Authors/Thomas Aquinas/Summa Theologiae/Part IIb/Q9

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IIª-IIae q. 9 pr. Deinde considerandum est de dono scientiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum scientia sit donum. Secundo, utrum sit circa divina. Tertio, utrum sit speculativa vel practica. Quarto, quae beatitudo ei respondeat. Question 9. The gift of knowledge Is knowledge a gift? Is it about Divine things? Is it speculative or practical? Which beatitude corresponds to it?
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1 Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia non sit donum. Dona enim spiritus sancti naturalem facultatem excedunt. Sed scientia importat effectum quendam naturalis rationis, dicit enim philosophus, in I Poster., quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Ergo scientia non est donum spiritus sancti. Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a "demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge." Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti sunt communia omnibus sanctis, ut supra dictum est. Sed Augustinus, XIV de Trin., dicit quod scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide. Ergo scientia non est donum. Objection 2. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy persons, as stated above (8, 4; I-II, 68, 5). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith." Therefore knowledge is not a gift.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, donum est perfectius virtute, ut supra dictum est. Ergo unum donum sufficit ad perfectionem unius virtutis. Sed virtuti fidei respondet donum intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non respondet ei donum scientiae. Nec apparet cui alii virtuti respondeat. Ergo, cum dona sint perfectiones virtutum, ut supra dictum est, videtur quod scientia non sit donum. Objection 3. Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above (I-II, 68, 8). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Question 8, Article 2). Therefore the gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated above (I-II, 68, 1,2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Isaiae XI computatur inter septem dona. On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Isaiah 11:2).
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod gratia est perfectior quam natura, unde non deficit in his in quibus homo per naturam perfici potest. Cum autem homo per naturalem rationem assentit secundum intellectum alicui veritati, dupliciter perficitur circa veritatem illam, primo quidem, quia capit eam; secundo, quia de ea certum iudicium habet. Et ideo ad hoc quod intellectus humanus perfecte assentiat veritati fidei duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est quod sane capiat ea quae proponuntur, quod pertinet ad donum intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Aliud autem est ut habeat certum et rectum iudicium de eis, discernendo scilicet credenda non credendis. Et ad hoc necessarium est donum scientiae. I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it. Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above (Question 8, Article 6): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod certitudo cognitionis in diversis naturis invenitur diversimode, secundum diversam conditionem uniuscuiusque naturae. Nam homo consequitur certum iudicium de veritate per discursum rationis, et ideo scientia humana ex ratione demonstrativa acquiritur. Sed in Deo est certum iudicium veritatis absque omni discursu per simplicem intuitum, ut in primo dictum est, et ideo divina scientia non est discursiva vel ratiocinativa, sed absoluta et simplex. Cui similis est scientia quae ponitur donum spiritus sancti, cum sit quaedam participativa similitudo ipsius. Reply to Objection 1. Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in I, 14, 7; wherefore God's knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod circa credenda duplex scientia potest haberi. Una quidem per quam homo scit quid credere debeat, discernens credenda a non credendis, et secundum hoc scientia est donum, et convenit omnibus sanctis. Alia vero est scientia circa credenda per quam homo non solum scit quid credi debeat, sed etiam scit fidem manifestare et alios ad credendum inducere et contradictores revincere. Et ista scientia ponitur inter gratias gratis datas, quae non datur omnibus, sed quibusdam. Unde Augustinus, post verba inducta, subiungit, aliud est scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat, aliud scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur et contra impios defendatur. Reply to Objection 2. A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: "It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly."
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod dona sunt perfectiora virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus. Non sunt autem perfectiora virtutibus theologicis, sed magis omnia dona ad perfectionem theologicarum virtutum ordinantur sicut ad finem. Et ideo non est inconveniens si diversa dona ad unam virtutem theologicam ordinantur. Reply to Objection 3. The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientiae donum sit circa res divinas. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIV de Trin., quod per scientiam, gignitur fides, nutritur et roboratur. Sed fides est de rebus divinis, quia obiectum fidei est veritas prima, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et donum scientiae est de rebus divinis. Objection 1. It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith." Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above (Question 1, Article 1). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, donum scientiae est dignius quam scientia acquisita. Sed aliqua scientia acquisita est circa res divinas, sicut scientia metaphysicae. Ergo multo magis donum scientiae est circa res divinas. Objection 2. Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut dicitur Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur. Si igitur est scientia circa res creatas, videtur quod etiam sit circa res divinas. Objection 3. Further, according to Romans 1:20, "the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XIV de Trin., dicit, rerum divinarum scientia proprie sapientia nuncupetur, humanarum autem proprie scientiae nomen obtineat. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): "The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge."
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod certum iudicium de re aliqua maxime datur ex sua causa. Et ideo secundum ordinem causarum oportet esse ordinem iudiciorum, sicut enim causa prima est causa secundae, ita per causam primam iudicatur de causa secunda. De causa autem prima non potest iudicari per aliam causam. Et ideo iudicium quod fit per causam primam est primum et perfectissimum. In his autem in quibus aliquid est perfectissimum, nomen commune generis appropriatur his quae deficiunt a perfectissimo, ipsi autem perfectissimo adaptatur aliud speciale nomen, ut patet in logicis. Nam in genere convertibilium illud quod significat quod quid est, speciali nomine definitio vocatur, quae autem ab hoc deficiunt convertibilia existentia nomen commune sibi retinent, scilicet quod propria dicuntur. Quia igitur nomen scientiae importat quandam certitudinem iudicii, ut dictum est; si quidem certitudo iudicii fit per altissimam causam, habet speciale nomen, quod est sapientia, dicitur enim sapiens in unoquoque genere qui novit altissimam causam illius generis, per quam potest de omnibus iudicare. Simpliciter autem sapiens dicitur qui novit altissimam causam simpliciter, scilicet Deum. Et ideo cognitio divinarum rerum vocatur sapientia. Cognitio vero rerum humanarum vocatur scientia, quasi communi nomine importante certitudinem iudicii appropriato ad iudicium quod fit per causas secundas. Et ideo, sic accipiendo scientiae nomen, ponitur donum distinctum a dono sapientiae. Unde donum scientiae est solum circa res humanas, vel circa res creatas. I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment. Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms, that which signifies "what a thing is," is given the special name of "definition," but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called "proper" terms. Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as stated above (Article 1), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that cause: and a wise man "absolutely," is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is called "wisdom," while the knowledge of human things is called "knowledge," this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet ea de quibus est fides sint res divinae et aeternae, tamen ipsa fides est quoddam temporale in animo credentis. Et ideo scire quid credendum sit pertinet ad donum scientiae. Scire autem ipsas res creditas secundum seipsas per quandam unionem ad ipsas pertinet ad donum sapientiae. Unde donum sapientiae magis respondet caritati, quae unit mentem hominis Deo. Reply to Objection 1. Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit secundum quod nomen scientiae communiter sumitur. Sic autem scientia non ponitur speciale donum, sed secundum quod restringitur ad iudicium quod fit per res creatas. Reply to Objection 2. This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quilibet cognoscitivus habitus formaliter quidem respicit medium per quod aliquid cognoscitur, materialiter autem id quod per medium cognoscitur. Et quia id quod est formale potius est, ideo illae scientiae quae ex principiis mathematicis concludunt circa materiam naturalem, magis cum mathematicis connumerantur, utpote eis similiores, licet quantum ad materiam magis conveniant cum naturali, et propter hoc dicitur in II Physic. quod sunt magis naturales. Et ideo, cum homo per res creatas Deum cognoscit, magis videtur hoc pertinere ad scientiam, ad quam pertinet formaliter, quam ad sapientiam, ad quam pertinet materialiter. Et e converso, cum secundum res divinas iudicamus de rebus creatis, magis hoc ad sapientiam quam ad scientiam pertinet. Reply to Objection 3. As stated above (Question 1, Article 1), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia quae ponitur donum sit scientia practica. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod actio qua exterioribus rebus utimur scientiae deputatur. Sed scientia cui deputatur actio est practica. Ergo scientia quae est donum est scientia practica. Objection 1. It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in I Moral., nulla est scientia si utilitatem pietatis non habet, et valde inutilis est pietas si scientiae discretione caret. Ex quo habetur quod scientia dirigit pietatem. Sed hoc non potest competere scientiae speculativae. Ergo scientia quae est donum non est speculativa, sed practica. Objection 2. Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lacks the discernment of knowledge." Now it follows from this authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti non habentur nisi a iustis, ut supra habitum est. Sed scientia speculativa potest haberi etiam ab iniustis, secundum illud Iac. ult., scienti bonum et non facienti, peccatum est illi. Ergo scientia quae est donum non est speculativa, sed practica. Objection 3. Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous, as stated above (Question 9, Article 5). But speculative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in I Moral., scientia in die suo convivium parat, quia in ventre mentis ignorantiae ieiunium superat. Sed ignorantia non tollitur totaliter nisi per utramque scientiam, scilicet et speculativam et practicam. Ergo scientia quae est donum est et speculativa et practica. On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the mind." Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, donum scientiae ordinatur, sicut et donum intellectus, ad certitudinem fidei. Fides autem primo et principaliter in speculatione consistit, inquantum scilicet inhaeret primae veritati. Sed quia prima veritas est etiam ultimus finis, propter quem operamur, inde etiam est quod fides ad operationem se extendit, secundum illud Gal. V, fides per dilectionem operatur. Unde etiam oportet quod donum scientiae primo quidem et principaliter respiciat speculationem, inquantum scilicet homo scit quid fide tenere debeat. Secundario autem se extendit etiam ad operationem, secundum quod per scientiam credibilium, et eorum quae ad credibilia consequuntur, dirigimur in agendis. I answer that, As stated above (Question 9, Article 8), the gift of knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Galatians 5:6: "Faith . . . worketh by charity." The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de dono scientiae secundum quod se extendit ad operationem, attribuitur enim ei actio, sed non sola nec primo. Et hoc etiam modo dirigit pietatem. Reply to Objection 1. Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 2 Unde patet solutio ad secundum. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est de dono intellectus quod non quicumque intelligit habet donum intellectus, sed qui intelligit quasi ex habitu gratiae; ita etiam de dono scientiae est intelligendum quod illi soli donum scientiae habeant qui ex infusione gratiae certum iudicium habent circa credenda et agenda, quod in nullo deviat a rectitudine iustitiae. Et haec est scientia sanctorum, de qua dicitur Sap. X, iustum deduxit dominus per vias rectas et dedit illi scientiam sanctorum. Reply to Objection 3. As we have already stated (8, 5) about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy things, according to Wisdom 10:10: "She conducted the just . . . through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy things."
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 1 Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientiae non respondeat tertia beatitudo, scilicet, beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur. Sicut enim malum est causa tristitiae et luctus, ita etiam bonum est causa laetitiae. Sed per scientiam principalius manifestantur bona quam mala, quae per bona cognoscuntur, rectum enim est iudex sui ipsius et obliqui, ut dicitur in I de anima. Ergo praedicta beatitudo non convenienter respondet scientiae. Objection 1. It would seem that the third beatitude, "Blessed are they that mourn," does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is known through evil: for "the straight line rules both itself and the crooked line" (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, consideratio veritatis est actus scientiae. Sed in consideratione veritatis non est tristitia, sed magis gaudium, dicitur enim Sap. VIII, non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius, nec taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gaudium. Ergo praedicta beatitudo non convenienter respondet dono scientiae. Objection 2. Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wisdom 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness." Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, donum scientiae prius consistit in speculatione quam in operatione. Sed secundum quod consistit in speculatione, non respondet sibi luctus, quia intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de imitabili et fugiendo, ut dicitur in III de anima; neque dicit aliquid laetum et triste. Ergo praedicta beatitudo non convenienter ponitur respondere dono scientiae. Objection 3. Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since "the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to be sought or avoided" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift of knowledge.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, scientia convenit lugentibus, qui didicerunt quibus malis vincti sunt, quae quasi bona petierunt. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): "Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good."
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ad scientiam proprie pertinet rectum iudicium creaturarum. Creaturae autem sunt ex quibus homo occasionaliter a Deo avertitur, secundum illud Sap. XIV, creaturae factae sunt in odium, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui scilicet rectum iudicium de his non habent, dum aestimant in eis esse perfectum bonum; unde in eis finem constituendo, peccant et verum bonum perdunt. Et hoc damnum homini innotescit per rectum iudicium de creaturis, quod habetur per donum scientiae. Et ideo beatitudo luctus ponitur respondere dono scientiae. I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man's aversion from God is occasioned, according to Wisdom 14:11: "Creatures . . . are turned to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise," of those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge. Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bona creata non excitant spirituale gaudium nisi quatenus referuntur ad bonum divinum, ex quo proprie consurgit gaudium spirituale. Et ideo directe quidem spiritualis pax, et gaudium consequens, respondet dono sapientiae. Dono autem scientiae respondet quidem primo luctus de praeteritis erratis; et consequenter consolatio, dum homo per rectum iudicium scientiae creaturas ordinat in bonum divinum. Et ideo in hac beatitudine ponitur luctus pro merito, et consolatio consequens pro praemio. Quae quidem inchoatur in hac vita, perficitur autem in futura. Reply to Objection 1. Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod de ipsa consideratione veritatis homo gaudet, sed de re circa quam considerat veritatem potest tristari quandoque. Et secundum hoc luctus scientiae attribuitur. Reply to Objection 2. Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.
IIª-IIae q. 9 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod scientiae secundum quod in speculatione consistit, non respondet beatitudo aliqua, quia beatitudo hominis non consistit in consideratione creaturarum, sed in contemplatione Dei. Sed aliqualiter beatitudo hominis consistit in debito usu creaturarum et ordinata affectione circa ipsas, et hoc dico quantum ad beatitudinem viae. Et ideo scientiae non attribuitur aliqua beatitudo pertinens ad contemplationem; sed intellectui et sapientiae, quae sunt circa divina. Reply to Objection 3. No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.

Notes

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