Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1/lect7

Lecture 7

Latin	English
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 1 Hic incipit ponere positiones eorum, qui posuerunt de principiis positiones extraneas non manifestas. Et primo illorum qui posuerunt plura principia rerum. Secundo illorum, qui posuerunt tantum unum ens, ibi, sunt autem aliqui et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Leucippi et Democriti, qui posuerunt principia rerum corporea. Secundo ponit opinionem Pythagoricorum, qui posuerunt principia rerum incorporea, ibi, in his autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Democriti et Leucippi de causa materiali rerum. Secundo de causa diversitatis, quomodo scilicet ex materia plures res diversificantur, in quo etiam apparet causa generationis et corruptionis rerum: in quo etiam cum antiquis philosophis conveniebant, ibi, et quemadmodum in unum et cetera. Dicit ergo, quod duo philosophi, qui amici dicuntur, quia in omnibus se sequebantur, scilicet Democritus et Leucippus, posuerunt rerum principia plenum et inane, sive vacuum; quorum plenum est ens, et vacuum sive inane non ens.	112. Here he begins to give the positions of those who held strange and obscure views about the principles of things. First, he gives the position of those who held that there are many principles of things; and second (134) the position of those who held that there is only one being (“But there are some”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Leucippus and Democritus, who held that the principles of things are corporeal. Second (119), he gives the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who held that the principles of things are incorporeal entities (“But during the time”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Democritus and Leucippus about the material cause of things; and second (115), their opinion about the cause of diversity, that is, how matter is differentiated into many things. In this discussion the cause of the generation and corruption of things also becomes evident; and this is a point on which these men agreed with the ancient philosophers (“And just as those who”). He says, then, that two philosophers, Democritus and Leucippus, who are called friends because they followed each other in all things, held that the principles of things are the full and the void or empty, of which the full is being, and the void or empty, non-being.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 2 Ad huius autem opinionis evidentiam recolendum est hoc quod philosophus dicit in primo de generatione, ubi diffusius eam tradit. Cum enim quidam philosophi posuissent omnia esse unum ens continuum, immobile: quia nec motus sine vacuo esse potest, ut videtur, nec etiam rerum distinctio, ut dicebant, cum continuitatis privationem, ex qua oportet intelligere corporum diversitatem, nisi per vacuum non possent comprehendere, vacuum autem nullo modo esse ponerent, supervenit Democritus, qui eorum rationi consentiens, diversitatem autem et motum a rebus auferre non valens, vacuum esse posuit, et omnia corpora ex quibusdam indivisibilibus corporibus esse composita: propter hoc, quia non videbatur sibi quod ratio posset assignari quare ens universum magis in una parte esset divisum quam in alia; ne poneret totum esse continuum, praeelegit ponere ubique totum et totaliter esse divisum; quod esse non posset si remaneret aliquod divisibile indivisum. Huiusmodi autem indivisibilia corpora invicem coniungi non possunt, nec esse ut ponebat, nisi vacuo mediante: quia nisi vacuum inter duo eorum interveniret, oporteret ex eis duobus unum esse continuum quod ratione praedicta non ponebat. Sic igitur uniuscuiusque corporis magnitudinem constitutam dicebat ex illis indivisibilibus corporibus implentibus indivisibilia spatia, et ex quibusdam spatii vacuis ipsis indivisibilibus corporibus interiacentibus, quae quidem poros esse dicebat.	113. Now in order to clarify this opinion we must recall what the Philosopher says in Book I of Generation, where he treats it more fully. For certain philosophers had held that everything is one continuous immobile being, because it seems that there cannot be motion without a void, or any distinction between things, as they said. And though they could not comprehend the privation of continuity, by reason of which bodies must be understood to be differentiated, except by means of a void, they claimed that the void existed in no way. Democritus, who came after them, and who agreed with their reasoning but was unable to exclude diversity and motion from things, held that the void existed, and that all bodies are composed of certain indivisible bodies [i.e., the atoms]. He did this because it seemed to him that no reason could be given why the whole of being should be divided in one part rather than another. And lest he should hold that the whole of being is continuous, he therefore chose to maintain that this whole is divided everywhere and in its entirety; and this could not be the case if anything divisible remained undivided. And according to him indivisible bodies of this kind can neither exist nor be joined together except by means of the void. For if the void did not come between any two of them, one continuous whole would result from the two; which he did not hold for the above reason. Hence he said that the continuous quantity of each body is constituted both of those indivisible bodies filling indivisible spaces and of certain empty spaces, which he called pores, coming between these indivisible bodies.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 3 Ex quo patet quod cum vacuum sit non ens, et plenum sit ens, non magis ponebat rei constitutionem ens quam non ens: quia nec corpora magis quam vacuum, nec vacuum magis quam corpora; sed ex duobus simul dicebat, ut dictum est corpus constitui. Unde praedicta duo ponebat rerum causas sicut materiam.	114. And since the void is non-being and the full is being, it is evident from this that he did not hold that a thing was constituted by being rather than non-being, because the [indivisible] bodies did not constitute things more than the void, or the void more than bodies; but he said that a body is composed at once of these two things, as is clear in the text. Hence he held that these two things are the causes of beings as their matter.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit et quemadmodum hic ostendit in quo conveniebant praedicti philosophi cum antiquis philosophis, qui ponebant unam tantum materiam. Ostendit autem quod conveniebant cum eis in duobus. Primo quidem, quia sicut sunt ponentes unam materiam, et ex illa materia una generabant aliam secundum diversas materiae passiones, quae sunt rarum et densum, quae accipiebant ut principia omnium aliarum passionum; ita et isti, scilicet Democritus et Leucippus, dicebant, quod causae differentes erant aliorum, scilicet corporum constitutorum ex indivisibilibus, videlicet quod per aliquas differentias illorum indivisibilium corporum et pororum diversa entia constituebantur.	115. And just as those (56). Here he shows in what respect these philosophers agreed with the ancients who claimed that there is only one matter. He indicates agreement in two respects. First, just as the ancient philosophers held that there is one matter, and from that one matter generated something else according to the different attributes of matter (i.e., the rare and dense, which they accepted as the principles of all other attributes), in a similar way these philosophers—Democritus and Leucippus—said that there were different causes of different things (namely, of the bodies composed of these indivisible bodies), i.e., that different beings were produced as a result of certain differences of these indivisible bodies and their pores.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 5 Eas autem differentias dicebant esse, unam secundum figuram, quae attenditur ex hoc quod aliquid est angulatum, circulare et rectum: aliam secundum ordinem quae est secundum prius et posterius: aliam secundum positionem, quae est secundum ante et retro, dextrum et sinistrum, sursum et deorsum. Et sic dicebant quod unum ens differt ab alio vel rhysmo idest figura, vel diathyge idest ordine, vel trope idest positione.	116. Now they said that these differences are, first, differences in shape, which is noted from this that things are angular, circular or square; second, differences in arrangement, i.e., insofar as the indivisible bodies are prior or subsequent; and, third, differences in position, i.e., insofar as these bodies are in front or behind, right or left, or above and below. Hence they said that one being differs from another “either by rhythm,” which is shape, “or by inter-contact,” which is arrangement, “or by turning,” which is position.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 6 Et hoc probat per exemplum in literis Graecis, in quibus una litera differt ab alia figura: sicut et in nostris differt una ab altera: a enim differt ab n, figura; an vero et na, differunt secundum ordinem, nam una ante aliam ordinatur. Una etiam differt ab altera positione, ut z ab n, sicut et apud nos videmus quod semivocales post liquidas poni non possunt ante quas ponuntur mutae in eadem syllaba. Sicut ergo propter triplicem diversitatem in literis ex eisdem literis diversimode se habentibus fit tragoedia et comoedia, ita ex eisdem corporibus indivisibilibus diversimode habentibus fiunt diversae species rerum.	117. He illustrates this by using the letters of the Greek alphabet, which differ from each other in shape just as in our alphabet one letter also differs from another; for A differs from N in shape. Again, AN differs from NA in arrangement, because one letter is placed before the other. And one letter also differs from another in position, as Z from IN, just as in our language we also see that semivowels cannot stand after liquids preceded by mutes in the same syllable. Therefore, just as tragedy and comedy come from the same letters as a result of the letters being disposed in different ways because of this threefold difference, in a similar fashion different species of things are produced from the same indivisible bodies as a result of the latter being disposed in different ways.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 7 Aliud vero in quo conveniebant isti philosophi cum antiquis est, quod sicut antiqui neglexerunt ponere causam ex qua motus inest rebus, ita et isti, licet illa indivisibilia corpora dicerent esse per se mobilia. Sic ergo patet quod per praedictos philosophos nihil dictum est nisi de duabus causis, scilicet de causa materiali ab omnibus, et de causa movente a quibusdam.	118. The second respect in which these philosophers agreed with the ancients is this: just as the ancient philosophers neglected to posit a cause which accounts for motion in things, so also did these men, although they would say that these indivisible bodies are capable of self-motion. Thus it is evident that these philosophers mentioned only two of the causes, i.e., all of them spoke of the material cause) and some of the efficient cause.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit in his autem hic ponit opiniones Pythagoricorum ponentium numeros esse substantias rerum. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit opiniones de rerum substantia. Secundo de rerum principiis, ibi, sed cuius gratia advenimus. Circa primum ponit duo, ex quibus inducebantur ad ponendum numeros esse rerum substantias. Secundum ponit ibi, amplius autem harmoniarum et cetera. Dicit ergo quod Pythagorici philosophi fuerunt, in his, idest, contemporanei aliquibus dictorum philosophorum, et ante hos, quia fuerunt quidam quibusdam priores. Sciendum est autem duo fuisse philosophorum genera. Nam quidam vocabantur Ionici, qui morabantur in illa terra, quae nunc Graecia dicitur: et isti sumpserunt principium a Thalete, ut supra dictum est. Alii philosophi fuerunt Italici, in illa parte Italiae quae quondam magna Graecia dicebatur, quae nunc Apulia et Calabria dicitur: quorum philosophorum princeps fuit Pythagoras natione Samius, sic dictus a quadam Calabriae civitate. Et haec duo philosophorum genera simul concurrerunt. Et propter hoc dicit quod fuerunt, in his et ante hos.	119. But during the time of these (57). Here he gives the opinions of the Pythagoreans, who held that numbers are the substances of things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he gives their opinions about the substance of things; and second (124), their opinions about the principles of things (“But the reason”). In regard to the first he gives two reasons by which they were led to assert that numbers are the substances of things. He gives the second reason (121) where he says “Moreover, since they considered.” He says that the Pythagoreans were philosophers who lived “during the time of these,” i.e., they were contemporaries of some of the foregoing philosophers; “and prior to them,” because they preceded some of them. Now it must be understood that there were two groups of philosophers. One group was called the Ionians, who inhabited the land which is now called Greece. This group originated with Thales, as was pointed out above (77). The other group of philosophers were the Italians, who lived in that part of Italy which was once called Greater Greece and is now called Apulia and Calabria. The leader of these philosophers was Pythagoras, a native of Samos, so called from a certain city of Calabria. These two groups of philosophers lived at the same time, and this is why he says that they lived “During the time of these and prior to them.”
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 9 Isti autem Italici philosophi, qui et Pythagorici dicuntur, primi produxerunt quaedam mathematica, ut ea rerum sensibilium substantias et principia esse dicerent. Dicit ergo, primi, quia Platonici eos sunt secuti. Ex hoc autem moti sunt ut mathematica introducerent, quia erant nutriti in eorum studio. Et ideo principia mathematicorum credebant esse principia omnium entium. Consuetum est enim apud homines, quod per ea quae noverunt, de rebus iudicare velint. Et quia inter mathematica numeri sunt priores, ideo conati sunt speculari similitudines rerum naturalium, et quantum ad esse et quantum ad fieri, magis in numeris quam in sensibilibus elementis, quae sunt terra et aqua et huiusmodi. Sicut enim praedicti philosophi passiones rerum sensibilium adaptant passionibus rerum naturalium, per quamdam similitudinem ad proprietates ignis et aquae et huiusmodi corporum: ita mathematici adaptabant proprietates rerum naturalium ad numerorum passiones, quando dicebant quod aliqua passio numerorum est causa iustitiae, et aliqua causa animae et intellectus, et aliqua causa temporis, et sic de aliis. Et sic passiones numerorum intelliguntur esse rationes et principia quaedam omnium apparentium in rebus sensibilibus, et quantum ad res voluntarias, quod designatur per iustitiam, et quantum ad formas substantiales rerum naturalium, quod designatur per intellectum et animam: et quantum ad accidentia, quod designatur per tempus.	120. These Italian philosophers, also called Pythagoreans, were the first to develop certain mathematical entities, so that they said that these are the substances and principles of sensible things. He says that they were “the first” because the Platonists were their successors. They were moved to bring in mathematics because they were brought up in the study of these sciences, and therefore they thought that the principles of mathematics are the principles of all existing things. For men are wont to judge about things in terms of what they already know. And since among mathematical entities numbers are first, these men therefore tried to see resemblances of natural things, both as regards their being and generation, in numbers rather than in the sensible elements—earth, water and the like. For just as the foregoing philosophers adapted the attributes of sensible things to those of natural things because of a certain resemblance which they bear to the properties of fire, water, and bodies of this kind, in a similar fashion these mathematicians adapted the properties of natural things to the attributes of numbers when they said that some one attribute of number is the cause of justice, another the cause of soul and intellect, and still another the cause of opportunity, and so on for other things. And in this way the attributes of numbers are understood to be the intelligible structures and principles of all things appearing in the sensible world, both in the realm of voluntary matters, signified by justice, and in that of the substantial forms of natural things, signified by soul and intellect, and in that of accidents, signified by opportunity.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit secundum motivum. Considerabant enim passiones harmoniarum, consonantiarum musicalium et earum rationes, scilicet proportiones, ex natura numerorum. Unde cum soni consonantes sint quaedam sensibilia, eadem ratione sunt conati et cetera alia sensibilia secundum rationem et secundum totam naturam assimilare numeris, ita quod numeri sunt primi in tota natura.	121. Moreover, since they (58). Here he gives the second reason which motivated them. For they thought of the attributes of harmonies, musical consonants and their ratios, i.e., proportions, in terms of the nature of numbers. Hence, since harmonious sounds are certain sensible things, they attempted by the same reasoning to liken all other sensible things, both in their intelligible structure and in their whole nature, to numbers, so that numbers are the first things in the whole of nature.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 11 Et propter hoc etiam aestimaverunt quod principia numerorum essent principia omnium entium existentium, et totum caelum nihil aliud esse dicebant nisi quamdam naturam et harmoniam numerorum, idest proportionem quamdam numeralem, similem proportioni, quae consideratur in harmoniis. Unde quaecumque habebant confessa, idest manifesta, quae poterant adaptare numeris et harmoniis adaptabant, et quantum ad caeli passiones, sicut sunt motus et eclypses et huiusmodi et quantum ad partes, sicut sunt diversi orbes: et quantum ad totum caeli ornatum, sicut sunt diversae stellae et diversae figurae in constellationibus.	122. For this reason too they thought that the principles of numbers are the principles of all existing things, and they said that the whole heaven is merely a kind of nature and harmony of numbers, i.e., a kind of numerical proportion similar to the proportion found in harmonies. Hence, whatever they had “revealed,” i.e., had shown, which they could adapt to numbers and harmonies, they also adapted both to the changes undergone by the heavens, as its motion, eclipses and the like; and to its parts, as the different orbs; and to the whole arrangement of the heavens, as the different stars and different figures in the constellations.
lib. 1 l. 7 n. 12 Et si aliquid deficiebat in rebus manifestis quod non videretur numeris adaptari, advocabant, idest ipsi de novo ponebant continuatum esse eis omne negotium, idest ad hoc quod totum negotium eorum quod erat adaptare sensibilia ad numeros, continuaretur, dum omnia sensibilia numeris adaptarent, sicut patet in uno exemplo. In numeris enim denarius videtur esse perfectus, eo quod est primus limes, et comprehendit in se omnium numerorum naturam: quia omnes alii numeri non sunt nisi quaedam repetitio denarii. Propter quod Plato usque ad decem faciebat numerum, ut dicitur quarto physicorum. Unde et Pythagoras, sphaeras, quae moventur in caelo, dixit decem, quamvis novem solum harum sint apparentes: quia deprehenduntur septem motibus planetarum, octava ex motu stellarum fixarum, nona vero ex motu diurno, qui est motus primus. Sed et Pythagoras addit decimam quae esset antictona idest in contrarium mota in inferioribus sphaeris, et per consequens in contrarium sonans. Dicebat enim ex motu caelestium corporum fieri quamdam harmoniam: unde sicut harmonia fit ex proportione sonorum contrariorum, scilicet gravis et acuti, ita ponebat quod in caelo erat unus motus in oppositam partem aliis motibus, ut fieret harmonia. Et secundum hanc positionem motus diurnus pertinebat ad decimam sphaeram, quae est ab oriente in occidentem, aliis sphaeris revolutis e contrario ab occidente in orientem. Nona vero secundum eum esse poterat, quae primo revolvebat omnes sphaeras inferiores in contrarium primi motus. De his autem quae ad opinionem istam Pythagorae pertinent, determinatum est diffusius et certius in ultimis libris huius scientiae.