Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1/lect1

Lecture 1

Latin	English
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 1 Huic autem scientiae Aristoteles prooemium praemittit, in quo duo tradit. Primo quidem ostendit circa quid haec scientia versetur. Secundo qualis sit ista scientia, ibi, quia vero non activa. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod huius scientiae, quae sapientia dicitur, est considerare causas. Secundo quales vel quas causas considerat, ibi, quoniam autem scientiam hanc. Circa primum praemittit quaedam ex quibus ad propositum arguit. Secundo ex praedictis rationem sumit, ibi, cuius autem gratia nunc. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit in communi scientiae dignitatem. Secundo, ostendit cognitionis ordinem, ibi, animalia quidem igitur et cetera. Scientiae autem dignitatem ostendit per hoc quod naturaliter desideratur ab omnibus tamquam finis. Unde circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit intentum. Secundo probat, ibi, signum autem. Proponit igitur primo, quod omnibus hominibus naturaliter desiderium inest ad sciendum.	1. Aristotle first sets down an introduction to this science, in which he treats of two things. First (2), he points out with what this science is concerned. Second (53), he explains what kind of science it is (“That this is not a practical science”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the office of this science, which is called wisdom, is to consider the causes of things. Second (36), he explains with what causes or kinds of causes it is concerned (“But since we are in search”). In regard to the first he prefaces certain preliminary considerations form which he argues in support of his thesis. Second (35), he draws a conclusion from these considerations (“Now the reason for undertaking”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he makes clear the dignity of scientific knowledge in general. Second (9), he explains the hierarchy in knowing (“Animals by nature”). Now he establishes the dignity of scientific knowledge from the fact that it is naturally desired as an end by all men. Hence, in regard to this he does two things. First, he states what he intends [to prove]. Second (1), he proves it (“A sign of this”). Accordingly, he says, first, that the desire to know belongs by nature to all men.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 2 Cuius ratio potest esse triplex: primo quidem, quia unaquaeque res naturaliter appetit perfectionem sui. Unde et materia dicitur appetere formam, sicut imperfectum appetit suam perfectionem. Cum igitur intellectus, a quo homo est id quod est, in se consideratus sit in potentia omnia, nec in actum eorum reducatur nisi per scientiam, quia nihil est eorum quae sunt, ante intelligere, ut dicitur in tertio de anima: sic naturaliter unusquisque desiderat scientiam sicut materia formam.	2. Three reasons can be given for this: The first is that each thing naturally desires its own perfection. Hence matter is also said to desire form as any imperfect thing desires its perfection. Therefore, since the intellect, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and becomes them actually only through knowledge, because the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, as is stated in Book III of The Soul, so each man naturally desires knowledge just as matter desires form.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 3 Secundo, quia quaelibet res naturalem inclinationem habet ad suam propriam operationem: sicut calidum ad calefaciendum, et grave ut deorsum moveatur. Propria autem operatio hominis inquantum homo, est intelligere. Per hoc enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad sciendum.	3. The second reason is that each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation, as something hot is naturally inclined to heat, and something heavy to be moved downwards. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand, for by reason of this he differs from all other things. Hence the desire of man is naturally inclined to understand, and therefore to possess scientific knowledge.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 4 Tertio, quia unicuique rei desiderabile est, ut suo principio coniungatur; in hoc enim uniuscuiusque perfectio consistit. Unde et motus circularis est perfectissimus, ut probatur octavo physicorum, quia finem coniungit principio. Substantiis autem separatis, quae sunt principia intellectus humani, et ad quae intellectus humanus se habet ut imperfectum ad perfectum, non coniungitur homo nisi per intellectum: unde et in hoc ultima hominis felicitas consistit. Et ideo naturaliter homo desiderat scientiam. Nec obstat si aliqui homines scientiae huic studium non impendant; cum frequenter qui finem aliquem desiderant, a prosecutione finis ex aliqua causa retrahantur, vel propter difficultatem perveniendi, vel propter alias occupationes. Sic etiam licet omnes homines scientiam desiderent, non tamen omnes scientiae studium impendunt, quia ab aliis detinentur, vel a voluptatibus, vel a necessitatibus vitae praesentis, vel etiam propter pigritiam vitant laborem addiscendi. Hoc autem proponit Aristoteles ut ostendat, quod quaerere scientiam non propter aliud utilem, qualis est haec scientia, non est vanum, cum naturale desiderium vanum esse non possit.	4. The third reason is that it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source, since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. This is also the reason why circular motion is the most perfect motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics, because its terminus is united to its starting-point. Now it is only by means of his intellect that man is united to the separate substances, which are the source of the human intellect and that to which the human intellect is related as something imperfect to something perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the ultimate happiness of man consists in this union. Therefore man naturally desires to know. The fact that some men do not devote any study to this science does not disprove this thesis; for those who desire some end are often prevented from pursuing it for some reason or other, either because of the difficulty of attaining it, or because of other occupations. And in this way, too, even though all men desire knowledge, still not all devote themselves to the pursuit of it because they are held back by other things, either by pleasures or the needs of the present life; or they may even avoid the effort that learning demands because they are lazy. Now Aristotle makes this statement in order to show that it is not pointless to search for a science that is not useful for anything else, as happens in the case of this science, since a natural desire cannot exist in vain.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 5 Deinde ostendit quod proposuerat, per signum: quia cum sensus ad duo nobis deserviant; scilicet ad cognitionem rerum, et ad utilitatem vitae; diliguntur a nobis propter seipsos, inquantum cognoscitivi sunt, et etiam propter hoc, quod utilitatem ad vitam conferunt. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod ille sensus maxime ab omnibus diligitur, qui magis cognoscitivus est, qui est visus, quem diligimus non solum ad agendum aliquid, sed etiam si nihil agere deberemus. Cuius causa est, quia iste sensus, scilicet visus, inter omnes magis facit nos cognoscere, et plures differentias rerum nobis demonstrat.	5. Then he establishes his thesis by means of an example. Since our senses serve us in two respects: in knowing things and in meeting the needs of life, we love them for themselves inasmuch as they enable us to know and also assist us to live. This is evident from the fact that all men take the greatest delight in that sense which. is most knowing, i.e., the sense of sight, which we value not merely in order to do something, but even when we are not required to act at all. The reason is that this sense—that of sight—is the most knowing of all our senses and makes us aware of many differences between things.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 6 In quo manifestum est quod duas praeeminentias visus in cognoscendo ad alios sensus ponit. Unam quidem quia perfectius cognoscit. Quod quidem visui accidit, eo quod spiritualior est inter omnes sensus. Quanto enim aliqua vis cognoscitiva est immaterialior, tanto est perfectior in cognoscendo. Quod autem visus sit immaterialior, patet si consideretur eius immutatio, qua ab obiecto immutatur. Nam, cum omnia alia sensibilia immutent organum et medium sensus secundum aliquam materialem immutationem, sicut tactus obiectum calefaciendo et infrigidando, obiectum vero gustus, afficiendo sapore aliquo organum gustus mediante saliva, obiectum autem auditus per motum corporalem, obiectum autem odoratus per fumalem evaporationem, solum obiectum visus non immutat nec organum nec medium nisi spirituali immutatione. Non enim pupilla nec aer coloratur, sed solum speciem coloris recipiunt secundum esse spirituale. Quia igitur sensus in actu consistit in actuali immutatione sensus ab obiecto, manifestum est illum sensum spiritualiorem esse in sua operatione, qui immaterialius et spiritualius immutatur. Et ideo visus certius et perfectius iudicat de sensibilibus inter alios sensus.	6. In this part it is clear that he gives two reasons why sight is superior to the other senses in knowing. The first is that it knows in a more perfect way; and this belongs to it because it is the most spiritual of all the senses. For the more immaterial a power is, the more perfectly it knows. And evidently sight is a more immaterial sense, if we consider the modification produced in it by its object. For all other sensible objects change both the organ and medium of a sense by a material modification, for example, the object of touch by heating and cooling, the object of taste by affecting the organ of taste with some flavor through the medium of saliva, the object of hearing by means of motion in the body, and the object of smell by means of the evaporation of volatile elements. But the object of sight changes the organ and medium of sight only by a spiritual modification; because neither the pupil of the eye nor the air becomes colored, but these only receive the form of color in a spiritual mode of being. Therefore, because actual sensation consists in the actual modification of a sense by its object, it is evident that that sense which is changed in a more immaterial and spiritual way is more spiritual in its operation. Hence sight judges about sensible objects in a more certain and perfect way than the other senses do.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 7 Aliam autem praeeminentiam ponit, quia nobis plura demonstrat. Quod quidem accidit ex ratione sui obiecti. Tactus enim et gustus, et similiter odoratus et auditus sunt cognoscitivi illorum accidentium, in quibus distinguuntur inferiora corpora a superioribus. Visus autem est cognoscitivus illorum accidentium, in quibus communicant inferiora corpora cum superioribus. Nam visibile actu est aliquid per lucem, in qua communicant inferiora corpora cum superioribus, ut dicitur secundo de anima; et ideo corpora caelestia solo visu sunt sensibilia.	7. The other reason which he gives for the superiority of sight is that it gives us more information about things. This is attributable to the nature of its object, for touch and taste, and likewise smell and hearing, perceive those accidents by which lower bodies are distinguished from higher ones. But sight perceives those accidents which lower bodies have in common with higher ones. For a thing is actually visible by means of light, which is common both to lower and higher bodies, as is said in Book II of The Soul. Hence the celestial bodies are perceptible only by means of sight.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 8 Est autem alia ratio, quia visus plures differentias rerum demonstrat; quia sensibilia corpora praecipue per visum et tactum cognoscere videmur, et adhuc magis per visum. Cuius ratio ex hoc sumi potest: quod alii tres sensus sunt cognoscitivi eorum quae a corpore sensibili quodammodo effluunt, et non in ipso consistunt: sicut sonus est a corpore sensibili, ut ab eo fluens et non in eo manens: et similiter fumalis evaporatio cum qua et ex qua odor diffunditur. Visus autem et tactus percipiunt illa accidentia quae rebus ipsis immanent, sicut color et calidum et frigidum. Unde iudicium tactus et visus extenditur ad res ipsas, iudicium autem auditus et odoratus ad ea quae a rebus ipsis procedunt, non ad res ipsas. Et inde est quod figura et magnitudo et huiusmodi, quibus ipsa res sensibilis disponitur, magis percipitur visu et tactu, quam aliis sensibus. Et adhuc amplius magis visu quam tactu, tum propter hoc quod visus habet maiorem efficaciam ad cognoscendum, ut dictum est, tum propter hoc, quod quantitas et ea quae ad ipsam sequuntur, quae videntur esse sensibilia communia, proximius se habent ad obiectum visus quam ad obiectum tactus. Quod ex hoc patet, quod obiectum visus omne corpus habens aliquam quantitatem aliquo modo consequitur, non autem obiectum tactus.	8. There is also another reason. Sight informs us of many differences between things, for we seem to know sensible things best by means of sight and touch, but especially by means of sight. The reason for this can be drawn from the fact that the other three senses perceive those accidents which in a way flow from a sensible body and do not remain in it. Thus sound comes from a sensible body inasmuch as it flows away from it and does not remain in it. The same thing is true of the evaporation of volatile elements, with which and by which odor is diffused. But sight and touch perceive those accidents which remain in sensible bodies, such as color, warmth and coldness. Hence the judgment of sight and touch is extended to things themselves, whereas the judgment of hearing and smell is extended to those accidents which flow from things and not to things themselves. It is for this reason that figure and size and the like, by which a sensible being itself is disposed, are perceived more by sight and touch than by the other senses. And they are perceived more by sight than by touch, both because sight knows more efficaciously, as has been pointed out (C 6), and also because quantity and those [accidents] which naturally follow from it, which are seen to be the common sensibles, are more closely related to the object of sight than to that of touch. This is clear from the fact that the object of sight belongs in some degree to every body having some quantity, whereas the object of touch does not.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit animalia quidem prosequitur de ordine cognitionis. Et primo quantum ad bruta animalia. Secundo quantum ad homines, ibi, alia quidem igitur et cetera. Circa vero bruta animalia tangit primo quidem id in quo omnia animalia communicant. Secundo id in quo animalia differunt, et seinvicem excedunt, ibi, ex sensibus. Communicant autem omnia animalia in hoc quod naturaliter sensus habent. Nam ex hoc animal est animal, quod habet animam sensitivam, quae natura est animalis, sicut forma unicuique propria est natura eius. Quamvis autem omnia animalia sensum habeant naturaliter, non tamen omnia habent omnes sensus, sed solum perfecta. Omnia vero habent sensum tactus. Ipse enim est quodammodo fundamentum omnium aliorum sensuum. Non autem habent omnia sensum visus, quia sensus visus est omnibus aliis perfectior in cognoscendo, sed tactus magis necessarius. Est enim cognoscitivus eorum, ex quibus animal constat, scilicet calidi, frigidi, humidi et sicci. Unde sicut visus inter omnes est perfectior in cognoscendo, ita tactus est magis necessarius, utpote primus existens in via generationis. Ea enim quae sunt perfectiora, secundum hanc viam, sunt posteriora respectu illius individui, quod de imperfecto ad perfectionem movetur.	9. Animals by nature, then (2). Here he considers the hierarchy in knowledge. He does this, first (9), with respect to brute animals; and, then (14), with respect to men (“Thus other animals”). With respect to brute animals he mentions first what all animals have in common; and second (10), that by which they differ and surpass one another (“Now in some animals”). Now all animals are alike in the respect that they possess by nature the power of sensation. For an animal is an animal by reason of the fact that it has a sentient soul, which is the nature of an animal in the sense in which the distinctive form of each thing is its nature. But even though all animals are naturally endowed with sensory power, not all animals have all the senses, but only perfect animals. All have the sense of touch, for this sense in a way is the basis of all the other senses. However, not all have the sense of sight, because this sense knows in a more perfect way than all the other senses. But touch is more necessary; for it perceives the elements of which an animal is composed, namely, the hot, cold, moist and dry. Hence, just as sight knows in a more perfect way than the other senses, in a similar way touch is more necessary inasmuch as it is the first to exist in the process of generation. For those things which are more perfect according to this process come later in the development of the individual which is moved from a state of imperfection to one of perfection.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit ex sensibus ponit diversitatem cognitionis, quae est in brutis: et tangit etiam tres gradus cognitionis in huiusmodi animalibus. Quaedam enim sunt, quae licet sensum habeant, non tamen habent memoriam, quae ex sensu fit. Memoria enim sequitur phantasiam, quae est motus factus a sensu secundum actum, ut habetur in secundo de anima. In quibusdam vero animalibus ex sensu non fit phantasia, et sic in eis non potest esse memoria: et huiusmodi sunt animalia imperfecta, quae sunt immobilia secundum locum, ut conchilia. Cum enim animalibus cognitio sensitiva sit provisiva ad vitae necessitatem et ad propriam operationem, animalia illa memoriam habere debent, quae moventur ad distans motu progressivo: nisi enim apud ea remaneret per memoriam intentio praeconcepta, ex qua ad motum inducuntur, motum continuare non possent quousque finem intentum consequerentur. Animalibus vero immobilibus sufficit ad proprias operationes, praesentis sensibilis acceptio, cum ad distans non moveantur; et ideo sola imaginatione confusa habent aliquem motum indeterminatum, ut dicitur tertio de anima.	10. Now in some animals (3). Here he indicates the different kinds and three levels of knowing found among brute animals. For there are certain animals which have sensation, although they do not have memory which comes from sensation. For memory accompanies imagination, which is a movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing, as we find in Book II of The Soul. But in some animals imagination does not accompany sensation, and therefore memory cannot exist in them. This is found verified in imperfect animals which are incapable of local motion, such as shellfish. For since sensory cognition enables animals to make provision for the necessities of life and to perform their characteristic operations, then those animals which move towards something at a distance by means of local motion must have memory. For if the anticipated goal by which they are induced to move did not remain in them through memory, they could not continue to move toward the intended goal which they pursue. But in the case of immobile animals the reception of a present sensible quality is sufficient for them to perform their characteristic operations, since they do not move toward anything at a distance. Hence these animals have an indefinite movement as a result of confused [or indeterminate] imagination alone, as he points out in Book III of The Soul.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 11 Ex hoc autem, quod quaedam animalia memoriam habent, et quaedam non habent, sequitur quod quaedam sunt prudentia et quaedam non. Cum enim prudentia ex praeteritorum memoria de futuris provideat (unde secundum Tullium in secundo rhetoricae, partes eius ponuntur memoria, intelligentia, et providentia), in illis animalibus prudentia esse non potest, qui memoria carent. Illa vero animalia, quae memoriam habent, aliquid prudentiae habere possunt. Dicitur autem prudentia aliter in brutis animalibus, et aliter hominibus inesse. In hominibus quidem est prudentia secundum quod ex ratione deliberant quid eos oporteat agere; unde dicitur sexto Ethicorum, quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Iudicium autem de rebus agendis non ex rationis deliberatione, sed ex quodam naturae instinctu, prudentia in aliis animalibus dicitur. Unde prudentia in aliis animalibus est naturalis aestimatio de convenientibus prosequendis, et fugiendis nocivis, sicut agnus sequitur matrem et fugit lupum.	11. Again, from the fact that some animals have memory and some do not, it follows that some are prudent and some not. For, since prudence makes provision for the future from memory of the past (and this is the reason why Tully in his Rhetoric, Book II, makes memory, understanding and foresight parts of prudence), prudence cannot be had by those animals which lack memory. Now those animals which have memory can have some prudence, although prudence has one meaning in the case of brute animals and another in the case of man. Men are prudent inasmuch as they deliberate rationally about what they ought to do. Hence it is saidin Book VI of the Ethics, that prudence is a rationally regulated plan of things to be done. But the judgment about things to be done which is not a result of any rational deliberation but of some natural instinct is called prudence in other animals. Hence in other animals prudence is a natural estimate about the pursuit of what is fitting and the avoidance of what is harmful, as a lamb follows its mother and runs away from a wolf .
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 12 Inter ea vero, quae memoriam habent, quaedam habent auditum et quaedam non. Quaecumque autem auditum non habent, ut apes, vel si quod aliud huiusmodi animal est, licet prudentiam habere possint, non tamen sunt disciplinabilia, ut scilicet per alterius instructionem possint assuescere ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum: huiusmodi enim instructio praecipue recipitur per auditum: unde dicitur in libro de sensu et sensato, quod auditus est sensus disciplinae. Quod autem dicitur apes auditum non habere, non repugnat ei, quod videntur ex quibusdam sonis exterreri. Nam sicut sonus vehemens occidit animal, et scindit lignum, ut in tonitruo patet, non propter sonum, sed propter commotionem aeris vehementem in quo est sonus: ita animalia, quae auditu carent, iudicium de sonis non habendo possunt per sonos aereos exterreri. Illa vero animalia, quae memoriam et auditum habent, et disciplinabilia et prudentia esse possunt.	12. But among those animals which have memory some have hearing and some do not. And all those which cannot hear (as the bee or any other similar type of animal that may exist), even though they have prudence, are still incapable of being taught, i.e., in the sense that they can be habituated to the doing or avoiding of something through someone else’s instruction, because such instruction is received chiefly by means of hearing. Hence in The Senses and Their Objects it is stated that hearing is the sense by which we receive instruction. Furthermore, the statement that bees do not have hearing is not opposed in any way to the observation that they are frightened by certain sounds. For just as a very loud sound kills an animal and splits wood, as is evident in the case of thunder, not because of the sound but because of the violent motion of the air in which the sound is present, in a similar fashion those animals which lack hearing can be frightened by the sounding air even though they have no perception of sound. However, those animals which have both memory and hearing can be both prudent and teachable.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 13 Patet igitur tres esse gradus cognitionis in animalibus. Primus est eorum, quae nec auditum nec memoriam habent: unde nec disciplinabilia sunt, nec prudentia. Secundus est eorum quae habent memoriam, sed non auditum; unde sunt prudentia, et non disciplinabilia. Tertius est eorum, quae utrumque habent, et sunt prudentia et disciplinabilia. Quartus autem modus esse non potest, ut scilicet sit aliquod animal, quod habeat auditum, et non habeat memoriam. Sensus enim, qui per exterius medium suum sensibile apprehendunt, inter quos est auditus, non sunt nisi in animalibus quae moventur motu progressivo, quibus memoria deesse non potest, ut dictum est.	13. It is evident, then, that there are three levels of knowing in animals. The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor memory, and which are therefore neither capable of being taught nor of being prudent. The second level is that of animals which have memory but are unable to hear, and which are therefore prudent but incapable of being taught. The third level is that of animals which have both of these faculties, and which are therefore prudent and capable of being taught. Moreover, there cannot be a fourth level, so that there would be an animal which had hearing but lacked memory. For those senses which perceive their sensible objects by means of an external medium—and hearing is one of these—are found only in animals which have locomotion and which cannot do without memory, as has been pointed out (10).
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit alia quidem ostendit gradus cognitionis humanae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo namque ostendit in quo cognitio humana excedit praedictorum cognitionem. Secundo ostendit quomodo humana cognitio per diversos gradus distribuatur, ibi, fit autem ex memoria. Dicit ergo in prima parte, quod vita animalium regitur imaginatione et memoria: imaginatione quidem, quantum ad animalia imperfecta; memoria vero quantum ad animalia perfecta. Licet enim et haec imaginationem habeant, tamen unumquodque regi dicitur ab eo quod est principalius in ipso. Vivere autem hic non accipitur secundum quod est esse viventis, sicut accipitur in secundo de anima: cum dicitur, vivere viventibus est esse. Nam huiusmodi vivere animalis non est ex memoria et imaginatione, sed praecedit utrumque. Accipitur autem vivere pro actione vitae, sicut et conversationem hominum vitam dicere solemus. In hoc vero, quod cognitionem animalium determinat per comparationem ad regimen vitae, datur intelligi quod cognitio inest ipsis animalibus non propter ipsum cognoscere, sed propter necessitatem actionis.	14. Thus other animals (4). Here he explains the levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (14), he explains how human knowing surpasses the knowing of the abovementioned animals. Second (17), he shows how human knowing is divided into different levels (“Now in men”). Accordingly, in the first part (4) he says that the life of animals is ruled by imagination and memory: by imagination in the case of imperfect animals, and by memory in the case of perfect animals. For even though the latter also have imagination, still each thing is said to be ruled by that [power] which holds the highest place within it. Now in this discussion life does not mean the being of a living thing, as it is understood in Book II of The Soul, when he says that “for living things to live is to be”; for the life of an animal in this sense is not a result of memory or imagination but is prior to both of these. But life is taken to mean vital activity, just as we are also accustomed to speak of association as the life of men. But by the fact that he establishes the truth about the cognition of animals with reference to the management of life, we are given to understand that knowing belongs to these animals, not for the sake of knowing, but because of the need for action.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 15 Supra memoriam autem in hominibus, ut infra dicetur, proximum est experimentum, quod quaedam animalia non participant nisi parum. Experimentum enim est ex collatione plurium singularium in memoria receptorum. Huiusmodi autem collatio est homini propria, et pertinet ad vim cogitativam, quae ratio particularis dicitur: quae est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis intentionum universalium. Et, quia ex multis sensibus et memoria animalia ad aliquid consuescunt prosequendum vel vitandum, inde est quod aliquid experimenti, licet parum, participare videntur. Homines autem supra experimentum, quod pertinet ad rationem particularem, habent rationem universalem, per quam vivunt, sicut per id quod est principale in eis.	15. Now, as is stated below (18), in men the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For an experience arises from the association of many singular [intentions] received in memory. And this kind of association is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones. Now since animals are accustomed to pursue or avoid certain things as a result of many sensations and memory, for this reason they seem to share something of experience, even though it be slight. But above experience, which belongs to particular reason, men have as their chief power a universal reason by means of which they live.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 16 Sicut autem se habet experimentum ad rationem particularem, et consuetudo ad memoriam in animalibus, ita se habet ars ad rationem universalem. Ideo sicut perfectum vitae regimen est animalibus per memoriam adiuncta assuefactione ex disciplina, vel quomodolibet aliter, ita perfectum hominis regimen est per rationem arte perfectam. Quidam tamen ratione sine arte reguntur; sed hoc est regimen imperfectum.	16. And just as experience is related to particular reason [in men], and customary activity to memory in animals, in a similar way art is related to universal reason. Therefore, just as the life of animals is ruled in a perfect way by memory together with activity that has become habitual through training, or in any other way whatsoever, in a similar way man is ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art. Some men, however, are ruled by reason without art; but this rule is imperfect.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit fit autem ostendit diversos gradus humanae cognitionis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo comparat experimentum ad artem quidem. Secundo comparat artem speculativam ad activam, ibi, primum igitur conveniens et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit generationem artis et experimenti. Secundo praeeminentiam unius ad alterum, ibi, ad agere quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit utriusque praedictorum generationem. Secundo manifestat per exemplum, ibi, acceptionem quidem enim et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit generationem experimenti. Secundo artis generationem ibi, hominibus autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex memoria in hominibus experimentum causatur. Modus autem causandi est iste; quia ex multis memoriis unius rei accipit homo experimentum de aliquo, quo experimento potens est ad facile et recte operandum. Et ideo quia potentiam recte et faciliter operandi praebet experimentum, videtur fere esse simile arti et scientiae. Est enim similitudo eo quod utrobique ex multis una acceptio alicuius rei sumitur. Dissimilitudo autem, quia per artem accipiuntur universalia, per experimentum singularia, ut postea dicetur.	17. Now in men (5). Here he explains the different levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (17), he compares art with experience; and, second (31), he compares speculative art with practical art (“It is only fitting”). He treats the first point in two ways. First, he explains how art and experience originate. Second (20), he explains how one is superior to the other (“In practical matters”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how each of the above originates. Second (18), he makes this clear by means of an example (“For to judge”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he describes how experience originates, and second (18), how art originates (“But in men, science”). He says first (5), then, that in men experience is caused by memory. The way in which it is caused is this: from several memories of a single thing a man acquires experience about some matter, and by means of this experience he is able to act easily and correctly. Therefore, because experience provides us with the ability to act easily and correctly, it seems to be almost the same as science and art. For they are alike inasmuch as in either case from many instances a single view of a thing is obtained. But they differ inasmuch as universals are grasped by art and singular things by experience, as is stated later (18).
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit hominibus autem ponit generationem artis: et dicit, quod ex experientia in hominibus fit scientia et ars: et probat per auctoritatem Poli, qui dicit, quod experientia facit artem, sed inexperientia casum. Quando enim aliquis inexpertus recte operatur, a casu est. Modus autem, quo ars fit ex experimento, est idem cum modo praedicto, quo experimentum fit ex memoria. Nam sicut ex multis memoriis fit una experimentalis scientia, ita ex multis experimentis apprehensis fit universalis acceptio de omnibus similibus. Unde plus habet hoc ars quam experimentum: quia experimentum tantum circa singularia versatur, ars autem circa universalia.	18. But in men science and art (6). Here he describes the way in which art arises. He says that in men science and art come from experience, and he proves this on the authority of Polus, whp says that “Experience causes art and inexperience luck.” For when an inexperienced person acts correctly, this happens by chance. Furthermore, the way in which art arises from experience is the same as the way spoken of above in which experience arises from memory. For just as one experiential cognition comes from many memories of a thing, so does one universal judgment abour all similar things come from the apprehension of many experiences. Hence art has this [unified view] more than experience, because experience is concerned only with singulars, whereas art has to do with universals.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 19 Quod consequenter per exempla exponit, cum dicit, acceptionem quidem etc.: quia cum homo accepit in sua cognitione quod haec medicina contulit Socrati et Platoni tali infirmitate laborantibus, et multis aliis singularibus, quidquid sit illud, hoc ad experientiam pertinet: sed, cum aliquis accipit, quod hoc omnibus conferat in tali specie aegritudinis determinata, et secundum talem complexionem, sicut quod contulit febricitantibus et phlegmaticis et cholericis, id iam ad artem pertinet.	19. Thereupon he makes this clear by means of examples (“But in men”). For when a man has learned that this medicine has been beneficial to Socrates and Plato, and to many other individuals who were suffering from some particular disease, whatever it may be, this is a matter of experience; but when a man learns that this particular treatment is beneficial to A men who have some particular kind of disease and some particular kind of physical constitution, as it has benefited the feverish, both the phlegmatic and the bilious, this is now a matter of art.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit ad agere comparat artem ad experimentum per modum praeeminentiae. Et secundum hoc duo facit. Primo comparat quantum ad actionem. Secundo quantum ad cognitionem, ibi, sed tamen scire et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod quantum ad actum pertinet, experientia nihil videtur differre ab arte. Cum enim ad actionem venitur, tollitur differentia, quae inter experimentum et artem erat per universale et singulare: quia sicut experimentum circa singularia operatur, ita et ars; unde praedicta differentia erat in cognoscendo tantum. Sed quamvis in modo operandi ars et experimentum non differant, quia utraque circa singularia operatur, differunt tamen in efficacia operandi. Nam experti magis proficiunt in operando illis qui habent rationem universalem artis sine experimento.	20. In practical matters (7). He compares art to experience from the viewpoint of pre-eminence; and in regard to this he does two things. First (20), he compares them from the viewpoint of action; and, second (23), from the viewpoint of knowledge (“Yet we think”). He says then that in practical matters experience seems to differ in no way from art; for when it comes to acting, the difference between experience and art, which is a difference between the universal and the singular, disappears, because art operates with reference to singulars just as experience does. Therefore the aforesaid difference pertains only to the way in which they come to know. But even though art and experience do not differ in the way in which they act, because both act on singular things, nevertheless they differ in the effectiveness of their action. For men of experience act more effectively than those who have the universal knowledge of an art but lack experience.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 21 Cujus causa est, quia actiones sunt circa singularia, et singularium sunt omnes generationes. Universalia enim non generantur nec moventur nisi per accidens, inquantum hoc singularibus competit. Homo enim generatur hoc homine generato. Unde medicus non sanat hominem nisi per accidens; sed per se sanat Platonem aut Socratem, aut aliquem hominem singulariter dictum, cui convenit esse hominem, vel accidit inquantum est curatus. Quamvis enim esse hominem per se conveniat Socrati, tamen curato et medicato per accidens convenit: haec est enim per se, Socrates est homo: quia si Socrates definiretur, poneretur homo in eius definitione, ut in quarto dicetur. Sed haec est per accidens, curatus vel sanatus est homo.	21. The reason is that actions have to do with singular things, and all processes of generation belong to singular things. For universals are generated or moved only by reason of something else, inasmuch as this belongs to singular things. For man is generated when this man is generated. Hence a physician heals man only incidentally, but properly he heals Plato or Socrates, or some man that can be individually named, to whom the nature man belongs, or rather to whom it is accidental inasmuch as he is the one healed. For even though the nature man belongs essentially to Socrates, still it belongs only accidentally to the one healed or cured; for the proposition “Socrates is a man” is an essential one, because, if Socrates were defined, man would be given in his definition, as will be said below in Book IV.” But the proposition “What is healed or cured is man” is an accidental one.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 22 Unde cum ars sit universalium, experientia singularium, si aliquis habet rationem artis sine experientia, erit quidem perfectus in hoc quod universale cognoscat; sed quia ignorat singulare cum experimento careat, multotiens in curando peccabit: quia curatio magis pertinet ad singulare quam ad universale, cum ad hoc pertineat per se, ad illud per accidens.	22. Hence, since art has to do with universals and experience with singulars, if anyone has the theoretical knowledge of an art but lacks experience, he will be perfect insofar as he knows the universal; but since he does not know the singular, because he lacks experience, he will very often make mistakes in healing. For healing belongs to the realm of the singular rather than to that of the universal, because it belongs to the former essentially and to the latter accidentally.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 23 Deinde cum dicit sed tamen comparat experimentum ad artem quantum ad cognitionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit praeeminentiam artis ad experimentum. Secundo probat, ibi, hoc autem est quia hi quidem et cetera. Proponit autem praeeminentiam artis et scientiae quantum ad tria. Scilicet quantum ad scire, quod quidem magis arbitramur esse per artem quam per experimentum. Item quantum ad obviare, quod in disputationibus accidit. Nam habens artem potest disputando obviare his quae contra artem dicuntur, non autem habens experimentum. Item quantum ad hoc quod artifices plus accedunt ad finem sapientiae, quam experti, tamquam magis sit, idest contingat, scire sapientiam sequentem omnia, idest dum sequitur universalia. Ex hoc enim artifex sapientior iudicatur, quam expertus quia universalia considerat. Vel aliter. Tamquam magis sit scire secundum sapientiam omnia sequentem, idest universalia. Alia litera, tamquam magis secundum scire sapientia omnia sequente: quasi dicat: tamquam sapientia sequente omnia idest consequente ad unumquodque, magis sit secundum scire, quam secundum operari: ut scilicet dicantur sapientes magis qui magis sciunt, non qui magis sunt operativi. Unde alia litera hunc sensum habet planiorem, qui sic dicit: tamquam secundum illud quod est scire magis, omnes sequuntur sapientiam.	23. Yet we think (8). Here he compares art with experience from the viewpoint of knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (23), he states how art is superior to experience; and second (24), he proves this (“Now this is because”). He claims that art and science are superior to experience in three respects. First, they are superior from the viewpoint of scientific knowledge, which we think is attained by art rather than by experience. Second, they are superior from the viewpoint of meeting objections, which occurs in disputes. For in a dispute the one who has an art is able to meet the objections raised against that art, but one who has experience [alone] cannot do this. Third, they are superior from this point of view, that those who have an art come nearer to the goal of wisdom than men of experience, “Implying that it is,” i.e., happens to be, “more truly to know if wisdom pursues all things,” i.e., insofar as it pursues universals. For one who has an art is judged wiser than one who has experience, by reason of the fact that he considers universals. Or in another version: “Implying that it is more according to wisdom to know as one pursuing all things,” i.e., universals. Another reading has: “As more conformable to knowing, since wisdom pursues all things,” as if to say: “As more dependent upon knowing” than upon doing, “since wisdom pursues all things,” i.e., it seeks to reach each single thing; so that those are rather called wise who are more knowing, not those who are more men of action. Hence another reading expresses this meaning more clearly, saying: “Implying that all pursue wisdom more with respect to knowing.”
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 24 Consequenter cum dicit hoc autem probat praedictam praeeminentiam tripliciter. Prima probatio talis est. Illi, qui sciunt causam et propter quid, scientiores sunt et sapientiores illis qui ignorant causam, sed solum sciunt quia. Experti autem sciunt quia, sed nesciunt propter quid. Artifices vero sciunt causam, et propter quid, et non solum quia: ergo sapientiores et scientiores sunt artifices expertis.	24. Now this is (9). Then he proves the superiority of art and science mentioned above, and he does this by means of three arguments. The first runs thus: those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are more knowing and wiser than those who merely know that it is so but do not know why. Now men of experience know that something is so but do not know the reason, whereas men who have an art know not merely that something is so but also know its cause and reason. Hence those who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 25 Primo primam probat cum dicit, unde et architectores et cetera. Probatio talis est. Illi qui sciunt causam et propter quid comparantur ad scientes tantum quia, sicut architectonicae artes ad artes artificum manu operantium. Sed architectonicae artes sunt nobiliores: ergo et illi qui sciunt causas et propter quid, sunt scientiores et sapientiores scientibus tantum quia.	25. For this reason too (9). Here he proves the first aspect of superiority, and this runs as follows. Those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are compared to those who merely know that it is so as the architectonic arts are to the arts of manual laborers. But the architectonic arts are nobler. In a similar way, then, those who know the causes and reasons of things are more knowing than those who merely know that things are so.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 26 Huius probationis prima ex hoc apparet, quia architectores sciunt causas factorum. Ad cuius intellectum sciendum est, quod architector dicitur quasi principalis artifex: ab archos quod est princeps, et techne quod est ars. Dicitur autem ars principalior illa, quae principaliorem operationem habet. Operationes autem artificum hoc modo distinguuntur: quia quaedam sunt ad disponendum materiam artificii, sicut carpentarii secando ligna et complanando disponunt materiam ad formam navis. Alia est operatio ad inductionem formae; sicut cum aliquis ex lignis dispositis et praeparatis navem compaginat. Alia est operatio in usum rei iam constitutae; et ista est principalissima. Prima autem est infima, quia prima ordinatur ad secundam, et secunda ad tertiam. Unde navisfactor est architector respectu eius qui praeparat ligna. Gubernator autem, qui utitur navi iam facta, est architector respectu navis factoris.	26. The first part of this proof becomes clear from the fact that architects, or master artists, know the causes of the things that are done. In order to understand this we must note that architect means chief artist, from a???? meaning chief, and te??? meaning art. Now that art is said to be a chief art which performs a more important operation. Indeed, the operations of artists are distinguished in this way; for some operations are directed to disposing the material of the artifact. Carpenters, for example, by cutting and planing the wood, dispose matter for the form of a ship. Another operation is directed to introducing this form into the matter, for example, when someone builds a ship out of wood which has been disposed and prepared. A third operation is directed to the use of the finished product, and this is the highest operation. But the first operation is the lowest because it is directed to the second and the second to the third. Hence the shipbuilder is a superior artist compared with the one who prepares the wood; and the navigator, who uses the completed ship, is a superior artist comparedwith the shipbuilder.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 27 Et, quia materia est propter formam, et talis debet esse materia quae formae competat, ideo navisfactor scit causam, quare ligna debeant esse sic disposita; quod nesciunt illi qui praeparant ligna. Similiter, cum tota navis sit propter usum ipsius, ille qui navi utitur, scit quare talis forma debeat esse; ad hoc enim debet talis esse, ut tali usui conveniens sit. Et sic patet, quod ex forma artificii sumitur causa operationum, quae sunt circa dispositionem materiae. Et ex usu sumitur causa operationum, quae sunt circa formam artificiati.	27. Further, since matter exists for the sake of form, and ought to be such as to befit the form, the shipbuilder knows the rea son why the wood should be shaped in some particular way; but those who prepare the wood do not know this. And in a similar way, since the completed ship exists in order to be used, the one who uses the ship knows why it should have some particular form; for the form should be one that befits its use. Thus it is evident that the reason for the operations which dispose the matter is taken from the design of the product in the artist’s mind, and the reason for the operations which produce the form of the artifact is taken from the use [to which the artifact is put].
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 28 Et sic manifestum est, quod architectores factorum causas sciunt. Illos vero, scilicet manu artifices, iudicamus vel denominamus, sicut quaedam inanimatorum. Et hoc non ideo quia faciunt operationes artificiales, sed quia quae faciunt, incognita faciunt. Sciunt enim quia, sed causas non cognoscunt; sicut etiam ignis exurit absque aliqua cognitione. Est igitur quantum ad hoc similitudo inter inanimata et manu artifices, quod sicut absque causae cognitione inanimata operantur ut ordinata ab aliquo superiori intellectu in proprium finem, ita et manu artifices. Sed in hoc est differentia: quia inanimata faciunt unumquodque suorum operum per naturam, sed manu artifices per consuetudinem: quae licet vim naturae habeat inquantum ad unum inclinat determinate, tamen a natura differt in hoc, quod est circa ea quae sunt ad utrumlibet secundum humanam cognitionem. Naturalia enim non consuescimus, sicut dicitur in secundo Ethicorum. Nec etiam cognitione carentium est consuescere. Haec autem quae dicta sunt, sic sunt consideranda tamquam ex eis appareat, quod aliqui non sunt sapientiores secundum quod est practicos, id est operatores esse, quod convenit expertis; sed secundum quod aliqui habent rationem de agendis, et cognoscunt causas agendorum, ex quibus rationes sumuntur: quod convenit architectoribus.	28. It is evident, then, that the master artists know the causes of the things which are done. In fact we judge and speak about the others, i.e., the manual laborers, as we do about certain inanimate things. This is not because they do not perform artful operations, but because the things which they do they do without knowing the cause; for they know that something is to be done but not why it is, just as fire burns without knowing why. Hence there is a likeness between inanimate things and manual laborers from this point of view, that, just as inanimate things act without knowing the causes, inasmuch as they are directed to their proper end by a superior intellect, so also do manual laborers. But they differ in this respect, that inanimate things perform each of their operations as a result of their nature, whereas manual laborers perform theirs through habit. And while habit is practically the same as nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one definite effect, still habit differs from nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites by reason of human knowledge. For we do not habituate natural bodies, as is stated in Book II of the Ethics; nor, indeed, is it possible to cause habits in things that lack knowledge. Now the statements that have been made, as is evident from the statements themselves, must be interpreted as meaning that some men are wiser, not insofar as they are “practical,” i.e., men of action, as befits men of experience, but insofar as they have a plan for things to be done and know their causes, which are the basis of such a plan; and this befits master artists.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 29 Deinde cum dicit et omnino ponit secundam rationem: quae talis est. Signum scientis est posse docere: quod ideo est, quia unumquodque tunc est perfectum in actu suo, quando potest facere alterum sibi simile, ut dicitur quarto Meteororum. Sicut igitur signum caliditatis est quod possit aliquid calefacere, ita signum scientis est, quod possit docere, quod est scientiam in alio causare. Artifices autem docere possunt, quia cum causas cognoscant, ex eis possunt demonstrare: demonstratio autem est syllogismus faciens scire, ut dicitur primo posteriorum. Experti autem non possunt docere, quia non possunt ad scientiam perducere cum causam ignorent. Et si ea quae experimento cognoscunt aliis tradant, non recipientur per modum scientiae, sed per modum opinionis vel credulitatis. Unde patet quod artifices sunt magis sapientes et scientes expertis.	29. In general a sign of scientific knowledge (10). Here he gives the second argument, which is as follows: a sign of knowledge is the ability to teach, and this is so because each thing is perfect in its activity when it can produce another thing similar to itself, as is said in Book IV of Meteors. Therefore, just as the possession of heat is indicated by the fact that a thing can heat something else, in a similar way the possession of knowledge is indicated by the fact that one can teach, that is, cause knowledge in another. But men who have an art can teach, for since they know causes they can demonstrate from these; and demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge, as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. But men who have experience [only] cannot teach; for since they do not know the causes, they cannot cause knowledge in someone else. And if they do teach others the things which they know by experience, these things are not learned after the manner of scientific knowledge but after that of opinion or belief. Hence, it is clear that men who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 30 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit tertiam rationem; quae talis est. Cognitiones singularium magis sunt propriae sensibus quam alicui alteri cognitioni, cum omnis cognitio singularium a sensu oriatur. Sed tamen, nec unum, idest nullum sensum dicimus sapientiam, scilicet propter hoc quod licet aliquis sensus cognoscat quia, tamen, non propter quid cognoscit. Tactus enim iudicat quod ignis calidus est, non tamen apprehendit propter quid: ergo experti qui habent singularium cognitionem causam ignorantes, sapientes dici non possunt.	30. Furthermore, we do not hold (11). Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows: knowing singular things is proper to the senses rather than to any other type of knowing [power], since our entire knowledge of singular things originates with the senses. Yet we do not hold that “any one of these,” i.e., any one of the senses, is wisdom, because even though each sense knows that a thing is so, it does not know why it is so; for touch judges that fire is hot but does not know why it is hot. Therefore men of experience, who have a knowledge of singular things but do not know their causes, cannot be called wise men.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 31 Deinde cum dicit primum quidem comparat artem activam speculativae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod ars speculativa magis est sapientia quam activa. Secundo respondet cuidam obiectioni, ibi, in moralibus. Ostendit autem quod primo dictum est, tali ratione. In quibuscumque scientiis vel artibus invenitur id propter quod homines scientes prae aliis hominibus in admiratione vel honore habentur, illae scientiae sunt magis honorabiles, et magis dignae nomine sapientiae. Quilibet autem inventor artis habetur in admiratione, propter hoc quod habet sensum et iudicium et discretionem causae ultra aliorum hominum sensum, et non propter utilitatem illorum quae invenit: sed magis admiramur, sicut sapientem et ab aliis distinguentem. Sapientem quidem, quantum ad subtilem inquisitionem causarum rei inventae: distinguentem vero, quantum ad investigationem differentiarum unius rei ad aliam. Vel aliter, ab aliis distinguentem, ut passive legatur, quasi in hoc ab aliis distinguatur. Unde alia litera habet, differentem. Ergo scientiae aliquae sunt magis admirabiles et magis dignae nomine sapientiae propter eminentiorem sensum, et non propter utilitatem.	31. It is only fitting (12). Here he compares practical art with speculative art; and in regard to this he does three things. First (20), he shows that a speculative art is wisdom to a greater degree than a practical art. Second (ibid.), he answers an objection (“The difference”). He proves his first statement by this argument: in any of the sciences or arts we find that men with scientific knowledge are more admired and are held in higher esteem than all other men, because their knowledge is held to be nobler and more worthy of the name of wisdom. Now the discoverer of any art at all is admired because he perceives, judges and discerns a cause beyond the perceptions of other men, and not because of the usefulness of his discoveries. We admire him rather “as being wise, and as distinguishing [a thing] from others.” As being wise, indeed, in the subtle way in which he investigates the causes of his discoveries, and as distinguishing [a thing] from others insofar as he investigates the ways in which one thing differs from another. Or, according to another interpretation, “as being distinct from the others” is to be read passively, as being distinguished in this respect from others. Hence another text has “one who is different.” Some sciences, then, are more admirable and worthy of the name of wisdom because their observations are more outstanding, not because they are useful.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 32 Cum igitur plures artes sint repertae quantum ad utilitatem, quarum quaedam sunt ad vitae necessitatem, sicut mechanicae; quaedam vero ad introductionem in aliis scientiis, sicut scientiae logicales: illi artifices dicendi sunt sapientiores, quorum scientiae non sunt ad utilitatem inventae, sed propter ipsum scire, cuiusmodi sunt scientiae speculativae.	32. Therefore, since many useful arts have been discovered (some to provide the necessities of life, as the mechanical arts, and others to introduce us to the sciences, as the logical disciplines), those artists must be said to be wiser whose sciences were discovered not for the sake of utility but merely for the sake of knowing, that is to say, the speculative sciences.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 33 Et quod speculativae scientiae non sint inventae ad utilitatem, patet per hoc signum: quia, iam partis, id est acquisitis vel repertis omnibus huiusmodi, quae possunt esse ad introductionem in scientiis, vel ad necessitatem vitae, vel ad voluptatem, sicut artes quae sunt ordinatae ad hominum delectationem: speculativae non sunt propter huiusmodi repertae, sed propter seipsas. Et quod non sint ad utilitatem inventae, patet ex loco quo inventae sunt. In locis enim illis primo repertae sunt, ubi primo homines studuerunt circa talia. Alia litera habet, et primum his locis ubi vacabant, id est ab aliis occupationibus quiescentes studio vacabant quasi necessariis abundantes. Unde et circa Aegyptum primo inventae sunt artes mathematicae, quae sunt maxime speculativae, a sacerdotibus, qui sunt concessi studio vacare, et de publico expensas habebant, sicut etiam legitur in Genesi.	33. That the speculative sciences were not discovered for the sake of utility is made clear by this fact, that after all sciences of this kind “had already been developed,” i.e., acquired or discovered, which can serve as introductions to the other sciences, or provide the necessities of life, or give pleasure (as those arts whose object is to delight man), the speculative sciences were discovered, not for this kind of end, but for their own sake. The fact that they were not discovered for the sake of utility becomes evident from the place in which they were discovered. For they originated in those places where men first applied themselves to such things. Another version reads, “And first in those places where men had leisure,” i.e., they had time for study because they were released from other occupations as a result of the abundance of things necessary [for life]. Hence the mathematical arts, which are speculative in the highest degree, were first discovered in Egypt by the priests, who were given time for study, and whose expenses were defrayed by the community, as we also read in Genesis (47:22)
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 34 Sed quia usus nomine artis fuerat et sapientiae et scientiae quasi indifferenter, ne aliquis putet haec omnia esse nomina synonyma idem penitus significantia hanc opinionem removet, et remittit ad librum Moralium, idest ad sextum Ethicorum, ubi dictum est, in quo differant scientia et ars et sapientia et prudentia et intellectus. Et ut breviter dicatur, sapientia et scientia et intellectus sunt circa partem animae speculativam, quam ibi scientificum animae appellat. Differunt autem, quia intellectus est habitus principiorum primorum demonstrationis. Scientia vero est conclusionis ex causis inferioribus. Sapientia vero considerat causas primas. Unde ibidem dicitur caput scientiarum. Prudentia vero et ars est circa animae partem practicam, quae est ratiocinativa de contingentibus operabilibus a nobis. Et differunt: nam prudentia dirigit in actionibus quae non transeunt ad exteriorem materiam, sed sunt perfectiones agentis: unde dicitur ibi quod prudentia est recta ratio agibilium. Ars vero dirigit in factionibus, quae in materiam exteriorem transeunt, sicut aedificare et secare: unde dicitur quod ars est recta ratio factibilium.	34. But because the names “wisdom,” “science” and “art” have been used indifferently, lest someone should think that these terms are synonymous, he excludes this opinion and refers to his work on morals, i.e., to Book VI of the Ethics, where he has explained the difference between art, wisdom, science, prudence, and understanding. And to give the distinction briefly—wisdom, science and understanding pertain to the speculative part of the soul, which he speaks of in that work as the scientific part of the soul. But they differ in that understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration, whereas science has to do with conclusions drawn from subordinate causes, and wisdom with first causes. This is the reason it is spoken of there as the chief science. But prudence and art belong to the practical part of the soul, which reasons about our contingent courses of action. And these also differ; for prudence directs us in actions which do not pass over into some external matter but are perfections of the one acting (which is the reason why prudence is defined in that work as the reasoned plan of things to be done), but art directs us in those productive actions, such as building and cutting, which pass over into external matter (which is the reason why art is defined as the reasoned plan of things to be made). Wisdom deals with causes.
lib. 1 l. 1 n. 35 Deinde cum dicit cuius autem ostendit ex praehabitis principale propositum; quod scilicet sapientia sit circa causas. Unde dicit quod hoc est cuius gratia nunc sermonem facimus, idest ratiocinationem praedictam: quia scientia illa quae denominatur sapientia, videtur esse circa primas causas, et circa prima principia. Quod quidem patet ex praehabitis. Unusquisque enim tanto sapientior est, quanto magis accedit ad causae cognitionem: quod ex praehabitis patet; quia expertus est sapientior eo qui solum habet sensum sine experimento. Et artifex est sapientior experto quocumque. Et inter artifices architector est sapientior manu artifice. Et inter artes etiam et scientias, speculativae sunt magis scientiae quam activae. Et haec omnia ex praedictis patent. Unde relinquitur quod illa scientia, quae simpliciter est sapientia, est circa causas. Et est similis modus arguendi, sicut si diceremus: illud quod est magis calidum, est magis igneum: unde quod simpliciter est ignis, est calidum simpliciter.	35. From what has been said he proves his major thesis, that is to say, that wisdom deals with the causes of things. He says that the reason “for undertaking this investigation,” i.e., the above piece of reasoning, is that the science which is called wisdom seems to be about first causes and principles. This is evident from the foregoing; for the more a man attains to a knowledge of the cause, the wiser he is. This is also evident from the foregoing; because the man of experience is wiser than one who has sensation alone without experience; and the artist is wiser than any man of experience; and among artists the architect is wiser than the manual laborer. And similarly among the arts and sciences the speculative are more scientific than the practical. All these things are dear from the foregoing remarks. It follows, then, that that science which is wisdom in an absolute sense is concerned with the causes of things. The method of arguing would be similar if we were to say that that which is hotter is more afire, and therefore that that which is afire in an absolute sense is hot in an absolute sense.