Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q89

• Question 89.1 Oaths
• Question 89.2
• Question 89.3
• Question 89.4
• Question 89.5
• Question 89.6
• Question 89.7
• Question 89.8
• Question 89.9
• Question 89.10

Latin	English
IIª-IIae q. 89 pr. Deinde considerandum est de actibus exterioribus latriae quibus aliquid divinum ab hominibus assumitur, quod est vel sacramentum aliquod, vel ipsum nomen divinum. Sed de sacramenti assumptione locus erit tractandi in tertia huius operis parte. De assumptione autem nominis divini nunc agendum est. Assumitur autem divinum nomen ab homine tripliciter, uno modo, per modum iuramenti, ad propria verba confirmanda; alio modo, per modum adiurationis, ad alios inducendum; tertio modo, per modum invocationis, ad orandum vel laudandum. Primo ergo de iuramento agendum est. Circa quod quaeruntur decem. Primo, quid sit iuramentum. Secundo, utrum sit licitum. Tertio, qui sint comites iuramenti. Quarto, cuius virtutis sit actus. Quinto, utrum sit appetendum et frequentandum, tanquam utile et bonum. Sexto, utrum liceat iurare per creaturam. Septimo, utrum iuramentum sit obligatorium. Octavo, quae sit maior obligatio, utrum iuramenti vel voti. Nono, utrum in iuramento possit dispensari. Decimo, quibus et quando liceat iurare.	Question 89. Oaths 1. What is an oath? 2. Is it lawful? 3. What are the accompanying conditions of an oath? 4. Of what virtue is it an act? 5. Are oaths desirable, and should they be employed frequently as something useful and good? 6. Is it lawful to swear by a creature? 7. Is an oath binding? 8. Which is more binding, an oath or a vow? 9. Is an oath subject to dispensation? 10. Who may lawfully swear, and when?
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iurare non sit testem Deum invocare. Quicumque enim inducit auctoritatem sacrae Scripturae inducit Deum in testimonium, cuius verba proponuntur in sacra Scriptura. Si ergo iurare est testem Deum invocare, quicumque inducit auctoritatem sacrae Scripturae iuraret. Hoc autem est falsum. Ergo et primum.	Objection 1. It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would swear.But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, ex hoc quod aliquis inducit aliquem in testem, nihil ei reddit. Sed ille qui per Deum iurat aliquid Deo reddit, dicitur enim Matth. V, reddes domino iuramenta tua; et Augustinus dicit quod iurare est ius veritatis Deo reddere. Ergo iurare non est Deum testem invocare.	Objection 2. Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is written (Matthew 5:33): "Thou shall pay [Douay: 'perform'] thy oaths to the Lord"; and Augustine says [Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is "to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, aliud est officium iudicis, et aliud testis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed quandoque iurando implorat homo divinum iudicium, secundum illud Psalm., si reddidi retribuentibus mihi mala, decidam merito ab inimicis meis inanis. Ergo iurare non est testem Deum invocare.	Objection 3. Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a witness, as shown above (Q67,70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Psalm 7:5, "If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies." Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de periurio, quid est, per Deum, nisi, testis est Deus?	On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx): "When a man says: 'By God,' what else does he mean but that God is his witness?"
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, iuramentum ad confirmationem ordinatur. Confirmatio autem in scibilibus per rationem fit, quae procedit ex aliquibus naturaliter notis, quae sunt infallibiliter vera. Sed particularia facta contingentia hominum non possunt per rationem necessariam confirmari. Et ideo ea quae de his dicuntur solent confirmari per testes. Sed humanum testimonium non est sufficiens ad huiusmodi confirmandum, propter duo. Primo quidem, propter defectum veritatis humanae, quia plurimi in mendacium labuntur, secundum illud Psalm., os eorum locutum est mendacium. Secundo, propter defectum cognitionis, quia homines non possunt cognoscere neque futura, neque cordium occulta, vel etiam absentia; de quibus tamen homines loquuntur, et expedit rebus humanis ut certitudo aliqua de his habeatur. Et ideo necessarium fuit recurrere ad divinum testimonium, quia Deus neque mentiri potest, neque eum aliquid latet. Assumere autem Deum in testem dicitur iurare, quia quasi pro iure introductum est ut quod sub invocatione divini testimonii dicitur pro vero habeatur. Divinum autem testimonium quandoque inducitur ad asserendum praesentia vel praeterita, et hoc dicitur iuramentum assertorium. Quandoque autem inducitur divinum testimonium ad confirmandum aliquid futurum, et hoc dicitur iuramentum promissorium. Ad ea vero quae sunt necessaria et per rationem investiganda non inducitur iuramentum, derisibile enim videretur si quis in disputatione alicuius scientiae vellet propositum per iuramentum probare.	I answer that, As the Apostle says (Hebrews 6:16), oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying, according to Psalm 16:10, "Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulgate: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of this lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were a principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory oath." But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliud est testimonio Dei uti iam dato, quod fit cum aliquis auctoritatem sacrae Scripturae inducit, et aliud est testimonium Dei implorare ut exhibendum, quod fit in iuramento.	Reply to Objection 1. It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod dicitur aliquis reddere iuramenta Deo ex hoc quod implet illud quod iurat. Vel quia in hoc ipso quod invocat Deum testem, recognoscit eum habere omnium cognitionem et infallibilem veritatem.	Reply to Objection 2. A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowledge and unerring truth.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod alicuius testimonium invocatur ad hoc quod testis invocatus veritatem manifestet circa ea quae dicuntur. Deus autem manifestat an verum sit quod dicitur, dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter revelando veritatem, vel per internam inspirationem; vel etiam per facti denudationem, dum scilicet producit in publicum ea quae erant occulta. Alio modo, per poenam mentientis, et tunc simul est iudex et testis, dum puniendo mendacem manifestat mendacium. Et ideo duplex est modus iurandi. Unus quidem per simplicem Dei contestationem, sicut cum aliquis dicit, est mihi Deus testis; vel, coram Deo loquor; vel, per Deum, quod idem est, ut dicit Augustinus. Alius modus iurandi est per execrationem, dum scilicet aliquis se, vel aliquid ad se pertinens, ad poenam obligat nisi sit verum quod dicitur.	Reply to Objection 3. A person is called to give witness, in order that he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. On one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as Augustine states [See argument On the contrary]; the other is by cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit licitum iurare. Nihil enim quod prohibetur in lege divina est licitum. Sed iuramentum prohibetur Matth. V, ego dico vobis, non iurare omnino, et Iac. V dicitur, ante omnia, fratres mei, nolite iurare. Ergo iuramentum est illicitum.	Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Matthew 5:34), "But I say to you not to swear at all"; and (James 5:12), "Above all things, my brethren, swear not." Therefore swearing is unlawful.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, id quod est a malo videtur esse illicitum, quia, ut dicitur Matth. VII, non potest arbor mala fructus bonos facere. Sed iuramentum est a malo, dicitur enim Matth. V, sit autem sermo vester, est, est; non, non. Quod autem his abundantius est a malo est. Ergo iuramentum videtur esse illicitum.	Objection 2. Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, because according to Matthew 7:18, "neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Matthew 5:37): "But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is over and above these is of evil." Therefore swearing is apparently unlawful.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, exquirere signum divinae providentiae est tentare Deum, quod est omnino illicitum, secundum illud Deut. VI, non tentabis dominum Deum tuum. Sed ille qui iurat videtur exquirere signum divinae providentiae, dum petit divinum testimonium, quod est per aliquem evidentem effectum. Ergo videtur quod iuramentum sit omnino illicitum.	Objection 3. Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Deuteronomy 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God." Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, dominum Deum tuum timebis, et per nomen eius iurabis.	On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum se bonum quod tamen cedit in malum eius qui non utitur eo convenienter, sicut sumere Eucharistiam est bonum, et tamen qui indigne sumit sibi iudicium manducat et bibit, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XI. Sic ergo in proposito dicendum est quod iuramentum secundum se est licitum et honestum. Quod patet ex origine et ex fine. Ex origine quidem, quia iuramentum est introductum ex fide qua homines credunt Deum habere infallibilem veritatem et universalem omnium cognitionem et provisionem. Ex fine autem, quia iuramentum inducitur ad iustificandum homines, et ad finiendum controversias, ut dicitur ad Heb. VI. Sed iuramentum cedit in malum alicui ex eo quod male utitur eo, idest sine necessitate et cautela debita. Videtur enim parvam reverentiam habere ad Deum qui eum ex levi causa testem inducit, quod non praesumeret etiam de aliquo viro honesto. Imminet etiam periculum periurii, quia de facili homo in verbo delinquit, secundum illud Iac. III, si quis in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est vir. Unde et Eccli. XXIII dicitur, iurationi non assuescat os tuum, multi enim casus in illa.	I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it "unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself" (1 Corinthians 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Hebrews 6:16). Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to James 3:2, "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man." Wherefore it is written (Sirach 23:9): "Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Hieronymus, super Matth., dicit, considera quod salvator non per Deum iurare prohibuerit, sed per caelum et terram. Hanc enim per elementa iurandi pessimam consuetudinem habere Iudaei noscuntur. Se ista responsio non sufficit, quia Iacobus addit, neque per aliud quodcumque iuramentum. Et ideo dicendum est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de mendacio, quod apostolus, in epistolis suis iurans, ostendit quomodo accipiendum esset quod dictum est, dico vobis non iurare omnino, ne scilicet iurando ad facilitatem iurandi veniatur, ex facilitate iurandi ad consuetudinem, a consuetudine in periurium decidatur. Et ideo non invenitur iurasse nisi scribens, ubi consideratio cautior non habet linguam praecipitem.	Reply to Objection 1. Jerome, commenting on Matthew 5:34, says: "Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the elements." Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, "nor by any other oath." Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), "when the Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, 'I say to you, not to swear at all'; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty words."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, si iurare cogeris, scias de necessitate venire infirmitatis eorum quibus aliquid suades, quae utique infirmitas malum est. Itaque non dixit, quod amplius est malum est; tu enim non malum facis qui bene uteris iuratione, ut alteri persuadeas quod utiliter persuades, sed, a malo est illius cuius infirmitate iurare cogeris.	Reply to Objection 2. According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): "If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly He did not say: 'That which is over and above is evil,' but 'is of evil.' For you do no evil; since you make good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it 'comes of the evil' of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui iurat non tentat Deum, quia non implorat divinum auxilium absque utilitate et necessitate; et praeterea non exponit se alicui periculo si Deus testimonium adhibere noluerit in praesenti. Adhibebit autem pro certo testimonium in futuro, quando illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium, ut dicitur I ad Cor. IV. Et illud testimonium nulli iuranti deficiet, vel pro eo vel contra eum.	Reply to Objection 3. He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at some future time, when He "will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts" (1 Corinthians 4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither for nor against him.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres comites iuramenti iustitia, iudicium et veritas. Ea enim quorum unum includitur in altero non sunt connumeranda tanquam diversa. Sed horum trium unum includitur in altero, quia veritas pars iustitiae est, secundum Tullium; iudicium autem est actus iustitiae, ut supra habitum est. Ergo inconvenienter numerantur tres comites iuramenti.	Objection 1. It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is an act of justice, as stated above (Question 60, Article 1). Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, multa alia requiruntur ad iuramentum, scilicet devotio, et fides, per quam credamus Deum omnia scire et mentiri non posse. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter enumerentur tres comites iuramenti.	Objection 2. Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently enumerated.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, haec tria in quolibet opere humano inquirenda sunt, nihil enim debet fieri contra iustitiam aut veritatem, aut sine iudicio, secundum illud I ad Tim. V, nihil facias sine praeiudicio, idest sine praecedenti iudicio. Ergo haec tria non magis debent associari iuramento quam aliis humanis actibus.	Objection 3. Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without judgment, according to 1 Timothy 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice," i.e. without previous judgment [Vulgate: 'Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with other human actions.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. IV, iurabis, vivit dominus, in veritate, in iudicio et in iustitia, quod exponens Hieronymus dicit, animadvertendum est quod iusiurandum hos habet comites, scilicet veritatem, iudicium et iustitiam.	On the contrary, It is written (Jeremiah 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iuramentum non est bonum nisi ei qui bene utitur iuramento. Ad bonum autem usum iuramenti duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod aliquis non leviter, sed ex necessaria causa et discrete iuret. Et quantum ad hoc, requiritur iudicium, scilicet discretionis ex parte iurantis. Secundo, quantum ad id quod per iuramentum confirmatur, ut scilicet neque sit falsum, neque sit aliquid illicitum. Et quantum ad hoc, requiritur veritas, per quam aliquis iuramento confirmat quod verum est; et iustitia, per quam confirmat quod licitum est. Iudicio autem caret iuramentum incautum; veritate autem iuramentum mendax; iustitia autem iuramentum iniquum sive illicitum.	I answer that, As stated above (Article 2), an oath is not good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iudicium non sumitur hic pro executione iustitiae, sed pro iudicio discretionis, ut dictum est. Neque etiam veritas hic accipitur secundum quod est pars iustitiae, sed secundum quod est quaedam conditio locutionis.	Reply to Objection 1. Judgment does not signify here the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod et devotio et fides, et omnia huiusmodi quae exiguntur ad debitum modum iurandi, intelliguntur in iudicio. Alia enim duo pertinent ad rem de qua iuratur, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod iustitia pertinet ad causam pro qua iuratur.	Reply to Objection 2. Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards the reason for swearing.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in iuramento est magnum periculum, tum propter Dei magnitudinem, cuius testimonium invocatur; tum etiam propter labilitatem linguae humanae, cuius verba iuramento confirmantur. Et ideo huiusmodi magis requiruntur ad iuramentum quam ad alios humanos actus.	Reply to Objection 3. There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for other human actions.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuramentum non sit actus religionis sive latriae. Actus enim latriae sunt circa aliqua sacra et divina. Sed iuramenta adhibentur circa controversias humanas, ut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI. Ergo iurare non est actus religionis seu latriae.	Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, ad religionem pertinet cultum Deo offerre, ut Tullius dicit. Sed ille qui iurat nihil Deo offert, sed Deum inducit in testem. Ergo iurare non est actus religionis.	Objection 2. Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, finis religionis seu latriae est reverentiam Deo exhibere. Hoc autem non est finis iuramenti, sed potius aliquod verbum confirmare. Ergo iurare non est actus religionis.	Objection 3. Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut. VI, dominum Deum tuum timebis, et ipsi soli servies, ac per nomen illius iurabis. Loquitur autem ibi de servitute latriae. Ergo iurare est actus latriae.	On the contrary, It is written (Deuteronomy 6:13): "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name." Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of religion.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, ille qui iurat invocat divinum testimonium ad confirmandum ea quae dicit. Nihil autem confirmatur nisi per aliquid quod certius est et potius. Et ideo in hoc ipso quod homo per Deum iurat, profitetur Deum potiorem, utpote cuius veritas est indefectibilis et cognitio universalis, et sic aliquo modo Deo reverentiam exhibet. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI, quod homines per maiores se iurant. Et Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod qui iurat, aut veneratur aut diligit eum per quem iurat. Philosophus etiam dicit, in I Metaphys., quod iuramentum est honorabilissimum. Exhibere autem reverentiam Deo pertinet ad religionem sive latriam. Unde manifestum est quod iuramentum est actus religionis sive latriae.	I answer that, As appears from what has been said above (Article 1), he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle says (Hebrews 6:16) that "men swear by one greater than themselves," and Jerome commenting on Matthew 5:34, says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that "to swear is to give very great honor." Now to show reverence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in iuramento duo considerantur, scilicet testimonium quod inducitur, et hoc est divinum; et id super quo inducitur testimonium, vel quod facit necessitatem testimonium inducendi, et hoc est humanum. Pertinet ergo iuramentum ad religionem ratione primi, non autem ratione secundi.	Reply to Objection 1. Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the latter.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc ipso quod aliquis assumit Deum in testem per modum iuramenti, profitetur eum maiorem, quod pertinet ad Dei reverentiam. Et sic aliquid offert Deo, scilicet reverentiam et honorem.	Reply to Objection 2. In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely, reverence and honor.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia quae facimus debemus in Dei reverentiam facere. Et ideo nihil prohibet si in hoc ipso quod intendimus hominem certificare, Deo reverentiam exhibeamus. Sic enim debemus aliquid in Dei reverentiam facere ut ex hoc utilitas proximis proveniat, quia etiam Deus operatur ad suam gloriam et nostram utilitatem.	Reply to Objection 3. Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God's honor that they may conduce to our neighbor's good, since God also works for His own glory and for our good.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1 Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuramentum sit appetendum et frequentandum, tanquam utile et bonum. Sicut enim votum est actus latriae, ita et iuramentum. Sed facere aliquid ex voto est laudabilius et magis meritorium quia votum est actus latriae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo, pari ratione, facere vel dicere aliquid cum iuramento est laudabilius. Et sic iuramentum est appetendum tanquam per se bonum.	Objection 1. It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above (Question 88, Article 5). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good essentially.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2 Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, super Matth., quod qui iurat, veneratur aut diligit eum per quem iurat. Sed venerari aut diligere Deum est appetendum tanquam per se bonum. Ergo et iuramentum.	Objection 2. Further, Jerome, commenting on Matthew 5:34, says that "he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears." Now reverence and love of God are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, iuramentum ordinatur ad confirmationem seu certificationem. Sed quod homo suum dictum confirmet, bonum est. Ergo iuramentum est appetendum tanquam bonum.	Objection 3. Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XXIII, vir multum iurans replebitur iniquitate. Et Augustinus dicit, in libro de mendacio, quod praeceptum domini de prohibitione iuramenti ad hoc positum est ut, quantum in te est, non affectes, non, quasi pro bono, cum aliqua delectatione appetas iusiurandum.	On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 23:12): "A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity": and Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that "the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod id quod non quaeritur nisi ad subveniendum alicui defectui, non numeratur inter ea quae sunt per se appetenda, sed inter ea quae sunt necessaria, sicut patet de medicina, quae quaeritur ad subveniendum infirmitati. Iuramentum autem quaeritur ad subveniendum alicui defectui, quo scilicet unus homo alteri discredit. Et ideo iuramentum est habendum non inter ea quae sunt per se appetenda, sed inter ea quae sunt huic vitae necessaria, quibus indebite utitur quicumque eis utitur ultra terminos necessitatis. Unde Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, qui intelligit non in bonis, idest per se appetendis, sed in necessariis iurationem habendam, refrenat se quantum potest, ut non ea utatur nisi necessitas cogat.	I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man's lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): "He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good thing," i.e. desirable for its own sake, "restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod alia ratio est de voto, et de iuramento. Nam per votum aliquid in Dei reverentiam ordinamus, unde ex hoc ipso fit religionis actus. Sed in iuramento e converso reverentia divini nominis assumitur ad promissi confirmationem. Et ideo illud quod iuramento confirmatur non propter hoc fit religionis actus, quia secundum finem morales actus species sortiuntur.	Reply to Objection 1. There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the end.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui iurat utitur quidem veneratione aut dilectione eius per quem iurat, non autem ordinat iuramentum ad venerandum aut diligendum eum per quem iurat, sed ad aliquid aliud quod est necessarium praesenti vitae.	Reply to Objection 2. He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod sicut medicina est utilis ad sanandum, et tamen quanto est virtuosior, tanto maius nocumentum inducit si non debite sumatur; ita etiam iuramentum utile quidem est ad confirmationem, tamen quanto est magis venerandum, tanto est magis periculosum nisi debite inducatur. Quia, ut dicitur Eccli. XXIII, si frustraverit, idest deceperit fratrem, delictum illius supra ipsum erit; et si dissimulaverit, quasi per simulationem iurando falsum, delinquit dupliciter (quia scilicet simulata aequitas est duplex iniquitas); et si in vanum iuraverit, idest sine debita causa et necessitate, non iustificabitur.	Reply to Objection 3. Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed aright; for, as it is written (Sirach 23:13), "if he make it void," i.e. if he deceive his brother, "his sin shall be upon him: and if he dissemble it," by swearing falsely, and with dissimulation, "he offendeth double," [because, to wit, "pretended equity is a twofold iniquity," as Augustine [Enarr. in Psalm 63:7] declares: "and if he swear in vain," i.e. without due cause and necessity, "he shall not be justified."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1 Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat per creaturas iurare. Dicitur enim Matth. V, ego dico vobis, non iurare omnino, neque per caelum, neque per terram, neque per Ierosolymam, neque per caput tuum, quod exponens Hieronymus dicit, considera quod hic salvator non per Deum iurare prohibuerit, sed per caelum et terram, et cetera.	Objection 1. It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is written (Matthew 5:34-36): "I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words, says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth," etc.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi culpae. Sed iuranti per creaturas adhibetur poena, dicitur enim XXII, qu. I, clericum per creaturam iurantem acerrime obiurgandum, si perstiterit in vitio, excommunicandum placuit. Ergo illicitum est per creaturas iurare.	Objection 2. Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is unlawful to swear by creatures.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, iuramentum est actus latriae, sicut dictum est. Sed cultus latriae non debetur alicui creaturae, ut patet Rom. I. Ergo non licet iurare per aliquam creaturam.	Objection 3. Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above (Article 4).But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to Romans 1:23-25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ioseph iuravit per salutem Pharaonis, ut legitur Gen. XLII. Ex consuetudine etiam iuratur per Evangelium, et per reliquias, et per sanctos.	On the contrary, Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Genesis 42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est iuramentum. Unum quidem quod fit per simplicem contestationem, inquantum scilicet Dei testimonium invocatur. Et hoc iuramentum innititur divinae veritati, sicut et fides. Fides autem est per se quidem et principaliter de Deo, qui est ipsa veritas; secundario autem de creaturis, in quibus veritas Dei relucet, ut supra habitum est. Et similiter iuramentum principaliter refertur ad ipsum Deum, cuius testimonium invocatur, secundario autem assumuntur ad iuramentum aliquae creaturae non secundum se, sed inquantum in eis divina veritas manifestatur; sicut iuramus per Evangelium, idest per Deum, cuius veritas in Evangelio manifestatur; et per sanctos, qui hanc veritatem crediderunt et observaverunt. Alius autem modus iurandi est per execrationem. Et in hoc iuramento inducitur creatura aliqua ut in qua divinum iudicium exerceatur. Et sic solet homo iurare per caput suum, vel per filium suum, aut per aliquam aliam rem quam diligit. Sicut et apostolus iuravit, II ad Cor. I, dicens, ego testem Deum invoco in animam meam. Quod autem Ioseph per salutem Pharaonis iuravit, utroque modo potest intelligi, vel per modum execrationis, quasi salutem Pharaonis obligaverit Deo; vel per modum contestationis, quasi contestando veritatem divinae iustitiae, ad cuius executionem principes terrae constituuntur.	I answer that, As stated above (1, ad 3), there are two kinds of oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or calling God as witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth, and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1). On like manner an oath is chiefly referred to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this truth and kept it. The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein. Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Corinthians 1:23), saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul." As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to execute.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dominus prohibuit iurare per creaturas ita quod eis adhibeatur reverentia divina. Unde Hieronymus ibidem subdit quod Iudaei, per Angelos, et cetera huiusmodi, iurantes, creaturas venerabantur Dei honore. Et eadem ratione punitur secundum canones clericus per creaturam iurans, quod ad blasphemiam infidelitatis pertinet. Unde in sequenti capitulo dicitur, si quis per capillum Dei vel caput iuraverit, vel alio modo blasphemia contra Deum usus fuerit, si in ecclesiastico ordine est, deponatur.	Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews, through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Divine honor." In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22, qu. i, can. Clericum, Objection 2), for swearing by a creature, for this savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 2 Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.	This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cultus latriae adhibetur ei cuius testimonium iurando invocatur. Et ideo praecipitur Exod. XXIII, per nomen externorum deorum non iurabitis. Non autem exhibetur cultus latriae creaturis quae in iuramento assumuntur secundum modos praedictos.	Reply to Objection 3. Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Exodus 23:13): "By the name of strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1 Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuramentum non habeat vim obligandi. Inducitur enim iuramentum ad confirmandum veritatem eius quod dicitur. Sed quando aliquis dicit aliquid de futuro, verum dicit etiam si non eveniat quod dicit, sicut Paulus, quamvis non iverit Corinthum, sicut dixerat, non tamen est mentitus, ut patet II Cor. I. Ergo videtur quod iuramentum non sit obligatorium.	Objection 1. It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Corinthians 1:15, seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Corinthians 16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, virtus non est virtuti contraria, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed iuramentum est actus virtutis, ut dictum est. Quandoque autem esset contra virtutem, aut in aliquod eius impedimentum, si quis servaret id quod iuravit, sicut cum aliquis iurat se facere aliquod peccatum, vel cum iurat desistere ab aliquo opere virtutis. Ergo iuramentum non semper est obligatorium.	Objection 2. Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above (Article 4). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath is not always binding.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3 Praeterea, quandoque aliquis invitus compellitur ad hoc quod sub iuramento aliquid promittat. Sed tales a iuramenti nexibus sunt per Romanos pontifices absoluti, ut habetur extra, de iureiurando, cap. verum in ea quaestione et cetera. Ergo iuramentum non semper est obligatorium.	Objection 3. Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 arg. 4 Praeterea, nullus potest obligari ad duo opposita. Sed quandoque oppositum est quod intendit iurans, et quod intendit ille cui iuramentum praestatur. Ergo iuramentum non potest semper esse obligatorium.	Objection 4. Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. V, reddes domino iuramenta tua.	On the contrary, It is written (Matthew 5:33): "Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 co. Respondeo dicendum quod obligatio refertur ad aliquid quod est faciendum vel dimittendum. Unde non videtur respicere iuramentum assertorium, quod est de praesenti vel de praeterito; neque etiam iuramentum de his quae sunt per alias causas fienda, sicut si quis iuramento assereret quod cras pluvia esset futura; sed solum in his quae sunt fienda per illum qui iurat. Sicut autem iuramentum assertorium, quod est de praeterito vel de praesenti, debet habere veritatem, ita etiam et iuramentum de his quae sunt fienda a nobis in futurum. Et ideo utrumque iuramentum habet quandam obligationem, diversimode tamen. Quia in iuramento quod est de praeterito vel praesenti, obligatio est non respectu rei quae iam fuit vel est, sed respectu ipsius actus iurandi, ut scilicet iuret id quod iam verum est vel fuit. Sed in iuramento quod praestatur de his quae sunt fienda a nobis, obligatio cadit e converso super rem quam aliquis iuramento firmavit. Tenetur enim aliquis ut faciat verum esse id quod iuravit, alioquin deest veritas iuramento. Si autem est talis res quae in eius potestate non fuit, deest iuramento discretionis iudicium, nisi forte quod erat ei possibile quando iuravit, ei reddatur impossibile per aliquem eventum; puta cum aliquis iuravit se pecuniam soluturum, quae ei postmodum vi vel furto subtrahitur. Tunc enim videtur excusatus esse a faciendo quod iuravit, licet teneatur facere quod in se est, sicut etiam supra circa obligationem voti diximus. Si vero sit quidem possibile fieri, sed fieri non debeat, vel quia est per se malum, vel quia est boni impeditivum, tunc iuramento deest iustitia. Et ideo iuramentum non est servandum in eo casu quo est peccatum vel boni impeditivum, secundum enim utrumque horum vergit in deteriorem exitum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod quicumque iurat aliquid se facturum, obligatur ad id faciendum, ad hoc quod veritas impleatur, si tamen alii duo comites adsint, scilicet iudicium et iustitia.	I answer that, An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears. Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth. Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow (88, 3, ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case "its result is evil" [Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.] Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliud est de simplici verbo, aliud de iuramento, in quo divinum testimonium imploratur. Sufficit enim ad veritatem verbi quod aliquis dicat id quod proponit se facturum, quia hoc iam verum est in sua causa, scilicet in proposito facientis. Sed iuramentum adhiberi non debet nisi in re de qua aliquis firmiter certus est. Et ideo si iuramentum adhibeatur, propter reverentiam divini testimonii quod invocatur, obligatur homo ut faciat esse verum id quod iuravit, secundum suam possibilitatem, nisi in deteriorem exitum vergat, ut dictum est.	Reply to Objection 1. It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iuramentum potest vergere in deteriorem exitum dupliciter. Uno modo, quia ab ipso principio habet peiorem exitum. Vel quia est secundum se malum, sicut cum aliquis iurat se adulterium patraturum. Sive quia est maioris boni impeditivum, puta cum aliquis iurat se non intraturum religionem, vel quod non fiet clericus, aut quod non accipiet praelationem in casu in quo expedit eum accipere, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Huiusmodi enim iuramentum a principio est illicitum, differenter tamen. Quia si quis iuret se facturum aliquod peccatum, et peccat iurando, et peccat iuramentum servando. Si quis autem iurat se non facturum aliquod melius bonum, quod tamen facere non tenetur, peccat quidem iurando, inquantum ponit obicem spiritui sancto, qui est boni propositi inspirator, non tamen peccat iuramentum servando, sed multo melius facit si non servet. Alio modo vergit in deteriorem exitum propter aliquid quod de novo emerserat, quod fuit impraemeditatum, sicut patet in iuramento Herodis, qui iuravit puellae saltanti se daturum quod petisset. Hoc enim iuramentum poterat esse a principio licitum, intellecta debita conditione, scilicet si peteret quod dare deceret, sed impletio iuramenti fuit illicita. Unde Ambrosius dicit, in I de officiis, est contra officium nonnunquam promissum solvere sacramentum, sicut Herodes, qui necem Ioannis praestavit ne promissum negaret.	Reply to Objection 2. An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does not keep it. Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was right to grant. but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): "Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod in iuramento quod quis coactus facit, duplex est obligatio. Una quidem qua obligatur homini cui aliquid promittit. Et talis obligatio tollitur per coactionem, quia ille qui vim intulit hoc meretur, ut ei promissum non servetur. Alia autem est obligatio qua quis Deo obligatur ut impleat quod per nomen eius promisit. Et talis obligatio non tollitur in foro conscientiae, quia magis debet damnum temporale sustinere quam iuramentum violare. Potest tamen repetere in iudicio quod solvit, vel praelato denuntiare, non obstante si contrarium iuravit, quia tale iuramentum vergeret in deteriorem exitum, esset enim contra iustitiam publicam. Romani autem pontifices ab huiusmodi iuramentis homines absolverunt non quasi decernentes huiusmodi iuramenta non esse obligatoria, sed quasi huiusmodi obligationes ex iusta causa relaxantes.	Reply to Objection 3. There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some just cause.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 7 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod quando non est eadem iurantis intentio et eius cui iurat, si hoc provenit ex dolo iurantis, debet iuramentum servari secundum sanum intellectum eius cui iuramentum praestatur. Unde Isidorus dicit, quacumque arte verborum quis iuret, Deus tamen, qui conscientiae testis est, ita hoc accipit sicut ille cui iuratur intelligit. Et quod hoc intelligatur de doloso iuramento, patet per id quod subditur, dupliciter reus fit qui et nomen Dei in vanum assumit, et proximum dolo capit. Si autem iurans dolum non adhibeat, obligatur secundum intentionem iurantis. Unde Gregorius dicit, XXVI Moral., humanae aures talia verba nostra iudicant qualia foris sonant, divina vero iudicia talia foris audiunt qualia ex intimis proferuntur.	Reply to Objection 4. When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile." If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod maior sit obligatio iuramenti quam voti. Votum enim est simplex promissio. Sed iuramentum supra promissionem adhibet divinum testimonium. Ergo maior est obligatio iuramenti quam voti.	Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, debilius solet per fortius confirmari. Sed votum interdum confirmatur iuramento. Ergo iuramentum est fortius quam votum.	Objection 2. Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a vow.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, obligatio voti causatur ex animi deliberatione, ut supra dictum est. Obligatio autem iuramenti causatur ex divina veritate, cuius testimonium invocatur. Cum ergo veritas Dei excedat deliberationem humanam, videtur quod obligatio iuramenti sit fortior quam obligatio voti.	Objection 3. Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above (Question 88, Article 1); while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 s. c. Sed contra, per votum obligatur aliquis Deo, per iuramentum obligatur interdum homini. Magis autem obligatur homo Deo quam homini. Ergo maior est obligatio voti quam iuramenti.	On the contrary, A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than an oath.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod utraque obligatio, scilicet voti et iuramenti, causatur ex aliquo divino, aliter tamen et aliter. Nam obligatio voti causatur ex fidelitate quam Deo debemus, ut scilicet ei promissum solvamus. Obligatio autem iuramenti causatur ex reverentia quam debemus ei, ex qua tenemur quod verificemus id quod per nomen eius promittimus. Omnis autem infidelitas irreverentiam continet, sed non convertitur, videtur enim infidelitas subiecti ad dominum esse maxima irreverentia. Et ideo votum ex ratione sua magis est obligatorium quam iuramentum.	I answer that, The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod votum est promissio non quaecumque, sed Deo facta, cui infidelem esse gravissimum est.	Reply to Objection 1. A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iuramentum non adhibetur voto quasi aliquid firmius, sed ut per duas res immobiles maior firmitas adhibeatur.	Reply to Objection 2. An oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable things" [Hebrews 6:18.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 8 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod deliberatio animi dat firmitatem voto quantum ex parte voventis est. Habet tamen maiorem firmitatis causam ex parte Dei, cui votum offertur.	Reply to Objection 3. Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 arg. 1 Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus possit dispensare in iuramento. Sicut enim veritas requiritur ad iuramentum assertorium, quod est de praeterito vel praesenti, ita ad iuramentum promissorium, quod est de futuro. Sed nullus potest cum aliquo dispensare quod de praeteritis vel praesentibus iuret contra veritatem. Ergo etiam nullus potest dispensare quod non faciat aliquis esse verum id quod cum iuramento in futurum promisit.	Objection 1. It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 arg. 2 Praeterea, iuramentum promissorium inducitur ad utilitatem eius cui fit promissio. Sed ille, ut videtur, non potest relaxare, quia est contra divinam reverentiam. Ergo multo minus per aliquem potest super hoc dispensari.	Objection 2. Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 arg. 3 Praeterea, in voto quilibet episcopus potest dispensare, exceptis quibusdam votis quae soli Papae reservantur, ut supra habitum est. Ergo, pari ratione, in iuramento, si esset dispensabile, quilibet episcopus posset dispensare. Quod tamen videtur esse contra iura. Non ergo videtur quod in iuramento possit dispensari.	Objection 3. Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above (88, 12, ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against the law [Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 s. c. Sed contra est quod votum est maioris obligationis quam iuramentum, ut supra dictum est. Sed in voto potest dispensari. Ergo in iuramento.	On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above (Article 8). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, necessitas dispensationis tam in lege quam in voto est propter hoc quod id quod in se, vel universaliter consideratum, est utile et honestum, secundum aliquem particularem eventum potest esse inhonestum et nocivum, quod non potest cadere nec sub lege nec sub voto. Quod autem aliquid sit inhonestum vel noxium, repugnat his quae debent attendi in iuramento, nam si sit inhonestum, repugnat iustitiae; si sit noxium, repugnat iudicio. Et ideo, pari ratione, etiam in iuramento dispensari potest.	I answer that, As stated above (Question 88, Article 10), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispensatio quae fit in iuramento non se extendit ad hoc quod aliquid contra iuramentum fiat, hoc enim est impossibile, cum observatio iuramenti cadat sub praecepto divino, quod est indispensabile. Sed ad hoc se extendit dispensatio iuramenti ut id quod sub iuramento cadebat, sub iuramento non cadat, quasi non existens debita materia iuramenti, sicut et de voto supra diximus. Materia autem iuramenti assertorii, quod est de praeterito vel praesenti, in quandam necessitatem iam transiit, et immutabilis facta est, et ideo dispensatio non referretur ad materiam, sed referretur ad ipsum actum iuramenti; unde talis dispensatio directe esset contra praeceptum divinum. Sed materia iuramenti promissorii est aliquid futurum, quod variari potest, ita scilicet quod in aliquo eventu potest esse illicitum vel nocivum, et per consequens non esse debita materia iuramenti. Et ideo dispensari potest in iuramento promissorio, quia talis dispensatio respicit materiam iuramenti, et non contrariatur praecepto divino de iuramenti observatione.	Reply to Objection 1. A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows (88, 10, ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod homo potest alteri promittere aliquid sub iuramento dupliciter. Uno modo, quasi pertinens ad utilitatem ipsius, puta si sub iuramento promittat se serviturum ei, vel pecuniam daturum. Et a tali promissione potest absolvere ille cui promissio facta est, intelligitur enim iam ei solvisse promissum quando facit de eo secundum eius voluntatem. Alio modo promittit aliquis alteri quod pertinet ad honorem Dei vel utilitatem aliorum, puta si aliquis iuramento promittat alicui se intraturum religionem, vel aliquod opus pietatis facturum. Et tunc ille cui promittitur non potest absolvere promittentem, quia promissio non est facta ei principaliter, sed Deo, nisi forte sit interposita conditio, scilicet, si illi videbitur cui promittit, vel aliquid aliud tale.	Reply to Objection 2. One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to God's honor or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. On this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, "provided he give his consent" or some such like condition.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 9 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod quandoque illud quod cadit sub iuramento promissorio est manifeste repugnans iustitiae, vel quia est peccatum, sicut cum aliquis iurat se facturum homicidium; vel quia est maioris boni impeditivum, sicut cum aliquis iurat se non intraturum religionem. Et tale iuramentum dispensatione non indiget, sed in primo casu tenetur aliquis tale iuramentum non servare; in secundo autem casu licitum est et servare et non servare, ut supra dictum est. Quandoque vero aliquid sub iuramento promittitur de quo dubium est utrum sit licitum vel illicitum, proficuum vel nocivum, aut simpliciter aut in aliquo casu. Et in hoc potest quilibet episcopus dispensare quandoque vero sub iuramento promittitur aliquid quod est manifeste licitum et utile. Et in tali iuramento non videtur habere locum dispensatio, sed commutatio, si aliquid melius faciendum occurrat ad communem utilitatem, quod maxime videtur pertinere ad potestatem Papae, qui habet curam universalis Ecclesiae; vel etiam absoluta relaxatio, quod etiam ad Papam pertinet, in omnibus generaliter quae ad dispensationem rerum ecclesiasticarum pertinent, super quas habet plenitudinem potestatis; sicut et ad unumquemque pertinet irritare iuramentum quod a sibi subditis factum est circa ea quae eius potestati subduntur; sicut pater potest irritare iuramentum puellae et vir uxoris, ut dicitur Num. XXX, sicut et supra de voto dictum est.	Reply to Objection 3. Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter a religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (07, ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. On this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter's oath, and a husband his wife's (Numbers 30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows (88, A8,9).
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 arg. 1 Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuramentum non impediatur per aliquam conditionem personae vel temporis. Iuramentum enim ad confirmationem inducitur, ut patet per apostolum, ad Heb. VI. Sed cuilibet convenit confirmare dictum suum, et quolibet tempore. Ergo videtur quod iuramentum non impediatur propter aliquam conditionem personae vel temporis.	Objection 1. It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Hebrews 6:16), is employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 arg. 2 Praeterea, maius est iurare per Deum quam per Evangelia, unde Chrysostomus dicit, si aliqua causa fuerit, modicum videtur facere qui iurat per Deum, qui autem iurat per Evangelium, maius aliquid fecisse videtur. Quibus dicendum est, stulti, Scripturae propter Deum factae sunt, non Deus propter Scripturas. Sed cuiuslibet conditionis personae, et quolibet tempore, in communi locutione consueverunt iurare per Deum. Ergo multo magis licitum est eis iurare per Evangelia.	Objection 2. Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "If there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the Scriptures were made for God's sake, not God for the sake of the Scriptures." Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 arg. 3 Praeterea, idem non causatur ex contrariis causis, quia contrariae causae sunt contrariorum. Sed aliqui excluduntur a iuramento propter defectum personae, sicut pueri ante quatuordecim annos, et etiam illi qui semel fuerunt periuri. Non ergo videtur quod aliqui prohibeantur iurare vel propter dignitatem, sicut clerici; aut etiam propter temporis solemnitatem.	Objection 3. Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 arg. 4 Praeterea, nullus homo vivens in hoc mundo est tantae dignitatis sicut Angeli, dicitur enim Matth. XI quod qui minor est in regno caelorum maior est illo, scilicet Ioanne Baptista adhuc in mundo vivente. Sed Angelo convenit iurare, dicitur enim Apoc. X quod Angelus iuravit per viventem in saecula saeculorum. Ergo nullus homo propter dignitatem debet excusari a iuramento.	Objection 4. Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Matthew 11:11) that "he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he," namely than John the Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written (Apocalypse 10:6) that the angel "swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever." Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account of his dignity.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 s. c. Sed contra est quod habetur II, qu. V, presbyter, vice iuramenti, per sanctam consecrationem interrogetur. Et XXII, qu. V, dicitur, nullus ex ecclesiastico ordine cuiquam laico quidquam super sancta Evangelia iurare praesumat.	On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): "Let a priest be examined 'by his sacred consecration,' instead of being put on his oath": and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): "Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman."
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 co. Respondeo dicendum quod in iuramento duo sunt consideranda. Unum quidem ex parte Dei, cuius testimonium inducitur. Et quantum ad hoc, debetur iuramento maxima reverentia. Et propter hoc a iuramento excluduntur et pueri ante annos pubertatis, qui non coguntur ad iurandum, quia nondum habent perfectum usum rationis, quo possint cum reverentia debita iuramentum praestare, et iterum periuri, qui ad iuramentum non admittuntur, quia ex retroactis praesumitur quod debitam reverentiam iuramento non exhibebunt. Et propter hoc etiam, ut iuramento debita reverentia exhibeatur, dicitur XXII, qu. V, honestum est ut qui in sanctis audet iurare, hoc ieiunus faciat, cum omni honestate et timore Dei. Aliud autem est considerandum ex parte hominis, cuius dictum iuramento confirmatur. Non enim indiget dictum hominis confirmatione nisi quia de eo dubitatur. Hoc autem derogat dignitati personae, ut dubitetur de veritate eorum quae dicit. Et ideo personis magnae dignitatis non convenit iurare. Propter quod dicitur II, qu. V, cap. si quis presbyter, quod sacerdotes ex levi causa iurare non debent. Tamen pro aliqua necessitate, vel magna utilitate, licitum est eis iurare, et praecipue pro spiritualibus negotiis. Pro quibus etiam iuramenta competit praestare in solemnibus diebus, quibus est spiritualibus rebus vacandum, non autem tunc sunt iuramenta praestanda pro rebus temporalibus, nisi forte ex magna necessitate.	I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths [Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): "It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of God." The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man's assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person's dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he says, wherefore "it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear." For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that "priests should not swear for trifling reasons." Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quidam sunt qui dictum suum confirmare non possunt propter eorum defectum, et quidam sunt quorum dictum adeo debet esse certum quod confirmatione non egeat.	Reply to Objection 1. Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be so certain that they need no confirmation.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod iuramentum, secundum se consideratum, tanto sanctius est et magis obligat quanto maius est id per quod iuratur, ut Augustinus dicit, ad Publicolam. Et secundum hoc, maius est iurare per Deum quam per Evangelia. Sed potest esse e converso propter modum iurandi, utpote si iuramentum quod fit per Evangelia, fiat cum quadam deliberatione et solemnitate; iuramentum autem quod fit per Deum, fiat leviter et absque deliberatione.	Reply to Objection 2. The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid tolli ex contrariis causis per modum superabundantiae et defectus. Et hoc modo aliqui impediuntur a iuramento quia sunt maioris auctoritatis quam quod eos iurare deceat, aliqui vero quia sunt minoris auctoritatis quam quod eorum iuramento stetur.	Reply to Objection 3. Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.
IIª-IIae q. 89 a. 10 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod iuramentum Angeli inducitur non propter defectum ipsius, quasi non sit eius simplici dicto credendum, sed ad ostendendum id quod dicitur ex infallibili Dei dispositione procedere. Sicut etiam et Deus aliquando in Scripturis iurans inducitur, ad ostendendum immobilitatem eius quod dicitur, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Heb. VI.	Reply to Objection 4. The angel's oath is adduced not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show that the statement made issues from God's infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His word, as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 6:17).