Authors/Thomas Aquinas/depotentia/Q1

DE POTENTIA QUESTION I

• Article 1 Is There Power in God
• Article 2 Is God's Power Infinite?
• Article 3 Are Those Things Possible to God Which Are Impossible to Nature?
• Article 4 Should We Judge a Thing to Be Possible or Impossible With Reference to Lower or to Higher Causes?
• Article 5 Whether God can do what he does not, and leave undone what he does? It would seem that the reply should be in the negative.
• Article 6 Can God Do What Others Can Do?
• Article 7 Is God Almighty?

Latin	English
	QUESTION I: THE POWER OF GOD
q. 1 pr. 1 Et primo quaeritur utrum in Deo sit potentia. q. 1 pr. 2 Secundo utrum potentia Dei sit infinita. q. 1 pr. 3 Tertio utrum ea quae sunt naturae impossibilia, Deo sint possibilia. q. 1 pr. 4 Quarto utrum iudicandum sit aliquid possibile vel impossibile, secundum causas inferiores vel superiores. q. 1 pr. 5 Quinto utrum Deus possit facere quae non facit, et dimittere quae facit. q. 1 pr. 6 Sexto utrum Deus possit facere quae alii faciunt, ut peccare, ambulare, et cetera. q. 1 pr. 7 Septimo utrum Deus dicatur omnipotens.	THERE are seven points of inquiry: (1) Is there power in God? (2) Is God's power infinite? (3) Can God do what nature cannot do? (4) Is a thing to be judged possible or impossible in reference to lower or to higher causes? (5) Can God do what he does not, or leave undone what he does? (6) Can God do whatever others do, for instance, can he sin, walk, etc.? (7) Is God all-powerful?
	Q. I: ARTICLE I: Is There Power in God?
	Sum. Th. I, Q. xxv, a. 1: C.G. I, 16; II, 7]
q. 1 a. 1 tit. 1 Et primo quaeritur utrum in Deo sit potentia q. 1 a. 1 tit. 2 Et videtur quod non.	THE question before us concerns God's power: the first point of inquiry is whether there is power in God. And it would seem that the reply should be in the negative.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 1 Potentia enim est operationis principium. Sed operatio Dei, quae est eius essentia, non habet principium, quia neque est genita neque procedens. Ergo in Deo non est potentia.	1. Power is a principle of operation. Now God's, operation, which is his essence, has no principle, since neither is it begotten nor does it proceed. Therefore power is not in God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 2 Praeterea, omne perfectissimum est Deo attribuendum, secundum Anselmum. Ergo quod respicit aliquid se perfectius, non debet Deo attribui. Sed omnis potentia respicit se perfectius, scilicet passiva formam et activa operationem. Ergo potentia Deo attribui non potest.	2. Whatever is most perfect should be ascribed to God, according to Anselm, (Monolog. xiv). Hence that which implies a relation to something more perfect should not be ascribed to God. But all power bears a relation to something more perfect, namely a passive form and an active operation. Therefore we should not ascribe power to God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, potentia est principium transmutandi in aliud secundum quod est aliud: secundum philosophum; sed principium relatio quaedam est; et est relatio Dei ad creaturas, prout significatur in potentia creandi vel movendi. Nulla autem talis relatio est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem. Ergo potentia non est in Deo secundum rem.	3. Power according to the Philosopher (Metaph. V, 12), denotes a principle of transmutation terminating in. another thing as such. Now a principle indicates relationship: and power is the relation of God to his creatures, significative of his ability to create or move them. But no such relation is really in God, but only in our way of thinking. Therefore power is not really in God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 4 Praeterea, habitus est perfectior potentia, utpote operanti propinquior. Sed habitus non ponitur in Deo. Ergo nec potentia.	4. Habit is more perfect than power, since it is closer to operation. But there are no habits in God. Neither, therefore, is there power in him.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 5 Praeterea, nihil debet in Deo significari per quod derogetur eius primitiae vel simplicitati. Sed Deus, in quantum est simplex, et primum agens, agit per essentiam suam. Ergo non debet significari agere per potentiam, quae saltem secundum modum significandi super essentiam addit.	5. No expression should be employed that is derogatory to God's primacy or simplicity. Now God by virtue of his simplicity, and considered as first agent, acts by his essence. Therefore we should not speak of him as acting by his power, which at least in its manner of signifying connotes something added to his essence.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 6 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in perpetuis non differt esse et posse: multo minus ergo in divinis. Sed ubi est eadem res, debet esse idem nomen a digniori sumptum. Dignius autem est essentia quam potentia: quia potentia essentiae advenit. Ergo in Deo debet nominari essentia tantum, non autem potentia.	6. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 4), in everlasting things there is no difference between actual being and possible being: and much more must this be the case in God. Now where two things are identical, they should have one name taken from the more dignified. But essence is more dignified than power, because power is an addition to essence. Therefore we should speak only of God's essence and not of his power.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 7 Praeterea, sicut materia prima est pura potentia, ita Deus est purus actus. Sed prima materia secundum essentiam suam considerata, est denudata ab omni actu. Ergo Deus in essentia sua consideratus, est absque omnipotentia.	7. As primary matter is pure potentiality (potentia), so is God pure act. Now primary matter considered in its essence is entirely void of act. Therefore God considered in his essence is void of all power (potentia).
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 8 Praeterea, omnis potentia ab actu separata est imperfecta: et ita, cum nihil imperfectum Deo conveniat, talis potentia in Deo esse non potest. Si ergo in Deo est potentia, oportet quod semper sit actui coniuncta: et ita potentia creandi est coniuncta actui semper; et sic sequitur quod ab aeterno creavit res; quod est haereticum.	8. Any power apart from its act is imperfect, so that as no imperfection may be ascribed to God, such a power cannot be in him. If then there is power in God, it must needs be always united to its act, and consequently the power to create will always be united to the act of creation : so that it will follow that God created things from eternity: which is heretical.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 9 Praeterea, quando aliquid sufficit ad aliquid agendum, superflue aliquid superadditur. Sed essentia Dei sufficit ad hoc quod Deus per eam aliquid agat. Ergo superflue ponitur in eo potentia per quam agat.	9. When one thing suffices for a certain action, it is superfluous to add another. But God's essence suffices for God to act through it. Therefore it is superfluous to say that he has power whereby to act.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 10 Sed dices, quod potentia non est aliud quam essentia secundum rem; sed solum secundum modum intelligendi.- Sed contra, omnis intellectus cui non respondet aliquid in re est cassus et vanus.	10. To this you may reply that God's power differs from his essence, not really but only in our way of thinking.-On the contrary, a concept to which there is no corresponding reality is void and senseless.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 11 Praeterea, praedicamentum substantiae est nobilius aliis praedicamentis. Sed Deo non attribuitur, ut Augustinus dicit. Multo ergo minus praedicamentum qualitatis. Sed potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Ergo Deo attribui non debet.	11. Substance is the most excellent of the predicaments; and yet, as Augustine asserts, it is not ascribed to God (De Trin. vii, 6). Much less, therefore, is the predicament of quality. Now power is assigned to the second species of quality. Therefore it should not be ascribed to God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 12 Sed dices, quod potentia quae Deo attribuitur, non est qualitas, sed Dei essentia, sola ratione differens.- Sed contra, aut isti rationi aliquid respondet in re, aut nihil. Si nihil ratio vana est. Si autem aliquid in re ei respondet, sequitur quod aliquid in Deo sit potentia praeter essentiam, sicut ratio potentiae est praeter rationem essentiae.	12. You will say, perhaps, that power as attributed to God is not a quality, but the very essence of God, differing therefrom but logically.-On the contrary, either there is something real corresponding to this logical distinction, or there is nothing. If nothing, the objection fails. If something, then it follows that in God power is in addition to his essence, even as the notion of power is distinct from the notion of essence.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 13 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, omnis potestas et omne effectivum est propter aliud eligendum. Nullum autem huiusmodi Deo convenit: quia ipse non est propter aliud. Ergo potentia Deo non convenit.	13. According to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 5) all power or energy is for the sake of some eligible end. But nothing of this kind can be said of God, since he is not for the sake of something else. Therefore power is unbecoming to God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 14 Praeterea, virtus a Dionysio ponitur media inter substantiam et operationem. Sed Deus non agit per aliquod medium. Ergo non agit per virtutem; et ita nec per potentiam: et sic potentia non est in Deo.	14. According to Dionysius (De Coel. Hier. xi) energy is a medium between substance and work. But God does not work through a medium. Therefore he does not work by energy, nor consequently by power: and thus it follows that power is not in God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 15 Praeterea, secundum philosophum potentia activa, quae soli Deo potest competere, est principium transmutationis in aliud, secundum quod est aliud. Sed Deus agit sine transmutatione, sicut patet in creatione. Ergo Deo potentia activa attribui non potest.	15. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12 ; ix, i) active power, which alone can be ascribed to God, is a principle of transmutation terminating in another ihing as such. But God acts without transmutation : for instance, in the creation. Therefore active power cannot be attributed to God.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 16 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, quod eiusdem est potentia actionis et passionis. Sed potentia passionis Deo non convenit. Ergo nec potentia actionis.	16. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that active and passive power are in the same subject. But passive power is unbecoming to God. Therefore active power is also.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 17 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, quod potentiae activae est contraria privatio. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo in Deo nullo modo sit privatio, non erit ibi potentia.	17. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that a contrary privation attaches to an active power. Now it is in the nature of contraries to have the same subject. Since then there can nowise be privation in God, neither can power be in him.
q. 1 a. 1 arg. 18 Praeterea, Magister dicit quod agere non proprie competit Deo. Sed ubi non est actio, ibi non potest esse potentia activa nec passiva, ut patet. Ergo nulla.	18. The Master says (II D. i.) that action is not properly speaking attributable to God. But where action is not, there can be no power, active or passive. Therefore no kind of power is in God.
q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 1 Sed contra. Est quod dicitur in Psalm. LXXXVIII, 9: potens es, domine, et veritas tua in circuitu tuo.	On the contrary, it is written (Ps. lxxxviii, 9) : Thou art mighty, O Lord, and thy truth is round about thee.
q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 2 Praeterea, Matth. III, 9: potens est Deus de lapidibus istis suscitare filios Abrahae.	Again it is written (Matt. iii, 9) : God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham.
q. 1 a. 1 s. c. 3 Praeterea, omnis operatio ab aliqua potentia procedit. Sed Deo maxime convenit operari. Ergo Deo maxime potentia convenit.	Moreover, all operation proceeds from power. Now operation is supremely attributable to God. Therefore power is most becoming to God.
q. 1 a. 1 co. Respondeo. Ad huius quaestionis evidentiam sciendum, quod potentia dicitur ab actu: actus autem est duplex: scilicet primus, qui est forma; et secundus, qui est operatio: et sicut videtur ex communi hominum intellectu, nomen actus primo fuit attributum operationi: sic enim quasi omnes intelligunt actum; secundo autem exinde fuit translatum ad formam, in quantum forma est principium operationis et finis. Unde et similiter duplex est potentia: una activa cui respondet actus, qui est operatio; et huic primo nomen potentiae videtur fuisse attributum: alia est potentia passiva, cui respondet actus primus, qui est forma, ad quam similiter videtur secundario nomen potentiae devolutum.	I answer that to make the point at issue clear we must observe that we speak of power in relation to act. Now act is twofold; the first act which is a form, and the second act which is operation. Seemingly the word 'act' was first universally employed in the sense of operation, and then, secondly, transferred to indicate the form, inasmuch as the form is the principle and end of operation. Wherefore in like manner power is twofold: active power corresponding to that act which is operation-and seemingly it was in this sense that the word 'power' was first employed:- and passive power, corresponding to the first act or the form,-to which seemingly the name of power was subsequently given.
Sicut autem nihil patitur nisi ratione potentiae passivae, ita nihil agit nisi ratione actus primi, qui est forma. Dictum est enim, quod ad ipsum primo nomen actus ex actione devenit. Deo autem convenit esse actum purum et primum; unde ipsi convenit maxime agere, et suam similitudinem in alias diffundere, et ideo ei maxime convenit potentia activa; nam potentia activa dicitur secundum quod est principium actionis. Sed et sciendum, quod intellectus noster Deum exprimere nititur sicut aliquid perfectissimum. Et quia in ipsum devenire non potest nisi ex effectuum similitudine; neque in creaturis invenit aliquid summe perfectum quod omnino imperfectione careat: ideo ex diversis perfectionibus in creaturis repertis, ipsum nititur designare, quamvis cuilibet illarum perfectionum aliquid desit; ita tamen quod quidquid alicui istarum perfectionum imperfectionis adiungitur, totum a Deo amoveatur. Verbi gratia esse significat aliquid completum et simplex sed non subsistens; substantia autem aliquid subsistens significat sed alii subiectum. Ponimus ergo in Deo substantiam et esse, sed substantiam ratione subsistentiae non ratione substandi; esse vero ratione simplicitatis et complementi, non ratione inhaerentiae, qua alteri inhaeret. Et similiter attribuimus Deo operationem ratione ultimi complementi, non ratione eius in quod operatio transit. Potentiam vero attribuimus ratione eius quod permanet et quod est principium eius, non ratione eius quod per operationem completur.	Now, just as nothing suffers save by reason of a passive power, so nothing acts except by reason of the first act, namely the form. For it has been stated that this first act is so called from action. Now God is act both pure and primary, wherefore it is most befitting to him to act and communicate his likeness to other things: and consequently active power is most becoming to him: since power is called active forasmuch as it is a principle of action. We must also observe that our mind strives to describe God as a most perfect being. And seeing that it is unable to get at him save by likening him to his effects, while it fails to find any creature so supremely perfect as to be wholly devoid of imperfection, consequently it endeavours to describe him as possessing the various perfections it discovers in creatures, although each of those perfections is in some way at fault, yet so as to remove, from God whatever imperfection is connected with them. For instance, being denotes something complete and simple, yet non-subsistent; substance denotes something subsistent, yet the subject of something. Accordingly we ascribe being and substance to God; but substance by reason of subsistence not of substanding; and being by reason of simplicity and completeness, not of inherence whereby it inheres to something. In like manner we ascribe to God operation by reason of its being the ultimate perfection, not by reason of that into which operation passes. And we attribute power to God by reason of that which is permanent and is the principle of power, and not by reason of that which is made complete by operation.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potentia non solum est operationis principium, sed etiam effectus; unde non oportet, quod si potentia in Deo ponitur quae sit effectus principium, quod essentiae divinae quae est operatio, sit aliquod principium. Vel dicendum, et melius, quod in divinis invenitur duplex relatio. Una realis, illa scilicet qua personae ad invicem distinguuntur, ut paternitas et filiatio; alias personae divinae non realiter sed ratione distinguerentur, ut Sabellius dixit. Alia rationis tantum, quae significatur, cum dicitur quod operatio divina est ab essentia divina, vel quod Deus operatur per essentiam suam. Praepositiones enim quasdam habitudines designant. Et hoc ideo contingit, quia cum attribuitur Deo operatio secundum suam rationem quae requirit aliquod principium, attribuitur etiam ei relatio existentis a principio, unde ista relatio non est nisi rationis tantum. Est autem de ratione operationis habere principium, non de ratione essentiae; unde licet essentia divina non habeat aliquod principium neque re neque ratione, tamen operatio divina habet aliquod principium secundum rationem.	Reply to the First Objection. Power is a principle not only of the operation but also of the effect. Hence it does not follow if power be in God as the principle of his effect, that it is a principle of God's essence which is his operation. Another and a better reply is that there is a twofold relation in God. One is real, that namely, by which the persons are mutually distinct, for instance, paternity and filiation ; otherwise the divine persons would be distinct not really but logically, as Sabellius maintained. The other kind of relation is logical, and is indicated when we say that the divine operation comes from the divine essence, or that God works by his essence : for prepositions indicate some kind of relationship. This is because when we attribute to God operation considered as requiring a principle, we attribute to him also the relationship of that which derives its existence from a principle, wherefore such relation is only logical. Now operation involves a principle, whereas essence does not: hence, although the divine essence has no principle, neither really nor logically, yet the divine operation has a principle in our way of thinking.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet omne perfectissimum sit Deo attribuendum, non tamen oportet quod omne illud quod Deo attribuitur, sit perfectissimum; sed oportet quod sit conveniens ad designationem perfectissimi, ad quod competit aliquid ratione suae perfectionis quod habet aliquid se perfectius, cui tamen deest illa quam aliud habet.	Reply to the Second Objection. Although all that is most perfect should be attributed to God, it does not follow that whatsoever is attributed to him is most perfect, but that it is suitable to designate that which is most perfect. The reason is that to a most perfect thing something may be attributed, so far as it is itself perfect, which however admits of something else more perfect still, though lacking the perfection which the other has.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod potentia dicitur principium non quia sit ipsa relatio quam significat nomen principii sed quia est id quod est principium.	Reply to the Third Objection. Power is said to be a principle, not as though it were the very relation signified by the name principle, but because it is identical with the principle.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod habitus numquam est in potentia activa, sed solum in passiva, et ea est perfectior: talis autem potentia Deo non attribuitur.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Habit is never in an active power, but only in a passive power, and is more perfect than it : such a power, however, is not attributed to God.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod ista sunt impossibilia, quod Deus ponatur agere per essentiam suam, et quod non sit in Deo potentia: hoc enim quod est actionis principium, potentia est: unde essentia divina ex hoc ipso quod ponitur Deus per ipsam agere, ponitur esse potentia. Et sic ratio potentiae in Deo non derogat neque simplicitati neque primitiae eius, quia non ponitur quasi aliquid additum essentiae.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. It is absurd to say that though God works by his essence there is no power in God. Because that which is a principle of action is a power: wherefore the mere fact that God works by his essence implies that there is power in God. Hence the notion of power in God does not derogate from his simplicity or his primacy, since it does not indicate something in addition to his essence.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod in perpetuis non differt esse et posse, intelligitur de potentia passiva; et sic nihil facit ad propositum, quia talis potentia non est in Deo. Tamen quia verum est quod potentia activa est idem in Deo quod eius essentia, ideo dicendum, quod licet essentia divina et potentia sint idem secundum rem, tamen quia potentia maxime modum significandi addit, ideo speciale nomen requirit: nam nomina respondent intellectibus, secundum philosophum.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. The statement that in everlasting things there is no difference between actual being and possible being, refers to passive power: consequently it has no bearing on the point at issue, because no such power is in God. Nevertheless, since it is true that active power in God is identical with his essence, we must reply that although the divine essence and power are the same in reality, yet seeing that power by its manner of signification indicates something in addition, it requires a special name : for names correspond to ideas, as the Philosopher says (Periherm. i).
q. 1 a. 1 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum, quod ratio illa probat quod in Deo non sit potentia passiva, et hoc concedimus.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. This argument proves that there is no passive power in God: and this we grant.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 8 Ad octavum dicendum, quod potentia Dei semper est coniuncta actui, id est operationi (nam operatio est divina essentia); sed effectus sequuntur secundum imperium voluntatis et ordinem sapientiae. Unde non oportet quod semper sit coniuncta effectui; sicut nec quod creaturae fuerint ab aeterno.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. God's power is always united to act, i.e. to operation (for operation is the divine essence) : but the effects follow according as his will commands and his wisdom ordains. Consequently it does not follow that his power is always united to its effect, or that creatures have existed from eternity.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 9 Ad nonum dicendum, quod essentia Dei sufficit ad hoc quod per eam Deus agat, nec tamen superfluit potentia: quia potentia intelligitur quasi quaedam res addita supra essentiam, sed superaddit secundum intellectum solam relationem principii: ipsa enim essentia ex hoc quod est principium agendi, habet rationem potentiae.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. God's essence suffices for him to act thereby: and yet his power is not superfluous: because it is understood not as a thing in addition to his essence, but as connoting in our way of thinking the sole relation of a principle : for from the mere fact that the essence is the principle of action it follows that it has the formality of power.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 10 Ad decimum dicendum, quod intellectui respondet aliquid in re dupliciter. Uno modo immediate, quando videlicet intellectus concipit formam rei alicuius extra animam existentis, ut hominis vel lapidis. Alio modo mediate, quando videlicet aliquid sequitur actum intelligendi, et intellectus reflexus supra ipsum considerat illud. Unde res respondet illi considerationi intellectus mediate, id est mediante intelligentia rei: verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis aliis speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit eam ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intellectus intelligit genus, non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed intelligentiae, ex qua consequitur ista intentio, respondet aliqua res. Et similiter est de relatione principii quam addit potentia supra essentiam: nam ei respondet aliquid in re mediate, et non immediate. Intellectus enim noster intelligit creaturam cum aliqua relatione et dependentia ad creatorem: et ex hoc ipso quia non potest intelligere aliquid relatum alteri, nisi e contrario reintelligat relationem ex opposito, ideo intelligit in Deo quamdam relationem principii, quae consequitur modum intelligendi, et sic refertur ad rem mediate.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. The reality corresponds to the concept in two ways. First, immediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the idea of a thing existing outside the mind, for instance, a man or a stone. Secondly, mediately, when, namely, something follows the act of the intellect, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that the reality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through the medium of the intellect's concept of the thing. For instance, the intellect understands animal nature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and consequently it understands that nature as a genus : to this act, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not correspond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus ; and yet there is something that corresponds to the thought that is the foundation of this mental process. It is the same with the relation of principle that power adds to essence : since something corresponds to it in reality, not however immediately, but mediately. For our mind conceives the creature as bearing a relation to and dependent on its Creator: and for this very reason, being unable to conceive one thing related to another, without on the other hand conceiving that relation to be reciprocal, it conceives in God a certain relation of principle, consequent to its mode of understanding, which relation is referred to the thing mediately.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 11 Ad undecimum dicendum, quod potentia, quae est in secunda specie qualitatis, non attribuitur Deo: haec enim est creaturarum, quae non immediate per formas suas essentiales agunt, sed mediantibus formis accidentalibus: Deus autem immediate agit per suam essentiam.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The power that is assigned to the second species of quality is not ascribed to God : it belongs to creatures who do not act immediately through their essential forms, but through the medium of accidental forms, whereas God acts immediately by his essence.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 12 Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod diversis rationibus attributorum respondet aliquid in re divina, scilicet unum et idem. Quia rem simplicissimam, quae Deus est, propter eius incomprehensibilitatem, intellectus noster cogitur diversis formis repraesentare; et ita istae diversae formae quas intellectus concipit de Deo, sunt quidem in Deo sicut in causa veritatis, in quantum ipsa res quae Deus est, est repraesentabilis per omnes istas formas; sunt tamen in intellectu nostro sicut in subiecto.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Something does indeed correspond in the divine reality to our various concepts of the divine attributes, but that something is one and the same. Because our mind is compelled to represent by means of various forms, that most simple being which is God, by reason of his incomprehensibility: so that these various forms which our mind conceives about God, are indeed in God as the cause of truth, in so far as the thing which is God can be represented by all these forms: nevertheless they are in our mind as their subject.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 13 Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod philosophus intelligit de potentiis activis et effectivis, et huiusmodi, quae sunt in artificialibus et in rebus humanis: nam nec etiam in rebus naturalibus verum est quod potentia activa sit semper propter suos effectus. Ridiculum enim est dicere, quod potentia solis sit propter vermes, qui eius virtute generantur; multo minus divina potentia est propter suos effectus.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The saying of the Philosopher applies to active and effective powers and the like, as applied to the productions of art and human activity: since not even in the physicalorder is it always true that an active power is for the sake of its effects. Thus it were absurd to say that the power of the sun is for the sake of the worms produced by its power : and much less is the divine power for the sake of its effects.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 14 Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod potentia Dei non est media secundum rem, quia non distinguitur ab essentia, nisi ratione; et ex hoc habetur quod significetur ut medium. Deus autem non agit per medium realiter differens a se ipso: unde ratio non sequitur.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. God's power is not a medium in reality, since it differs not from his essence except logically : which suffices for our speaking of it as though it were a medium. But God does not work through a medium that is really distinct from himself : wherefore the argument fails.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 15 Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod duplex est actio. Una quae est cum transmutatione materiae; alia est quae materiam non praesupponit; ut patet in creatione: et utroque modo Deus agere potest, ut infra patebit. Unde patet quod Deo recte potentia activa potest attribui, licet non semper agat transmutando.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Action is twofold. One is accompanied by transmutation of matter; the other presupposes no matter, for instance, creation : and God can act either way, as we shall see further on. Hence active power may rightly be ascribed to God, although he does not always act by causing a change in something.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 16 Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod philosophus non loquitur universaliter, sed particulariter, quando scilicet aliquid movet se ipsum, sicut animal. Quando autem aliquid movetur ab altero, tunc non est eadem potentia passionis et actionis.	Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Philosopher's statement is not general but particular, and applies to a thing which, like an animal, causes its own movement. When, however, one thing is moved by another, passive and active power do not coincide.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 17 Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod potentiae dicitur esse contraria privatio, scilicet impotentia; non tamen de contrarietate facienda est circa Deum mentio, quia nihil quod est in Deo, habet contrarium, cum non sit in genere.	Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The privation that is contrary to power is impotence. But we must not speak of contraries in connection with God, because nothing in God has a contrary, since he is not in a genus.
q. 1 a. 1 ad 18 Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod agere non removetur a Deo simpliciter, sed per modum rerum naturalium, quae agunt et patiuntur simul.	Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. We do not remove action as such from God, but that kind of action which belongs to nature, where things are at the same time active and passive.
	Q. I: ARTICLE II
	Is God's Power Infinite?
	Sum. Th. I, Q. xxv, a. 2: C.G. I, 43
q. 1 a. 2 tit. 1 Secundo quaeritur utrum potentia Dei sit infinita. q. 1 a. 2 tit. 2 Et videtur quod non.	THE second point of inquiry is whether God's power is infinite: and it would seem that it is not.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 1 Quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., frustra esset in natura aliqua potentia activa cui non responderet aliqua passiva. Sed potentiae infinitae divinae non respondet aliqua passiva in natura. Ergo frustra esset divina potentia infinita.	1. It is stated in Metaph. ix, 1, that in nature any active power that has no corresponding passive power is fruitless. But no passive power in nature corresponds to an infinite power in God. Therefore an infinite power in God would be fruitless.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea philosophus probat, non esse potentiam infinitam magnitudine infinita: quia sequeretur quod ageret in non tempore. Nam maior virtus agit in minori tempore: unde quanto virtus est maior, tanto tempus est minus. Sed potentiae infinitae ad finitam nulla est proportio. Ergo nec temporis in quo agit potentia infinita, ad tempus in quo agit potentia finita. Cuiuslibet autem temporis ad quodlibet tempus est proportio. Ergo cum potentia finita moveat in tempore, potentia infinita movebit in non tempore. Eadem ratione si potentia Dei est infinita, semper operabitur in non tempore; quod falsum est.	2. The Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that a thing of finite magnitude has not infinite power: since if it had it would act in no time. Because the greater power acts in less time: wherefore the greater the power the less the time. But there is no proportion between an infinite and a finite power. Neither, therefore, is there proportion between the time taken by the action of an infinite power, and that taken by the action of a finite power. Yet between an time and any other time there is proportion. Therefore since a finite power takes time to move, an infinite power will move in no time. For the same reason, if God's power is infinite, it will always act without time: but this is false.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 3 Sed dices, quod voluntas divina non determinat quanto tempore velit effectum suum compleri; et sic non oportet quod potentia divina semper agat in non tempore.- Sed contra, voluntas divina non potest immutare eius potentiam. Sed de ratione potentiae infinitae est quod agat in non tempore. Ergo hoc per voluntatem divinam immutari non potest.	3. To this you may reply that God's will determines in how much time he will bring his effects to completion. -On the contrary, God's will cannot change his omnipotence. But it is natural to an infinite power to act without time. Therefore this cannot be changed by God's will.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, omnis potentia manifestatur per suum effectum. Sed Deus non potest facere effectum infinitum. Ergo potentia Dei non est infinita.	4. A power is made known by its effect. But God cannot produce an infinite effect. Therefore his power is not infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 5 Praeterea, potentia proportionatur operationi. Sed operatio Dei est simplex. Ergo et potentia. Simplex autem et infinitum ad invicem repugnant. Ergo ut prius.	5. Power is proportionate to operation. But God's operation is simple. Therefore his power is simple also. But the simple and the infinite are mutually incompatible. Therefore the same conclusion follows.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 6 Praeterea, infinitum est passio quantitatis, ut philosophus dicit. Sed Deus est absque quantitate et magnitudine. Ergo eius potentia non potest esse infinita.	6. Infinity is an attribute of quantity according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, i). But in God there is neither quantity nor magnitude. Therefore his power cannot be infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 7 Praeterea, omne quod est distinctum est finitum. Sed potentia Dei est distincta a rebus aliis. Ergo est finita.	7. Whatever is distinct is finite. But God's power is distinct from other things. Therefore it is finite.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 8 Praeterea, infinitum dicitur per remotionem finis. Finis autem est triplex; scilicet magnitudinis, ut punctus; perfectionis, ut forma; intentionis, ut causa finalis. Haec autem duo ultima, cum sint perfectionis, a Deo removeri non debent. Ergo divina potentia non debet dici infinita.	8. The infinite denotes something endless. Now end is threefold: the end of a magnitude, as a point; the end of perfection, as a form; and the end of intention, as a final cause. But the last two since they belong to, perfection must not be removed from God. Therefore the divine power is not infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 9 Praeterea, si potentia Dei est infinita, hoc non potest esse nisi quia est effectuum infinitorum. Sed multa alia sunt quae habent effectus infinitos in potentia, ut intellectus, qui potest intelligere infinita in potentia, et sol qui potest producere effectus infinitos. Si ergo potentia Dei dicatur infinita, pari ratione et multae aliae erunt infinitae; quod est impossibile.	9. If God's power be infinite, this can only be because it is concerned with infinite effects. But there are many other things which have effects potentially infinite; thus the intellect can understand an infinite number of things potentially, and the sun can produce an infinite number of things. If, then, God's power be infinite, for the same reason many other powers will be infinite: which is impossible.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 10 Praeterea, finis est quoddam ad nobilitatem pertinens. Sed omne quod est huiusmodi, rebus divinis debet attribui. Ergo potentia divina debet dici finita.	10. Finish is something excellent: and all that is excellent should be ascribed to God. Therefore God's power should be described as finite.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 11 Praeterea, infinitum, secundum philosophum, est partis, et materiae: quae imperfectionis sunt, et Deo non conveniunt. Ergo nec infinitum est in potentia divina.	ii. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6) infinity implies parts and matter: which imply imperfection and are unbecoming to God. Therefore there is no infinity in God's power.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 12 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, terminus neque finitus neque infinitus est. Sed divina potentia est omnium rerum terminus. Ergo non est infinita.	12. According to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 6) a term is neither finite nor infinite. But God's power is the term of all things. Therefore it is not infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 arg. 13 Praeterea, Deus agit tota potentia sua. Si ergo potentia eius est infinita, semper effectus eius erit infinitus; quod erat impossibile.	13. God works with his whole power. If then his power be infinite, his effect will be always infinite: and this is impossible.
q. 1 a. 2 s. c. 1 Sed contra. Est quod dicit Damascenus, quod infinitum est quod neque tempore neque loco neque comprehensione finitur. Hoc autem convenit divinae potentiae. Ergo divina potentia est infinita.	On the contrary, Damascene says that the infinite is that which neither time nor place nor mind can grasp. Now this is becoming to the divine power. Therefore God's power is infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 s. c. 2 Praeterea, Hilarius dicit: Deus immensae virtutis, vivens potestas, quae nusquam non adsit nec usquam desit. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo potentia Dei est infinita.	Further, Hilary says (De Trin. viii) that God's power is immeasurable; he is the living mighty One, ever Present, never failing. Now that which is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore God's power is infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 co. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo privative; et sic dicitur infinitum quod natum est habere finem et non habet: tale autem infinitum non invenitur nisi in quantitatibus. Alio modo dicitur infinitum negative, id est quod non habet finem. Infinitum primo modo acceptum Deo convenire non potest, tum quia Deus est absque quantitate, tum quia omnis privatio imperfectionem designat, quae longe a Deo est. Infinitum autem dictum negative convenit Deo quantum ad omnia quae in ipso sunt. Quia nec ipse aliquo finitur, nec eius essentia, nec sapientia, nec potentia, nec bonitas; unde omnia in ipso sunt infinita.	I answer that a thing is said to be infinite in two ways: First, by way of privation; thus a thing is said to be infinite, when it is in its nature to have an end, and yet it has none: but such infinity is found only in quantities. Secondly, by way of negation, when it has no end. Infinity cannot be ascribed to God in the former sense, both because in him there is not quantity, and because all privation denotes imperfection, which is far removed from God. On the other hand infinity in the second sense is ascribed to God and to all that is in him, because he himself, his essence, his wisdom, his power, his goodness are all without limit, wherefore in him all is infinite.
Sed de infinitate eius potentiae specialiter sciendum est, quod cum potentia activa sequatur actum, quantitas potentiae sequitur quantitatem actus; unumquodque enim tantum abundat in virtute agendi quantum est in actu. Deus autem est actus infinitus, quod patet ex hoc quod actus non finitur nisi dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte agentis; sicut ex voluntate artificis recipit quantitatem et terminum pulchritudo domus. Alio modo ex parte recipientis; sicut calor in lignis terminatur et quantitatem recipit secundum dispositionem lignorum. Ipse autem divinus actus non finitur ex aliquo agente, quia non est ab alio, sed est a se ipso; neque finitur ex alio recipiente, quia cum nihil potentiae passivae ei admisceatur, ipse est actus purus non receptus in aliquo; est enim Deus ipsum esse suum in nullo receptum. Unde patet quod Deus est infinitus; quod sic videri potest. Esse enim hominis terminatum est ad hominis speciem, quia est receptum in natura speciei humanae; et simile est de esse equi, vel cuiuslibet creaturae. Esse autem Dei, cum non sit in aliquo receptum, sed sit esse purum, non limitatur ad aliquem modum perfectionis essendi, sed totum esse in se habet; et sic sicut esse in universali acceptum ad infinita se potest extendere, ita divinum esse infinitum est; et ex hoc patet quod virtus vel potentia sua activa, est infinita. Sed sciendum quod quamvis potentia habeat infinitatem ex essentia, tamen ex hoc ipso quod comparatur ad ea quorum est principium, recipit quemdam modum infinitatis quem essentia non habet.	With special regard to the infinity of his power it must be observed that whereas active power answers to act, the quantity of a power depends on the quantity of the act: since the more actual a thing is the more it abounds in active power. Now God is infinite act: for act can be finite in two ways only. First, on the part of the agent: thus an architect by his will sets definite bounds to the beauty of a house. Secondly, on the part of the recipient: thus the heat of a furnace is limited by and its intensity depends upon the disposition of the fuel. Now God's action is not limited by any agent, because it proceeds from no other but himself: nor is it limited by any recipient, because since there is no passive potency in him, he is pure self-subsistent act. Wherefore it is clear that God is infinite: and this can be made evident as follows: The being of man is limited to the species of man, because it is received into the nature of the human species: the same applies to the being of a horse, or of any other creature. But the being of God, since it is not received into anything, but is pure being, is not limited to any particular mode of a perfection of being, but contains all being within itself: and thus as being taken in its widest sense can extend to an infinity of things, so the divine being is infinite: and hence it is clear that his might or active power is infinite. But we must note that, although his power is infinite by reason of his essence, nevertheless from the very fact that we refer it to the things whereof it is the source, it has a certain mode of infinity which the essence has not.
Nam in obiectis potentiae, quaedam multitudo invenitur; in actione etiam invenitur quaedam intensio secundum efficaciam agendi, et sic potest potentiae activae attribui quaedam infinitas secundum conformitatem ad infinitatem quantitatis et continuae et discretae. Discretae quidem secundum quod quantitas potentiae attenditur secundum multa vel pauca obiecta; et haec vocatur quantitas extensiva: continuae vero, secundum quod quantitas potentiae attenditur in hoc quod remisse vel intense agit; et haec vocatur quantitas intensiva. Prima autem quantitas convenit potentiae respectu obiectorum, secunda vero respectu actionis. Istorum enim duorum activa potentia est principium. Utroque autem modo divina potentia est infinita. Nam nunquam tot effectus facit quin plures facere possit, nec unquam ita intense operatur quin intensius operari possit. Intensio autem in operatione divina non est attendenda secundum quod operatio est in operante, quia sic semper est infinita, cum operatio sit divina essentia; sed attendenda est secundum quod attingit effectum; sic enim a Deo moventur quaedam efficacius, quaedam minus efficaciter.	For in the objects of power there is a certain multitude, in action also there is a certain intensity according to its efficiency, so that a certain infinity may be ascribed to active power after the manner of the infinity of quantity, whether continuous or discrete. Of discrete quantity, forasmuch as the quantity of a power is measured by many or few objects,-and this is called extensive quantity: of continuous quantity, forasmuch as the quantity of a power is measured by the intensity or slackness of its action, -and this is called intensive quantity. The former quantity is ascribed to power in respect of its objects, the latter in respect of its action: and active power is the principle of both. In both ways the divine power is infinite: since never does it produce so many effects that it cannot produce more; nor does it ever act with such intensity, that it cannot act more intensely. But in the divine operation intensity is not measured according as operation is in the operator, for then it is always infinite, since God's operation is his essence, but according as it attains its effect, for thus some things are moved by God more efficaciously, some less.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil quod est in Deo, potest dici frustra, quia frustra est quod est ad aliquem finem quem non potest attingere; Deus autem et quae in ipso sunt, non sunt ad finem, sed sunt finis. Vel dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de potentia activa naturali. Res enim naturales coordinatae sunt ad invicem, et etiam omnes creaturae: Deus autem est extra hunc ordinem; ipse enim est ad quem totus hic ordo ordinatur, sicut ad bonum extrinsecum, ut exercitus ad ducem, secundum philosophum. Et ideo non oportet ut ei quod est in Deo, aliquid in creaturis respondeat.	Reply to the First Objection. Nothing in God can be called fruitless: for a fruitless thing is one that is directed to an end which it cannot attain: whereas God and all that is in him, are not directed to an end, but are the end. Or we may reply that the Philosopher is speaking of, a natural active power. For there is co-ordination in the things of nature, and in all created things: whereas God is outside that order, since to him as an extrinsic good is the whole of it directed, as the army to the commander-in-chief, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 10). - Consequently there is no need in creatures for a power corresponding to God's power.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum Commentatorem in VIII Physic., demonstratio illa de proportione temporis et potentia moventis procedit de potentia infinita in magnitudine, quae proportionatur infinito temporis cum sint unius generis determinati, scilicet continuae quantitatis, non autem tenet de infinito extra magnitudinem, quod non est proportionale infinito temporis, utpote alterius rationis existens. Vel dicendum, ut tactum est in obiiciendo, quod Deus quia agit voluntarie, mensurat motum eius quod ab eo movetur, sicut vult.	Reply to the Second Objection. According to the Commentator (Phys. viii, com. 79) this argument drawn from the proportion between time and the mover's power means that a magnitude's infinite power is proportionate to an infinity of time, since they both belong to one definite genus, i.e. continuous quantity; but it does not hold with regard to an infinity apart from magnitude, that is not .proportionate to an infinity of time, since it is of another kind. It may also be replied, as hinted in the objection, that since God acts by his will, he adapts the movement of whatever he moves, according as he wills.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet voluntas Dei non possit mutare eius potentiam, potest tamen determinare eius effectum. Nam voluntas potentiam movet.	Reply to the Third Objection. Although God's will cannot change his power, it can limit its effect: because the will is the motive force of power.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod ipsa ratio facti vel creati repugnat infinito. Nam ex hoc ipso quod fit ex nihilo, habet aliquem defectum, et est in potentia, non actus purus; et ideo non potest aequari primo infinito ut sit infinitum.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. The very notion of being made or created is incompatible with the infinite. The very fact that it is made out of nothing, argues its imperfection and potentiality, and shows that it is not pure act: and consequently it cannot be equalled to the infinite, as though it also were infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod infinitum privative dictum, quod est passio quantitatis, repugnat simplicitati, non autem infinitum quod est negative dictum.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. Privative infinity is an attribute of quantity and is repugnant to simplicity; whereas negative infinity is not.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum, quod illa ratio procedit de infinito privative dicto.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument applies to infinity taken as a privation.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum, quod aliquid potest esse distinctum dupliciter. Uno modo per aliud sibi adiunctum, sicut homo distinguitur per rationalem differentiam ab asino, et tale distinctum oportet esse finitum, quia illud adiunctum determinat ipsum ad aliquid. Alio modo per se ipsum; et sic Deus est distinctus ab omnibus rebus, et hoc eo ipso quia nihil addi ei est possibile; unde non oportet quod sit finitus neque ipse neque aliquid quod in ipso significatur.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. A thing may be distinct in two ways. First, by some kind of adjunct; thus man is distinct from an ass by the difference of reason: and a distinct thing of this kind must needs be finite, because the adjunct defines it as a particular thing. Secondly, by itself -and thus God is distinct from other things: and this for the simple reason that it is impossible to add anything to him: hence it does not follow that he is finite, either in himself or as regards anything that is attributed to him.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 8 Ad octavum dicendum, quod finis cum sit perfectionis, Deo nobilissimo modo attribuitur, scilicet ut ipse essentialiter sit finis, non denominative finitus.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. Since end implies perfection, it is ascribed to God in the highest possible way; namely, that he is essentially the end, and not denominatively finite.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 9 Ad nonum dicendum, quod sicut in quantitatibus potest considerari infinitum secundum unam dimensionem et non secundum aliam, et iterum infinitum secundum omnem dimensionem, ita et in effectibus. Possibile est enim aliquam creaturam posse producere effectus infinitos quantum est de se, secundum aliquid, utpote secundum numerum in eadem specie; et sic omnium illorum effectuum natura est finita, utpote ad unam speciem determinata, ut si accipiamus homines vel asinos infinitos. Non est autem possibile ut sit aliqua creatura quae possit in effectus infinitos omnibus modis et secundum numerum et secundum species et secundum genera; sed hoc solius Dei est, et ideo sola eius potentia est simpliciter infinita.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. As in quantities we may consider infinity in regard to one dimension, and not in regard to another, or again in regard to all dimensions; even so may we consider infinity in effects. Thus it is possible for a creature considered in itself to be able to produce an infinity of effects in some particular respect, for instance, as regards number in one species; and then the nature of all those effects is finite, being confined to one particular species-for instance, an infinite number of men or asses. But it is impossible for a creature to be able to produce an infinity of effects in every way, in point of number, species and genera: this belongs to God alone, wherefore his power alone is simply infinite.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 10 Ad decimum dicendum, sicut ad octavum.	The reply to the Tenth Objection is the same as to the Eighth.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 11 Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de infinito privative dicto.q. 1 a. 2 ad 12 Et similiter dicendum ad duodecimum.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This argument takes infinity as a privation:
q. 1 a. 2 ad 12 Et similiter dicendum ad duodecimum.	And the same answer applies to the Twelfth Objection.
q. 1 a. 2 ad 13 Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod Deus semper agit tota sua potentia; sed effectus terminatur secundum imperium voluntatis, et ordinem rationis.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God always works with the whole of his power. But his effect is limited according to the determination of his will and the order of reason.
q. 1 a. 3 tit. 1 Tertio quaeritur utrum ea quae sunt naturae impossibilia, sint Deo possibilia	Q. I: ARTICLE III Are Those Things Possible to God Which Are Impossible to Nature?
q. 1 a. 3 tit. 2 Et videtur quod non.	THE third point of inquiry is whether God can do what nature cannot: and the reply seemingly should be in the negative.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 1 Dicit enim quaedam Glossa, Rom. XI, vers. 24, quod Deus cum sit auctor naturae non potest facere contra naturam. Sed ea quae sunt impossibilia naturae sunt contra naturam. Ergo Deus ea facere non potest.	1. The (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24 says that since God is the author of nature he cannot do what is contrary to nature. Now things that nature cannot do are contrary to nature. Therefore God cannot do them.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, sicut omne in natura necessarium est demonstrabile, ita omne impossibile in natura, est improbabile per demonstrationem. Sed in omni conclusione demonstrationis includuntur demonstrationis principia; in omnibus autem demonstrationis principiis includitur hoc principium, quod affirmatio et negatio non sunt simul vera. Ergo istud principium includitur in quolibet impossibili naturae. Sed Deus non potest facere quod negatio et affirmatio sint simul vera, ut respondens dicebat. Ergo nullum impossibile in natura potest facere.	2. As all that is necessary in nature can be demonstrated, so whatsoever is impossible in nature can be disproved by demonstration. Now every conclusion of a demonstration involves the principles of that demonstration: and all principles of demonstration imply the principle that yes and no cannot be both true at the same time. Therefore this principle is involved whenever a thing is impossible to nature. But according to the respondent God cannot make yes or no to be both true at the same time. Therefore he cannot do what is naturally impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, sub Deo sunt duo principia, ratio et natura. Sed Deus ea quae sunt impossibilia rationi, facere non potest, sicut quod genus non praedicetur de specie. Ergo nec illa quae sunt impossibilia naturae.	3. There are two principles under God, reason and nature. Now God cannot do what is impossible to reason, for instance, that a genus be not predicated of its species. Neither therefore can he do what is impossible to nature.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, sicut se habet falsum et verum ad cognitionem, ita se habet possibile et impossibile ad operationem. Sed illud quod est falsum in natura, Deus scire non potest. Ergo quod est impossibile in natura, Deus non potest operari.	4. As false and true are in relation to knowledge, so are possible and impossible to operation. Now God cannot know what is false in nature; therefore he cannot do what is impossible in nature.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 5 Praeterea, quando est simile de uno et omnibus, quod probatur de uno, intelligitur de omnibus esse probatum; sicut si probatur de uno triangulo, demonstrato quod habeat tres aequales duobus rectis, de omnibus intelligitur esse probatum. Sed similis ratio videtur de omni impossibili, quod Deus illud possit et non possit; tum ex parte facientis, quia divina potentia infinita est: tum ex parte facti, quia omnis res habet potentiam obedientiae ad Deum. Ergo si aliquod impossibile est naturae quod facere non possit, ut respondens dicebat, videtur quod nullum impossibile facere possit.	5. SO far as there is uniformity among a number of things, what is proved of one is taken to be proved of all: thus if it be proved of one triangle that the three angles equal two right angles, we take this to be proved of all triangles. Now all impossible things apparently agree in the point of their being possible or impossible to God: both in relation to the doer, since God's power is infinite, and in relation to the thing done, since everything has an obediential potentiality to God. Therefore, if there be anything naturally impossible that God cannot do, seemingly he cannot do anything that is impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 6 Praeterea, II Timoth. II, 13, dicitur: fidelis Deus, qui se ipsum negare non potest. Negaret autem se ipsum, ut dicit Glossa, si promissum non impleret. Sicut autem promissum Dei est a Deo, ita omne verum est a Deo: quia, ut dicit Glossa Ambrosii I Cor. XII, 3, super illud: nemo potest dicere, dominus Iesus, omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a spiritu sancto est. Ergo non potest facere contra aliquod verum. Faceret autem contra verum, si faceret aliquid impossibile. Ergo Deus non potest facere aliquid impossibile in natura.	6. It is written (2 Tim. ii, 13) that God is faithful, he cannot deny himself. But he would deny himself, says the (interlinear) gloss, if he fulfilled not his promise. Now, as God's promise comes from God, so is all truth from God: because (according to a gloss of Ambrose [=Ambrosiaster] on 1 Corinthians xii, 3, No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Spirit) all truth, by whomsoever uttered, is from the Holy Spirit. Therefore God cannot act counter to the truth. He would, however, were he to do what is impossible. Therefore he cannot do what is naturally impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 7 Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, quod minimum inconveniens Deo est impossibile. Sed inconveniens esset quod affirmatio et negatio essent simul vera, quia intellectus esset ligatus. Ergo Deus non potest facere hoc; et ita non potest facere omnia impossibilia in natura.	7. Anselm says (Cur Deus homo, i, 24) that God cannot do what is in the least way unbecoming. Now it would be unbecoming for yes and no to be true at the same time, because the mind would be in a fix. Therefore God cannot do this; and consequently he cannot do whatever is impossible to nature.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 8 Praeterea, nullus artifex potest operari contra artem suam: quia principium suae operationis est ars. Sed Deus faceret contra artem suam, si faceret aliquid impossibile in natura: quia naturae ordo, secundum quem illud est impossibile, est secundum artem divinam. Ergo Deus et cetera.	8. No artist can Work counter to his art, since this is the very principle of his work. But God would be working against his art, were he to do what is impossible in nature, because the order of nature, in relation to which that thing is impossible, is a reflection of the divine art. Therefore God cannot do what is naturally impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 arg. 9 Praeterea, magis est impossibile quod est impossibile per se quam quod est impossibile per accidens. Sed Deus non potest facere quod est impossibile per accidens, scilicet quod id quod fuit non fuerit, ut patet per Hieronymum qui dicit, quod cum cetera Deus possit, non potest facere virginem de corrupta; et per Augustinum, et per philosophum. Ergo Deus non potest facere id quod est impossibile per se in natura.	9. That which is impossible in itself is more impossiblee than what is impossible accidentally. Now God cannot do what is accidentally impossible, for instance, that what has been should not have been; thus Jerome says (Ep. 22, Ad Eustoch., de cust. virg.) that God, whereas he can do other things, cannot make a virgin of one who is not a virgin. See also Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 5) and the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2). Therefore God cannot do what is in itself naturally impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 1 Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Lucae I, 37: non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum.	1. On the contrary, it is written (Luke i, 37): No word shall be impossible with God.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 2 Praeterea, omnis potentia quae potest facere hoc et non illud, est potentia limitata. Si ergo Deus potest facere possibilia in natura, et non impossibilia, vel haec impossibilia et non illa, videtur quod Dei potentia sit limitata, quod est contra supra determinata. Ergo et cetera.	2. Any power that can do one thing, but not another, is limited. If, then, God can do what is possible to nature, but not that which is impossible, or some that are impossible and not others, it would seem that his is a limited power, which is contrary to what we have proved above. Therefore, etc.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 3 Praeterea, omne illud quod non limitatur per aliquid quod est in re, per nihil quod est in re impediri potest. Sed Deus non limitatur per aliquid quod est in re. Ergo per nihil quod est in re potest impediri; et ita veritas huius principii: affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse simul, non potest impedire quin Deus possit facere. Et pari ratione de omnibus aliis.	3. That which is uncircumscribed by anything in existence, cannot be hindered by anything in existence. Now God is uncircumscribed by anything in existence. Therefore nothing in existence can be a hindrance to him: so that the truth of the principle of contradiction cannot be a hindrance to God's action. The same applies to all other principles.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 4 Praeterea, privationes non suscipiunt magis et minus. Sed impossibile dicitur secundum privationem potentiae. Si ergo unum impossibile est quod Deus facere potest, ut caecum illuminare, videtur pari ratione quod potest facere omnia.	4. Privation is not susceptive of degrees. Now the impossible connotes privation of power. Therefore if God can do one impossible thing, for instance restore sight to the blind, it would seem that he can do all.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 5 Praeterea, omne quod resistit alicui, resistit in ratione alicuius oppositionis. Sed potentiae divinae nihil est oppositum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo ei nihil potest resistere; et ita potest facere omnia impossibilia.	5. All resistance is by reason of opposition. But nothing can oppose God's power, as shown above. Therefore nothing can resist it: and so he can do all things impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 6 Praeterea, sicut caecitas opponitur visioni, ita virginitas partui. Sed Deus fecit quod virgo, manens virgo, pareret. Ergo pari ratione potest facere quod caecus, manens caecus, videat, et potest facere quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, et per consequens omnia impossibilia.	6. As blindness is opposed to sight, so is virginity opposed to birth-giving. Now God made a virgin to give birth and yet remain a virgin. Therefore he can equally make a blind man to see while remaining blind, and he can make yes and no to be true at the same time, and consequently all impossible things.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 7 Praeterea, difficilius est coniungere formas substantiales disparatas quam formas accidentales. Sed Deus coniunxit in unum formas substantiales maxime disparatas, scilicet divinam et humanam, quae differunt secundum creatum et increatum. Ergo multo amplius potest coniungere duas formas accidentales in unum, ut faciat quod idem sit album et nigrum: et sic idem quod prius.	7. It is more difficult to unite diverse substantial forms, than diverse accidental forms. Now God united together the most diverse substantial forms, namely the divine and human natures, which differ as uncreated and created. Much more, therefore, can he unite two accidental forms, so that the same thing be black and white: and thus the same conclusion follows.
q. 1 a. 3 s. c. 8 Praeterea, posito quod a definito removeatur aliquid quod cadat in eius definitione, sequitur contraria esse simul, sicut quod homo non sit rationalis. Sed terminari ad duo puncta est in definitione lineae rectae. Ergo si quis hoc removeat a linea recta, sequitur quod duo contraria sint simul. Sed Deus hoc fecit quando intravit ianuis clausis ad discipulos: tunc enim fuerunt duo corpora simul, et sic sequitur quod duae lineae fuerunt terminatae ad duo puncta tantum, et unaquaeque ad duo puncta. Ergo Deus potest facere quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, et per consequens potest facere omnia impossibilia.	8. If we deny of the thing defined part of its definition, it will follow that contrary statements are true at the same time; for instance, if we were to say that a man is not a rational being. Now it is part of the definition of a straight line that its extremities are points. Therefore if anyone were to deny this of a straight line, it would follow that two contrary statements are simultaneously true. Now God did this when he came in to his disciples, the doors being closed: since two bodies were then in the same place, so that two lines would have terminated in two points only, and each of them also in two points. Consequently God can make yes and no to be true at the same time, and therefore he can do all things impossible.
q. 1 a. 3 co. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod, secundum philosophum, possibile et impossibile dicuntur tripliciter. Uno modo secundum aliquam potentiam activam vel passivam; sicut dicitur homini possibile ambulare secundum potentiam gressivam, volare vero impossibile. Alio modo non secundum aliquam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsum, sicut dicimus possibile quod non est impossibile esse, et impossibile dicimus quod necesse est non esse. Tertio modo dicitur possibile secundum potentiam mathematicam quae est in geometricis, prout dicitur linea potentia commensurabilis, quia quadratum eius est commensurabile. Hoc autem possibili praetermisso, circa alia duo consideremus. Sciendum est ergo quod impossibile quod dicitur secundum nullam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsum, dicitur ratione discohaerentiae terminorum. Omnis autem discoherentia terminorum est in ratione alicuius oppositionis; in omni autem oppositione includitur affirmatio et negatio, ut probatur X Metaph.; unde in omni tali impossibili implicatur affirmationem et negationem esse simul. Hoc autem nulli activae potentiae attribui potest; quod sic patet. Omnis activa potentia consequitur actualitatem et entitatem eius cuius est. Unumquodque autem agens est natum agere sibi simile; unde omnis actio activae potentiae terminatur ad esse. Etsi enim aliquando fit per actionem non esse, ut in corruptione patet, tamen hoc non est nisi in quantum esse unius non compatitur esse alterius, sicut esse calidi non compatitur esse frigidi; et ideo calor ex principali intentione generat calidum, sed quod corrumpat frigidum, hoc est ex consequenti. Hoc autem quod est affirmationem et negationem esse simul, rationem entis habere non potest, nec etiam non entis, quia esse tollit non esse, et non esse tollit esse: unde nec principaliter nec ex consequenti potest esse terminus alicuius actionis potentiae activae. Impossibile vero quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo propter defectum ipsius potentiae ex se ipsa, quia videlicet ad illum effectum non potest se extendere, utpote quando non potest agens naturale transmutare aliquam materiam. Alio modo ab extrinseco, utpote cum potentia alicuius impeditur vel ligatur. Sic ergo aliquid dicitur impossibile fieri tribus modis. Uno modo propter defectum activae potentiae, sive in transmutando materiam, sive in quocumque alio; alio modo propter aliquod resistens vel impediens; tertio modo propter hoc quod id quod dicitur impossibile fieri, non potest esse terminus actionis. Ea ergo quae sunt impossibilia in natura primo vel secundo modo, Deus facere potest. Quia eius potentia, cum sit infinita, in nullo defectum patitur, nec est aliqua materia quam transmutare non possit ad libitum; eius enim potentiae resisti non potest. Sed id quod tertio modo dicitur impossibile, Deus facere non potest, cum Deus sit actus maxime, et principale ens. Unde eius actio non nisi ad ens terminari potest principaliter, et ad non ens consequenter. Et ideo non potest facere quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, nec aliquod eorum in quibus hoc impossibile includitur. Nec hoc dicitur non posse facere propter defectum suae potentiae: sed propter defectum possibilis, quod a ratione possibilis deficit; propter quod dicitur a quibusdam quod Deus potest facere, sed non potest fieri.	I answer that according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing is said to be possible or impossible in three ways. First, in respect of a power active or passive: thus it is possible for a man to walk in respect of his ability to walk, whereas it is impossible for him to fly. Secondly, not in respect of a power but in itself: thus we say that a thing is possible if it be not impossible, and that a thing is impossible which of necessity is not. Thirdly, a thing is said to be possible in respect of mathematical power, as we say in geometry; thus a certain line is potentially measurable, because its square is measurable. Omitting this last kind of possibility, let us consider the other two. It must be noted that a thing is said to be impossible, not in respect of any power, but in itself, by reason of the mutual exclusion of terms. Now all such mutual exclusion corresponds to some opposition: and every opposition connotes affirmation and negation, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4, so that all impossibilities of this kind imply the mutual exclusion of an affirmation and a negation. That this cannot be ascribed to any active power is proved as follows. All active power is consequent upon the actuality and entity of the thing to which it belongs. Now every agent has a natural tendency to produce its like: wherefore every act of an active power terminates in being. For although at times non-being is the result of an action, such as, for instance, corruption, this is simply because the being of one thing is incompatible with the being of another; thus the being of a hot thing is incompatible with the being of a cold thing: wherefore the chief purpose of heat is to generate heat, but that it destroys cold is by way of consequence. Now, for yes and no to be true at the same time cannot have the nature of being, nor even of non-being, since being removes non-being, and nonbeing removes being: and consequently it can be neither the principal nor the secondary term of action of an active power. On the other hand a thing is said to be impossible in respect of a power in two ways. First, on account of an inherent defect in the power, in that the effect is beyond its reach, as when a natural agent cannot transform a certain matter. Secondly, when the impossibility arises from without, as in the case of a power that is hindered or tied. Accordingly there are three ways in which it is said to be impossible for a thing to be done. First, by reason of a defect in the active power, whether in transforming matter, or in any other way. Secondly, by reason of a resistant or an obstacle. Thirdly, because that which is said to be impossible cannot be the term of an action. Those things, then, which are impossible to nature in the first or second way are possible to God: because, since his power is infinite, it is subject to no defect, nor is there any matter that he cannot transform at will, since his power is irresistible. On the other hand those things which involve the third kind of impossibility God cannot do, since he is supreme act and sovereign being: wherefore his action cannot terminate otherwise than principally in being, and secondarily in nonbeing. Consequently he cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, nor any of those things which involve such an impossibility. Nor is he said to be unable to do these things through lack of power, but through lack of possibility, such things being intrinsically impossible: and this is what is meant by those who say that 'God can do it, but it cannot be done.'
q. 1 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Augustini in Glossa illa non est intelligendum quod Deus non possit facere aliter quam natura faciat, cum ipse frequenter faciat contra consuetum cursum naturae; sed quia quidquid in rebus facit, non est contra naturam, sed est eis natura, eo quod ipse est conditor et ordinator naturae. Sic enim in rebus naturalibus videtur, quod quando aliquod corpus inferius a superiori movetur, est ei ille motus naturalis, quamvis non videatur conveniens motui quem naturaliter habet ex seipso; sicut mare movetur secundum fluxum et refluxum a luna; et hic motus est ei naturalis, ut Commentator dicit, licet aquae secundum se ipsum motus naturalis sit ferri deorsum; et hoc modo omnes creaturae quasi pro naturali habent quod a Deo in eis fit. Et propter hoc in eis distinguitur potentia duplex: una naturalis ad proprias operationes vel motus; alia quae obedientiae dicitur, ad ea quae a Deo recipiunt.	Reply to the First Objection. Augustine's words quoted in the gloss mean, not that God is unable to do otherwise than nature does, since his works are often contrary to the wonted course of nature; but that whatever he does in things is not contrary to nature, but is nature in them, forasmuch as he is the author and controller of nature. Thus in the physical order we observe that when an inferior body is moved by a higher, the movement is natural to it, although it may not seem in keeping with the movement which it has by reason of its own nature: thus the tidal movement of the sea is caused by the moon; and this movement is natural to it as the Commentator observes (De coelo et mundo, iii, comm. 20), although water of itself has naturally a downward movement. Thus in all creatures, what God does in them is quasi-natural to them. Wherefore we distinguish in them a twofold potentiality: a natural potentiality in respect of their proper operations and movements, and another, which we call obediential, in respect of what is done in them by God.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod in quolibet impossibili implicatur affirmationem et negationem esse simul secundum hoc quod est impossibile; sed ea quae sunt impossibilia propter defectum potentiae naturalis, ut caecum, videntem fieri, vel aliquid huiusmodi, cum non sint impossibilia secundum se ipsa, non implicant huiusmodi impossibile secundum se ipsa, sed per comparationem ad potentiam naturalem cui sunt impossibilia, ut si dicamus, natura potest facere caecum videntem, implicatur praedictum impossibile, quia naturae potentia est terminata ad aliquid, ultra quod est id quod ei attribuitur.	Reply to the Second Objection. Every impossibility involves the incompatibility of affirmation and negation as such. Those things, however, that are impossible by reason of a lack of the natural power, such as that a blind man can be made to see, and the like, since they are not intrinsically impossible, do not involve such an impossibility in themselves, but only in relation to the natural power to which they are impossible. Thus were we to say that nature can make a blind man to see, the statement would involve an impossibility of this kind, because nature's power is confined to definite effects, beyond which is the effect we would ascribe to it.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod impossibilia rationalis philosophiae non sunt secundum aliquam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsa: quia ea quae sunt in rationali philosophia, non sunt applicata ad materiam, vel ad aliquas potentias naturales.	Reply to the Third Objection. Philosophical reasoning regards impossibilities not in relation to a power, but in themselves: because it does not consider things in their application to matter or to any natural power.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud quod est falsum in natura, est falsum simpliciter, et ideo non est simile.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. That which is naturally false is false simply; hence there is no comparison.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod non est eadem ratio de omni impossibili: quia quaedam sunt impossibilia per se, quaedam per respectum ad aliquam potentiam, ut supra dictum est. Nec hoc quod dissimiliter se habent ad divinam potentiam, impedit infinitatem divinae potentiae, vel obedientiam creaturae.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. Impossibilities are not all in the same ratio: since some things are impossible in themselves, and some with respect to a power, as above stated. Nor does the fact that they bear different relations to the divine power militate against the infinity of that power, or the obedience of the creature thereto.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum, quod Deus id quod iam verum est, non destruit; quia non facit ut quod verum fuit, non fuerit; sed facit quod aliquod non sit verum, quod alias verum esset. Sicut cum suscitat mortuum, facit quod non sit verum eum esse mortuum, quod aliter verum esset. Vel aliter dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ex hoc quod Deus non impleret promissum, sequeretur eum non esse veracem: ex hoc autem quod aliquem suum effectum destruit, hoc non sequitur: quia non ordinavit ut suus effectus perpetuo maneret, sicut ordinavit quod promissum impleret.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. God does not destroy what is already true: because he does not make that which was true not to have been: but he does make that which otherwise had been true, not to be true. Thus when he raises the dead to life, he makes it to be untrue that he is dead, which would have been true otherwise.-Or we may reply, that there is no comparison, since were God not to keep his promise, it would follow that he is untruthful: whereas this does not follow if he undoes what he has done: because he has not decreed that whatever he does should always remain so, as he has ordained to keep his promise.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum, quod non potest facere affirmationem et negationem esse simul: non quia sit inconveniens, sed ratione praedicta.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, not because it is unbecoming, but for the reason stated above.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 8 Ad octavum dicendum, quod ars Dei non solum se extendit ad ea quae facta sunt, sed ad multa alia. Unde quando in aliquo mutat cursum naturae non propter hoc contra artem suam facit.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. God's art extends not only to the things made but to many others also. Hence when he changes the course of nature in anything, he does not therefore act against his art.
q. 1 a. 3 ad 9 Ad nonum dicendum, quod Socratem non cucurrisse, si cucurrerit, dicitur impossibile per accidens: eo quod Socratem currere vel non currere, quantum est in se, est contingens; sed per implicationem huius quod est praeteritum non fuisse, fit impossibile per se. Et ideo dicitur impossibile per accidens, quasi per aliud adveniens. Hoc autem adveniens est impossibile secundum se ipsum. Et plane implicat contradictionem: dicere enim, quod fuit et non fuit, sunt contradictoria: quo sequitur, si fiat quod praeteritum non fuerit.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is accidentally impossible for Socrates not to have run, if he did run: since that Socrates runs or runs not, considered in itself, is a contingency: yet since it would imply that what has been has not been, it becomes impossible in itself. Hence it is said to be impossible accidentally, that is through some adventitious circumstance: which circumstance is impossible in itself, and clearly involves a contradiction: since to say that a thing has been, and that it has not been are contradictory statements: which would be the case if the past were made not to have been.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 1 Ad primum vero, quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod verbum dicitur non solum quod ore profertur, sed quod mente concipitur. Hoc autem quod est affirmationem et negationem esse simul veram, non potest mente concipi, ut probatur IV Metaph., et per consequens nec aliquid eorum in quibus hoc includitur. Cum enim contrariae opiniones sint quae sunt contrariorum, secundum philosophum, sequeretur eumdem simul habere contrarias opiniones: et ita non est contra verbum Angeli, si dicatur, quod Deus non potest praedictum impossibile.	Reply to, the First Objection on the other side. A word is not only uttered by the lips but is also conceived in the mind. Now the mind cannot conceive yes and no as being true at the same time (Metaph. iv, 3), and therefore it cannot conceive anything in which this is involved. For otherwise since, according to the Philosopher, contrary opinions involve contrary statements, it would follow that the same person would have contrary opinions at the same time. Wherefore it is not contrary to the angel's statement to say that God cannot do the above-mentioned kind of impossibility.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia Dei non potest praedictum impossibile, quia deficit a ratione possibilis: et ideo potentia Dei non dicitur limitari, quamvis hoc non possit.	Reply to the Second Objection. God cannot do this kind of impossibility because it is outside the range of possibility: wherefore God's power is not said to be limited, although he cannot do it.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus dicitur hoc non posse, non a libero arbitrio, quasi impeditus, ut dictum est; sed quia hoc non potest esse terminus actionis alicuius activae potentiae.	Reply to the Third Objection. God is said to be unable to do this, not as though he were prevented by the free-will, as stated above, but because this cannot be the term of action of an active power.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod privatio non recipit magis et minus secundum se; potest tamen recipere secundum causam; sicut aliquis dicitur magis caecus qui habet oculum erutum, quam cuius visus impeditur propter aliquem humorem impedientem: et similiter dicitur magis impossibile quod est secundum se ipsum impossibile, quam quod est simpliciter impossibile.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Privation as such is not susceptive of degrees, but it can be in respect of its cause: thus a man who has lost an eye is more blind than one who is prevented from seeing by some disease of the eye. In like manner that which is impossible in itself may be said to be more impossible than a thing which is impossible simply.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod, sicut iam dictum est, Deus non dicitur hoc non posse, quod impediatur ab aliquo, sed rationibus praedictis.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated above, God is said to be unable to do this, not because something prevents him, but for the reasons given.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 6 Ad sextum dicendum, quod virginitas non opponitur partui sicut caecitas visui; sed opponitur virili commixtioni sine qua natura partum facere non potest, Deus autem potest.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. Virginity is not opposed to child-bearing as blindness to sight: it is opposed to copulation without which nature cannot cause a child to be born, whereas God can.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 7 Ad septimum dicendum, quod illa opposita, creatum et increatum, non fuerunt in Christo secundum idem, sed secundum diversas naturas; unde non sequitur quod Deus potest facere opposita inesse eidem secundum idem.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. The created and uncreated, though disparate, were not in Christ in the same respect, but in respect of the different natures: hence it does not follow that God can make opposite things to be in the same subject and in the same respect.
q. 1 a. 3 ad s. c. 8 Ad octavum dicendum, quod quando Christus intravit ianuis clausis, et duo corpora fuerunt simul, non est aliquid factum contra geometriae principia. Nam ad duo puncta diversorum corporum ex una parte, non terminabatur una linea, sed duae. Quamvis enim duae lineae mathematicae non sint distinguibiles nisi secundum situm, ita quod intelligi non potest duas lineas tales simul esse; tamen duae naturales distinguuntur in subiecto; ita quod, posito quod duo corpora sint simul, sequitur quod duae lineae sint simul, et duo puncta, et duae superficies.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. When Christ entered, the doors being closed, and two bodies were in the same place, nothing occurred contrary to the principles of geometry. For then not one but two lines terminated in two points of different bodies on the one side. Although two mathematical lines are not distinguishable except by, their position, so that one cannot conceive two such lines to be in the same Place: nevertheless two natural lines are distinguishable by their subjects, so that, granted that two bodies occupy the same place, it follows that two lines coincide, as well as two points, and two surfaces.
q. 1 a. 4 tit. 1 Quarto quaeritur utrum sit iudicandum aliquid possibile vel impossibile secundum causas inferiores aut secundum causas superiores	Q. I: ARTICLE IV
q. 1 a. 4 tit. 2 Et videtur quod secundum superiores.	Should We Judge a Thing to Be Possible or Impossible With Reference to Lower or to Higher Causes?
	THE fourth point of inquiry is whether we ought to judge of a thing's possibility or impossibility in reference to its lower or its higher causes. And it would seem that we should consider its higher causes.
q. 1 a. 4 arg. 1 Quia sicut dicit quaedam Glossa I Cor. I, 20: stultitia sapientium mundi fuit, quia iudicaverunt possibile et impossibile secundum quod videbant in rerum natura. Ergo non est iudicandum de possibili et impossibili secundum causas inferiores, sed secundum superiores.	1. The (interlinear) gloss on 1 Corinthians i says that the folly of the wise men of the world consisted in their judging of possibility and impossibility by observing nature. Therefore we should judge a thing to be possible or impossible by considering not its lower but its higher causes.
q. 1 a. 4 arg. 2 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, illud quod est primum in omni genere, est mensura omnium quae sunt illius generis. Sed divina potentia est prima potentia. Ergo secundum eam debet aliquid iudicari possibile et impossibile.	2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, i), that which is first in any genus is the measure of whatsoever is included in that genus. Now God's power is the first power. Th fore a thing should be deemed possible or impossible in reference to it.
q. 1 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, quanto causa magis influit in effectum, tanto secundum eam magis debet iudicium sumi. Sed causa prima magis influit in effectum quam causa secunda. Ergo secundum causam primam magis debet iudicari de effectu. Effectus ergo iudicandi sunt possibiles vel impossibiles secundum causas superiores.	3. The more a cause penetrates its effect, the better it serves as a guide to our judgement of the effect. Now the First Cause reaches further into the effect than do secondary causes. Therefore we should rather judge of an effect by referring to the First Cause: and consequently we should deem a thing possible or impossible in relation to the higher causes.
q. 1 a. 4 arg. 4 Praeterea, illuminare caecum est impossibile secundum causas inferiores; et tamen hoc est possibile, cum quandoque fiat. Ergo non est iudicandum si aliquid impossibile sit, secundum causas inferiores, sed secundum superiores.	4. To give sight to a blind man is impossible with respect to the lower causes: and yet it is possible, since sometimes it is done. Therefore we should judge of a thing's impossibility not according to the lower but according to the higher causes.
q. 1 a. 4 arg. 5 Praeterea, mundum fore fuit possibile antequam mundus esset. Non autem fuit possibile secundum causas inferiores. Ergo idem quod prius.	5. Before the world existed it was possible that it would exist. But this possibility did not rest on lower causes. Therefore the same conclusion follows.
q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 1 Sed contra. Secundum illam causam effectus debet iudicari possibilis a qua recipit possibilitatem. Sed effectus recipit possibilitatem vel contingentiam, aut etiam necessitatem, a causa proxima, non autem a remota; sicut meritum recipit contingentiam a libero arbitrio, quod est causa proxima; non autem necessitatem a praedestinatione divina, quae est causa remota. Ergo secundum causas inferiores, quae sunt proximae, debet iudicari aliquid possibile vel impossibile.	1. On the contrary an effect should be adjudged possible in reference to the cause on which its possibility is based. Now an effect derives its possibility, contingency or even necessity from its proximate and not from its remote cause: thus merit is a contingent effect by reason of the free-will, its proximate cause, and not a necessary effect by reason of its remote cause which is divine predestination. Therefore one should judge of a thing's possibility or impossibility by referring to its lower or proximate causes.
q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 2 Praeterea, quod est possibile secundum causas inferiores, est etiam possibile secundum causas superiores, et ita est possibile secundum omnem modum. Sed quod est possibile secundum omnem modum, est possibile simpliciter. Ergo secundum causas inferiores est aliquid iudicandum possibile simpliciter.	2. What is possible in regard to lower causes is also possible in regard to higher causes, and therefore in every way possible. Now that which is possible in every way is possible simply. Therefore in order to judge whether a thing be simply possible, we must refer to the lower causes.
q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 3 Praeterea, causae superiores sunt necessariae. Si ergo secundum eas essent iudicandi effectus, omnes effectus erunt necessarii: quod est impossibile.	3. The higher causes are necessary. If, then, we are to consider effects in the light of higher causes, all effects win, be necessary: and this is impossible.
q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 4 Praeterea, Deo sunt omnia possibilia. Si ergo secundum ipsum possibile et impossibile iudicetur, omnino nihil est impossibile: quod est inconveniens.	4. All things are possible to God. Therefore if we must judge of a thing's possibility or impossibility in reference to him, nothing will be impossible: and this is absurd.
q. 1 a. 4 s. c. 5 Praeterea, nominibus utendum est secundum quod plures loquuntur. Sed de potentia hoc modo homines loquuntur, quod sint ita ordinatae, potentia, dispositio, necessitas et actus. Haec autem inveniuntur in causis inferioribus non superioribus. Ergo non est iudicandum de possibilitate rerum secundum causas superiores, sed secundum inferiores.	5. In the employment of terms we should follow the common use. Now we are wont in referring to power, to speak of power, disposition, necessity and action as being related to one another. But these are to be found in the lower and not the higher causes. Therefore we should judge of the possibility or impossibility of a thing in reference to the lower and not the higher causes.
q. 1 a. 4 co. Respondeo. Dicendum quod iudicium de possibili et impossibili potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo ex parte iudicantium; alio modo ex parte eius de quo iudicatur. Quantum ad primum, sciendum est, quod si sunt duae scientiae, quarum una considerat causas altiores, et alia minus altas; iudicium in utraque non eodem modo sumetur, sed secundum causas quas utraque considerat, ut patet in medico et astrologo; quorum astrologus considerat causas supremas, medicus autem causas proximas. Unde medicus dabit iudicium de sanitate vel morte infirmi secundum causas proximas, id est virtutem naturae et virtutem morbi; astrologus vero secundum causas remotas, scilicet secundum positionem siderum. Eodem modo est in proposito. Est enim duplex sapientia: scilicet mundana, quae dicitur philosophia, quae considerat causas inferiores, scilicet causas causatas, et secundum eas iudicat; et divina, quae dicitur theologia, quae considerat causas superiores, id est divinas, secundum quas iudicat. Dicuntur autem superiores causae, divina attributa, ut sapientia, bonitas, et voluntas divina, et huiusmodi. Sciendum tamen, quod ista quaestio frustra movetur de affectibus qui non possunt esse nisi superiorum causarum, id est quos solus Deus facere potest; illos enim non convenit dici possibiles vel impossibiles secundum causas inferiores. Sed haec quaestio movetur de illis effectibus qui sunt causarum inferiorum: hi enim effectus sunt inferiorum et superiorum: sic enim potest in dubitationem verti. Similiter etiam ista quaestio non habet locum in illis possibilibus et impossibilibus, quae non dicuntur secundum aliquam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsa. Effectus autem causarum secundarum, de quibus est quaestio, secundum iudicium theologi, dicuntur possibiles et impossibiles secundum causas superiores; secundum autem iudicium philosophi, dicuntur possibiles vel impossibiles secundum causas inferiores. Si autem consideretur istud iudicium quantum ad naturam eius de quo iudicatur, sic patet quod effectus debent iudicari possibiles secundum causas proximas, cum actio causarum remotarum, secundum causas proximas determinetur, quas praecipue effectus imitantur: et ideo secundum eas praecipue iudicium de effectibus sumitur. Et hoc patet etiam per simile de potentia passiva. Nam materia non dicitur, proprie loquendo, in potentia ad aliquid, quae est remota, sicut terra ad scyphum; sed quae est propinqua, uno motore potens exire in actum, ut patet per philosophum, sicut aurum est potentia scyphus sola arte educente in actum. Et similiter effectus, in quantum est ex sui natura, non nisi propinquis causis possibiles vel impossibiles dicuntur.	I reply that judgement as to the possibility or impossibility of a thing may be considered in two ways; with reference to the one who judges, and with reference to the thing in question. As regards the first it must be observed that if there are two sciences, one of which considers the higher causes, and the, other the less high, judgement in each must not be formed in the same way, but in reference to those causes which both sciences consider. Take, for instance, the physician and the astrologer, of whom the latter considers the highest causes and the former the proximate causes: the physician will form his judgement about a man's illness or death according to the proximate causes, namely the forces of nature and the gravity of the disease: whereas the astrologer will judge according to the remote causes, namely the position of the stars. It is thus with the point at issue. For wisdom is twofold: mundane wisdom called philosophy, which considers the lower causes, causes namely that are themselves caused, and bases its judgements on them: and divine wisdom or theology, which considers the higher, that is the divine, causes and judges according to them. Now the higher causes are the divine attributes, such as the wisdom, goodness, will of God, and the like. It must be noted, however, that there is no point in referring this question to those effects which belong exclusively to the higher causes, and which God alone can produce; since it were senseless to say that they are possible or impossible in relation to lower causes. The point in question is about effects produced by lower causes: since such effects may be produced by both lower and higher causes, and it is about them that a doubt may occur. Again the question at issue does not concern things that are possible or impossible not with respect to a power, but in themselves. Accordingly these effects of second causes with which this question is concerned are judged by the theologian to be possible or impossible with regard to the higher causes, and by the philosopher, with regard to the lower causes. If, however, this judgement be formed with respect to the nature of the thing in question, it is clear that the effects must be judged to be possible or impossible with respect to their proximate causes, since the action of their remote causes is determined according to their proximate causes, to which those effects are especially likened: and with respect to which, therefore, any judgement about the effects should be formed. This may be made evident by comparison with passive power. For properly speaking matter is not said to be potentially this or that when the matter is remote, as earth with respect to becoming a goblet: but when the matter is proximate and potentially receptive of actuality by one agent, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix, 1, 7): thus gold is potentially a goblet, since it receives that form by art alone. In like manner an effect, so far as its nature is concerned, is said to be possible or impossible in respect of its proximate causes alone.
q. 1 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum dicendum, quod sapientes mundi propter hoc stulti vocantur, quia quae secundum causas inferiores sunt impossibilia simpliciter et absolute impossibilia iudicabant, etiam Deo.	Reply to the First Objection. The wise men of the world are said to be foolish because they judged things that are impossible with regard to lower causes, to be absolutely and simply impossible even to God.
q. 1 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod comparatio possibilis ad potentiam, non est sicut mensurati ad mensuram, sed sicut obiecti ad potentiam. Contingit tamen divinam potentiam omnium potentiarum esse mensuram.	Reply to the Second Objection. The possible is compared to power not as the thing measured is compared to its measure, but as object to power. And yet the divine power is the measure of all powers.
q. 1 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet causa prima maxime influat in effectum, tamen eius influentia per causam proximam determinatur et specificatur; et ideo eius similitudinem imitatur effectus.	Reply to the Third Objection. Although the first cause has the greatest influence on the effect, its influence, nevertheless, is determined and specified by the proximate cause, whose likeness therefore the effect bears.
q. 1 a. 4 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis illuminare caecum sit Deo possibile, non tamen potest dici omnino possibile.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although to make the blind see is possible to God, it cannot be said to be possible in every way.
q. 1 a. 4 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod mundum fore, fuit possibile respectu causarum superiorum: unde hoc non pertinet ad quaestionem praesentem. Et propterea istud dictum: mundum fore, est possibile non solum secundum divinam potentiam activam, sed secundum se ipsum, quia termini non sunt discohaerentes.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. That the world would exist was possible with respect to the higher causes; hence this does not concern the question at issue. Wherefore the statement that the world will exist, was possible not only as regards the divine power, but also in itself, because the terms do not contradict each other.
q. 1 a. 4 ad s. c. 1 Ad primum quod in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad naturam effectus de quo iudicatur.	Reply to the First Objection on the other side. This argument considers the nature of the effect that is in question.
q. 1 a. 4 ad s. c. 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod licet illud quod est possibile secundum causas inferiores, sit etiam possibile secundum superiores, non tamen est ita de impossibili, immo magis e contrario; unde non sequitur quod iudicium debeat sumi universale sive universaliter secundum causas inferiores de possibili et impossibili.	Reply to the Second Objection. Although what is possible with respect to inferior causes is also possible with respect to higher causes, this does not apply to the impossible, rather is it the other way about. Consequently we must not form a universal decision on the matter, or judge that a thing is possible or impossible in every case with respect to lower causes.
q. 1 a. 4 ad s. c. 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod non iudicantur aliqua impossibilia vel possibilia secundum aliquas causas, quia sint similes illis causis in possibilitate vel in impossibilitate, sed quia causis illis sunt possibiles vel impossibiles.	Reply to the Third Objection. We do not judge a thing to be possible or impossible to this or that cause through some likeness in point of possibility or impossibility between that cause and some other cause, but because it is possible or impossible to that cause.
q. 1 a. 4 ad s. c. 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum considerationem theologi, omnia illa quae non sunt in se impossibilia, possibilia dicuntur, secundum illud, Marc. IX, 22: omnia possibilia sunt credenti; et: non est impossibile apud Deum omne verbum: Luc. I, 37.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. The theologian would say that whatever is not impossible in itself is possible to God; according to Mark ix, 22, All things are possible to him that believeth, and Luke i, 37, No word shall be impossible with God.
q. 1 a. 4 ad s. c. 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod licet omnia illa in causis superioribus non inveniantur, tamen causis superioribus sunt subiecta; et propterea obiectio illa procedit de potentia passiva, non de activa de qua nunc loquimur.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. Though all these things are not to be found in the higher causes, they are subject to them: hence this argument considers passive and not active power of which we are speaking now.
	Q. I: ARTICLE V
	Can God Do What He Does Not?
	Sum. Th. 1, Q. xxv, A. 5; xiv, A. 8: Q. xv; C.G. II, 23-30
q. 1 a. 5 tit. 1 Quinto quaeritur utrum Deus possit facere quae non facit et dimittere quae facitq. 1 a. 5 tit. 2 Et videtur quod non.	THE fifth point of inquiry is whether God can do what he does not, and leave undone what he does? It would seem that the reply should be in the negative.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 1 Deus non potest facere nisi quod praescit se facturum. Sed non praescit se facturum nisi quod facit. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quod facit.	1. God cannot do otherwise than what he foresees that he will do. Now he does not foresee that he will do otherwise than what he does. Therefore God cannot do otherwise than he does.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 2 Sed dicit respondens, quod ratio ista procedit de potentia in ordine ad praescientiam, non de potentia absoluta.- Sed contra, immobiliora sunt divina humanis. Sed apud nos quae fuerunt, non possunt non fuisse. Ergo multo minus quae Deus praescivit, non potest non praescivisse. Sed praescientia manente, non potest alia facere. Ergo Deus, absolute loquendo, non potest alia facere quam quae facit.	2. But, say you, that argument considers power in its relation to prescience, and not absolutely.-On the contrary, the things of God are more unchangeable than the things of man. Now with us it is impossible for what has been not to have been. Much less then is it possible that God did not foresee what he foresaw: and so long as his foreknowledge stands, he cannot act otherwise. Therefore absolutely speaking God cannot do otherwise than he does.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 3 Praeterea, sicut divina natura est immutabilis, ita et divina sapientia. Sed ponentes Deum agere ex necessitate naturae ponebant eum non posse alia quam quae fecit. Ergo similiter et nos debemus ponere, qui dicimus Deum agere secundum ordinem sapientiae.	3. God's wisdom is unchangeable even as his nature. Now those who said that God acts by natural necessity, said that he cannot do otherwise than he does. Therefore we too must say so, who say that God acts according to the order of his wisdom.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 4 Sed dicet respondens, quod ratio ista procedit de potentia regulata per sapientiam, non de potentia absoluta.- Sed contra, illud quod non potest fieri secundum ordinem sapientiae absolute homini Christo impossibile dicitur; quamvis illud potuerit de potentia absoluta. Dicitur enim Ioan. VIII, 55: si dixero quod non novi eum, ero similis vobis mendax. Poterat enim Christus haec verba pronuntiare; sed quia contra ordinem sapientiae erat, dicitur absolute, quod Christus non potuerit mentiri. Ergo multo amplius quod non est secundum ordinem sapientiae, absolute loquendo, Deus non potest.	4. But it may be said that the foregoing argument considers power as controlled by wisdom and not absolutely. -On the contrary, that which is impossible in the order of wisdom is said without qualification to be impossible to the man Christ: although it was possible to him absolutely. Thus it is said (Jo. viii, 55): If I shall say that I know him not, I shall be like to you, a liar. For Christ could say those words, but since it was against the order of wisdom, it is said without any qualification that he could not lie. Much more therefore must we say absolutely that God cannot do what is contrary to the order of wisdom.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 5 Praeterea, in Deo duo contradictoria simul esse non possunt. Sed absolutum et regulatum contradictionem implicant; nam absolutum est quod secundum se consideratur; illud vero quod regulatur, ordinem ad aliud habet. Ergo in Deo non debet poni potentia absoluta et regulata.	5. Two things that are in mutual contradiction cannot be in God. Now the absolute and the conditional are in mutual contradiction, since the absolute is that which is considered in itself, while the conditional depends on something else. Therefore we should not place in God an absolute and a conditional power.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 6 Praeterea, potentia et sapientia Dei sunt aequales. Una ergo aliam non excedit; potentia ergo absque sapientia esse non potest; et ita potentia divina semper est sapientia regulata.	6. God's power and wisdom are equal: wherefore one does not extend beyond the other. Therefore his power cannot be separated from his wisdom, and consequently is always regulated by it.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 7 Praeterea, quod Deus fecit, est iustum. Sed non potest facere nisi iustum. Ergo non potest facere nisi quod fecit vel faciet.	7. What God has done is just. But he cannot act but justly. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he has done or will do.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 8 Praeterea, bonitatis divinae est ut non solum se communicet, sed ordinatissime se communicet. Sic ergo ea quae fiunt a Deo, ordinate fiunt. Sed praeter ordinem Deus facere non potest. Ergo non potest facere alia quam quae fecit.	8. It becomes God's goodness not only to communicate itself, but to do so in most orderly fashion; hence what God does is done in an orderly way. Now God cannot act without order. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he has done.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 9 Praeterea, Deus non potest facere nisi quod vult; quia in agentibus per voluntatem potentia sequitur voluntatem, velut imperantem. Sed non vult nisi quae facit. Ergo non potest facere nisi quod facit.	9. God cannot do but what he wills to do: because in voluntary agents the power follows the will as commanded by it. Now he wills not save what he does. Therefore he cannot do save what he does.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 10 Praeterea, Deus, cum sit sapientissimus operator, nihil agit sine ratione. Rationes autem quibus Deus agit, Dionysius dicit esse productivas existentium; existentia autem sunt quae sunt; et sic Deus rationes non habet nisi eorum quae sunt. Ergo non potest facere nisi ea quae facit.	10. Since God is a most wise operator, he does nothing without an idea. Now the ideas' on which God acts are, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), productive of the things that exist: and the things that exist are the things that are: wherefore God has no other things in hiss mmindd save those that are. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he does.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 11 Praeterea, secundum philosophos, res naturales sunt in primo motore, qui Deus est, sicut artificiata in artifice; et sic Deus operatur tamquam artifex. Sed artifex non operatur sine forma vel idea sui operis; domus enim quae est in materia, est a domo quae est in mente artificis, secundum philosophum. Sed Deus non habet ideas nisi eorum quae fecit, vel facit, vel facturus est. Ergo praeter hoc Deus nihil agere potest.	11. According to the philosophers, the things of nature are in the first mover, that is God, as in the craftsman are the things that he makes: wherefore God works like a craftsman. Now a craftsman does not work without having the form or idea of his work: for according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, i) the material house comes from the house that is in the builder's mind. But God has ideas of those things only that he has done, or does, or will do. Therefore God cannot do anything else.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 12 Praeterea, Augustinus in Lib. de symbolo dicit: hoc solum Deus non potest nisi quod non vult. Sed non vult nisi quae fecit. Ergo non potest nisi quae facit.	12. Augustine (De Symbolo i) says: God is unable to do that alone which he does not wish to do. Now he does not wish to do save what he does. Therefore he cannot do but what he does.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 13 Praeterea, Deus mutari non potest. Ergo non se habet ad utrumlibet contrariorum; et sic sua potentia est determinata ad unum. Ergo non potest facere nisi quae facit.	13. God cannot change. Therefore he cannot be indifferent to either of two contraries: so that his power is fixed on one thing. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he does.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 14 Praeterea, quidquid Deus facit aut dimittit, facit aut dimittit optima ratione. Sed Deus non potest facere aliquid aut dimittere nisi optima ratione. Ergo non potest facere nec dimittere, nisi quod facit aut dimittit.	14. Whatever God does or omits to do, he does or omits for the best reason. Now God cannot do or omit to do save for the best reason. Therefore he cannot do or omit except what he does or omits to do.
q. 1 a. 5 arg. 15 Praeterea, optimi est optima adducere, secundum Platonem, et sic Deus, cum sit optimus, optimum facit. Sed optimum cum sit superlativum, uno modo est. Ergo Deus non potest facere alio modo vel alia quam quae fecit.	15. According to Plato the best produces the best: and so God who is supremely good, does whatever is best. Now the best, being superlative, is only one. Therefore God cannot do otherwise or other things than he has done.
q. 1 a. 5 s. c. 1 Sed contra. Est quod dicit Christus Deus et homo: Matth. XXVI, 53: an non possum rogare patrem?. Poterat ergo Christus aliquid quod non faciebat.	1. On the contrary Christ, God and man, said (Matt. xxvi, 53): Cannot I ask my Father? Therefore Christ could do what he did not.
q. 1 a. 5 s. c. 2 Praeterea, Ephes. III, 20, dicitur: ei qui potest omnia facere superabundanter quam intelligimus aut petimus. Non tamen omnia facit. Ergo potest alia facere quam quae facit.	2. It is said (Ephes. iii, 20): To him who is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand. But he does not do all things. Therefore he can do things that he? does not.
q. 1 a. 5 s. c. 3 Praeterea, potentia Dei est infinita. Hoc autem non esset si determinaretur ad ea tantum quae facit: ergo potest alia facere quam quae facit.	3. God's power is infinite. But it would not be were it confined to the things that he does. Therefore he can do other things besides.
q. 1 a. 5 s. c. 4 Praeterea, Hugo de sancto Victore dicit, quod omnipotentiae Dei non adaequatur opus. Ergo potentia excedit opus: et ita plura potest facere quam quae facit.	4. Hugh of St. Victor says that God's works are not equal to his power. Therefore his power surpasses his work: and consequently he can do more than he does.
q. 1 a. 5 s. c. 5 Praeterea, potentia Dei est actus non finitus, quia non per aliquid finitur. Hoc autem non esset, si limitaretur ad ea quae facit. Ergo idem quod prius.	5. God's power is an endless act, since nothing can put an end to it. Now this would not be the case if it were limited to what it does. Therefore the same conclusion follows.
q. 1 a. 5 co. Respondeo. Dicendum quod hic error, scilicet Deum non posse facere nisi quae facit, duorum fuit: primo fuit quorumdam philosophorum dicentium Deum agere ex necessitate naturae. Quod si esset, cum natura sit determinata ad unum, divina potentia ad alia agenda se extendere non posset quam ad ea quae facit. Secundo fuit quorumdam theologorum considerantium ordinem divinae iustitiae et sapientiae, secundum quem res fiunt a Deo, quem Deum praeterire non posse dicebant; et incidebant in hoc, ut dicerent, quod Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit. Et imponitur hic error magistro Petro Almalareo. Harum ergo positionum veritatem inquiramus, vel falsitatem; et primo primae. Quod enim Deus non agat ex necessitate naturae planum est videre. Omne enim agens agit propter finem, quia omnia optant bonum. Actio autem agentis, ad hoc quod sit conveniens fini, oportet quod ei adaptetur et proportionetur quod non potest fieri nisi ab aliquo intellectu, qui finem et rationem finis cognoscat, et proportionem finis ad id quod est ad finem; aliter convenientia actionis ad finem casualis esset. Sed intellectus praeordinans in finem, quandoque quidem est coniunctus agenti vel moventi, ut homo in sua actione; quandoque separatus, ut patet in sagitta, quae ad determinatum finem tendit, non per intellectum sibi coniunctum, sed per intellectum hominis ipsam dirigentem. Impossibile est autem, id quod agit ex naturae necessitate, sibi ipsi determinare finem: quia quod est tale, est ex se agens; et quod est agens vel motum ex se ipso, in ipso est agere vel non agere, moveri vel non moveri, ut dicitur VIII Physic., et hoc non potest competere ei quod ex necessitate movetur, cum sit determinatum ad unum. Unde oportet quod omni ei quod agit ex necessitate naturae, determinetur finis ab aliquo quod sit intelligens. Propter quod dicitur a philosophis, quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. Unde si aliquando aliquod corpus naturale adiungitur alicui intellectui, sicut in homine patet, quantum ad illas actiones quibus intellectus illius finem determinat, obedit natura voluntati, sicut ex motu locali hominis patet: quantum vero ad illas actiones in quibus ei finem non determinat, non obedit, sicut in actu nutrimenti et augmenti. Ex his ergo colligitur quod id quod ex necessitate natura agit, impossibile est esse principium agens, cum determinetur sibi finis ab alio. Et sic patet quod impossibile est Deum agere ex necessitate naturae; et ita radix primae positionis falsa est. Sic autem restat investigare de secunda positione. Circa quod sciendum est, quod dupliciter dicitur aliquis non posse aliquid. Uno modo absolute; quando scilicet aliquid principiorum, quod sit necessariam actioni, ad actionem illam non se extendit; ut si pes sit confractus, homo non potest ambulare. Alio modo ex suppositione; posito enim opposito alicuius actionis, actio fieri non potest; non enim possum ambulare dum sedeo. Cum autem Deus sit agens per voluntatem et intellectum, ut probatum est, oportet in ipso tria actionis principia considerare; et primo intellectum, secundo voluntatem, tertio potentiam naturae. Intellectus ergo voluntatem dirigit, voluntas vero potentiae imperat quae exequitur. Sed intellectus non movet nisi in quantum proponit voluntati suum appetibile; unde totum movere intellectum est in voluntate. Sed dupliciter dicitur Deum absolute non posse aliquid. Uno modo quando potentia Dei non se extendit in illud: sicut dicimus quod Deus non potest facere quod affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sic autem non potest dici quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod facit; constat enim quod potentia Dei ad multa alia potest se extendere. Alio modo quando voluntas Dei ad illud se extendere non potest. Oportet enim quod quaelibet voluntas habeat aliquem finem quem naturaliter velit, et cuius contrarium velle non possit; sicut homo naturaliter et de necessitate vult beatitudinem, et miseriam velle non potest. Cum hoc autem quod voluntas velit necessario finem suum naturalem, vult etiam de necessitate ea sine quibus finem habere non potest, si hoc cognoscat; et haec sunt quae sunt commensurata fini; sicut si volo vitam, volo cibum. Ea vero sine quibus finis haberi potest, quae non sunt fini commensurata; non de necessitate vult. Finis ergo naturalis divinae voluntatis est eius bonitas, quam non velle non potest. Sed fini huic non commensurantur creaturae, ita quod sine his divina bonitas manifestari non possit; quod Deus intendit ex creaturis. Sicut enim manifestatur divina bonitas per has res quae nunc sunt et per hunc rerum ordinem, ita potest manifestari per alias creaturas et alio modo ordinatas: et ideo divina voluntas absque praeiudicio bonitatis, iustitiae et sapientiae, potest se extendere in alia quam quae facit. Et in hoc fuerunt decepti errantes: aestimaverunt enim ordinem creaturarum esse quasi commensuratum divinae bonitati quasi absque eo esse non posset. Patet ergo quod absolute Deus potest facere alia quam quae fecit. Sed quia ipse non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera, ex suppositione potest dici, quod Deus non potest alia facere quam quae fecit: supposito enim quod ipse non velit alia facere, vel quod praesciverit se non alia facturum, non potest alia facere, ut intelligatur composite, non divisim.	I reply that the error of those who say that God cannot do otherwise than he does is connected with two schools of thought. Certain philosophers maintained that God acts from natural necessity: in which case since nature is confined to one effect, the divine power could not extend to other things besides what it actually does. Then there have been certain theologians who maintained that God cannot act beside the order of divine justice and wisdom according to which he works, and thus they came to say that God cannot do otherwise than he does. This error is ascribed to Peter Almalar. Let us now inquire into the truth or falsity of these opinions. To begin with the first, it is evident that God does not act from natural necessity. Every agent acts for an end, since all things seek the good. Now for the agent's action to be suited to the end, it must be adapted and proportionate to it, and this cannot be done save by an intellect that is cognisant both of the end and of its nature as end, and again of the proportion between the end and the means: otherwise the suitability of the action to the end would be fortuitous. But this intellect ordering the means to the end is sometimes united to the agent or mover; such is man in his actions: sometimes it is separate, as in the case of the arrow whose flight in a definite direction is effected by an intellect united not to it but to the archer. Now that which acts of natural necessity cannot determine its end: because in the latter case the agent acts of itself, and when a thing acts or is in motion of itself, there is in it to act or not to act, to be in motion or not to be in motion, which cannot apply to that which is moved of necessity, since it is confined to one effect. Hence everything that acts of natural necessity must have its end determined by an intelligent agent. For this reason philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence. Therefore whenever a natural body is united to an intellect, as in man, as regards those actions whereby that intellect determines the end, nature obeys the will, as when a man walks:, whereas as regards those actions by which the intellect does not fix the end, nature does not obey, as in the process of nourishment and growth. Accordingly we conclude that a thing which acts from natural necessity cannot be a principle of action, since its end is determined by another. Hence it is impossible that God act from natural necessity, and so the foundation of the first opinion is false. It remains for us to examine the second opinion. Observe then that there are two senses in which one is said to be unable to do a thing. First, absolutely: when, namely, one of the principles necessary for an action does not extend to that action; thus it his foot be fractured a man cannot walk. Secondly, by supposition, for if we suppose the opposite of an action, that action cannot be done, thus so long as I sit I cannot walk. Now since God is an intellectual and voluntary agent, as we have proved, we must consider in him three principles of action: first, the intellect, secondly, the will, thirdly, the power of nature. Accordingly the intellect directs the will, and the will commands the executive power. The intellect, however, does not move except by proposing to the will its appetible object, so that the entire movement of the intellect is in the will. Now God is said in two ways to be unable to do a thing. In one way when his power does not extend to it; thus we say that God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, as we have shown above. In this way it cannot be said that God cannot do but what he does, for it is evident, that his power can extend to many other things. In another way, when God's will cannot extend to it. For every will must needs have an end which it wills naturally, the contrary of which it cannot will: thus man naturally desires to be happy and cannot wish to be unhappy. Moreover the will, besides having of necessity a desire for its natural end, desires also of necessity those things without which it cannot obtain that end, if they be known: such things are those that are proportionate to the end: thus if I wish to live I wish for food: whereas it does not of necessity desire these things without which the end can be obtained. Now the natural end of the divine will is the divine goodness, which it is unable not to will. Creatures, however, are not proportionate to this end, as though without them the divine goodness could not be made manifest, which manifestation was God's intention in creating. For even as the divine goodness is made manifest through these things that are and through this order of things, so could it be made manifest through other creatures and another order: wherefore God's will without prejudice to his goodness, justice and wisdom, can extend to other things besides those which he has made. And this is where they erred: for they thought that the created order was commensurate and necessary to the divine goodness. It is clear then that God absolutely can do otherwise than he has done. Since, however, he cannot make contradictories to be true at the same time, it can be said ex hypothesi that God cannot make other things besides those he has, made: for if we suppose that he does not wish to do otherwise, or that he foresaw that he would not do otherwise, as long as the supposition stands, he cannot do otherwise, though apart from that supposition he can.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod haec locutio, Deus non potest facere nisi quod praescit se facturum, est duplex: quia exceptio potest referri ad potentiam quae importatur per ly potest, vel ad actum, qui importatur per ly facere. Si primo modo, tunc locutio est falsa. Plura enim potest facere quam praesciat se facturum; et in hoc sensu ratio procedebat. Si autem secundo modo, sic locutio est vera; et est sensus, quod non potest esse quod aliquid fiat a Deo, et non sit a Deo praescitum. Sed hic sensus non est ad propositum.	Reply to the First Objection. When you say that God is not able to do except what he has foreseen that he would do, the statement admits of a twofold construction: because the negative may refer either to the power signified in the word able, or to the act signified in the word do. In the former case the statement is false: since God is able to do other things besides those that he foresees he will do, and it is in this sense that the objection runs. In the latter case the statement is true, the sense being that it is impossible for God to do anything that was not foreknown by him. In this sense the statement is not to the point.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod in Deo non cadit praeteritum et futurum; sed quidquid est in eo, est totum in praesenti aeternitatis. Nec praeteritum vel futurum in eo verbum significatur, nisi per respectum ad nos; unde non habet hic locum obiectio de necessitate praeteriti. Nihilominus dicendum est, quod obiectio non est ad propositum: quia praescientia non commensuratur potentiae faciendi, de qua est quaestio; sed solum divinae actioni, ut dictum est.	Reply to the Second Objection. In God nothing is past or future: in him everything is in the eternal present. And when we speak of him in a past or future tense, it is not he but we who are past or future: wherefore the objection by referring to the necessity of the past misses the mark. We must also observe that the objection is not to the point, since God's foreknowledge of What he will do is not commensurate with his power to do (which is the object of our present inquiry) but only with what he actually does, as already stated.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod illi qui dicebant Deum agere ex necessitate naturae, ponebant positionem de qua agitur, non solum ratione immutabilitatis naturae, sed ratione determinationis naturae ad unum. Sapientia autem divina non est determinata ad unum, sed se habet ad multa scienda; unde non est simile.	Reply to the Third Objection. Those who maintained that God acts from natural necessity, held the opinion we are discussing, not only on account of the unchangeableness of nature, but also because nature is confined to one process of action. But divine wisdom is not confined to one manner of action, and its knowledge extends to many things. Hence the comparison fails.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod Christus non poterat velle dicere illa verba absolute, quae mendacium important, sine praeiudicio suae bonitatis. Sic autem non est in proposito, ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non sequitur.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Christ could not wish to say those words absolutely, without prejudice to his goodness, since they would be untrue. This does not apply to the question at issue, as we have already indicated; hence the conclusion does not follow.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod absolutum et regulatum non attribuuntur divinae potentiae nisi ex nostra consideratione: quae potentiae Dei in se consideratae, quae absoluta dicitur, aliquid attribuit quod non attribuit ei secundum quod ad sapientiam comparatur, prout dicitur ordinata.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. The absolute and the conditional are ascribed to the divine power solely from. our point of view. To this power considered in itself and which we describe as God's absolute power, we ascribe something that we do not ascribe to it when we compare it with his ordered wisdom.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum, quod potentia Dei numquam est in re sine sapientia: sed a nobis consideratur sine ratione sapientiae.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. Wherever God's power works his wisdom is present; nevertheless we consider power without reference to his wisdom.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum, quod Deus fecit quidquid est iustum in actu, non autem quidquid est iustum in potentia; potest enim aliquid facere quod nunc non est iustum, quia non est: tamen si esset, faceret iustum.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. God has done whatever is actually just not whatever is just potentially: since he is able to do that which at present is not just through not being in existence; yet if it were, what he does would be just.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 8 Ad octavum dicendum, quod divina bonitas potest se communicare ordinate, non solum isto modo quo res operatur, sed multis aliis.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. The divine goodness is able to communicate itself in orderly fashion, not only in the way in which things are actually set in order, but in many other ways.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 9 Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet Deus non velit facere nisi quae facit, potest tamen alia velle; et ideo, absolute loquendo, potest alia facere.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. Though God does not wish to do save what he does, he can nevertheless wish to do other things: wherefore absolutely speaking he can do other things.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 10 Ad decimum dicendum, quod rationes illas, de quibus Dionysius loquitur, intelligit esse productivas existentium absolute, non solum autem eorum quae nunc sunt in actu.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. When Dionysius speaks of the divine ideas as being productive of things, he is speaking absolutely without implying that those things actually exist at present.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 11 Ad undecimum dicendum, quod in hac quaestione versatur, utrum eorum quae nec sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt, quae tamen Deus facere potest, sit idea. Videtur dicendum, quod si idea secundum completam rationem accipiatur, scilicet secundum quod idea nominat formam artis, non solum intellectu excogitatam, sed etiam per voluntatem ad opus ordinatam, sic praedicta non habent ideam; si vero accipiatur secundum imperfectam rationem, prout scilicet est solum excogitata in intellectu artificis, sic habent ideam. Patet enim in artifice creato quod excogitat aliquas operationes quas nunquam operari intendit. In Deo vero quidquid ipse cognoscit, est in eo per modum excogitati; cum in ipso non differat cognoscere actu et habitu. Ipse enim novit totam potentiam suam, et quidquid potest: unde omnium quae potest habet rationes quasi excogitatas.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The question is whether there is in God an idea of those things that neither exist, nor will exist, nor have existed, and that nevertheless God is able to make. Seemingly the reply should be, if we take an idea in, its complete signification, namely as signifying the art-form, not only as conceived by the intellect, but also as directed to execution by the will, then of such things God has no idea. On the other hand if we take an idea in its incomplete state, as the mere mental conception of the worker, then God has an idea of those things. For it is clear that the created craftsman conceives works that he has no intention of executing. Now whatever God knows is in him as something thought out, since in him actual and habitual knowledge do not differ: for he knows his whole power and whatsoever he is able to do: hence in him are, thought out as it were, the ideas of whatsoever things he is able to make.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 12 Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod intelligendum est hoc Deum non posse quod non vult se posse: et sic non facit ad propositum.	Reply to the Twelfth Objection. This means that God is unable to do what he does not wish to be able to do; hence it is not to the point.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 13 Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod licet Deus sit immutabilis, tamen eius voluntas non est determinata ad unum in his quae facienda sunt: et ideo habet liberum arbitrium.	Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Though God is unchangeable, his will is not confined to one issue as regards things to be done: hence he has free-will.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 14 Ad decimumquartum dicendum, quod optima ratio, qua Deus omnia facit, est sua bonitas et sua sapientia: quae maneret, etiam si alia, vel alio modo faceret.	Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The best reason for which God does everything, is his goodness and wisdom, which would remain even though he made other things or acted otherwise.
q. 1 a. 5 ad 15 Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod illud quod facit, est optimum per ordinem ad Dei bonitatem: et ideo quidquid aliud est ordinabile ad eius bonitatem secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, est optimum.	Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. What God does is the best in reference to his goodness: hence whatsoever else can be referred to his goodness, according to the order of his wisdom, is still the best.
q. 1 a. 6 tit. 1 Sexto quaeritur utrum Deus possit facere quae sunt aliis possibilia, ut peccare, ambulare et huiusmodi	Q. I: ARTICLE VI
q. 1 a. 6 tit. 2 Et videtur quod sic.	Can God Do What Others Can Do?
	THE sixth point of inquiry is whether God can do things that are possible to others, for instance, can he sin, walk and so forth? And seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 1 Quia Augustinus dicit, quod melior est natura quae potest peccare, quam quae peccare non potest. Sed omne quod est optimum, est Deo attribuendum. Ergo Deus potest peccare.	1. Augustine says (Enchir. cv) that it is a better nature that can sin than that which cannot. Now whatsoever is best should be ascribed to God. Therefore God can sin.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 2 Praeterea, illud quod est laudabilitatis, non debet Deo subtrahi. Sed in laudem viri dicitur Eccli. XXXI, 10: qui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus. Ergo posse transgredi et non transgredi Deo debet attribui.	2. We should not withhold from God anything that is praiseworthy. Now it is said in praise of a man (Ecclus. xxxi, 10) that he could have transgressed and hath not transgressed. Therefore the power to sin and not to sin should be ascribed to God.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 3 Praeterea, philosophus dicit: potest Deus et studiosus prava agere. Ergo Deus potest peccare.	3. The Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 5) that evil deeds are possible to a god or a wise man. Therefore God can sin.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 4 Praeterea, quicumque consentit in peccatum mortale, peccat mortaliter. Sed quicumque praecipit peccatum mortale, consentit, immo quodammodo principaliter facit. Cum ergo Deus praeceperit peccatum mortale Abrahae, scilicet quod interficeret filium innocentem; et Oseae, quo acciperet mulierem fornicariam, et faceret ex ea filios fornicationis, et Semei, ut malediceret David, ut habetur II Reg. XVI, 7, quem constat peccasse ex poena sibi inflicta III Reg. II, 36, videtur quod ipse peccaverit mortaliter.	4. To consent to a mortal sin is to sin mortally: and he who commands the commission of a mortal sin, is a consenting party, in fact sometimes he is the principal. Since then God commanded Abraham to commit a mortal sin, namely to slay his innocent son, and Osee to take a wife of fornication, and have of her children of fornication, and Semei to curse David (2 Kings xvi), although he sinned by so doing since we find that he was punished for the deed (3 Kings ii); it would seem that he sinned mortally.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 5 Praeterea, quicumque cooperatur peccanti mortaliter, ipse peccat mortaliter. Sed Deus cooperatur peccanti mortaliter: ipse enim operatur in omni operatione, et per consequens in omni eo qui mortaliter peccat. Ergo Deus peccat.	5. It is a mortal sin to co-operate with one who sins mortally. Now God co-operates with him who commits a mortal sin: since he operates in every deed, and consequently in every man who commits a mortal sin. Therefore God sins.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 6 Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum, sive in malum. Sed inclinare voluntatem hominis in malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus peccat.	6. Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xxi, cf. Gloss on Rom. i) says that God operates in the hearts of men, by inclining their will whithersoever he will, be it to good or to evil. Now it is a sin to incline a man's will to evil. Therefore God sins.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 7 Praeterea, homo factus est ad imaginem Dei, ut habetur Gen. I, 26. Sed quod invenitur in imagine oportet inveniri in exemplari. Hominis autem voluntas est ad utrumlibet. Ergo et voluntas Dei; et ita potest peccare et non peccare.	7. Man was made to God's image (Gen. i). Now whatsoever is in the image must needs be in the original: and man's will is indifferent to this or that. Therefore God's will is also: and consequently he can sin and not sin.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 8 Praeterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest et superior. Sed homo cuius virtus est inferior divina virtute, potest ambulare, peccare et alia huiusmodi facere. Ergo et Deus.	8. Whatsoever a lower power can do, a higher power can do also. Now man whose power is inferior to God's power is able to walk, to sin and so forth. Therefore God also can do these things.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 9 Praeterea, tunc aliquis omittit quando non facit bona quae potest. Sed Deus potest multa bona facere quae non facit. Ergo omittit, et ita peccat.	9. To omit is not to do the good one is able to do. But God is able to do many good things that he does not. Therefore he omits them and consequently sins.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 10 Praeterea, quicumque potest prohibere peccatum et non prohibet, videtur peccare. Sed Deus potest prohibere omnia peccata. Cum ergo non prohibeat, videtur quod peccet.	10. Apparently he sins who can prevent the commission of sin, and prevents it not. Now God can prevent all sins being committed. Since then he does not do so it would seem that he sins.
q. 1 a. 6 arg. 11 Praeterea, Amos III, 6, habetur: non est malum in civitate quod Deus non faciat. Hoc autem non potest intelligi de malo poenae: nam dicitur Sap. I, 13, quod Deus mortem non fecit. Ergo oportet intelligi de malo culpae; et sic Deus est auctor mali culpae.	11. It is written (Amos iii, 6): Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done? But this cannot refer to penal evil, since it is written (Wis. i, 13): God made not death. Therefore it must refer to the evil of sin: so that God is the author of the evil of sin.
q. 1 a. 6 s. c. 1 Sed contra. I Ioan. I, 5, dicitur: Deus lux est, et tenebrae in eo non sunt ullae. Sed peccata sunt tenebrae spirituales. Ergo peccatum in Deo esse non potest.	On the contrary it is said (1 Jo. i, 5): God is light, and in him there is no darkness. Now sin is spiritual darkness. Therefore in God there can be no sin.
q. 1 a. 6 s. c. 2 Praeterea, princeps propriis legibus astrictus non tenetur. Sed omne peccatum est contra legem divinam, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo Deus peccato astringi non potest.	Moreover, a sovereign is not bound by his own laws. And every sin is contrary to the divine law as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). Therefore God cannot be subject to sin.
q. 1 a. 6 co. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, Deum absolute aliquid non posse dicitur dupliciter: uno modo ex parte voluntatis; alio modo ex parte potentiae. Ex parte siquidem voluntatis, Deus non potest facere quod non potest velle. Cum autem nulla voluntas possit velle contrarium eius quod naturaliter vult, sicut voluntas hominis non potest velle miseriam; constat quod voluntas divina non potest velle contrarium suae bonitatis, quam naturaliter vult. Peccatum autem est defectus quidam a divina bonitate: unde Deus non potest velle peccare. Et ideo absolute concedendum est, quod Deus peccare non potest. Ex parte vero potentiae dicitur Deum non posse aliquid, dupliciter: uno modo ratione ipsius potentiae; alio modo ratione possibilis. Potentia siquidem eius quantum in se est, cum sit infinita, in nullo deficiens invenitur quod ad potentiam pertineat. Sed quaedam sunt quae secundum nomen potentiam important, quae secundum rem sunt potentiae defectus; sicut multae negationes sunt, quae in affirmationibus includuntur; ut cum dicitur posse deficere, videtur secundum modum loquendi, quaedam potentia importari, cum magis potentiae defectus importetur. Et propter hoc potentia aliqua dicitur esse perfecta, secundum philosophum, quando ista non potest. Sicut enim illae affirmationes habent vim negationum secundum rem, ita istae negationes habent vim affirmationum. Et propter hoc dicimus, Deum non posse deficere, et per consequens non posse moveri (quia motus et defectus quamdam imperfectionem important) et per consequens non posse eum ambulare, nec alios actus corporeos exercere, qui sine motu non fiunt. Ratione vero possibilis dicitur Deum aliquid non posse facere quia id contradictionem implicat, ut ex supra dictis, art. 5, patet; et per hunc modum dicitur quod non potest facere alium Deum aequalem sibi. Implicatur enim contradictio ex eo quod factum oportet esse in potentia aliquo modo, cum recipiat esse ab alio, et sic non potest esse actus purus, quod est proprium ipsius Dei.	I answer that, as already stated (A. 5) there are two ways in which God may be said to be unable to do a thing, in respect of his will and in respect of his power. On the part of his will God cannot do what he cannot will. And since no will can consent to the contrary of what it naturally desires,-thus a man's will cannot desire unhappiness,-it is clear that God's will cannot will what is contrary to his goodness, since he wills this naturally. Now sin is a lapse from divine goodness: wherefore God cannot will to sin. Therefore we must grant absolutely that God cannot sin. On the part of his power God is said in two ways to be unable to do a thing, in respect of his power and in respect of the thing. His power considered in itself, since it is infinite, lacks nothing that appertains to power. There are certain things, however, which in name denote power whereas in reality they are wanting in power. Such are many negations that are expressed affirmatively: as when we say that so and so can fail, the terms would seem to imply some sort of power, whereas it is rather a lack of power that is signified. For this reason, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a power is said to be perfect when it is unable to do such things: because while such affirmations are in reality negations, the corresponding negations have an affirmative force. Hence we say that God cannot fail, and consequently that he cannot be moved (since movement and failing imply imperfection), and therefore that he cannot walk nor perform any other bodily actions, since these are inseparable from movement. On the part of the thing, God is said to be unable to do a thing when it implies a contradiction, as stated above (A. 5): and in this way we say that God cannot make another God equal to himself: since a contradiction is implied in that what is made must needs be somewhat in potentiality, seeing that it receives its being from another, and consequently cannot be pure act which is proper to God.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa comparatio non est intelligenda universaliter, sed solum inter hominem et animalia bruta.	Reply to the First Objection. This comparison must not be taken universally, but only as between man and dumb animals.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod dicitur in laudem hominis non semper est congruum laudi divinae, immo esset blasphemia; ut si dicerem Deum poenitere et huiusmodi. Aliquid enim, ut dicit Dionysius est in inferiori natura laudabile quod in superiori natura vituperatur.	Reply to the Second Objection. That which is said in praise of man is not always becoming to the praise of God; it might even be a blasphemy, as if I were to say that God repents and the like. Because, as Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv) what is praised in a lower nature is blamed in a higher.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum philosophi est intelligendum sub conditione voluntatis. Haec enim conditionalis est vera: Deus potest prava agere si vult: nihil enim prohibet conditionalem esse veram, licet antecedens et consequens sint impossibilia; ut patet in hac: si homo volat, habet alas.	Reply to the Third Objection. The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as conditional to the will. This conditional statement is true: God can do wicked things if he will, although both antecedent and consequence are impossible; thus it is clear that if a man flies he has wings.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquem actum qui in se esset peccatum mortale, aliqua circumstantia addita fieri virtuosum: occidere enim hominem absolute peccatum mortale est; sed ministro iudicis occidere hominem propter iustitiam ex praecepto iudicis, non est peccatum, sed actus iustitiae. Sicut autem princeps civitatis habet disponere de hominibus quantum ad vitam et mortem, et alia quaecumque pertinent ad finem sui regiminis, qui est iustitia, ita Deus habet omnia in sui dispositione dirigere ad finem sui regiminis quod est eius bonitas. Et ideo licet occidere filium innocentem, de se possit esse peccatum mortale, tamen si hoc fiat ex praecepto Dei propter finem quem Deus praevidit et ordinavit, licet etiam sit homini ignotus, non est peccatum, sed meritum. Et similiter etiam dicendum est de fornicatione Oseae, cum constet Deum esse ordinatorem totius humanae generationis: quamvis quidam dicant, quod hoc non acciderit secundum veritatem rei, sed secundum visionem prophetiae. De praecepto autem Semei est dicendum aliter. Dicitur enim Deus dupliciter praecipere. Uno modo loquendo spiritualiter vel corporaliter per substantiam creatam; et sic praecepit Abrahae et prophetis. Alio modo inclinando, sicut dicitur praecepisse vermi ut comederet hederam, Ionae I. Et per hunc modum praecepit Semei ut malediceret David, in quantum cor eius inclinavit; et hoc per modum qui infra in solutione ad sextum, dicetur.	Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nothing prevents an act that is in itself a mortal sin from becoming virtuous through the addition of a circumstance. Thus absolutely speaking it is a mortal sin to kill a man: yet it is not a mortal sin but an act of justice for the judge's minister to put a man to death for justice' sake in pursuance of the judge's sentence. Now, even as the civil authority has the disposal of men in matters of life and death, and all that touches the .end of its government, namely justice, so God has all things at his disposal to direct them to the end of his government, which end is his goodness. Wherefore though it may be in itself a mortal sin to slay an innocent son, yet if this be done at God's command for an end foreseen and preordained by God, though unknown to the slayer, it is not a sin but a meritorious act. The same applies to the fornication of Osee, for it is clear that God orders all human procreation. Some, however, assert that this did not happen in reality, but only in a prophetic vision. As to the command given to Semei we must give a different reply. God is said in two ways to command. In one way by speaking either interiorly or outwardly through a created substance: and thus he commanded Abraham and the Prophets. In another way by inclination: thus it is related that he commanded a worm to consume the ivy (Jonas iv, 7). In this way he commanded Semei to curse David, by inclining his heart, and this in the manner we shall explain in the Reply to the Sixth Objection.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 5 Ad quintum dicendum, quod operatio peccati, quantum ad id quod habet de entitate et actualitate, refertur in Deum sicut in causam; quantum vero ad id quod habet de deformitate peccati, refertur in liberum arbitrium, non in Deum; sicut quidquid motus est in claudicatione, est a virtute gressiva; deformitas autem eius est a curvitate cruris.	Reply to the Fifth Objection. The sinful act, forasmuch as it has entity and actuality, is to be referred to God as its cause; but in so far as it has the deformity of sin, it must be referred to the free-will and not to God: thus all that there is of movement in limping comes from the power to walk, whereas the defect is owing to a misshapen leg.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 6 Ad sextum dicendum, quod Deus non dicitur inclinare voluntates hominum in malum, immittendo malitiam, vel ad malitiam commovendo; sed permittendo et ordinando, ut videlicet qui crudelitatem exercere consentiunt, in illos exerceant quos dignos Deus iudicat.	Reply to the Sixth Objection. God is said to incline man's will to evil, not as though he infused malice into it, or urged it to wickedness, but by permitting and directing the evil, for instance he directs the exercise of cruelty to the punishment of those whom he deems deserving of it.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 7 Ad septimum dicendum, quod non est necessarium, quidquid in homine invenitur, quamvis sit ad imaginem Dei, in Deo inveniri; et tamen in proposito voluntas Dei est ad utrumlibet, quia non est ad unum obiectum determinata. Potest enim hoc facere vel non facere, aut facere hoc vel illud: non tamen sequitur quod aliquid istorum possit male facere, quod est peccare.	Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although man is made in God's image, it does not follow that whatever is in man is also in God. Nevertheless, as to the point raised, God's will is indifferent to this or that, since it is not fixed to one object. For he is able either to do a thing or not to do it, to do this or to do that: yet it does not follow that in either case he can do ill, which is to sin.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 8 Ad octavum dicendum, quod obiectio illa tenet in his quae pertinent ad potestatis perfectionem, non autem in his quae important potestatis defectum.	Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument applies to those things which refer to the perfection of power but not to those which refer to the lack of power.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 9 Ad nonum dicendum, quod licet Deus possit multa bona facere quae non facit, non tamen omittit: quia non debet illa facere, quod requiritur ad rationem omissionis.	Reply to the Ninth Objection. Though God is able to do many good things which he does not, he does not omit them, since he is not bound to do them, which is a necessary condition of an omission.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 10 Et similiter dicendum est ad decimum; nam non est reus peccati qui peccatum non impedit nisi quando impedire debet.	Reply to the Tenth Objection. The same answer applies here, since a man is not guilty of a sin through failing to prevent it, unless he be bound to do so.
q. 1 a. 6 ad 11 Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum Amos intelligitur de malo poenae. Quod autem dicitur Sap. I, 13: Deus mortem non fecit intelligitur quantum ad ipsam causam mortis, quae est meritum culpae, vel quantum ad primam naturae institutionem, qua fecit hominem suo modo immortalem.	Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The words of Amos refer to penal evil. And the words of the Book of Wisdom, God hath not made death, refer to the cause of death, as the wages of sin; or to the original formation of human nature when man was made by nature immortal.
q. 1 a. 7 tit. 1 Septimo quaeritur quare Deus dicatur omnipotens	Q. I: ARTICLE VII
q. 1 a. 7 tit. 2 Et videtur quod dicatur omnipotens quia simpliciter omnia possit.	Is God Almighty?
	Sum. Th. I, Q. xxv, A. 3: III, Q. xiii, A. I: C.G. ii, 22, 25
	THE seventh point of inquiry is: Why is God called almighty?
q. 1 a. 7 arg. 1 Sicut enim Deus dicitur omnipotens, ita dicitur omnisciens. Sed dicitur omnisciens, quia simpliciter omnia scit. Ergo et omnipotens dicitur, quia simpliciter omnia potest.	1. It would seem that the reason is because he can simply do all things. For he is called almighty in the same way as he is called omniscient. Now he is called omniscient because he simply knows all things. Therefore he is called almighty because he can simply do all things.
q. 1 a. 7 arg. 2 Praeterea, si non ideo dicatur omnipotens quia simpliciter omnia possit, tunc haec distributio importata, non est absoluta, sed accommodata. Talis autem distributio non est universalis, sed determinatur ad aliquid. Ergo divina potentia esset ad aliquid determinata, et non esset infinita. Sed contra, Deus non potest facere, sicut dictum est, art. 3 et 5, ut affirmatio et negatio sint simul vera; nec potest peccare nec mori. Haec autem includuntur in hac distributione, si absolute sumatur. Ergo non debet absolute sumi; et ita Deus non potest dici omnipotens quia omnia possit absolute.	2. If the reason for calling him almighty is not because he can simply do all things, then the implication that he can do all things is not absolutely true but only in an accommodated sense: in which case the predication would not be universal but particular, and consequently the divine power would be confined to certain effects and therefore finite.
	On the contrary, as stated above (AA. 3, 5) God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time: neither can he sin or die. Yet these things would be included in the above predication were it to be taken absolutely. Therefore it must not be taken absolutely: and consequently the reason why God is called almighty is not because he can absolutely do all things.
q. 1 a. 7 arg. 3 Item videtur quod dicatur omnipotens quia potest omnia quae vult: dicit enim Augustinus in Enchiridion: non ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quidquid vult, potest. Sed contra, beati possunt quidquid volunt: aliter voluntas eorum non esset perfecta. Non tamen dicuntur omnipotentes. Ergo hoc non sufficit ad rationem omnipotentiae, quod Deus possit quidquid vult. Praeterea, voluntas sapientis non est de impossibili: unde nullus sapiens vult nisi quod potest; nec tamen quilibet sapiens est omnipotens. Ergo idem quod prius.	3. It would seem that he is called almighty because he can do whatsoever he wills. For Augustine says (Enchir. xcvi): He is called almighty for no other reason but that he can do whatsoever lie wills.-On the contrary. The blessed can do whatsoever they will, otherwise their will would not be perfect. And yet they are not called almighty. Therefore the fact that God can do whatsoever he wills is not sufficient reason for calling him almighty. Further, a wise man does not will the impossible, wherefore no wise man desires to do except what he is able to do. And yet not all the wise are almighty. Therefore the same conclusion follows.
q. 1 a. 7 arg. 4 Item videtur quod dicatur omnipotens, quia possit omnia possibilia. Dicitur enim omnisciens, quia scit omnia scibilia. Ergo pari ratione dicitur omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia. Sed contra, si dicitur omnipotens quia potest omnia possibilia; aut hoc est quia potest omnia possibilia sibi, aut quia potest omnia possibilia naturae. Si quia potest omnia possibilia naturae, tunc eius omnipotentia naturae potentiam non excedit; quod est absurdum. Si vero quia potest omnia possibilia sibi, tunc pari ratione quilibet dicetur omnipotens, quia quilibet potest omnia possibilia sibi. Et praeterea est ibi quaedam expositio per circumlocutionem, quae non est conveniens.	4. It would seem that he is called almighty because he can do whatsoever is possible. For he is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Therefore there is equal reason for calling him almighty because he can do all things possible.-On the contrary, if he be called almighty because he can do all things possible,, this is either because he can do all things possible to him, or because he can do all things possible to nature. In the latter case his power would not surpass that of nature, which is absurd: in the former case, everyone would be called almighty, since everyone can do what is possible to himself. Moreover such an explanation is by way of circumlocution, which is inept.
q. 1 a. 7 arg. 5 Item quaeritur quare Deus dicitur omnipotens et omnisciens, et non omnivolens.	5. If God is called almighty and all-knowing, why is he not also called all-willing?
q. 1 a. 7 co. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod quidam volentes rationem omnipotentiae assignare, quaedam acceperunt quae ad rationem omnipotentiae non pertinent, sed magis sunt causa omnipotentiae, vel pertinentia ad perfectionem omnipotentiae, vel pertinentia ad rationem potentiae, vel ad modum habendi potentiam. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod ideo Deus est omnipotens, quia habet potentiam infinitam. Qui non dicunt rationem omnipotentiae, sed causam; sicut anima rationalis est causa hominis, sed non est eius definitio. Quidam vero ideo dixerunt Deum omnipotentem, quia non potest aliquid pati nec potest deficere, nec aliquid potest in ipsum, et alia huiusmodi, quae ad perfectionem potentiae pertinent. Quidam etiam dixerunt, quod ideo dicitur omnipotens, quia potest quidquid vult; et hoc habet a se et per se; quod pertinet ad modum habendi potentiam. Hae autem rationes omnes ideo sunt insufficientes, quia praetermittunt rationes operationum ad obiecta, quas implicat omnipotentia. Et ideo dicendum est, quod accipienda est aliqua trium viarum quae tactae sunt in obiiciendo, et dicunt comparationem ad obiecta. Dicendum ergo est, quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentia Dei, quantum est de se, ad omnia illa obiecta se extendit quae contradictionem non implicant. Nec etiam instantia de illis est quae defectum important, vel corporalem motum; quia posse ea, Deo est non posse. Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant Deus non potest; quae quidem sunt impossibilia secundum se. Relinquitur ergo quod Dei potentia ad ea se extendat quae sunt possibilia secundum se. Haec autem sunt quae contradictionem non implicant. Constat ergo quod Deus ideo dicitur omnipotens quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia secundum se.	I answer that in an attempt to assign a reason for God's omnipotence some have sought it in things that are not the reason but rather the cause of omnipotence, or which appertain to the perfection of his omnipotence, or to the nature of his power, or to the way in which he has power. Thus some have said that God is almighty because his power is infinite: these assigned not the reason but the cause of omnipotence: for instance, a rational soul is the cause not the definition of a man. Some said that God is almighty because he is impassible and indefectible, and nothing can act on him, and so on, all of which appertain to the perfection of his power. And some said that he is called almighty because he can do whatsoever he wills, and this by nature and essentially; but this regards the way in which he has power. Now all these reasons are insufficient in that they fail to account for the relation between operation and its object, which relation is implied in omnipotence. Wherefore we reply that we must take one of the explanations indicated in the objections which take into account this relationship to objects.-Accordingly, as stated above (A. 5) God's power, considered in itself, extends to all such objects as do not imply a contradiction. Nor does the objection stand that refers to things which imply a defect or bodily movement, since the very possibility of such things involves their impossibility to God. And as regards things that imply a contradiction, they are impossible to God as being impossible in themselves. Consequently God's power extends to things that are possible in themselves: and such are the things that do not involve a contradiction. Therefore it is evident that God is called almighty because he can do all things that are possible in themselves.
q. 1 a. 7 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus dicitur omnisciens quia scit omnia scibilia; falsa autem, quae non sunt scibilia, nescit. Impossibilia autem secundum se comparantur ad potentiam sicut falsa ad scientiam.	Reply to the First Objection. God is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Now the false are not knowable and therefore he knows them not: and things impossible in themselves are compared to power as the false are compared to knowledge.
q. 1 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procederet, si distributio terminaretur infra genus possibilium hoc modo quod non se extenderet ad omnia possibilia. Ad illud quod quaeritur de alia ratione omnipotentiae, dicendum, quod posse quidquid vult facere non est sufficiens ratio omnipotentiae, sed est sufficiens signum omnipotentiae; et sic intelligendum est verbum Augustini.	Reply to the Second Objection. This argument would stand if the universality were confined within the genus of things possible so as not to extend to all things possible.
q. 1 a. 7 ad 3 Ad illud quod arguitur de tertia ratione, dicendum, quod Deus dicitur omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute; et ideo obiectio non recte procedit de possibilibus Deo vel naturae.	To the second reason suggested for calling God almighty we have to say that to be able to do whatsoever he wills is not a sufficient reason, though it is a sufficient sign: it is 'in this sense that we must take the works of Augustine. To the argument advanced for the third reason, we reply that God is called almighty because he is able to do all things that are absolutely possible: hence it is not to the point where the objection distinguishes between things possible to God and those which are possible, to nature.
q. 1 a. 7 ad 5 Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, dicendum, quod in his quae aguntur per voluntatem, ut dicitur IX Metaph., potentia et scientia determinantur ad opus per voluntatem; et ideo scientia et potentia in Deo quasi non determinata universaliter pronuntiantur, ut cum dicitur omnisciens vel omnipotens, sed voluntas quae determinat, non potest esse omnium, sed eorum tantum ad quae potentiam et scientiam determinat; et ideo Deus non potest dici omnivolens.	To the last question we reply that in voluntary actions, power and knowledge (as stated in Metaph. ix, 2, 5) are brought into action by the will: wherefore in God power and knowledge are described in universal terms as being without limit, as when we say that God is all-knowing and almighty: whereas the will, seeing that it is the determining force, cannot cover all things, but only those to which it determines power and knowledge: hence God cannot be called all-willing.