quod non impetrent, illud scilicet quod est impetrabile. Secundo, ut ex multis gratia agatur Deo de beneficiis quae confert iustis, quae etiam in utilitatem multorum vergunt, ut patet per apostolum, II ad Cor. I. Tertio, ut maiores non superbiant, dum considerant se minorum suffragiis indigere. Reply to Objection 3. We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate, according to Ecclesiastes 7:14, "No man can correct whom God hath despised." Hence it is written (1 John 5:16): "He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him, who sinneth not to death." Now just as the benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help of prayer. We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss on Romans 15:30, "Help me in your prayers," says: "The Apostle rightly tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain" that which is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Corinthians 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need the prayers of the less perfect.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non debeamus pro inimicis orare. Quia, ut dicitur Rom. XV, quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt. Sed in sacra Scriptura inducuntur multae imprecationes contra inimicos, dicitur enim in Psalm., erubescant et conturbentur omnes inimici mei, erubescant et conturbentur valde velociter. Ergo et nos debemus orare contra inimicos, magis quam pro eis. Objection 1. It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies. According to Romans 15:4, "what things soever were written, were written for our learning." Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies; thus it is written (Psalm 6:11): "Let all my enemies be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very speedily [Vulgate: 'Let them be turned back and be ashamed.']." Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, vindicari de inimicis in malum inimicorum cedit. Sed sancti vindictam de inimicis petunt, secundum illud Apoc. VI, usquequo non vindicas sanguinem nostrum de his qui habitant in terra? Unde et de vindicta impiorum laetantur, secundum illud Psalm., laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam. Ergo non est orandum pro inimicis, sed magis contra eos. Objection 2. Further, to be revenged on one's enemies is harmful to them. But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apocalypse 6:10, "How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on earth?" Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their enemies, according to Psalm 57:11, "The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge." Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but against them.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, operatio hominis et eius oratio non debent esse contraria. Sed homines quandoque licite impugnant inimicos, alioquin omnia bella essent illicita, quod est contra supradicta. Ergo non debemus orare pro inimicis. Objection 3. Further, man's deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above (Question 40, Article 1). Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. V, orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos. On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 5:44): "Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod orare pro alio caritatis est, sicut dictum est. Unde eodem modo quo tenemur diligere inimicos, tenemur pro inimicis orare. Qualiter autem teneamur inimicos diligere supra habitum est, in tractatu de caritate, ut scilicet in eis diligamus naturam, non culpam; et quod diligere inimicos in generali est in praecepto, in speciali autem non est in praecepto nisi secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo esset paratus etiam specialiter inimicum diligere et eum iuvare in necessitatis articulo, vel si veniam peteret; sed in speciali absolute inimicos diligere et eos iuvare perfectionis est. Et similiter necessitatis est ut in communibus nostris orationibus quas pro aliis facimus, inimicos non excludamus. Quod autem pro eis specialiter oremus, perfectionis est, non necessitatis, nisi in aliquo casu speciali. I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated above (Article 7). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise on charity (25, 8,9), how we are bound to love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one's enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is an act of perfection. In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them individually, except in certain special cases.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod imprecationes quae in sacra Scriptura ponuntur quadrupliciter possunt intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod prophetae solent figura imprecantis futura praedicere, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte. Secundo, prout quaedam temporalia mala peccatoribus quandoque a Deo ad correctionem immittuntur. Tertio, quia intelliguntur petere non contra ipsos homines, sed contra regnum peccati, ut scilicet correctione hominum peccatum destruatur. Quarto, conformando voluntatem suam divinae iustitiae circa damnationem perseverantium in peccato. Reply to Objection 1. The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets "to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," as Augustine states [De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21. Secondly, in the sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in eodem libro Augustinus dicit, vindicta martyrum est ut evertatur regnum peccati, quo regnante tanta perpessi sunt. Vel, sicut dicitur in libro de quaest. Vet. et novi Test., postulant se vindicari non voce, sed ratione, sicut sanguis Abel clamavit de terra. Laetantur autem de vindicta non propter eam, sed propter divinam iustitiam. Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod licitum est impugnare inimicos ut compescantur a peccatis, quod cedit in bonum eorum et aliorum. Et sic etiam licet orando petere aliqua temporalia mala inimicorum ut corrigantur. Et sic oratio et operatio non erunt contraria. Reply to Objection 3. It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one another.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem petitiones orationis dominicae assignentur. Vanum enim est petere illud quod semper est. Sed nomen Dei semper est sanctum, secundum illud Luc. I, sanctum nomen eius. Regnum etiam eius est sempiternum, secundum illud Psalmo, regnum tuum, domine, regnum omnium saeculorum. Voluntas etiam Dei semper impletur, secundum illud Isaiae XLVI, omnis voluntas mea fiet. Vanum ergo est petere quod nomen Dei sanctificetur, quod regnum eius adveniat, et quod eius voluntas fiat. Objection 1. It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy, according to Luke 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is everlasting, according to Psalm 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isaiah 46:10, "All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask for "the name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and for "His will to be done."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, prius est recedere a malo quam consequi bonum. Inconvenienter igitur videntur praeordinari petitiones quae pertinent ad consequendum bonum, petitionibus quae pertinent ad amotionem mali. Objection 2. Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the removal of evil.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, ad hoc aliquid petitur ut donetur. Sed praecipuum donum Dei est spiritus sanctus, et ea quae nobis per ipsum dantur. Ergo videntur inconvenienter proponi petitiones, cum non respondeant donis spiritus sancti. Objection 3. Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one. Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 arg. 4 Praeterea, secundum Lucam in oratione dominica ponuntur solum quinque petitiones, ut patet Luc. XI. Superfluum igitur fuit quod secundum Matthaeum septem petitiones ponuntur. Objection 4. Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 arg. 5 Praeterea, in vanum videtur captare benevolentiam eius qui benevolentia sua nos praevenit. Sed Deus nos sua benevolentia praevenit, quia ipse prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. IV. Superflue ergo praemittitur petitionibus, pater noster, qui es in caelis, quod videtur ad benevolentiam captandam pertinere. Objection 5. Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" (1 John 4:19). Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our "Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win God's benevolence.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 s. c. Sed in contrarium sufficit auctoritas Christi orationem instituentis. On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer, suffices.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod oratio dominica perfectissima est, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, si recte et congruenter oramus, nihil aliud dicere possumus quam quod in ista oratione dominica positum est. Quia enim oratio est quodammodo desiderii nostri interpres apud Deum, illa solum recte orando petimus quae recte desiderare valemus. In oratione autem dominica non solum petuntur omnia quae recte desiderare possumus, sed etiam eo ordine quo desideranda sunt, ut sic haec oratio non solum instruat postulare, sed etiam sit informativa totius nostri affectus. Manifestum est autem quod primo cadit in desiderio finis; deinde ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem noster Deus est. In quem noster affectus tendit dupliciter, uno quidem modo, prout volumus gloriam Dei; alio modo, secundum quod volumus frui gloria eius. Quorum primum pertinet ad dilectionem qua Deum in seipso diligimus, secundum vero pertinet ad dilectionem qua diligimus nos in Deo. Et ideo prima petitio ponitur, sanctificetur nomen tuum, per quam petimus gloriam Dei. Secunda vero ponitur, adveniat regnum tuum, per quam petimus ad gloriam regni eius pervenire. Ad finem autem praedictum ordinat nos aliquid dupliciter, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem, bonum quod est utile in finem. Est autem aliquid utile in finem beatitudinis dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et principaliter, secundum meritum quo beatitudinem meremur Deo obediendo. Et quantum ad hoc ponitur, fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo, et in terra. Alio modo, instrumentaliter, et quasi coadiuvans nos ad merendum. Et ad hoc pertinet quod dicitur, panem nostrum quotidianum da nobis hodie, sive hoc intelligatur de pane sacramentali, cuius quotidianus usus proficit homini, in quo etiam intelliguntur omnia alia sacramenta; sive etiam intelligatur de pane corporali, ut per panem intelligatur omnis sufficientia victus, sicut dicit Augustinus, ad Probam; quia et Eucharistia est praecipuum sacramentum, et panis est praecipuus cibus, unde et in Evangelio Matthaei scriptum est, supersubstantialem, idest praecipuum, ut Hieronymus exponit. Per accidens autem ordinamur in beatitudinem per remotionem prohibentis. Tria autem sunt quae nos a beatitudine prohibent. Primo quidem, peccatum, quod directe excludit a regno, secundum illud I ad Cor. VI, neque fornicarii, neque idolis servientes, etc., regnum Dei possidebunt. Et ad hoc pertinet quod dicitur, dimitte nobis debita nostra. Secundo, tentatio, quae nos impedit ab observantia divinae voluntatis. Et ad hoc pertinet quod dicitur, et ne nos inducas in tentationem, per quod non petimus ut non tentemur, sed ut a tentatione non vincamur, quod est in tentationem induci. Tertio, poenalitas praesens, quae impedit sufficientiam vitae. Et quantum ad hoc dicitur, libera nos a malo. I answer that, The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this prayer of our Lord." For since prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: "Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom. To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and as it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and in which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew we read, "supersubstantial," i.e. "principal," as Jerome expounds it. We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according to 1 Corinthians 6:9-10, "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God"; and to this refer the words, "Forgive us our trespasses." Secondly, there is temptation which hinders us from keeping God's will, and to this we refer when we say: "And lead us not into temptation," whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer in the words, "Deliver us from evil."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, cum dicimus, sanctificetur nomen tuum, non hoc petitur quasi non sit sanctum Dei nomen, sed ut sanctum ab hominibus habeatur; quod pertinet ad Dei gloriam in hominibus propagandam. Quod autem dicitur, adveniat regnum tuum, non ita dictum est quasi Deus nunc non regnet, sed, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, desiderium nostrum ad illud regnum excitamus, ut nobis veniat, atque in eo regnemus. Quod autem dicitur, fiat voluntas tua, recte intelligitur, obediatur praeceptis tuis. Sicut in caelo et in terra, idest, sicut ab Angelis, ita ab hominibus. Unde hae tres petitiones perfecte complebuntur in vita futura, aliae vero quatuor pertinent ad necessitatem vitae praesentis, sicut Augustinus dicit, in Enchiridio. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we say, "Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God's name is not holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing," and this pertains to the diffusion of God's glory among men. When we say, "Thy kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now," but "we excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may reign therein," as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11). The words, "Thy will be done rightly signify, 'May Thy commandments be obeyed' on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as by angels" (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the present life.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum oratio sit interpres desiderii, ordo petitionum non respondet ordini executionis, sed ordini desiderii sive intentionis, in quo prius est finis quam ea quae sunt ad finem, et consecutio boni quam remotio mali. Reply to Objection 2. Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, adaptat septem petitiones donis et beatitudinibus, dicens, si timor Dei est quo beati sunt pauperes spiritu, petamus ut sanctificetur in hominibus nomen Dei timore casto. Si pietas est qua beati sunt mites, petamus ut veniat regnum eius, ut mitescamus, nec ei resistamus. Si scientia est qua beati sunt qui lugent, oremus ut fiat voluntas eius, quia sic non lugebimus. Si fortitudo est qua beati sunt qui esuriunt, oremus ut panis noster quotidianus detur nobis. Si consilium est quo beati sunt misericordes, debita dimittamus, ut nobis nostra dimittantur. Si intellectus est quo beati sunt mundo corde, oremus ne habeamus duplex cor, temporalia sectando, de quibus tentationes fiunt in nobis. Si sapientia est qua beati sunt pacifici quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur, oremus ut liberemur a malo, ipsa enim liberatio liberos nos faciet filios Dei. Reply to Objection 3. Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: "If it is fear God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God's name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very fact become the free children of God."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., Lucas in oratione dominica petitiones non septem, sed quinque complexus est. Ostendens enim tertiam petitionem duarum praemissarum esse quodammodo repetitionem, praetermittendo eam facit intelligi, quia scilicet ad hoc praecipue voluntas Dei tendit ut eius sanctitatem cognoscamus, et cum ipso regnemus. Quod etiam Matthaeus in ultimo posuit, libera nos a malo, Lucas non posuit, ut sciat unusquisque in eo se liberari a malo quod non infertur in tentationem. Reply to Objection 4. According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this--that we come to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him. Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," is omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not led into temptation.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 9 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod oratio non porrigitur Deo ut ipsum flectamus, sed ut in nobis ipsis fiduciam excitemus postulandi. Quae quidem praecipue excitatur in nobis considerando eius caritatem ad nos, qua bonum nostrum vult, et ideo dicimus, pater noster; et eius excellentiam, qua potest, et ideo dicimus, qui es in caelis. Reply to Objection 5. Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our regard, whereby he wills our good--wherefore we say: "Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil it--wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod orare non sit proprium rationalis creaturae. Eiusdem enim videtur esse petere et accipere. Sed accipere convenit etiam personis increatis, scilicet filio et spiritui sancto. Ergo etiam eis convenit orare, nam et filius dicit, Ioan. XIV, ego rogabo patrem; et de spiritu sancto dicit apostolus, spiritus postulat pro nobis. Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said (John 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulgate: 'the'] Father," and the Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Romans 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, Angeli sunt supra rationales creaturas, cum sint intellectuales substantiae. Sed ad Angelos pertinet orare, unde in Psalm. dicitur, adorate eum, omnes Angeli eius. Ergo orare non est proprium rationalis creaturae. Objection 2. Angels are above rational creatures, since they are intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels, wherefore we read in the Psalm 96:7: "Adore Him, all you His angels." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, eiusdem est orare cuius est invocare Deum, quod praecipue fit orando. Sed brutis animalibus convenit invocare Deum secundum illud Psalm., qui dat iumentis escam ipsorum, et pullis corvorum invocantibus eum. Ergo orare non est proprium rationalis creaturae. Objection 3. Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Psalm 146:9, "Who giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon Him." Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra, oratio est actus rationis, ut supra habitum est. Sed rationalis creatura a ratione dicitur. Ergo orare est proprium rationalis creaturae. On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above (Article 1). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, oratio est actus rationis per quem aliquis superiorem deprecatur, sicut imperium est actus rationis quo inferior ad aliquid ordinatur. Illi ergo proprie competit orare cui convenit rationem habere, et superiorem quem deprecari possit. Divinis autem personis nihil est superius, bruta autem animalia non habent rationem. Unde neque divinis personis neque brutis animalibus convenit orare, sed proprium est rationalis creaturae. I answer that, As stated above (Article 1) prayer is an act of reason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divinis personis convenit accipere per naturam, orare autem est accipientis per gratiam. Dicitur autem filius rogare, vel orare, secundum naturam assumptam, scilicet humanam, non secundum divinam. Spiritus autem sanctus dicitur postulare, quia postulantes nos facit. Reply to Objection 1. Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio et intellectus in nobis non sunt diversae potentiae, ut in primo habitum est, differunt autem secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Et ideo quandoque intellectuales creaturae, quae sunt Angeli, distinguuntur a rationalibus, quandoque autem sub rationalibus comprehenduntur. Et hoc modo dicitur oratio esse proprium rationalis creaturae. Reply to Objection 2. As stated in I, 79, 8, intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included under them. On this sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod pulli corvorum dicuntur Deum invocare, propter naturale desiderium quo omnia suo modo desiderant consequi bonitatem divinam. Sic etiam bruta animalia dicuntur Deo obedire, propter naturalem instinctum quo a Deo moventur. Reply to Objection 3. The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 arg. 1 Ad undecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sancti qui sunt in patria non orent pro nobis. Actus enim alicuius magis est meritorius sibi quam aliis. Sed sancti qui sunt in patria non merentur sibi, nec pro se orant, quia iam sunt in termino constituti. Ergo etiam neque pro nobis orant. Objection 1. It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for us. A man's action is more meritorious for himself than for others. But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray for themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither therefore do they pray for us.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 arg. 2 Praeterea, sancti perfecte suam voluntatem Deo conformant, ut non velint nisi quod Deus vult. Sed illud quod Deus vult semper impletur. Ergo frustra sancti pro nobis orarent. Objection 2. Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut sancti qui sunt in patria sunt superiores nobis, ita et illi qui sunt in Purgatorio, quia iam peccare non possunt. Sed illi qui sunt in Purgatorio non orant pro nobis, sed magis nos pro eis. Ergo nec sancti qui sunt in patria pro nobis orant. Objection 3. Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints in heaven pray for us.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 arg. 4 Praeterea, si sancti qui sunt in patria pro nobis orarent, superiorum sanctorum esset efficacior oratio. Non ergo deberet implorari suffragium orationum sanctorum inferiorum, sed solum superiorum. Objection 4. Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to implore the help of the lower saints' prayers but only of those of the higher saints.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 arg. 5 Praeterea, anima Petri non est Petrus. Si ergo animae sanctorum pro nobis orarent quandiu sunt a corpore separatae, non deberemus interpellare sanctum Petrum ad orandum pro nobis, sed animam eius. Cuius contrarium Ecclesia facit. Non ergo sancti, ad minus ante resurrectionem, pro nobis orant. Objection 5. Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur II Mach. ult., hic est qui multum orat pro populo et universa sancta civitate, Ieremias, propheta Dei. On the contrary, It is written (2 Maccabees 15:14): "This is . . . he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, Vigilantii error fuit quod, dum vivimus, mutuo pro nobis orare possumus; postquam autem mortui fuerimus, nullius sit pro alio exaudienda oratio, praesertim cum martyres, ultionem sui sanguinis obsecrantes, impetrare nequiverint. Sed hoc est omnino falsum. Quia cum oratio pro aliis facta ex caritate proveniat, ut dictum est, quanto sancti qui sunt in patria sunt perfectioris caritatis, tanto magis orant pro viatoribus, qui orationibus iuvari possunt, et quanto sunt Deo coniunctiores, tanto eorum orationes sunt magis efficaces. Habet enim hoc divinus ordo, ut ex superiorum excellentia in inferiora refundatur, sicut ex claritate solis in aerem. Unde et de Christo dicitur, Heb. VII, accedens per semetipsum ad Deum ad interpellandum pro nobis. Et propter hoc Hieronymus, contra Vigilantium, dicit, si apostoli et martyres adhuc in corpore constituti possunt orare pro ceteris, quando pro se adhuc debent esse solliciti; quanto magis post coronas, victorias et triumphos. I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of Vigilantius consisted in saying that "while we live, we can pray one for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs' prayers are granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged." But this is absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed from charity, as stated above (A7,8), the greater the charity of the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said of Christ (Hebrews 7:25): "Going to God by His own power . . . to make intercession for us" [Vulgate: 'He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.']. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): "If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and triumph."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sanctis qui sunt in patria, cum sint beati, nihil deest nisi gloria corporis, pro qua orant. Orant autem pro nobis, quibus deest beatitudinis ultima perfectio. Et eorum orationes habent efficaciam impetrandi ex praecedentibus eorum meritis, et ex divina acceptatione. Reply to Objection 1. The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the body's glory, and for this they pray. But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous merits and through God's acceptance.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti impetrant illud quod Deus vult fieri per orationes eorum. Et hoc petunt quod aestimant eorum orationibus implendum secundum Dei voluntatem. Reply to Objection 2. The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be granted through their prayers according to God's will.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt in Purgatorio, etsi sint superiores nobis propter impeccabilitatem, sunt tamen inferiores quantum ad poenas quas patiuntur. Et secundum hoc non sunt in statu orandi, sed magis ut oretur pro eis. Reply to Objection 3. Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus vult inferiora per omnia superiora iuvari. Et ideo oportet non solum superiores, sed etiam inferiores sanctos implorare. Alioquin esset solius Dei misericordia imploranda. Contingit tamen quandoque quod imploratio inferioris sancti efficacior est, vel quia devotius implorantur; vel quia Deus vult eorum sanctitatem declarare. Reply to Objection 4. It is God's will that inferior beings should be helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious, either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God wishes to make known his sanctity.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 11 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum quod quia sancti viventes meruerunt ut pro nobis orarent, ideo eos invocamus nominibus quibus hic vocabantur, quibus etiam nobis magis innotescunt. Et iterum propter fidem resurrectionis insinuandam, sicut legitur Exod. III, ego sum Deus Abraham, et cetera. Reply to Objection 5. It is because the saints while living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the saying of Exodus 3:6, "I am the God of Abraham," etc.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 arg. 1 Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio non debeat esse vocalis. Oratio enim, sicut ex dictis patet, principaliter Deo porrigitur. Deus autem locutionem cordis cognoscit. Frustra igitur vocalis oratio adhibetur. Objection 1. It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated above (Article 4), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal prayer.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 arg. 2 Praeterea, per orationem mens hominis debet in Deum ascendere, ut dictum est. Sed voces retrahunt homines ab ascensu contemplationis in Deum, sicut et alia sensibilia. Ergo in oratione non est vocibus utendum. Objection 2. Further, prayer should lift man's mind to God, as stated above (1, ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in our prayers.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 arg. 3 Praeterea, oratio debet offerri Deo in occulto, secundum illud Matth. VI, tu autem cum oraveris, intra in cubiculum, et clauso ostio, ora patrem tuum in abscondito. Sed per vocem oratio publicatur. Ergo non debet oratio esse vocalis. Objection 3. Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according to Matthew 6:6, "But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret." But prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer should not be vocal.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalm., voce mea ad dominum clamavi, voce mea ad dominum deprecatus sum. On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 141:2): "I cried to the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est oratio, communis, et singularis. Communis quidem oratio est quae per ministros Ecclesiae in persona totius fidelis populi Deo offertur. Et ideo oportet quod talis oratio innotescat toti populo, pro quo profertur. Quod non posset fieri nisi esset vocalis. Et ideo rationabiliter institutum est ut ministri Ecclesiae huiusmodi orationes etiam alta voce pronuntient, ut ad notitiam omnium possit pervenire. Oratio vero singularis est quae offertur a singulari persona cuiuscumque sive pro se sive pro aliis orantis. Et de huiusmodi orationis necessitate non est quod sit vocalis. Adiungitur tamen vox tali orationi triplici ratione. Primo quidem, ad excitandum interiorem devotionem, qua mens orantis elevetur in Deum. Quia per exteriora signa, sive vocum sive etiam aliquorum factorum, movetur mens hominis et secundum apprehensionem, et per consequens secundum affectionem. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, quod verbis et aliis signis ad augendum sanctum desiderium nosipsos acrius excitamus. Et ideo in singulari oratione tantum est vocibus et huiusmodi signis utendum quantum proficit ad excitandum interius mentem. Si vero mens per hoc distrahatur, vel qualitercumque impediatur, est a talibus cessandum. Quod praecipue contingit in illis quorum mens sine huiusmodi signis est sufficienter ad devotionem parata. Unde Psalmista dicebat, tibi dixit cor meum, exquisivit te facies mea; et de Anna legitur, I Reg. I, quod loquebatur in corde suo. Secundo, adiungitur vocalis oratio quasi ad redditionem debiti, ut scilicet homo Deo serviat secundum totum illud quod ex Deo habet, idest non solum mente, sed etiam corpore. Quod praecipue competit orationi secundum quod est satisfactoria. Unde dicitur Osee ult., omnem aufer iniquitatem, et accipe bonum, et reddemus vitulos labiorum nostrorum. Tertio, adiungitur vocalis oratio ex quadam redundantia ab anima in corpus ex vehementi affectione, secundum illud Psalm., laetatum est cor meum, et exultavit lingua mea. I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to the knowledge of all. On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that "by means of words and other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires." Hence then alone should we use words and such like signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Psalm 26:8) said: "My heart hath said to Thee: 'My face hath sought Thee,'" and we read of Anna (1 Samuel 1:13) that "she spoke in her heart." Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is written (Hosea 14:3): "Take away all iniquity, and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips." Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to Psalm 15:9, "My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vocalis oratio non profertur ad hoc quod aliquid ignotum Deo manifestetur, sed ad hoc quod mens orantis vel aliorum excitetur in Deum. Reply to Objection 1. Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the person praying or of other persons to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod verba ad aliud pertinentia distrahunt mentem, et impediunt devotionem orantis. Sed verba significantia aliquid ad devotionem pertinens excitant mentes, praecipue minus devotas. Reply to Objection 2. Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 12 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., eo proposito dominus vetat in conventu orare ut a conventu videatur. Unde orans nihil novum facere debet quod aspiciant homines, vel clamando vel pectus percutiendo vel manus expandendo. Nec tamen, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, videri ab hominibus nefas est, sed ideo haec agere ut ab hominibus videaris. Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says [Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "Our Lord forbids one to pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men's attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet, "according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), "it is not wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen by men."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 arg. 1 Ad tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod de necessitate orationis sit quod sit attenta. Dicitur enim Ioan. IV, spiritus est Deus, et eos qui adorant eum, in spiritu et veritate adorare oportet. Sed oratio non est in spiritu si non sit attenta. Ergo de necessitate orationis est quod sit attenta. Objection 1. It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of prayer. It is written (John 4:24): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But prayer is not in spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 arg. 2 Praeterea, oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum. Sed quando oratio non est attenta, intellectus non ascendit in Deum. Ergo de necessitate orationis est quod sit attenta. Objection 2. Further, prayer is "the ascent of the mind to God" [Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24. But the mind does not ascend to God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 arg. 3 Praeterea, de necessitate orationis est quod careat omni peccato. Sed non est absque peccato quod aliquis orando evagationem mentis patiatur, videtur eum deridere Deum, sicut et si alicui homini loqueretur et non attenderet ad ea quae ipse proferret. Unde Basilius dicit, est divinum auxilium implorandum non remisse, nec mente huc illuc evagante, eo quod talis non solum non impetrabit quod petit, sed et magis Deum irritabit. Ergo de necessitate orationis esse videtur quod sit attenta. Objection 3. Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what he was saying. Hence Basil says [De Constit. Monach. i] that the "Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger." Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that it should be attentive.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 s. c. Sed contra est quod etiam sancti viri quandoque orantes evagationem mentis patiuntur, secundum illud Psalm., cor meum dereliquit me. On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the mind when they pray, according to Psalm 39:13, "My heart hath forsaken me."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quaestio haec praecipue locum habet in oratione vocali. Circa quam sciendum est quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, per quod melius pervenitur ad finem. Et sic attentio absolute orationi necessaria est. Alio modo dicitur aliquid necessarium sine quo res non potest consequi suum effectum. Est autem triplex effectus orationis. Primus quidem communis omnibus actibus caritate informatis, quod est mereri. Et ad hunc effectum non ex necessitate requiritur quod attentio adsit orationi per totum, sed vis primae intentionis qua aliquis ad orandum accedit, reddit totam orationem meritoriam, sicut in aliis meritoriis actibus accidit. Secundus autem effectus orationis est ei proprius, quod est impetrare. Et ad hunc etiam effectum sufficit prima intentio, quam Deus principaliter attendit. Si autem prima intentio desit, oratio nec meritoria est nec impetrativa, illam enim orationem Deus non audit cui ille qui orat non intendit, ut Gregorius dicit. Tertius autem effectus orationis est quem praesentialiter efficit, scilicet quaedam spiritualis refectio mentis. Et ad hoc de necessitate requiritur in oratione attentio. Unde dicitur I Cor. XIV, si orem lingua, mens mea sine fructu est. Sciendum tamen quod est triplex attentio quae orationi vocali potest adhiberi. Una quidem qua attenditur ad verba, ne quis in eis erret. Secunda qua attenditur ad sensum verborum. Tertia qua attenditur ad finem orationis, scilicet ad Deum et ad rem pro qua oratur, quae quidem est maxime necessaria. Et hanc etiam possunt habere idiotae. Et quandoque intantum abundat haec intentio, qua mens fertur in Deum, ut etiam omnium aliorum mens obliviscatur, sicut dicit Hugo de sancto Victore. I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways. First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, and this is merit. On order to realize this effect, it is not necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the force of the original intention with which one sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and impetration: because, as Gregory [Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of those who pay no attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my understanding is without fruit." It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states [De Modo Orandi ii].
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in spiritu et veritate orat qui ex instinctu spiritus ad orandum accedit, etiam si ex aliqua infirmitate mens postmodum evagetur. Reply to Objection 1. To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the mind wander through weakness.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod mens humana, propter infirmitatem naturae, diu in alto stare non potest, pondere enim infirmitatis humanae deprimitur anima ad inferiora. Et ideo contingit quod quando mens orantis ascendit in Deum per contemplationem, subito evagetur ex quadam infirmitate. Reply to Objection 2. The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden it wanders off through weakness.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 13 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod si quis ex proposito in oratione mente evagetur, hoc peccatum est, et impedit orationis fructum. Et contra hoc Augustinus dicit, in regula, Psalmis et hymnis cum oratis Deum, hoc versetur in corde quod profertur in ore. Evagatio vero mentis quae fit praeter propositum, orationis fructum non tollit. Unde Basilius dicit, si vero, debilitatus a peccato, fixe nequis orare, quantumcumque potes teipsum cohibeas, et Deus ignoscit, eo quod non ex negligentia, sed ex fragilitate non potes, ut oportet, assistere coram eo. Reply to Objection 3. Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 arg. 1 Ad quartumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio non debeat esse diuturna. Dicitur enim Matth. VI, orantes nolite multum loqui. Sed oportet multum loqui diu orantem, praesertim si oratio sit vocalis. Ergo non debet esse oratio diuturna. Objection 1. It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is written (Matthew 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 arg. 2 Praeterea, oratio est explicativa desiderii. Sed desiderium tanto est sanctius quanto magis ad unum restringitur, secundum illud Psalm., unam petii a domino, hanc requiram. Ergo et oratio tanto est Deo acceptior quanto est brevior. Objection 2. Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Psalm 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after." Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 arg. 3 Praeterea, illicitum videtur esse quod homo transgreditur terminos a Deo praefixos, praecipue in his quae pertinent ad cultum divinum, secundum illud Exod. XIX, contestare populum, ne forte velit transcendere propositos terminos ad videndum dominum, et pereat ex eis plurima multitudo. Sed a Deo praefixus est nobis terminus orandi per institutionem orationis dominicae, ut patet Matth. VI. Ergo non licet ultra orationem protendere. Objection 3. Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to Exodus 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting the Lord's Prayer (Matthew 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our prayer beyond its limits.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 s. c. Sed contra, videtur quod continue sit orandum. Quia dominus dicit, Luc. XVIII, oportet semper orare, et non deficere. Et I ad Thess. V, sine intermissione orate. Objection 4.On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray continually. For our Lord said (Luke 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thessalonians 5:17): "Pray without ceasing."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de oratione dupliciter loqui possumus, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio modo, secundum causam suam. Causa autem orationis est desiderium caritatis, ex quo procedere debet oratio. Quod quidem in nobis debet esse continuum vel actu vel virtute, manet enim virtus huius desiderii in omnibus quae ex caritate facimus; omnia autem debemus in gloriam Dei facere, ut dicitur I ad Cor. X. Et secundum hoc oratio debet esse continua. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, in ipsa fide, spe et caritate continuato desiderio semper oramus. Sed ipsa oratio secundum se considerata non potest esse assidua, quia oportet aliis operibus occupari. Sed, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, ideo per certa intervalla horarum et temporum etiam verbis rogamus Deum, ut illis rerum signis nosipsos admoneamus; quantumque in hoc desiderio profecerimus, nobis ipsis innotescamus; et ad hoc agendum nosipsos acrius excitemus. Uniuscuiusque autem rei quantitas debet esse proportionata fini, sicut quantitas potionis sanitati. Unde et conveniens est ut oratio tantum duret quantum est utile ad excitandum interioris desiderii fervorem. Cum vero hanc mensuram excedit, ita quod sine taedio durare non possit, non est ulterius oratio protendenda. Unde Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, dicuntur fratres in Aegypto crebras quidem habere orationes, sed eas tamen brevissimas, et raptim quodammodo iaculatas, ne illa vigilanter erecta, quae oranti plurimum necessaria est, per productiores moras evanescat atque hebetetur intentio. Ac per hoc etiam ipsi satis ostendunt hanc intentionem, sicut non esse obtundendam si perdurare non potest, ita, si perduraverit, non cito esse rumpendam. Et sicut hoc est attendendum in oratione singulari per comparationem ad intentionem orantis, ita etiam in oratione communi per comparationem ad populi devotionem. I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The not cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the glory of God" (1 Corinthians 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): "Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof." Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, ad Probam, non est hoc orare in multiloquio, si diutius oretur. Aliud est sermo multus; aliud diuturnus affectus. Nam et de ipso domino scriptum est quod pernoctaverit in orando, et quod prolixius oraverit, ut nobis praeberet exemplum. Et postea subdit, absit ab oratione multa locutio, sed non desit multa precatio, si fervens perseverat intentio. Nam multum loqui est in orando rem necessariam superfluis agere verbis. Plerumque autem hoc negotium plus gemitibus quam sermonibus agitur. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Ondeed this business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod prolixitas orationis non consistit in hoc quod multa petantur, sed in hoc quod affectus continuetur ad unum desiderandum. Reply to Objection 2. Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dominus non instituit hanc orationem ut his solis verbis uti debeamus in orando, sed quia ad haec sola impetranda debet tendere nostrae orationis intentio, qualitercumque ea proferamus vel cogitemus. Reply to Objection 3. Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think of them.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 14 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis continue orat, vel propter continuitatem desiderii, ut dictum est. Vel quia non intermittit quin temporibus statutis oret. Vel propter effectum, sive in ipso orante, qui etiam post orationem remanet magis devotus; sive etiam in alio, puta cum aliquis suis beneficiis provocat alium ut pro se oret, etiam quando ipse ab orando quiescit. Reply to Objection 4. One may pray continually, either through having a continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who prays--because he remains more devout even after praying, or in some other person--as when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 arg. 1 Ad quintumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio non sit meritoria. Omne enim meritum procedit a gratia. Sed oratio praecedit gratiam, quia etiam ipsa gratia per orationem impetratur, secundum illud Luc. XI, pater vester de caelo dabit spiritum bonum petentibus se. Ergo oratio non est actus meritorius. Objection 1. It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is obtained by means of prayer according to Luke 11:13, "(How much more) will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 arg. 2 Praeterea, si oratio aliquid meretur, maxime videtur mereri illud quod orando petitur. Sed hoc non semper meretur, quia multoties etiam sanctorum orationes non exaudiuntur; sicut Paulus non est exauditus petens removeri a se stimulum carnis. Ergo oratio non est actus meritorius. Objection 2. Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 arg. 3 Praeterea, oratio praecipue fidei innititur, secundum illud Iac. I, postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans. Fides autem non sufficit ad merendum, ut patet in his qui habent fidem informem. Ergo oratio non est actus meritorius. Objection 3. Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James 1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 s. c. Sed contra est quod super illud Psalm., oratio mea in sinu meo convertetur, dicit Glossa, etsi eis non profuit, ego tamen non sum frustratus mea mercede. Merces autem non debetur nisi merito. Ergo oratio habet rationem meriti. On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Psalm 34:13, "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward." Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oratio, praeter effectum spiritualis consolationis quam praesentialiter affert, duplicem habet virtutem respectu futuri effectus, scilicet virtutem merendi, et virtutem impetrandi. Oratio autem, sicut et quilibet alius actus virtutis, habet efficaciam merendi inquantum procedit ex radice caritatis, cuius proprium obiectum est bonum aeternum, cuius fruitionem meremur. Procedit tamen oratio a caritate mediante religione, cuius est actus oratio ut dictum est; concomitantibus etiam quibusdam aliis virtutibus quae ad bonitatem orationis requiruntur, scilicet humilitate et fide. Ad religionem enim pertinet ipsam orationem Deo offerre. Ad caritatem vero pertinet desiderium rei cuius complementum oratio petit. Fides autem est necessaria ex parte Dei, quem oramus, ut scilicet credamus ab eo nos posse obtinere quod petimus. Humilitas autem est necessaria ex parte ipsius petentis, qui suam indigentiam recognoscit. Est etiam et devotio necessaria, sed haec ad religionem pertinet, cuius est primus actus, necessarius ad omnes consequentes, ut supra dictum est. Efficaciam autem impetrandi habet ex gratia Dei, quem oramus, qui etiam nos ad orandum inducit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Verb. Dom., non nos hortaretur ut peteremus, nisi dare vellet. Et Chrysostomus dicit, nunquam oranti beneficia denegat qui ut orantes non deficiant sua pietate instigat. I answer that, As stated above (Article 13) prayer, besides causing spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above (Article 3), and with the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated above (82, 1 and 2). As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): "He would not urge us to ask, unless He were willing to give"; and Chrysostom Cf. Catena Aurea of St. Thomas on Luke 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words of Chrysostom says: "He never refuses to grant our prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in praying."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod oratio quae est sine gratia gratum faciente meritoria non est, sicut nec aliquis alius actus virtuosus. Et tamen etiam oratio quae impetrat gratiam gratum facientem procedit ex aliqua gratia, quasi ex gratuito dono, quia ipsum orare est quoddam donum Dei, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de perseverantia. Reply to Objection 1. Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is "a gift of God," as Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii).
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ad aliud principaliter respicit meritum orationis quandoque quam ad id quod petitur, meritum enim praecipue ordinatur ad beatitudinem; sed petitio orationis directe se extendit quandoque ad aliqua alia, ut ex dictis patet. Si ergo illud aliud quod petit aliquis pro seipso, non sit ei ad beatitudinem utile, non meretur illud, sed quandoque hoc petendo et desiderando meritum amittit, puta si petat a Deo complementum alicuius peccati, quod est non pie orare. Quandoque vero non est necessarium ad salutem, nec manifeste saluti contrarium. Et tunc, licet orans possit orando mereri vitam aeternam, non tamen meretur illud obtinere quod petit. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro sententiarum prosperi, fideliter supplicans Deo pro necessitatibus huius vitae, et misericorditer auditur, et misericorditer non auditur. Quid enim infirmo sit utile magis novit medicus quam aegrotus. Et propter hoc etiam Paulus non est exauditus petens amoveri stimulum carnis, quia non expediebat. Si vero id quod petitur sit utile ad beatitudinem hominis, quasi pertinens ad eius salutem, meretur illud non solum orando, sed etiam alia bona opera faciendo. Et ideo indubitanter accipit quod petit, sed quando debet accipere, quaedam enim non negantur, sed ut congruo dentur tempore, differuntur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Quod tamen potest impediri, si in petendo non perseveret. Et propter hoc dicit Basilius, ideo quandoque petis et non accipis, quia perperam postulasti, vel infideliter vel leviter, vel non conferentia tibi, vel destitisti. Quia vero homo non potest alii mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno, ut supra dictum est; ideo per consequens nec ea quae ad vitam aeternam pertinent potest aliquando aliquis ex condigno alteri mereri. Et propter hoc non semper ille auditur qui pro alio orat, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo ponuntur quatuor conditiones, quibus concurrentibus, semper aliquis impetrat quod petit, ut scilicet pro se petat, necessaria ad salutem, pie et perseveranter. Reply to Objection 2. Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one's petition. For the chief object of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above (A6,7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): "He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than the sick man what is good for the disease." For this reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: "since certain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable time," according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): "The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking." Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated above (I-II, 114, 6), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (07, ad 2,3). Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to ask--"for ourselves--things necessary for salvation--piously--perseveringly"; when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 15 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod oratio innititur principaliter fidei non quantum ad efficaciam merendi, quia sic innititur principaliter caritati, sed quantum ad efficaciam impetrandi. Quia per fidem habet homo notitiam omnipotentiae divinae et misericordiae, ex quibus oratio impetrat quod petit. Reply to Objection 3. Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes to know of God's omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence prayer impetrates what it asks for.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 arg. 1 Ad sextumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatores orando non impetrent aliquid a Deo. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, scimus quia peccatores Deus non audit. Quod consonat ei quod dicitur Prov. XXVIII, qui declinat aures suas ne audiat legem, oratio eius erit execrabilis, oratio autem execrabilis non impetrat aliquid a Deo. Ergo peccatores non impetrant aliquid a Deo. Objection 1. It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by their prayers. It is written (John 9:31): "We know that God doth not hear sinners"; and this agrees with the saying of Proverbs 28:9, "He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination." Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 arg. 2 Praeterea, iusti impetrant a Deo illud quod merentur, ut supra habitum est. Sed peccatores nihil possunt mereri, quia gratia carent, et etiam caritate, quae est virtus pietatis, ut dicit Glossa, II ad Tim. III, super illud, habentes quidem speciem pietatis, virtutem autem eius abnegantes; et ita non pie orant, quod requiritur ad hoc quod oratio impetret, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatores nihil impetrant orando. Objection 2. Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as stated above (15, ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since they lack grace and charity which is the "power of godliness," according to a gloss on 2 Timothy 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof." and so their prayer is impious, and yet piety it required in order that prayer may be impetrative, as stated above (15, ad 2). Therefore sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 arg. 3 Praeterea, Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., pater non libenter exaudit orationem quam filius non dictavit. Sed in oratione quam Christus dictavit dicitur, dimitte nobis debita nostra, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris, quod peccatores non faciunt. Ergo vel mentiuntur hoc dicentes, et sic non sunt exauditione digni, vel, si non dicant, non exaudiuntur, quia formam orandi a Christo institutam non servant. Objection 3. Further, Chrysostom Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom says: "The Father is unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired." Now in the prayer inspired by Christ we say: "Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us": and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., si peccatores non exaudiret Deus, frustra publicanus dixisset, domine, propitius esto mihi peccatori. Et Chrysostomus dicit, super Matth., omnis qui petit accipit, idest, sive iustus sit sive peccator. On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): "If God were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be merciful to me a sinner"; and Chrysostom [Hom. xviii of the same Opus Imperfectum] says: "Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say whether he be righteous or sinful."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in peccatore duo sunt consideranda, scilicet natura, quam diligit Deus; et culpa, quam odit. Si ergo peccator orando aliquid petit inquantum peccator, idest secundum desiderium peccati, hoc a Deo non auditur ex misericordia, sed quandoque auditur ad vindictam, dum Deus permittit peccatorem adhuc amplius ruere in peccata, Deus enim quaedam negat propitius quae concedit iratus, ut Augustinus dicit. Orationem vero peccatoris ex bono naturae desiderio procedentem Deus audit, non quasi ex iustitia, quia peccator hoc non meretur, sed ex pura misericordia, observatis tamen quatuor praemissis conditionibus, ut scilicet pro se petat, necessaria ad salutem, pie et perseveranter. I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For "God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger," as Augustine declares (Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner's prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy [Cf. 15, ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation, piously and perseveringly.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan., illud verbum est caeci adhuc inuncti, idest nondum perfecte illuminati. Et ideo non est ratum. Quamvis possit verificari si intelligatur de peccatore inquantum est peccator. Per quem etiam modum oratio eius dicitur execrabilis. Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod peccator non potest pie orare quasi eius oratio ex habitu virtutis informetur. Potest tamen eius oratio esse pia quantum ad hoc quod petit aliquid ad pietatem pertinens, sicut ille qui non habet habitum iustitiae, potest aliquid iustum velle, ut ex supradictis patet. Et quamvis eius oratio non sit meritoria, potest tamen esse impetrativa, quia meritum innititur iustitiae, sed impetratio gratiae. Reply to Objection 2. There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to will something just, as stated above (Question 59, Article 2). And though his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 16 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, oratio dominica profertur ex persona communi totius Ecclesiae. Et ideo si aliquis nolens dimittere debita proximo dicat orationem dominicam, non mentitur, quamvis hoc quod dicit non sit verum quantum ad suam personam, est enim verum quantum ad personam Ecclesiae. Extra quam est merito, et ideo fructu orationis caret. Quandoque tamen aliqui peccatores parati sunt debitoribus suis remittere. Et ideo ipsi orantes exaudiuntur, secundum illud Eccli. XXVIII, relinque proximo tuo nocenti te, et tunc deprecanti tibi peccata solventur. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (07, ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are heard, according to Sirach 28:2, "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 arg. 1 Ad septimumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dicantur esse orationis partes obsecrationes, orationes, postulationes, gratiarum actiones. Obsecratio enim videtur esse quaedam adiuratio. Sed, sicut Origenes dicit, super Matth., non oportet ut vir qui vult secundum Evangelium vivere, adiuret alium, si enim iurare non licet, nec adiurare. Ergo inconvenienter ponitur obsecratio orationis pars. Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 arg. 2 Praeterea, oratio, secundum Damascenum, est petitio decentium a Deo. Inconvenienter ergo orationes contra postulationes dividuntur. Objection 2. Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting to distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 arg. 3 Praeterea, gratiarum actiones pertinent ad praeterita, alia vero ad futura. Sed praeterita sunt priora futuris. Inconvenienter ergo gratiarum actiones post alia ponuntur. Objection 3. Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 s. c. In contrarium est auctoritas apostoli, I ad Tim. II. On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Timothy 2:1).
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad orationem tria requiruntur. Quorum primum est ut orans accedat ad Deum, quem orat. Quod significatur nomine orationis, quia oratio est ascensus intellectus in Deum. Secundo, requiritur petitio, quae significatur nomine postulationis, sive petitio proponatur determinate, quod quidem nominant quidam proprie postulationem; sive indeterminate, ut cum quis petit iuvari a Deo, quod nominant supplicationem; sive solum factum narretur, secundum illud Ioan. XI, ecce, quem amas infirmatur, quod vocant insinuationem. Tertio, requiritur ratio impetrandi quod petitur. Et hoc vel ex parte Dei, vel ex parte petentis. Ratio quidem impetrandi ex parte Dei est eius sanctitas, propter quam petimus exaudiri, secundum illud Dan. IX, propter temetipsum inclina, Deus meus, aurem tuam. Et ad hoc pertinet obsecratio, quae est per sacra contestatio, sicut cum dicimus, per nativitatem tuam, libera nos, domine. Ratio vero impetrandi ex parte petentis est gratiarum actio, quia de acceptis beneficiis gratias agentes, meremur accipere potiora, ut in collecta dicitur. Et ideo dicit Glossa, I ad Tim. II, quod in Missa obsecrationes sunt quae praecedunt consecrationem, in quibus quaedam sacra commemorantur; orationes sunt in ipsa consecratione, in qua mens maxime debet elevari in Deum; postulationes autem sunt in sequentibus petitionibus; gratiarum actiones in fine. In pluribus etiam Ecclesiae collectis haec quatuor possunt attendi. Sicut in collecta Trinitatis, quod dicitur, omnipotens, sempiterne Deus, pertinet ad orationis ascensum in Deum; quod dicitur, qui dedisti famulis tuis etc., pertinet ad gratiarum actionem; quod dicitur, praesta, quaesumus etc., pertinet ad postulationem; quod in fine ponitur, per dominum nostrum etc., pertinet ad obsecrationem. In collationibus autem patrum dicitur quod obsecratio est imploratio pro peccatis; oratio, cum aliquid Deo vovemus; postulatio, cum pro aliis petimus. Sed primum melius est. I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is signified in the word "prayer," because prayer is "the raising up of one's mind to God." The second is that there should be a petition, and this is signified in the word "intercession." On this case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is "intercession" properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in John 11:3, "Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick," and then they call it "insinuation." The third condition is the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Daniel 9:17-18, "For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear"; and to this pertains "supplication" [obsecratio] which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say, "Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord." The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is "thanksgiving"; since "through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater benefits," as we say in the collect [Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Timothy 2:1 says that "in the Mass, the consecration is preceded by supplication," in which certain sacred things are called to mind; that "prayers are in the consecration itself," in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and that "intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end." We may notice these four things in several of the Church's collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, "Almighty eternal God" belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, "Who hast given to Thy servants," etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, "grant, we beseech Thee," belong to intercession; and the words at the end, "Through Our Lord," etc. belong to supplication. In the "Conferences of the Fathers" (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read: "Supplication is bewailing one's sins; prayer is vowing something to God; intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy." The first explanation, however, is the better.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obsecratio non est adiuratio ad compellendum, quae prohibetur, sed ad misericordiam implorandum. Reply to Objection 1. "Supplication" is an adjuration not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod oratio communiter sumpta includit omnia quae hic dicuntur. Sed secundum quod contra alia dividitur, importat proprie ascensum in Deum. Reply to Objection 2. "Prayer" in the general sense includes all the things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes properly the ascent to God.
IIª-IIae q. 83 a. 17 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in diversis praeterita praecedunt futura, sed aliquid unum et idem prius est futurum quam sit praeteritum. Et ideo gratiarum actio de aliis beneficiis praecedit postulationem aliorum beneficiorum, sed idem beneficium prius postulatur, et ultimo, cum acceptum fuerit, de eo gratiae aguntur. Postulationem autem praecedit oratio, per quam acceditur ad eum a quo petimus. Orationem autem praecedit obsecratio, quia ex consideratione divinae bonitatis ad eum audemus accedere. Reply to Objection 3. Among things that are diverse the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consideration of God's goodness we dare approach Him.

Notes

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