Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quod sapientia sit quaedam scientia circa causas existens, hic vult ostendere circa quales causas et circa qualia principia sit. Ostendit autem quod est circa causas maxime universales et primas; et argumentatur a definitione sapientiae. Unde circa hoc tria facit. Primo colligit definitionem sapientiae ex his quae homines de homine sapiente et sapientia opinantur. Secundo ostendit quod omnia ista conveniunt universali scientiae, quae considerat causas primas et universales, ibi, istorum autem et cetera. Tertio concludit propositum, ibi, ex omnibus ergo et cetera. Circa primum ponit sex opiniones hominum communes quae de sapientia habentur. Primam, ibi, primum itaque et cetera. Quae talis est: quod communiter omnes accipimus sapientem maxime scire omnia, sicut eum decet, non quod habeat notitiam de omnibus singularibus. Hoc enim est impossibile, cum singularia sint infinita, et infinita intellectu comprehendi non possint.	36. Having shown that wisdom is a knowledge of causes, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish with what kinds of causes and what kinds of principles it is concerned. He shows that it is concerned with the most universal and primary causes, and he argues this from the definition of wisdom. In regard to this he does three things. First, he formulates a definition of wisdom from the different opinions which men have about the wise man and about wisdom. Second (44), he shows that all of these are proper to that universal science which considers first and universal causes (“Now of these”). Third (50), he draws the conclusion at which he aims (“In view of everything”). In regard to the first he gives six common opinions which men have entertained about wisdom. He states the first where he says “But since we are in search”; and this opinion is this: in general we all consider those especially to be wise who know all things, as the case demands, without having a knowledge of every singular thing. For this is impossible, since singular things are infinite in number, and an infinite number of things cannot be comprehended by the intellect.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit postea difficilia secundam ponit: et est ista, quod illum sapientem ponimus esse, qui est potens ex virtute sui intellectus cognoscere difficilia, et illa quae non sunt levia communiter hominibus ad sciendum; quia commune est omnibus sentire, idest sensibilia cognoscere. Unde hoc est facile, et non est sophon, idest aliquid sapientis et ad sapientem pertinens: et sic patet, quod id quod proprie ad sapientem pertinet, non leviter ab omnibus cognoscitur.	37. Next, we say that (15). Here he gives the second opinion, which is this: we hold that man to be wise who is capable, by reason of his intellect, of knowing difficult things, and those which are not easy for ordinary men to understand. For sensory perception, i.e., the knowing of sensible things, is common to all men, and is therefore easy and so not a matter of wisdom. That is to say, it is neither a mark nor the office of a wise man. Thus it is clear that whatever pertains properly to wisdom is not easily known by all.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit adhuc certiorem tertiam ponit: et est, quod nos dicimus illum sapientem esse qui de his quae scit, habet certitudinem magis quam alii communiter habeant.	38. Again, [we consider] (16). Here he gives the third opinion, namely, that we say that he is wise who, regarding what he knows, is more certain than other men generally are.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit et magis quartam ponit: et est talis. Illum dicimus magis sapientem in omni scientia, qui potest assignare causas cuiuslibet quaesiti, et per hoc docere.	39. And in every branch (17). Here he gives the fourth opinion, namely, that that man is said to be wiser in every science who can give the causes of anything that is brought into question, and can teach by means of this.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit sed et hanc quintam ponit: et est, quod illa de numero scientiarum est sapientia, quae per se est magis eligibilis et voluntaria, idest volita gratia scientiae, et propter ipsum scire, quam illa scientia, quae est causa quorumque aliorum contingentium quae possunt ex scientia generari; cuiusmodi est necessitas vitae, delectatio et huiusmodi alia.	40. Again, among the sciences (18). Here he gives the fifth opinion, which is this: among the many sciences that science which is more desirable and willed for its own sake, i.e., chosen for the sake of knowledge and for knowledge itself alone, is more of the nature of wisdom than one which is for the sake of any of the other contingent effects which can be caused by knowledge, such as the necessities of life, pleasure, and so forth.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit et hanc sextam ponit: et est talis, quod istam sapientiam, de qua facta est mentio, oportet esse vel dicimus esse magis antiquiorem, idest digniorem, famulante scientia. Quod quidem ex praehabitis intelligi potest. Nam in artibus mechanicis famulantes sunt illae, quae exequuntur manu operando praecepta superiorum artificum, quos supra architectores et sapientes nominavit.	41. And we think (19). Here he gives the sixth opinion, namely, that this wisdom, of which mention has been made, must be or is said to be “rather the more basic,” i.e., nobler, than “a subordinate science.” This can be understood from the foregoing. For in the field of the mechanical arts, subordinate artists are those who execute by manual operations the commands of superior artists, whom he referred to above as master artists and wise men.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 7 Et quod magis conveniat ratio sapientiae scientiis imperantibus quam famulantibus, probat per duo. Primo, quia scientiae famulantes ordinantur a superioribus scientiis. Artes enim famulantes ordinantur in finem superioris artis, sicut ars equestris ad finem militaris. Sed sapientem secundum omnem opinionem non decet ordinari ab alio, sed ipsum potius alios ordinare. Item inferiores architectores persuadentur a superioribus, inquantum credunt superioribus artificibus circa operanda vel fienda. Credit enim navisfactor gubernatori docenti qualis debet esse forma navis. Sapienti autem non convenit ut ab alio persuadeatur, sed quod ipse aliis persuadeat suam scientiam.	42. That the notion of wisdom belongs to sciences which give orders rather than to those which take them, he proves by two arguments. The first is that subordinate sciences are directed to superior sciences. For subordinate arts are directed to the end of a superior art, as the art of horsemanship to the end of the military art. But in the opinion of all it is not fitting that a wise man should be directed by someone else, but that he should direct others The second is that inferior artists are induced to act by superior artists inasmuch as they rely upon superior artists for the things which they must do or make. Thus the shipbuilder relies upon the instructions of the navigator for the kind of form which a ship ought to have. However, it does not befit a wise man that he should be induced to act by someone else, but that he should use his knowledge to induce others to act.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 8 Istae igitur sunt tales opiniones, quas homines accipiunt de sapientia et sapiente. Ex quibus omnibus potest quaedam sapientiae descriptio formari: ut ille sapiens dicatur, qui scit omnia etiam difficilia per certitudinem et causam, ipsum scire propter se quaerens, alios ordinans et persuadens. Et sic patet quasi maior syllogismi. Nam omnem sapientem oportet talem esse; et e converso, quicumque est talis, sapiens est.	43. These, then, are the kind of opinions which men have of wisdom and the wise; and from all of these a description of wisdom can be formulated, so that the wise man is described as one who knows all, even difficult matters, with certitude and through their cause; who seeks this knowledge for its own sake; and who directs others and induces them to act. And in this way the major premise of the syllogism becomes evident. For every wise man must be such, and conversely whoever is such is wise. These six attributes are found in the metaphysician.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit istorum autem ostendit quod omnia praedicta conveniunt ei qui cognoscit primas causas et universales; et eo ordine prosequitur quo supra posuit. Unde primo posuit quod habenti scientiam universalem maxime insit omnia scire; quod erat primum. Quod sic patet. Quicumque enim scit universalia, aliquo modo scit ea quae sunt subiecta universalibus, quia scit ea in illa: sed his quae sunt maxime universalia sunt omnia subiecta, ergo ille qui scit maxime universalia, scit quodammodo omnia.	44. Now of these (20). Here he shows that all of the above attributes come together in the man who knows the first and universal causes of things; and he follows the same order as he did above. Thus he held first that knowledge of all things in the highest degree belongs to him who has universal knowledge. This was the first opinion, and it is made clear in this way: Whoever knows universals knows in some respect the things which are subordinate to universals, because he knows the universal in them.’ But all things are subordinate to those which are most universal. Therefore the one who knows the most universal things, knows in a sense all things.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit sed fere autem ostendit eidem inesse secundum, tali ratione. Illa quae sunt maxime a sensibilibus remota, difficilia sunt hominibus ad cognoscendum; nam sensitiva cognitio est omnibus communis, cum ex ea omnis humana cognitio initium sumat. Sed illa quae sunt maxime universalia, sunt sensibilibus remotissima, eo quod sensus singularium sunt: ergo universalia sunt difficillima hominibus ad cognoscendum. Et sic patet quod illa scientia est difficillima, quae est maxime de universalibus.	45. But the things (21). Here he proves that the second attribute belongs to the same person, by the following argument. Those things which are farthest removed from the senses are difficult for men to know; for sensory perception is common to all men since all human knowledge originates with this. But those things which are most universal are farthest removed from sensible things, because the senses have to do with singular things. Hence universals are the most difficult for men to know. Thus it is clear that that science is the most difficult which is most concerned with universals.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 11 Sed contra hoc videtur esse quod habetur primo physicorum. Ibi enim dicitur quod magis universalia sunt nobis primo nota. Illa autem quae sunt primo nota, sunt magis facilia. Sed dicendum, quod magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut Avicenna dicit, et prius in intellectu cadit animal quam homo. Sicut enim in esse naturae quod de potentia in actum procedit prius est animal quam homo, ita in generatione scientiae prius in intellectu concipitur animal quam homo. Sed quantum ad investigationem naturalium proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota minus communia; eo quod per causas particulares, quae sunt unius generis vel speciei, pervenimus in causas universales. Ea autem quae sunt universalia in causando, sunt posterius nota quo ad nos, licet sint prius nota secundum naturam, quamvis universalia per praedicationem sint aliquo modo prius quo ad nos nota quam minus universalia, licet non prius nota quam singularia; nam cognitio sensus qui est cognoscitivus singularium, in nobis praecedit cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium. Facienda est etiam vis in hoc quod maxime universalia non dicit simpliciter esse difficillima, sed fere. Illa enim quae sunt a materia penitus separata secundum esse, sicut substantiae immateriales, sunt magis difficilia nobis ad cognoscendum, quam etiam universalia: et ideo ista scientia, quae sapientia dicitur, quamvis sit prima in dignitate, est tamen ultima in addiscendo.	46. But the statement which appears in Book I of the Physics seems to contradict this. For it is said there that more universal things are known first by us; and those things which are known first are those which are easier. Yet it must be said that those things which are more universal according to simple apprehension are known first; for being is the first thing that comes into the intellect, as Avicenna says, and animal comes into the intellect before man does. For just as in the order of nature, which proceeds from potentiality to actuality, animal is prior to man, so too in the genesis of knowledge the intellect conceives animal before it conceives man. But with respect to the investigations of natural properties and causes, less universal things are known first, because we discover universal causes by means of the particular causes which belong to one genus or species. Now those things which are universal in causing are known subsequently by us (notwithstanding the fact that they are things which are primarily knowable according to their nature), although things which are universal by predication are known to us in some way before the less universal (notwithstanding the fact that they are not known prior to singular things). For in us sensory knowledge, which is cognitive of singular things, precedes intellective knowledge, which is about universals. And some importance must also be attached to the fact that he does not say that the most universal things are the most difficult absolutely, but “just about.” For those things which are entirely separate from matter in being, as immaterial substances, are more difficult for us to know than universals. Therefore, even though this science which is called wisdom is the first in dignity, it is still the last to be learned.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit scientiarum vero ostendit tertium eidem inesse, tali ratione. Quanto aliquae scientiae sunt priores naturaliter, tanto sunt certiores: quod ex hoc patet, quia illae scientiae, quae dicuntur ex additione ad alias, sunt minus certae scientiis quae pauciora in sua consideratione comprehendunt ut arithmetica certior est geometria, nam ea quae sunt in geometria, sunt ex additione ad ea quae sunt in arithmetica. Quod patet si consideremus quid utraque scientia considerat ut primum principium scilicet unitatem et punctum. Punctus enim addit supra unitatem situm: nam ens indivisibile rationem unitatis constituit: et haec secundum quod habet rationem mensurae, fit principium numeri. Punctus autem supra hoc addit situm. Sed scientiae particulares sunt posteriores secundum naturam universalibus scientiis, quia subiecta earum addunt ad subiecta scientiarum universalium: sicut patet, quod ens mobile de quo est naturalis philosophia, addit supra ens simpliciter, de quo est metaphysica, et supra ens quantum de quo est mathematica: ergo scientia illa quae est de ente, et maxime universalibus, est certissima. Nec illud est contrarium, quia dicitur esse ex paucioribus, cum supra dictum sit, quod sciat omnia. Nam universale quidem comprehendit pauciora in actu, sed plura in potentia. Et tanto aliqua scientia est certior, quanto ad sui subiecti considerationem pauciora actu consideranda requiruntur. Unde scientiae operativae sunt incertissimae, quia oportet quod considerent multas singularium operabilium circumstantias.	47. Again, the most certain (22). Here he shows that the third attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: the more any sciences are prior by nature, the more certain they are. This is clear from the fact that those sciences which are said to originate as a result of adding something to the other sciences are less certain than those which take fewer things into consideration; for example, arithmetic is more certain than geometry because the objects considered in geometry are a result of adding to those considered in arithmetic. This becomes evident if we consider what these two sciences take as their first principle, namely, the point and the unit. For the point adds to the unit the notion of position, because undivided being constitutes the intelligible structure of the unit; and insofar as this has the function of a measure it becomes the principle of number. And the point adds to this the notion of position. However, particular sciences are subsequent in nature to universal sciences, because their subjects add something to the subjects of universal sciences. For example, it is evident that mobile being, with which the philosophy of nature deals, adds to being pure and simple, with which metaphysics is concerned, and to quantified being, with which mathematics is concerned. Hence that science which treats of being and the most universal things is the most certain. Moreover, the statement here that this science deals with fewer principles is not opposed to the one made above, that it knows all things; for the universal takes in fewer inferiors actually, but many potentially. And the more certain a science is, the fewer actual things it has to consider in investigating its subject-matter. Hence the practical sciences are the least certain, because they must consider the many circumstances attending individual effects.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit est et doctrinalis ostendit quartum eidem inesse, tali ratione. Illa scientia est magis doctrix vel doctrinalis, quae magis considerat causas: illi enim soli docent, qui causas de singulis dicunt; quia scire per causam est, et docere est scientiam in aliquo causare. Sed illa scientia quae universalia considerat, causas primas omnium causarum considerat: unde patet quod ipsa est maxime doctrix.	48. Moreover, that science (23). Here he proves that the fourth attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: that science is more instructive, or better able to teach, which is concerned to a greater degree with causes. For only those teach who assign the causes of every single thing, because scientific knowledge comes about through some cause, and to teach is to cause knowledge in another. But that science which considers universals considers the first of all the causes. Hence it is evidently the best fitted to teach.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit et noscere ostendit quintum eidem inesse, tali ratione. Illarum scientiarum maxime est scire et cognoscere earum causa, idest propter seipsas et non propter alias, quae sunt de maxime scibilibus: sed illae scientiae quae sunt de primis causis, sunt de maxime scibilibus: igitur illae scientiae maxime sui gratia desiderantur. Primam sic probat. Qui desiderat scire propter scire, magis desiderat scientiam: sed maxima scientia est de maxime scibilibus: ergo illae scientiae sunt magis desideratae propter seipsas quae sunt de magis scibilibus. Secundam probat sic. Illa, ex quibus et propter quae alia cognoscuntur, sunt magis scibilia his quae per ea cognoscuntur: sed per causas et principia alia cognoscuntur et non e converso, et cetera.	49. Again, understanding (24). Here he proves that the fifth attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: it is the office of those sciences which deal with things that are most knowable, most properly to know and understand for their own sake, i.e., for the sake of those sciences themselves and not for something else. But it is the sciences that deal with first causes which consider the most knowable things. Therefore those sciences are desired most for their own sake. He proves the first premise thus: One who most desires knowledge for the sake of knowledge most desires scientific knowledge. But the highest kind of knowledge is concerned with things that are most knowable. Therefore those sciences are desired most for their own sake which have to do with things that are most knowable. He proves the second premise thus: Those things from which and by reason of which other things are known are more knowable than the things which are known by means of them. But these other things are known through causes and principles, and not vice versa, etc.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit maxime vero ostendit sextum inesse eidem: et est ratio talis. Illa scientia se habet ad alias ut principalis, sive ut architectonica ad servilem sive ad famulantem, quae considerat causam finalem, cuius causa agenda sunt singula; sicut apparet in his, quae supra diximus. Nam gubernator, ad quem pertinet usus navis, qui est finis navis, est quasi architector respectu navisfactoris, qui ei famulatur. Sed praedicta scientia maxime considerat causam finalem rerum omnium. Quod ex hoc patet, quia hoc cuius causa agendo sunt singula, est bonum uniuscuiusque, idest particulare bonum. Finis autem bonum est in unoquoque genere. Id vero, quod est finis omnium, idest ipsi universo, est hoc quod est optimum in tota natura: et hoc pertinet ad considerationem praedictae scientiae: ergo praedicta est principalis, sive architectonica omnium aliarum.	50. But that science (25). Here he proves that the sixth attribute belongs to the same science, by the following argument: that science which considers the final cause, or that for the sake of which particular things are done, is related to the other sciences as a chief or master science is to a subordinate or ancillary one, as is evident from the foregoing remarks. For the navigator, to whom the use, or end, of the ship belongs, is a kind of master artist in relation to the shipbuilder who serves him. But the aforesaid science is concerned most with the final cause of all things. This is dear from the fact that that for the sake of which all particular things are done is the good of each, i.e., a particular good. But the end in any class of things is a good; and that which is the end of all things, i.e., of the universe itself, is the greatest good in the whole of nature. Now this belongs to the consideration of the science in question, and therefore it is the chief or architectonic science with reference to all the others.
lib. 1 l. 2 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit ex omnibus concludit ex praedictis conclusionem intentam; dicens, quod ex omnibus praedictis apparet, quod in eamdem scientiam cadit nomen sapientiae, quod quaerimus; scilicet in illam scientiam, quae est theorica, idest speculativa primorum principiorum et causarum. Hoc autem manifestum est quantum ad sex primas conditiones, quae manifeste pertinent consideranti universales causas. Sed, quia sexta conditio tangebat finis considerationem, quae apud antiquos non manifeste ponebatur esse causa, ut infra dicetur; ideo specialiter ostendit, quod haec conditio est eiusdem scientiae, quae scilicet est considerativa primarum causarum; quia videlicet ipse finis, qui est bonum, et cuius causa fiunt alia, est una de numero causarum. Unde scientia, quae considerat primas et universales causas, oportet etiam quod consideret universalem finem omnium, quod est optimum in tota natura.	51. In view of everything (26). Here he draws from the foregoing arguments his intended conclusion, saying that it is clear from everything that has been said that the name wisdom which we are investigating belongs to the same science which considers or speculates about first principles and causes. This is evident from the six primary conditions which clearly pertain to the science that considers universal causes. But because the sixth condition touched on the consideration of the end, which was not clearly held to be a cause among the ancient philosophers, as will be said below (1177), he therefore shows in a special way that this condition belongs to the same science, namely, the one which considers first causes. For the end, which is a good and that for the sake of which other things are done, is one of the many causes. Hence the science which considers first and universal causes must also be the one which considers the universal end of all things, which is the greatest good in the whole of nature.