Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber10/lect12

Lecture 12

Latin	English
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit quae sunt contraria quae non faciunt differre specie, hic ostendit quae sunt contraria quae etiam genere differre faciunt. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat veritatem. Secundo excludit quorumdam falsam opinionem, ibi, nunc ergo diximus et cetera. Tertio infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis, ibi, palam igitur quod non contingit et cetera. Primo ergo praemittit duo ad ostendendum propositum: quorum primum est, quod contraria sunt diversa specie, ut supra ostensum est.	2136. After having shown what contraries do not cause things to differ specifically, here the Philosopher explains what contraries cause things to differ generically. In regard to this he does three things. First (895)C 2136), he establishes the truth. Second (896:C 2138), he rejects the false opinion of certain men (“Now we have already”). Third (898:C 214.3), he draws a corollary from his discussion (“It is clearly”). He accordingly first of all (895) lays down two premises necessary for the proof of his thesis. The first of these is that contraries are formally different, as was explained above (888:C 2.120). Corruptible & incorruptible are generically different.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 2 Secundum est, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt contraria. Quod probat ex hoc, quod impotentia opposita determinatae potentiae est quaedam privatio, ut in nono habitum est. Privatio autem est principium contrarietatis. Unde sequitur, quod impotentia sit contrarium potentiae. Corruptibile autem et incorruptibile opponuntur secundum potentiam et impotentiam. Sed diversimode. Nam si accipiatur potentia communiter, secundum quod se habet ad posse agere vel pati quodcumque, sic corruptibile secundum potentiam dicetur, incorruptibile secundum impotentiam. Si autem dicatur potentia secundum quod non est posse aliquid deterius, sic e converso, incorruptibile dicetur secundum potentiam, corruptibile vero secundum impotentiam.	2137. The second premise is that the corruptible and the incorruptible are contraries. He proves this from the fact that the incapacity opposed to a definite capacity is a kind of privation, as has been stated in Book IX (1784). Now privation is a principle of contrariety; and therefore it follows that incapacity is contrary to capacity, and that the corruptible and the incorruptible are opposed as capacity and incapacity. But they are opposed in a different way. For if capacity is taken (1) according to its general meaning, as referring to the ability to act or to be acted upon in some way, then the term corruptible is used like the term capacity, and the term incorruptible like the term incapacity. (2) But if the term capacity is used of something inasmuch as it is incapable of undergoing something for the worse, then contrariwise the term incorruptible is referred to capacity, and the term corruptible is referred to incapacity. 2137a. But although it seems necessary from these remarks to conclude that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ specifically, he concludes that they differ generically. And this is true because, just as form and actuality pertain to the species, so too matter and capacity pertain to the genus. Hence, just as the contrariety which pertains to form and actuality causes difference in species, so too the contrariety which pertains to capacity or potency causes difference in genus.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 3 Cum autem ex his videretur concludendum quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt specie, concludit quod sunt diversa genere. Et hoc ideo, quia sicut forma et actus pertinent ad speciem, ita materia et potentia pertinent ad genus. Unde sicut contrarietas quae est secundum formas et actus, facit differentiam secundum speciem, ita contrarietas quae est secundum potentiam, facit generis diversitatem.	2137a. But although it seems necessary from these remarks to conclude that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ specifically, he concludes that they differ generically. And this is true because, just as form and actuality pertain to the species, so too matter and capacity pertain to the genus. Hence, just as the contrariety which pertains to form and actuality causes difference in species, so too the contrariety which pertains to capacity or potency causes difference in genus.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit nunc autem excludit quorumdam falsam opinionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo proponit eam. Secundo improbat, ibi, sed contrariorum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod probatio praemissa de corruptibili et incorruptibili est accepta ex ratione horum universalium nominum, secundum scilicet quod unum significat potentiam, et aliud impotentiam. Sed sicut quibusdam videtur, non necesse est quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differant specie, sicut non est hoc necesse in albo et nigro. Convenit enim idem esse album et nigrum. Sed diversimode. Quia si illud quod dicitur album et nigrum sit aliquod universale, simul est album et nigrum quantum ad diversos. Sicut simul verum est dicere, quod homo est albus propter Socratem et niger propter Platonem. Si vero fuerit aliquid singularium, non erit simul album et nigrum. Sed tamen potest nunc esse album, postea nigrum, cum tamen album et nigrum sint contraria. Et hoc modo dicunt quidam, quod simul in eadem specie possunt esse quaedam corruptibilia et quaedam incorruptibilia. Et idem singulariter quandoque corruptibile, et quandoque incorruptibile.	2138. Now we have already (896). Here he rejects the false opinion of certain men; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives this opinion. Second (997:C 213()), he shows that it is false (“But while some”). He accordingly says, first (896), that the proof which was given above regarding the corruptible and the incorruptible is based on the meaning of these universal terms, i.e., inasmuch as one signifies a capacity and the other an incapacity. But, as it seems to certain men, it is not necessary that the corruptible and the incorruptible should differ specifically, just as this is not necessary for white and black, because it is admissible for the same thing to be both white and black, although in different ways. For if what is said to be white and black is something universal, it is white and black at the same time in different subjects. Thus it is true to say that man is at the same time both white, because of Socrates, and black, because of Plato. But if it is a singular thing, it will not be both white and black at the same time (although it can now be white and afterward black) since white and black are contraries. Thus some say that some things can be corruptible and some incorruptible within the same genus, and that the same singular thing can sometimes be corruptible and sometimes incorruptible.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit sed contrariorum excludit praedictam opinionem; dicens, quod contrariorum quaedam sunt in his de quibus dicuntur secundum accidens, sicut album et nigrum homini, de quibus nunc dictum est: et alia multa sunt huiusmodi contraria, in quibus locum habet quod dictum est, scilicet quod possunt simul esse in eadem specie, et successive in eodem singulari. Sed quaedam contraria sunt, de quibus hoc est impossibile; de quorum numero sunt corruptibile et incorruptibile.	2139. But while some (897). Here he rejects the foregoing opinion. He says that some contraries belong accidentally to the things of which they are predicated, as white and black belong to man, as has been mentioned already (892:C 2131); and there are many other contraries of this kind in reference to which the view stated is verified, i.e., that contraries can exist simultaneously in the same species and successively in the same singular thing. But there are other contraries which are incapable of this, and among these are the corruptible and the incorruptible.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 6 Non enim corruptibile inest secundum accidens alicui eorum de quibus praedicatur; quia quod est secundum accidens, contingit non inesse. Corruptibile autem ex necessitate inest his quibus inest. At si hoc non sit verum, sequeretur, quod unum et idem sit quandoque corruptibile et quandoque incorruptibile: quod est impossibile secundum naturam. (Licet per hoc non excludatur, quin virtus divina possit aliqua corruptibilia secundum suam naturam, incorruptibiliter conservare).	2140. For corruptible does not belong accidentally to any of the things of which it is predicated, because what is accidental is capable of not belonging to a thing. But corruptible belongs necessarily to the things in which it is present. If this were not so it would follow that the very same thing would sometimes be corruptible and sometimes incorruptible; but this is naturally impossible. (However, this does not prevent the divine power from being able to keep some things which are corruptible by their very nature from being corrupted.)
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 7 Sic igitur necesse est, cum corruptibile non praedicetur secundum accidens, quod aut significet substantiam eius de quo praedicatur, aut aliquid quod est in substantia. Est enim unumquodque corruptibile per materiam, quae est de substantia rei. Et similis ratio est de incorruptibili; quia utrumque ex necessitate inest. Sic igitur patet, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile opponuntur sicut secundum se praedicata; quae scilicet praedicantur de aliquo inquantum huiusmodi, secundum quod tale, et primo.	2141. Since the term corruptible, then, is not an accidental predicate, it must signify either the substance of the thing of which it is predicated or something belonging to the substance; for each thing is corruptible by reason of its matter, which belongs to its substance. The same argument applies to incorruptibility, because both belong to a thing necessarily. Hence it is evident that corruptible and incorruptible are opposed as essential predicates, which are predicated of a thing inasmuch as it is a thing of this kind, as such and primarily.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 8 Et ex hoc sequitur ex necessitate, quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sint genere diversa. Manifestum est enim quod contraria quae sunt in uno genere, non sunt de substantia illius generis. Non enim rationale et irrationale sunt de substantia animalis. Sed animal est potentia utrumque. Quodcumque autem genus accipiatur, oportet quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sint de intellectu eius. Unde impossibile est quod communicent in aliquo genere. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Nam corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non potest esse materia una. Genus autem, physice loquendo, a materia sumitur. Unde supra dictum est, quod ea quae non communicant in materia, sunt genere diversa. Logice autem loquendo, nihil prohibet quod conveniant in genere, inquantum conveniunt in una communi ratione, vel substantiae, vel qualitatis, vel alicuius huiusmodi.	2142. And from this it necessarily follows that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically; for it is evident that contraries which belong to one genus do not belong to the substance of that genus; for “rational” and “irrational” do not belong to the substance of animal. But animal is the one or the other potentially. And whatever genus may be taken, corruptible and incorruptible must pertain to its intelligible make-up. It is impossible, then, that they should have a common genus. And this is reasonable, for there cannot be a single matter for both corruptible and incorruptible things. Now speaking from the viewpoint of the philosophy of nature, genus is taken from the matter; and thus it was said above (890:C 2125) that things which do not have a common matter are other or different in genus. But speaking from the viewpoint of logic, nothing prevents them from having the same common genus inasmuch as they have one common definition, either that of substance or of quality or of quantity or something of this sort.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit palam igitur infert quoddam corollarium ex dictis; scilicet quod non possunt esse species separatae, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Ponunt enim duos homines, unum sensibilem qui est corruptibilis, et unum separatum qui est incorruptibilis, quem dicunt speciem vel ideam hominis. Species autem sive ideae dicuntur esse eadem specie, secundum Platonicos, cum singularibus. Et nomen speciei non aequivoce praedicatur de specie et de singulari, cum tamen incorruptibile et corruptibile etiam genere differant. Et ea quae sunt diversa genere plus distant, quam quae differunt specie.	2143. It is clearly impossible (898). Next he draws a corollary from his discussion, namely, that there cannot be separate Forms as the Platonists claimed; for they maintained that there are two men: a sensible man who is corruptible, and a separate man who is incorruptible, which they called the separate Form or Idea of man. But the separate Forms or Ideas are said to be specifically the same as individual things, according to the Platonists. And the name of the species is not predicated equivocally of the separate Form and of singular things, although the corruptible and the incorruptible differ even generically. And those things which differ generically are more widely separated than those which differ specifically.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 10 Attendendum est autem, quod licet philosophus ostenderit, quod quaedam contraria non faciunt differre specie, et quaedam faciunt differre etiam genere; tamen omnia contraria aliquo modo faciunt differre specie, si fiat comparatio contrariorum ad aliquod determinatum genus. Nam album et nigrum, licet non faciant differre specie in genere animalis, faciunt tamen differre specie in genere coloris. Et masculinum et femininum faciunt differre specie in genere sexus. Et animatum et inanimatum, licet faciant differre genere quantum ad infimas species, tamen quantum ad genus quod per se dividitur in animatum et inanimatum, faciunt differre specie tantum. Nam omnes differentiae generis sunt constitutivae specierum quarumdam, licet illae species possint genere esse diversa.	2144. Now it must be observed that although the Philosopher has shown that some contraries do not cause things to differ specifically, and that some cause things to differ even generically, none the less all contraries cause things to differ specifically in some way if the comparison between contraries is made with reference to some definite genus. For even though white and black do not cause difference in species within the same genus of animal, they do cause difference in species in the genus of color. And male and female cause difference in species in the genus of sex. And while living and nonliving cause difference in genus in reference to the lowest species, still in reference to the genus which is divided essentially into living and non-living they merely cause difference in species. For all differences of a genus constitute certain species, although these species can differ generically.
lib. 10 l. 12 n. 11 Corruptibile autem et incorruptibile dividunt per se ens: quia corruptibile est quod potest non esse, incorruptibile autem quod non potest non esse. Unde, cum ens non sit genus, non mirum si corruptibile et incorruptibile non conveniant in aliquo uno genere. Et haec de decimo libro.	2145. But corruptible and incorruptible divide being essentially, because that is corruptible which is capable of not being, and that is incorruptible which is incapable of not being. Hence, since being is not a genus, it is not surprising if the corruptible and the incorruptible do not have a common genus. This brings our treatment of Book X to a close.