Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1/lect3

Lecture 3

Latin	English
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 1 Ostenso circa quae versatur consideratio huius scientiae, ostendit qualis sit scientia ista. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit dignitatem huius scientiae. Secundo ostendit ad quem terminum ista scientia pervenire conetur, ibi, oportet vero aliqualiter et cetera. Circa primum facit quatuor. Primo ostendit quod non est scientia activa, sed speculativa. Secundo, quod ipsa est libera maxime, ibi, sed ut dicimus et cetera. Tertio, quod non est humana, ibi, propter quod et iuste. Quarto, quod est honorabilissima, ibi, nec ea aliam. Primum ostendit dupliciter. Primo per rationem. Secundo per signum, ibi, testatur autem hoc et cetera.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 2 Primo ergo ponit talem rationem. Nulla scientia in qua quaeritur ipsum scire propter seipsum, est scientia activa, sed speculativa: sed illa scientia, quae sapientia est, vel philosophia dicitur, est propter ipsum scire: ergo est speculativa et non activa. Minorem hoc modo manifestat. Quicumque quaerit fugere ignorantiam sicut finem, tendit ad ipsum scire propter seipsum: sed illi, qui philosophantur, quaerunt fugere ignorantiam sicut finem: ergo tendunt in ipsum scire propter seipsum.	53. First, he gives this argument. No science in which knowledge itself is sought for its own sake is a practical science, but a speculative one. Bot that science which is wisdom, or philosophy as it is called, exists for the sake of knowledge itself. Hence it is speculative and not practical. He proves the minor premise in this way. Whoever seeks as an end to escape from ignorance tends toward knowledge for itself. But those who philosophize seek as an end to escape from ignorance. Therefore they tend towards knowledge for itself.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 3 Quod autem ignorantiam fugere quaerant, patet ex hoc, quia illi, qui primo philosophati sunt, et qui nunc philosophantur, incipiunt philosophari propter admirationem alicuius causae: aliter tamen a principio, et modo: quia a principio admirabantur dubitabilia pauciora, quae magis erant in promptu, ut eorum causae cognoscerentur: sed postea ex cognitione manifestorum ad inquisitionem occultorum paulatim procedentes incoeperunt dubitare de maioribus et occultioribus, sicut de passionibus lunae, videlicet de eclypsi eius, et mutatione figurae eius, quae variari videtur, secundum quod diversimode se habet ad solem. Et similiter dubitaverunt de his quae sunt circa solem, ut de eclypsi eius, et motu ipsius, et magnitudine eius. Et de his quae sunt circa astra, sicut de quantitate ipsorum, et ordine, et aliis huiusmodi, et de totius universi generatione. Quod quidam dicebant esse generatum casu, quidam intellectu, quidam amore.	54. That they seek to escape from ignorance is made clear from the fact that those who first philosophized and who now philosophize did so from wonder about some cause, although they did this at first differently than now. For at first they wondered about less important problems, which were more obvious, in order that they might know their cause; but later on, progressing little by little from the knowledge of more evident matters to the investigation of obscure ones, they began to raise questions about more important and hidden matters, such as the changes undergone by the moon, namely, its eclipse, and its change of shape, which seems to vary inasmuch as it stands in different relations to the sun. And similarly they raised questions about the phenomena of the sun, such as its eclipse, its movement and size; and about the phenomena of the stars, such as their size, arrangement, and so forth; and about the origin of the whole universe, which some said was produced by chance, others by an intelligence, and others by love.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 4 Constat autem, quod dubitatio et admiratio ex ignorantia provenit. Cum enim aliquos manifestos effectus videamus, quorum causa nos latet, eorum tunc causam admiramur. Et ex quo admiratio fuit causa inducens ad philosophiam, patet quod philosophus est aliqualiter philomythes, idest amator fabulae, quod proprium est poetarum. Unde primi, qui per modum quemdam fabularem de principiis rerum tractaverunt, dicti sunt poetae theologizantes, sicut fuit Perseus, et quidam alii, qui fuerunt septem sapientes. Causa autem, quare philosophus comparatur poetae, est ista, quia uterque circa miranda versatur. Nam fabulae, circa quas versantur poetae, ex quibusdam mirabilibus constituuntur. Ipsi etiam philosophi ex admiratione moti sunt ad philosophandum. Et quia admiratio ex ignorantia provenit, patet quod ad hoc moti sunt ad philosophandum ut ignorantiam effugarent. Et sic deinde patet, quod scientiam, persecuti sunt, idest studiose quaesierunt, solum ad cognoscendum, et non causa alicuius usus idest utilitatis.	55. Further, he points out that perplexity and wonder arise from ignorance. For when we see certain obvious effects whose cause we do not know, we wonder about their cause. And since wonder was the motive which led men to philosophy, it is evident that the philosopher is, in a sense, a philo-myth, i.e., a lover of myth, as is characteristic of the poets. Hence the first men to deal with the principles of things in a mythical way, such as Perseus and certain others who were the seven sages, were called the theologizing poets. Now the reason why the philosopher is compared to the poet is that both are concerned with wonders. For the myths with which the poets deal are composed of wonders, and the philosophers themselves were moved to philosophize as a result of wonder. And since wonder stems from ignorance, they were obviously moved to philosophize in order to escape from ignorance. It is accordingly evident from this that “they pursued” knowledge, or diligently sought it, only for itself and not for any utility or usefulness.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 5 Notandum est autem, quod cum prius nomine sapientiae uteretur, nunc ad nomen philosophiae se transfert. Nam pro eodem accipiuntur. Cum enim antiqui studio sapientiae insistentes sophistae, idest sapientes vocarentur, Pythagoras interrogatus quid se esse profiteretur, noluit se sapientem nominare, sicut sui antecessores, quia hoc praesumptuosum videbatur esse; sed vocavit se philosophum, idest amatorem sapientiae. Et exinde nomen sapientis immutatum est in nomen philosophi, et nomen sapientiae in nomen philosophiae. Quod etiam nomen ad propositum aliquid facit. Nam ille videtur sapientiae amator, qui sapientiam non propter aliud, sed propter seipsam quaerit. Qui enim aliquid propter alterum quaerit, magis hoc amat propter quod quaerit, quam quod quaerit.	56. Now we must note that, while this science was first designated by the name wisdom, this was later changed to the name philosophy, since they mean the same thing. For while the ancients who pursued the study of wisdom were called sophists, i.e., wise men, Pythagoras, when asked what he professed himself to be, refused to call himself a wise man as his predecessors had done, because he thought this was presumptuous, but called himself a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom. And from that time the name “wise man” was changed to “philosopher,” and “wisdom” to “philosophy.” This name also contributes something to the point under discussion, for that man seems to be a lover of wisdom who seeks wisdom, not for some other reason, but for itself alone. For he who seeks one thing on account of something else, has greater love for that on whose account he seeks than for that which he seeks.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit testatur autem probat idem per signum; dicens, quod hoc quod dictum est, scilicet quod sapientia vel philosophia non sit propter aliquam utilitatem quaesita, sed propter ipsam scientiam, testatur accidens, idest eventus, qui circa inquisitores philosophiae provenit. Nam cum eis cuncta fere existerent, quae sunt ad necessitatem vitae, et quae sunt ad pigritiam, idest ad voluptatem, quae in quadam vitae quiete consistit, et quae sunt etiam ad eruditionem necessaria, sicut scientiae logicales, quae non propter se quaeruntur, sed ut introductoriae ad alias artes, tunc primo incoepit quaeri talis prudentia, idest sapientia. Ex quo patet, quod non quaeritur propter aliquam necessitatem aliam a se, sed propter seipsam: nullus enim quaerit hoc quod habetur. Unde, quia omnibus aliis habitis ipsa quaesita est, patet quod non propter aliquid aliud ipsa quaesita est, sed propter seipsam.	57. And what has happened (28). Here he proves the same point by means of an example. The statement (he says) that wisdom or philosophy is not sought for any utility but for knowledge itself is proved by “what has happened,” i.e., by what has occurred in the case of those who have pursued philosophy. For when nearly all those [arts] were discovered which are necessary for life, “leisure” (i.e., for the sort of pleasure which consists in a life of ease), and learning, such as the logical sciences, which are not sought for themselves but as introductions to the other arts, then man began for the first time to seek this kind of prudence, namely, wisdom. And from this it is clear that wisdom is not sought because of any necessity other than itself but for itself a one; for no one seeks something which he already possesses. Hence, because wisdom was sought after all other knowledge had been discovered, it is evident that it was not sought for some reason other than itself but for itself.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit sed ut dicimus hic probat secundum, scilicet quod ipsa sit libera; et utitur tali ratione. Ille homo proprie dicitur liber, qui non est alterius causa, sed est causa suiipsius. Servi enim dominorum sunt, et propter dominos operantur, et eis acquirunt quicquid acquirunt. Liberi autem homines sunt suiipsorum, utpote sibi acquirentes et operantes. Sola autem haec scientia est propter seipsam: ergo ipsa sola est libera inter scientias.	58. But just as (29). Here he proves the second attribute, namely, that wisdom is free; and he uses the following argument: that man is properly said to be free who does not exist for someone else but for himself. For slaves exist for their masters, work for them, and acquire for them whatever they acquire. But free men exist for themselves inasmuch as they acquire things for themselves and work for themselves. But only this science exists for itself; and therefore among all the sciences only this science is free.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 8 Et notandum, quod hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo quod hoc quod dicitur haec sola demonstret in genere omnem scientiam speculativam. Et tunc verum est quod solum hoc genus scientiarum propter seipsum quaeritur. Unde et illae solae artes liberales dicuntur, quae ad sciendum ordinantur: illae vero quae ordinantur ad aliquam utilitatem per actionem habendam, dicuntur mechanicae sive serviles. Alio modo, ut demonstret specialiter istam philosophiam, sive sapientiam, quae est circa altissimas causas; quia inter causas altissimas etiam est finalis causa, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet, quod haec scientia consideret ultimum et universalem finem omnium. Et sic omnes aliae scientiae in eam ordinantur sicut in finem; unde sola ista maxime propter se est.	59. Now we must note that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, the expression “only this” may indicate every speculative science as a class. And then it is true that only this class of science is sought for itself. Hence, only those arts which are directed to knowing are called free [or liberal] arts, whereas those which are directed to some useful end attained by action are called mechanical or servile arts. Understood in another way, the expression may specifically indicate this philosophy or wisdom which deals with the highest causes; for the final cause is also one of the highest causes, as was stated above (51). Therefore this science must consider the highest and universal end of all things. And in this way all the other sciences are subordinated to it as an end. Hence only this science exists in the highest degree for itself. Why this science is super-human
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit propter quod hic probat tertium scilicet quod non sit humana. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit propositum. Secundo excludit quorumdam errorem, ibi, quare secundum Simonidem et cetera. Ostendit autem propositum suum tali ratione. Scientia, quae est maxime libera, non potest esse ut possessio naturae illius, quae multipliciter est ministra vel ancilla: humana autem natura in multis, idest quantum ad multa est ministra: ergo praedicta scientia non est humana possessio. Dicitur autem humana natura ministra, inquantum multipliciter necessitatibus subditur. Ex quo provenit, quod quandoque praetermittit id quod est secundum se quaerendum, propter ea quae sunt necessaria vitae; sicut dicitur in tertio topicorum, quod philosophari melius est quam ditari, licet ditari quandoque sit magis eligendum, puta indigenti necessariis. Ex quo patet, quod illa sapientia tantum propter seipsam quaeritur, quae non competit homini ut possessio. Illud enim habetur ab homine ut possessio, quod ad nutum habere potest, et quo libere potest uti. Ea autem scientia, quae propter se tantum quaeritur, homo non potest libere uti, cum frequenter ab ea impediatur propter vitae necessitatem. Nec etiam ad nutum subest homini, cum ad eam perfecte homo pervenire non possit. Illud tamen modicum quod ex ea habetur, praeponderat omnibus quae per alias scientias cognoscuntur.	60. For this reason (30). Here he proves the third attribute, namely, that this science is not a human [possession]. In regard to this he does two things. First, he proves his thesis. Second (61), he criticizes an erroneous view held by certain men (“Hence, according to Simonides”). He proves his thesis by the following argument. A science which is free in the highest degree cannot be a possession of that nature which is servile and subordinate in many respects. But human nature is servile “in many respects,” i.e., in many ways. Therefore this science is not a human possession. Now human nature is said to be servile insofar as it stands in need of many things. And on this account it happens that man sometimes neglects what should be sought for its own sake because of the things necessary for life. Thus it is said in Book III of the Topics that it is better to philosophize than to become wealthy, although sometimes becoming wealthy is more desirable, that is, to one lacking life’s necessities. From this it is clear that that wisdom is sought for itself alone which does not belong to man as his proper possession. For man has as his possession what he can have at his command and use freely. But that science which is sought for itself alone, man cannot use freely, since he is often kept from it because of the necessities of life. Nor again is it subject to man’s command, because man cannot acquire it perfectly. Yet that very small part of it which he does have outweighs all the things known through the other sciences.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit quare secundum hic excludit errorem cuiusdam Simonidis poetae, qui dicebat, quod soli Deo competit hunc honorem habere, quod velit illam scientiam, quae est propter seipsam quaerenda, et non propter aliud. Sed non est dignum viro, quod non quaerat illam scientiam quae est secundum suam conditionem, quae scilicet ordinatur ad necessaria vitae, quibus homo indiget.	61. Hence, according to Simonides (31). Here he rejects the error of a certain poet, Simonides, who said that it is proper to God alone to have the honor of desiring that knowledge which ought to be sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. But it is not fitting that man should not seek that knowledge which is in keeping with his own condition, namely, that which is directed to the necessities of life required by man.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 11 Iste autem error Simonidis proveniebat ex aliquorum poetarum errore, qui dicebant, quod res divina invidet, et ex invidia ea quae ad honorem suum pertinent non vult Deus ab omnibus acceptari. Et si in aliis Deus hominibus invidet, multo magis est iustum in hoc, scilicet in scientia propter se quaesita, quae est honorabilissima inter omnia. Et secundum eorum opinionem, sequitur, quod omnes imperfecti sunt infortunati. Fortunatos enim esse homines dicebant ex providentia deorum, qui eis bona sua communicabant. Unde ex invidia deorum sua bona communicare nolentium, sequitur, quod homines extra perfectionem huius scientiae remanentes sint infortunati.	62. Now Simonides’ error came from that of certain poets who said that the Deity is envious, and that since He is envious He does not desire that the things which pertain to His honor should be shared by all. And if God is envious of men in other things, He is rightly more so in this case, i.e., in the case of the science which is sought for its own sake, which is the most honorable of all the sciences. And according to the opinion of these men it follows that all who are imperfect are unfortunate’ for they said that men are fortunate as a result of the providence of the gods, who communicate their goods to men. Hence as a result of the envy of the gods, who are unwilling to communicate their goods, it follows that men, who remain outside the perfection of this science, are unfortunate.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 12 Sed radix huius opinionis est falsissima; quia non est conveniens, quod aliqua res divina invideat. Quod ex hoc patet, quia invidia est tristitia de prosperitate alicuius. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi quia bonum alterius aestimatur ab invido ut proprii boni diminutio. Deo autem non convenit esse tristem, cum non sit alicui malo subiectus. Nec etiam per bonum alterius eius bonum diminui potest; quia ex eius bonitate, sicut ex indeficienti fonte, omnia bona effluunt. Unde etiam Plato dixit, quod a Deo est omnis relegata invidia. Sed poetae non solum in hoc, sed in multis aliis mentiuntur, sicut dicitur in proverbio vulgari.	63. But the basis of this opinion is most false, because it is not fitting that any divine being should be envious. This is evident from the fact that envy is sadness at someone else’s prosperity. But this can occur only because the one who is envious thinks that someone else’s good diminishes his own. Now it is impossible that God’ should be sad, because He is not subject to evil of any kind. Nor can His goodness be diminished by someone else’s goodness, since every good flows from His goodness as from an unfailing spring. Hence Plato also said that there is no envy of any kind in God.’ But the poets have lied not only in this matter but in many others, as is stated in the common proverb. Why this science is most honorable
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit nec ea aliam ostendit quartum, scilicet quod haec scientia sit honorabilissima, tali ratione. Illa scientia est maxime honorabilis, quae est maxime divina, sicut etiam Deus honorabilior est rebus omnibus: sed ista scientia est maxime divina: ergo est honorabilissima. Minor sic probatur. Aliqua scientia dicitur esse divina dupliciter; et haec sola scientia utroque modo divina dicitur. Uno modo scientia divina dicitur quam Deus habet. Alio modo, quia est de rebus divinis. Quod autem haec sola habeat utrumque, est manifestum; quia, cum haec scientia sit de primis causis et principiis, oportet quod sit de Deo; quia Deus hoc modo intelligitur ab omnibus, ut de numero causarum existens, et ut quoddam principium rerum. Item talem scientiam, quae est de Deo et de primis causis, aut solus Deus habet, aut si non solus, ipse tamen maxime habet. Solus quidem habet secundum perfectam comprehensionem. Maxime vero habet, inquantum suo modo etiam ab hominibus habetur, licet ab eis non ut possessio habeatur, sed sicut aliquid ab eo mutuatum.	64. Nor must we think (32). Here he proves the fourth attribute, namely, that this is the most honorable science, by the following argument. That science which is most divine is most honorable, just as God Himself is also the most honorable of all things. But this science is the most divine, and is therefore the most honorable. The minor premise is proved in this way: a science is said to be divine in two ways, and only this science is said to be divine in both ways. First, the science which God has is said to be divine; and second, the science which is about divine matters is said to be divine. But it is evident that only this science meets both of these requirements, because, since this science is about first causes and principles, it must be about God; for God is understood in this way by all inasmuch as He is one of the causes and a principle of things. Again, such a science which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way. And He has it in the highest degree inasmuch as it is also had by men in their own way, although it is not had by them as a human possession, but as something borrowed from Him.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 14 Ex his autem ulterius concludit, quod omnes aliae scientiae sunt necessariae magis quam ista ad aliquam vitae utilitatem: minus enim sunt propter se quaesitae. Sed nulla aliarum dignior ista potest esse.	65. From these considerations he draws the further conclusion that all other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be more excellent than this one. The relation between wonder and wisdom
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit oportet vero hic ponit terminum, in quem proficit ista scientia; et dicit quod ordo eius consistit vel terminatur ad contrarium eius quod erat in illis qui prius istam scientiam quaerebant. Sicut etiam in generationibus naturalibus et motibus accidit. Nam unusquisque motus terminatur ad contrarium eius a quo motus incipit. Unde, cum inquisitio sit motus quidam ad scientiam, oportet quod terminetur ad contrarium eius a quo incipit. Initiata est autem (ut praedictum est) inquisitio huius scientiae ab admiratione de omnibus: quia primi admirabantur pauciora, posteriores vero occultiora. Quae quidem admiratio erat, si res ita se haberet sicut automata mirabilia, idest quae videntur mirabiliter a casu accidere. Automata enim dicuntur quasi per se accidentia. Admirantur enim homines praecipue quando aliqua a casu eveniunt hoc modo, ac si essent praevisa vel ex aliqua causa determinata. Casualia enim non a causa sunt determinata, et admiratio est propter ignorantiam causae. Et ideo cum homines nondum poterant speculari causas rerum, admirabantur omnia quasi quaedam casualia. Sicut admirantur circa conversiones solis, quae sunt duae; scilicet duos tropicos, hyemalem et aestivalem. Nam in tropico aestivali incipit sol converti versus meridiem, cum prius versus Septemtrionem tenderet. In tropico autem hyemali e converso. Et etiam circa hoc quod diameter non est commensurabilis lateri quadrati. Cum enim non mensurari videatur esse solius indivisibilis, sicut sola unitas est quae non mensuratur a numero, sed ipsa omnes numeros mensurat, mirum videtur si aliquid quod non est indivisibile non mensuratur; ac per hoc id quod non est minimum non mensuratur. Constat autem, quod diametrum quadrati et latus eius non sunt indivisibilia, sive minima. Unde mirum videtur si non sunt commensurabilia.	66. But it is necessary (33). He now gives the goal toward which this science moves. He says that its progression comes to rest, or is terminated, in the contrary of what was previously found in those who first sought this science, as also happens in the case of natural generations and motions. For each motion is terminated in the contrary of that from which the motion begins. Hence, since investigation is a kind of movement towards knowledge, it must be terminated in the contrary of that from which it begins. But, as was stated above (53), the investigation of this science began with man’s wonder about all things, because the first philosophers wondered about less important matters and subsequent philosophers about more hidden ones. And the object of their wonder was whether the case was like that of strange chance occurrences, i.e., things which seem to happen mysteriously by chance. For things which happen as if by themselves are called chance occurrences. For men wonder most of all when things happen by chance in this way, supposing that they were foreseen or determined by some cause. For chance occurrences are not determined by a cause, and wonder results from ignorance of a cause. Therefore when men were not yet able to recognize the causes of things, they wondered about all things as if they were chance occurrences; just as they wondered about changes in the course of the sun, which are two in number, namely, the solstices, that of winter and that of summer. For at the summer solstice the sun begins to decline toward the south, after previously declining toward the north. But at the winter solstice the opposite occurs. And they wondered also that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with a side. For since to be immeasurable seems to belong to the indivisible alone (just as unity alone is what is not measured by number but itself measures all numbers), it seems to be a matter of wonder that something which is not indivisible is immeasurable, and consequently that what is not a smallest part is immeasurable. Now it is evident that the diagonal of a square and its side are neither indivisible nor smallest parts. Hence it seems a matter of wonder if they are not commensurable.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 16 Cum ergo philosophiae inquisitio ab admiratione incipiat, oportet ad contrarium finire vel proficere; et ad id proficere quod est dignius, ut proverbium vulgare concordat, quo dicitur, quod semper proficere est in melius. Quid enim sit illud contrarium et dignius, patet in praedictis mirabilibus; quia quando iam homines discunt causas praedictorum, non mirantur. Ut geometer non admiratur si diameter sit incommensurabilis lateri. Scit enim causam huius; quia scilicet proportio quadrati diametri ad quadratum lateris non est sicut proportio numeri quadrati ad numerum quadratum, sed sicut proportio duorum ad unum. Unde relinquitur, quod proportio lateris ad diametrum non sit sicut proportio numeri ad numerum. Et ex hoc patet quod commensurari non possunt. Illae enim solae lineae sunt commensurabiles, quarum proportio ad invicem est sicut proportio numeri ad numerum. Erit ergo finis huius scientiae in quem proficere debemus, ut causas cognoscentes, non admiremur de earum effectibus.	67. Therefore, since philosophical investigation began with wonder, it must end in or arrive at the contrary of this, and this is to advance to the worthier view, as the common proverb agrees, which states that one must always advance to the better. For what that opposite and worthier view is, is evident in the case of the above wonders, because when men have already learned the causes of these things they do not wonder. Thus the geometrician does not wonder if the diagonal is incommensurable with a side. For he knows the reason for this, namely, that the proportion of the square of the diagonal to the square of a side is not as the proportion of the square of a number to the square of a number, but as the proportion of two to one. Hence it follows that the proportion of a side to the diagonal is not as the proportion of number to number. And from this it is evident that they cannot be made commensurable. For only those lines are commensurable which are proportioned to each other as number to number. Hence the goal of this science to which we should advance will be that in knowing the causes of things we do not wonder about their effects.
lib. 1 l. 3 n. 17 Patet igitur ex praedictis quae sit natura huius scientiae, quia est speculativa, libera, non humana, sed divina: et quae est eius intentio, qua oportet habere quaestionem et totam methodum et totam hanc artem. Intendit enim circa primas et universales rerum causas, de quibus etiam inquirit et determinat. Et propter harum cognitionem ad praedictum terminum pervenit, ut scilicet non admiretur cognitis causis.	68. From what has been said, then, it is evident what the nature of this science is, namely, that it is speculative and free, and that it is not a human possession but a divine one; and also what its aim is, for which the whole inquiry, method, and art must be conducted. For its goal is the first and universal causes of things, about which it also makes investigations and establishes the truth. And by reason of the knowledge of these it reaches this goal, namely, that there should be no wonder because the causes of things are known.