Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1/lect5

Lecture 5

Latin	English
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 1 Postquam posuit opinionem de causa materiali, hic ponit opinionem de causa efficiente: quae est unde principium motus. Et dividitur in duas. Primo ponit opiniones eorum, qui simpliciter assignaverunt causam motus et generationis. Secundo prosequitur opinionem illorum, qui posuerunt causam efficientem, quae est etiam principium boni et mali in rebus, ibi, post hos et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationem cogentem ad ponendum causam moventem. Secundo ostendit qualiter ad positionem diversi diversimode se habuerunt, ibi, igitur omnino qui talem et cetera. Dicit ergo: quidam philosophi sic processerunt in causa materiali ponenda; sed et ipsa rei evidens natura dedit eis viam ad veritatis cognitionem vel inventionem, et coegit eos quaerere dubitationem quamdam quae inducit in causam efficientem, quae talis est. Nulla res vel subiectum transmutat seipsum, sicut lignum non transmutat seipsum ut ex eo lectus fiat: nec aes est sibi causa transmutandi, ut ex eo fiat statua: sed oportet aliquid aliud esse quod est eis mutationis causa, quod est artifex. Sed ponentes causam materialem unam vel plures, dicebant ex ea sicut ex subiecto fieri generationem et corruptionem rerum: ergo oportet quod sit aliqua alia causa mutationis; et hoc est quaerere aliud genus principii et causae, quod nominatur, unde principium motus et cetera.	93. Having given the philosophers opinions about the material cause, Aristotle now gives their opinions about the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. This is divided into two parts. First, he gives the opinion of those who assigned without qualification a cause of motion and generation. Second (97), he examines the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, which is also the principle of good and evil in the world (“After these men”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasoning which compelled them to posit an efficient cause. Second (94), he shows the different positions which different men have held regarding this (“Now in general”). He says (45), then, that some philosophers have proceeded in this way in positing a material cause, but that the very nature of reality clearly provided them with a course for understanding or discovering the truth, and compelled them to investigate a problem which led them to the efficient cause. This problem is as follows: no thing or subject changes itself; for example, wood does not change itself so that a bed comes from it, nor does bronze cause itself to be changed in such a way that a statue comes from it; but there must be some other principle which causes the change they undergo, and this is the artist. But those who posited a material cause, whether one or more than one, said that the generation and corruption of things come from this cause as a subject. Therefore there must be some other cause of change, and to seek this is to seek another class of principle and cause, which is called the source of motion.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit igitur omnino hic ostendit quod ad praedictam rationem tripliciter philosophi se habuerunt. Illi enim, qui istam viam a principio tetigerunt, et dixerunt unam causam materialem, non multum se gravabant in solutione huius quaestionis: erant enim contenti ratione materiae, causam motus penitus negligentes.	94. Now in general (46). He shows here that the philosophers have adopted three positions with respect to the foregoing issue. For those who adopted this course from the very beginning, and said that there is one material cause, were not greatly concerned with the solution of this problem. For they were content with their view of matter and neglected the cause of motion altogether.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 3 Alii vero dicentes omnia unum esse, quasi per praedictam rationem devicti, non valentes pervenire ad assignandam causam motus, negaverunt totaliter motum. Unde dixerunt, quod totum universum est unum ens immobile. In quo differebant a primis naturalibus, qui dicebant unam causam esse omnium rerum substantiam, quae tamen movetur per rarefactionem et condensationem, ut sic ex uno plura quodammodo fierent: licet non dicerent quod mutaretur secundum generationem et corruptionem simpliciter: hoc enim quod nihil simpliciter generaretur vel corrumperetur fuit antiqua opinio ab omnibus confessa, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed istis posterioribus proprium fuit differentiae quod totum est unum immobile, sicut omni motu carens. Hi fuerunt Parmenides et Melissus, ut infra dicetur. Ergo patet quod illis, qui dicunt totum unum immobile, non contigerit intelligere eos talem causam scilicet causam motus, quia ex quo motum subtrahunt, frustra quaerunt causam motus nisi tantum Parmenides: quia iste etsi poneret unum secundum rationem, ponebat tamen plura secundum sensum, ut infra dicetur. Unde inquantum plura ponebat, conveniebat ei ponere plures causas, quarum una esset movens, et alia mota: quia sicut pluralitatem secundum sensum ponebat, ei oportebat quod poneret motum secundum sensum. Nam ex uno subiecto non potest intelligi pluralitas constituta, nisi per aliquem modum motus.	95. But others, who said that all things are one, being defeated as it were by this issue, as they were unable to go so far as to assign a cause of motion, denied motion altogether. Hence they said that the whole universe is one immobile being. In this respect they differed from the first philosophers of nature, who said that one cause is the substance of all things although it is moved by rarefaction and condensation, so that in this way many things come to be in some measure from one principle. However, they did not say that this principle is subject to generation and corruption in an absolute sense. For the view that nothing was generated or corrupted without qualification is an ancient one admitted by all of them, as is clear from what was said above (75). But it was peculiar to these later thinkers to say that the whole of reality is one immobile being, devoid of every kind of motion. These men were Parmenides and Melissus, as will be explained below (138). Hence it is evident that it was impossible for those who said that the whole is one immobile being to conceive of “such a cause,” i.e., a cause of motion. For, by the very fact that they did away with motion, they sought in vain for a cause of motion. An exception was Parmenides; for even though he held that there is only one thing according to reason, he held that there are many things according to the senses, as will be stated below (101). Hence, inasmuch as Parmenides held that there are many things, it was in keeping with his position to hold that there are many causes, one of which would be a mover and the others something moved. For just as he held that there are many things according to the senses, in a similar way it was necessary for him to hold that there is motion according to the senses, because a plurality of things can be understood to be produced from one subject only by some kind of motion.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 4 Tertii fuerunt qui plures facientes rerum substantias, consenserunt praedictae rationi ponentes causam motus. Ponebant enim calidum vel frigidum causas, vel ignem et terram: quorum igne utebantur ut habente mobilem, idest motivam naturam; aqua vero et terra et aere contrario, vel ut habentibus naturam passivam: et sic ignis erat ut causa efficiens, alia vero ut causa materialis.	96. Third, there were those who, in making the substances of things many, assented to the aforesaid reasoning by positing a cause of motion. For they maintained that the hot or the cold, i.e., fire or earth, are causes; and of these they used fire as having a mobile, i.e., an active, nature, but water, earth and air they used in the opposite way, i.e., as having a passive nature. Thus fire was a sort of efficient cause, but the others a sort of material cause.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit post hos hic ponit opiniones ponentium causam efficientem non solum ut principium motus, sed etiam ut principium boni vel mali in rebus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo narrat eorum opiniones. Secundo ostendit in quo in ponendo causas defecerunt, ibi, isti quidem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionis rationes, ex quibus movebantur ad ponendum aliam causam a praedictis. Secundo ostendit quomodo diversimode causam posuerunt, ibi, dicens et aliquis et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod post praedictos philosophos qui solum unam causam materialem posuerunt, vel plures corporales, quarum una erat activa, alia ut passiva: et post alia prima principia ab eis posita, iterum fuerunt ab ipsa veritate coacti, ut aiebamus, idest sicut supra dictum est, ut quaererent principium, habitum idest consequenter se habens ad praedicta, scilicet causam boni, quae quidem est causa finalis, licet ab eis non poneretur nisi per accidens, ut infra patebit. Ponebatur enim ab eis solum causa boni per modum causae efficientis. Et ad hoc cogebantur, quia praemissa principia non sufficiebant ad generandum naturam entium, in qua quidem inveniuntur aliqua bene se habere. Quod demonstrat conservatio corporum in propriis locis, extra quae corrumpuntur. Et ulterius utilitates, quae proveniunt ex partibus animalium, quae hoc modo dispositae inveniuntur secundum quod congruit ad bonum esse animalis.	97. After these men (47). Here he gives the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, not only as a principle of motion, but also as a principle of good and evil in things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he expounds their views. Second (107), he shows in what respect they failed in assigning the causes of things (“These thinkers”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasons for their position by which they were induced to posit another cause besides the foregoing one. Second (100), he shows how they posited this kind of cause in different ways (“And when someone”). He says first, then, that after the foregoing philosophers who held that there is only one material cause, or many bodies, one of which was active and the others passive, and after the other first principles given by them, men were again compelled by the truth itself ‘ “as we have said,” i.e., as was stated above (93), to seek the “next” principle, i.e., the one which naturally follows the foregoing one, namely, the cause of good, which is really the final cause, although it was held by them only incidentally, as will be see below (177). For they held that there is a cause of goodness in things only after the manner of an efficient cause. They were compelled to do this because the foregoing principles were not sufficient to account for the generation of the natural world, in which some things are found to be well disposed . The fact that bodies are conserved in their proper places and are corrupted outside of them proves this; and so do the benefits resulting from the parts of animals, which are found to be disposed in this manner according as this is in keeping with an animal’s good state of being.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 6 Huiusmodi autem bonae dispositionis vel habitudinis, quam quaedam res iam habent, quaedam vero adipiscuntur per aliquam factionem, non sufficienter ponitur causa vel ignis, vel terra, vel aliquod talium corporum: quia ista corpora determinate agunt ad unum secundum necessitatem propriarum formarum, sicut ignis calefacit et tendit sursum, aqua vero infrigidat et tendit deorsum. Praedictae autem utilitates, et bonae dispositiones rerum exigunt habere causam non determinatam ad unum tantum, cum in diversis animalibus diversimode inveniantur partes dispositae, et in unoquoque secundum congruentiam ipsorum naturae.	98. But neither fire nor earth nor any such bodies were held to be adequate causes of this kind of good disposition or state of being which some things already have but others acquire by some kind of production. For these bodies act in one definite way according to the necessity of their proper forms, as fire heats things and tends upward, and water cools things and tends downward. But the aforesaid benefits and good states of being of things must have a cause which is not limited to one effect only, since the parts of different animals are found to be disposed in different ways, and in each one insofar as it is in keeping with its nature.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 7 Unde non est conveniens, quod ignis vel terra vel aliquod huiusmodi sit causa praedictae bonae habitudinis rerum: nec fuit conveniens, quod ipsi hoc aestimaverint: nec iterum bene se habet dicere, quod sint automata idest per se evenientia et casualia, et quod a fortuna tantum immutetur eorum causalitas: licet aliqui eorum hoc dixerint, ut Empedocles et quicumque posuerunt causam materialem tantum: sicut patet secundo physicorum. Quod tamen patet etiam esse falsum, per hoc quod huiusmodi bonae dispositiones inveniuntur vel semper, vel in maiori parte. Ea autem quae sunt a casu vel a fortuna, non sunt sicut semper, sed nec sicut frequenter, sed ut raro. Et propter hoc necessarium fuit alterum invenire principium bonae dispositionis rerum, praeter quatuor elementa. Alia litera habet, nec ipsi automato et fortunae; et est idem sensus quod prius.	99. Hence, it is not reasonable that fire or earth or the like should be the cause of the aforesaid good state of being which things have, nor was it reasonable that these men should have thought this to be the case. Nor again would it be reasonable to say that these things are chance occurrences, i.e., that they are accidental or come about by chance, and that their causality is changed only fortuitously; although some of these thinkers had said this, as Empedocles and all those who posited a material cause, as is evident in Book II of the Physics. However, this is also seen to be false by reason of the fact that good dispositions of this kind are found either always or for the most part, whereas things that come about by chance or fortune do not occur always or for the most part but seldom. For this reason, then, it was necessary to discover besides the four elements some other principle which would account for the good dispositions of things. Another text has “Nor would it be right that these should be attributed to chance occurrence and fortune,” but this means the same as the above.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit dicens et hic ponit in speciali opiniones de praedicto principio. Et primo ponit opiniones ponentium unam causam. Secundo ponentium duas, ibi, quoniam vero contraria bonis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones ponentium causam primam efficientem intellectum. Secundo ponentium amorem, ibi, suspicatus est autem et cetera. Dicit ergo quod post praedictam rationem apparuit aliquis dicens intellectum esse in tota natura, sicut est in animalibus, et ipsum esse causam mundi et ordinis totius, idest universi, in quo ordine consistit bonum totius, et uniuscuiusque. Et hic purificavit priores philosophos, ad puram veritatem eos reducens qui inconvenientia dixerunt, huiusmodi causam non tangentes. Hanc autem sententiam manifeste tangit Anaxagoras, licet causam huiusmodi sententiam proferendi dederit ei primo quidam alius philosophus, scilicet Hermotimus Clazomenius. Unde patet quod illi qui sunt opinati sic, simul posuerunt idem rebus esse principium, quod bene haberent se, et quod esset unde principium motus est.	100. And when someone said (48). Here he gives in detail the opinions about the aforesaid principle. First, he gives the opinions of those who held that there is one [efficient] cause; and second (104), the opinions of those who held that there are two such causes (“But since there would seem”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the views of those who held that the first efficient cause is an intellect; and second (101), the opinions of those who held that it is love (“Now someone might”). He says, then, that after the foregoing doctrine someone appeared who said that there is an intellect present in nature at large, just as there is in animals, and that this is the cause of the world and the order of the whole, i.e., of the universe, in which order the good of the entire universe and that of every single part consists. And this man atoned for the first philosophers by reducing to pure truth those who said unreasonable things and did not mention this kind of cause. Now Anaxagoras clearly stated this doctrine, although another philosopher —Hermotimus of Clazomenae—first gave him the idea of proposing this opinion. Hence it is evident that those who held this opinion claimed at the same time that the principle by which things are well disposed and the one which is the source of motion in things, are one and the same.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit suspicatus est ponit opinionem ponentium amorem esse principium primum; quem tamen non ita expresse vel plane, posuerunt. Et ideo dicit, quod suspicio fuit apud aliquos, quod Hesiodus quaesivisset huiusmodi principium bonae habitudinis rerum, vel quicumque alius posuit amorem vel desiderium in rebus. Cum enim Parmenides universi generationem monstrare tentaret, dixit, quod amor deorum providit omnibus, ut mundus constitueretur. Nec est contra sensum eius, qui posuit unum ens immobile, quod hic dicit; quia hic ponebat plura secundum sensum, licet unum secundum rationem, ut supra dictum est, et infra dicetur. Deos autem corpora caelestia appellabat, vel forte aliquas substantias separatas.	101. Now someone might (49). Here he gives the opinion of those who claimed that love is the first principle, although they did not hold this very explicitly or clearly. Accordingly, he says that some suspected that Hesiod had sought for such a principle to account for the good disposition of things, or anyone else who posited love or desire in nature. For when Parmenides attempted to explain the generation of the universe, he said that in the establishing of the universe “Love, the first of all the gods, was made.” Nor is this opposed to his doctrine that there is one immobile being, of which Aristotle speaks here; because this man held that there are many things according to the senses, although there is only one thing according to reason, as was stated above and will be stated below. Moreover, he called the celestial bodies, or perhaps certain separate substances, gods.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 10 Sed Hesiodus dixit quod primo omnium fuit chaos, et deinde facta est terra latior, ut esset receptaculum aliorum: posuerunt enim receptaculum et locum principium esse, ut dicitur quarto physicorum. Et posuit rerum principium amorem, qui condocet omnia immortalia. Et hoc ideo, quia communicatio bonitatis ex amore provenire videtur. Nam beneficium est signum et effectus amoris. Unde, cum ex rebus immortalibus huiusmodi corruptibilia esse habeant, et omnem bonam dispositionem, oportet hoc amori immortalium attribuere. Immortalia autem posuit vel ipsa corpora caelestia, vel ipsa principia materialia. Sic autem posuit chaos et amorem, quasi necessarium sit in rerum existentiis esse non solum materiam motuum, sed et ipsam causam agentem, quae res moveat et congreget; quod videtur ad amorem pertinere. Nam et in nobis amor ad actiones movet, et quia est omnium affectionum principium. Nam et timor et tristitia et spes, non nisi ex amore procedunt. Quod autem amor congreget, ex hoc patet; quia ipse amor est unio quaedam amantis et amati, dum amans amatum quasi se reputat. Iste autem Hesiodus ante philosophorum tempora fuit in numero poetarum.	102. But Hesiod said that first of all there was chaos, and then broad earth was made, to be the receptacle of everything else; for it is evident that the receptacle [or void] and place are principles, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. And he also held that love, which instructs all the immortals, is a principle of things. He did this because the communication of goodness seems to spring from love, for a good deed is a sign and effect of love. Hence, since corruptible things derive their being and every good disposition from immortal beings of this kind, this must be attributed to the love of the immortals. Furthermore, he held that the immortals are either the celestial bodies themselves, or material principles themselves. Thus he posited chaos and love as though there had to be in existing things not only a material cause of their motions, but also an efficient cause which moves and unites them, which seems to be the office of love. For love moves us to act, because it is the source of all the emotions, since fear, sadness and hope proceed only from love. That love unites things is clear from this, that love itself is a certain union between the lover and the thing loved, seeing that the lover regards the beloved as himself. This man Hesiod is to be numbered among the poets who lived before the time of the philosophers.
lib. 1 l. 5 n. 11 Quis autem horum sit prior, idest potior in scientia, utrum ille qui dixit amorem esse primum principium, vel qui dixit intellectum, posterius poterit iudicari, scilicet ubi agetur de Deo. Et hoc iudicium distributionem vocat: quia per hoc unicuique suus gradus attribuitur dignitatis. Alia translatio planius habet: hos quidem igitur quomodo congruat transire, et quis de hoc sit prior, posterius poterit iudicari.	103. Now, as to which one of these thinkers is prior, i.e., more competent in knowledge, whether the one who said that love is the first principle, or the one who said hat intellect is, can be decided later on, that is, where God is discussed. He calls this decision an arrangement, because the degree of excellence belonging to each man is allotted to him in this way. Another translation states this more clearly: “Therefore, in what order it is fitting to go over these thinkers, and who in this order is prior, can be decided later on.”