Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber12/lect11

Lecture 11

Latin	English
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit de substantia immateriali quantum ad eius perfectionem et quantum ad eius unitatem, nunc determinat quasdam dubitationes pertinentes ad actionem eius. Ostensum est enim supra, quod prima immaterialis substantia movet sicut intelligibile, et sicut bonum desiderabile. Et ideo dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima determinat quaedam dubia circa primam immaterialem substantiam, quantum ad hoc quod est bonum intelligibile et intellectus. In secunda quantum ad hoc quod est bonum appetibile, ibi, perscrutandum est autem qualiter habet et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo assignat rationem dubitationis circa intellectum primae substantiae. Secundo dubitationem movet et determinat, ibi, nam si non intelligat. Dicit ergo primo, quod ea quae pertinent ad intellectum primae substantiae immaterialis, habent quasdam dubitationes, et videntur oriri ex hoc. Ostenderat enim philosophus quod intellectus intelligens et appetens primum movens, quod movet sicut intelligibile et desiderabile, habet aliquid se dignius, scilicet illud quod intelligitur ab eo, et desideratur. Ostenderat etiam quod ipsum primum intelligibile, est etiam intellectus. Unde posset videri quod pari ratione, haberet aliquid dignius et superius, et quod non esset supremum et optimum: quod est contra ea quae apparent de primo principio. Et ideo dicit hic, quod videtur omnibus apparens, quod principium sit dignissimum. Sed difficultates quaedam emergunt, si quis velit assignare quomodo se habeat ita quod sit dignissimum, idest optimum et perfectissimum.	2600. Having settled the issue about the perfection and oneness of this immaterial substance, the Philosopher now meets certain difficulties concerning its activity; for it has been shown above (1067-70:C 2519-35) that the first immaterial substance causes motion as an intelligible object and a desirable good. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1089:C 2600) he settles certain difficulties about the first immaterial substance insofar as it is an intelligible good and an intellect; and in the second (1102:C 2627), insofar as it is a desirable good (“We must also inquire”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reason for the difficulty concerning the intellect of the first substance. Second (1090:C 2901), he raises and meets this difficulty (“For if it is not”). He accordingly says, first (1089), that, the things which pertain to the intellect of the first immaterial substance involve certain difficulties, and these seem to arise as follows. The Philosopher has shown that the intellect which understands and desires the first inovrr, which causes inotion as an object of understanding and of desire, has something nobler than itself, namely, what is understood and desired by it. He has also shown that the first intelligible object itself is also an intellect. Hence for a like reason it could appear that the first intellect also has something nobler and higher than itself, and that it therefore is not the highest and best thing. But this is contrary to the truths which are apparent about the first principle; and so he says here that it seems evident to all that this principle is the noblest. Yet certain difficulties emerge if one wishes to explain how it is “noblest,” i.e., best and most perfect.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit nam si manifestat huiusmodi difficultates. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationes. Secundo praemittit quaedam, quae sunt praenecessaria ad determinationem omnium quaestionum motarum, ibi, palam ergo quod divinissimum et cetera. Tertio solvit dubitationes, ibi, primum quidem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestiones principaliter intentas. Secundo movet quamdam quaestionem incidentem, cuius solutio necessaria est ad praemissas quaestiones, ibi, ergo utrum differt. Movet autem primo duas quaestiones. Prima est, quomodo intellectus primi moventis se habeat ad suum intelligere. Secunda, quomodo se habeat ad suum intelligibile, ibi, amplius autem sive intellectus. Sciendum est ergo, quod intellectus ad suum intelligere potest se habere tripliciter. Uno modo quod non conveniat ei intelligere in actu, sed in potentia tantum, vel in habitu. Alio modo quod conveniat ei in actu. Alio modo quod sit ipsum suum intelligere, sive sua intelligentia, quod idem est.	2601. For if it is not (1090). Then he clears up these difficulties; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he raises the difficulties. Second (1093:C 2606), he prefaces his discussion with certain prerequisites for meeting all the questions raised (“Hence it is evident”). Third (1094:C 2608), he solves these difficulties (“Therefore, if the first mover”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (1090), he raises the qucstions in which he is chiefly interested. Second (1092:C 2604), he introduces an additional question whose solution is necessary for solving the questions raised (“Does it make”). First of all he raises two questions. He asks, first, how the intellect of the first mover is related to its own act of understanding; and second (1091:C 2603), how it is related to its own intelligible object (“Furthermore, whether”). Now it should be noted that an intellect can be related to its own act of understanding in three ways: first, actual understanding does not,belong to it but only potential or habitual understanding; second, actual understanding does belong to it; and third, it is identical with its own act of understanding or its own knowledge, which are the same thing.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 3 Dicit ergo, quod si intellectus primi moventis non intelligat in actu, sed solum in potentia, vel in habitu, non erit aliquid nobile: bonum enim et nobilitas intellectus est in hoc quod actu intelligit; intellectus autem intelligens tantum in potentia vel in habitu, se habet sicut dormiens: nam dormiens habet quidem potentias operum vitae, sed opera vitae non operatur: unde somnus dicitur esse dimidium vitae, et secundum somnum non differt felix ab infelice, virtuosus a vitioso. Si autem intellectus primi intellectus intelligat quidem actu, sed principale eius bonum, quod est operatio eius, sit aliquid aliud ab ipso, quia eius intelligentia, idest operatio intellectualis ipsius non est hoc quod sua substantia, comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, et perfectibile ad perfectionem. Et sic sequitur quod primum intelligens non sit optima substantia: honorabilitas enim et nobilitas inest ei per suum intelligere: nihil autem quod est nobile secundum aliud, est nobilissimum. Sic igitur videtur sequi quod substantia primi intelligentis non sit optima, sive intelligat in potentia tantum, sive in actu; nisi ponatur cum hoc quod sua substantia sit suum intelligere, ut post determinabit.	2602. He accordingly says, first (1090), that, if the intellect of the first mover is not actually understanding but only potentially or habitually understanding, it will have no dignity; for the goodness and nobility of an intellect consists in its actually understanding, and an intellect that is only potentially or habitually understanding is like one asleep. For one asleep has certain powers which enable him to perform vital optrations even though he is not using them, and thus he is said to be half alive; and during sleep there is no difference between happiness and unhappiness or between virtue and vice. But if the intellect of the first intelligence is actually understanding, yet its chief good, which is its activity, is something different from itself because its “act of understanding,” i.e., its intellectual activity, is not identical with its own essence, then its essence is related to its act of understanding as potentiality to actuality, and as something perfectible to its perfection. It accordingly follows that the first intellect is not the best substance; for it is by reason of its act of understamling that lionor and nobility belong to it, and nothing that is noble in comparison with something else is noblest in itself. It seems to follow, then, that the essence of the first intellect is not the best, whether it understands only potentially or actually, unless one assumes along with this that its very essence is identical with its act of understanding, as he will establish later on (1094:C 2608).
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem antequam solvat positam quaestionem, movet aliam de intelligibili. Unde dicit, quod sive substantia primi moventis sit intellectus, quasi quaedam potentia intellectiva, sive sit intelligentia, idest actus intellectus, idest intelligere, quod prima quaestio quaerebat, quaerendum restat quid intelligit? Aut enim intelligit seipsum, aut aliquid aliud. Si intelligit aliquid aliud, aut intelligit semper idem, aut oportet quod intelligat aliud et aliud; quandoque, scilicet, hoc, quandoque illud.	2603. Furthermore, whether its substance (1091). Before he answers the questions raised he asks another about the intelligible object of the first mover. He says that, whether the essence of the first mover is its power to understand or its “act of understanding,” i.e., its intellectual activity or thought (this was the first question raised), we must still ask what it understands? For it understands either itself or something else. And if it understands something else, it must understand either the same thing always or something different, i.e., sometimes one thing and sometimes another.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit ergo utrum antequam solvat praemissas quaestiones, interponit quamdam quaestionem, cuius solutio valet ad determinationem praemissarum. Et est quaestio utrum ad nobilitatem vel perfectionem intellectus aliquid differat, vel nihil, quod intelligatur aliquid bonum et nobile, aut quodcumque contingit.	2604. Does it make any difference (1092). So before he answers the foregoing questions, he introduces another question whose solution is useful in giving the answer; that is, whether it makes any difference or none at all to the nobility or perfection of the intellect that it should understand what is good and noble or what is contingent. 26o5. By using an instance he shows that it does make a difference, because it seems incongruous and unreasonable that anyone should ponder or employ the operation of his intellect on things that are base. That this should not be the case would demand that the nobility of the intellect be independent of the nobility of its object, and that the understanding of base things be no different from the understanding of good things. But this is quite impossible, since activities are evidently specified by their proper objects. Hence the nobler an object, the nobler must be the operation.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 6 Et quod differat, quodam signo ostendit: quia inconveniens videretur et absurdum, quod aliquis meditetur, et operationem sui intellectus occupet circa quaedam vilia. Quod non esset, si non pertineret ad nobilitatem intellectus nobilitas intelligibilis, sed indifferens esset intelligere nobilia et vilia. Hoc enim omnino est impossibile. Manifestum est enim, quod operationes secundum propria obiecta specificantur. Unde oportet, quod quanto nobilius est obiectum, tanto nobilior sit operatio.	2605. By using an instance he shows that it does make a difference, because it seems incongruous and unreasonable that anyone should ponder or employ the operation of his intellect on things that are base. That this should not be the case would demand that the nobility of the intellect be independent of the nobility of its object, and that the understanding of base things be no different from the understanding of good things. But this is quite impossible, since activities are evidently specified by their proper objects. Hence the nobler an object, the nobler must be the operation.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit palam ergo praemittit quaedam necessaria ad solutionem principalium quaestionum. Et primo ponit duo: quorum primum concludit ex solutione interpositae quaestionis. Si enim differt ad nobilitatem intellectus intelligere bonum, aut quodcumque contingens, ut dictum est; manifestum est, quod cum primus intellectus sit nobilissimus, quod intelligit aliquid divinissimum et honoratissimum.	2606. Hence it is evident (1093). He prefaces his discussion with certain points necessary for answering the main questions. First, he gives two points. He infers the first of these from the solution of the question which he interjected. For, if it does make a difference to the nobility of the intellect whether it understands what is good or what is contingent, as has been stated (1092:C 2605), then, since the first intellect is the noblest, it obviously knows what is most divine and most honorable.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 8 Secundum, quod determinata est solutio ultimae partis secundae quaestionis principalis. Quaerebatur enim utrum intellectus primi mutaretur de uno in aliud. Et patet quod non mutatur de uno intellecto in aliud; quia cum intelligat divinissimum, si mutaretur in aliud intelligibile, esset eius mutatio in aliquid indignius, quod non competit alicui, nisi tendenti in defectionem et corruptionem. Iterum hoc ipsum quod est transire de uno intellecto in aliud, est quidam motus: unde non potest competere primo moventi, cum sit omnino immobile.	2607. The second point is the solution given to the last part of the second main question. The question was whether the intellect of the first mover changes from one intelligible object to another. Now it is evident that it does not change from one object to another. For, since it understands what is most divine, if it were to change from one object to another, it would change to a less noble one; but this is fitting only to something tending to defect and destruction. Moreover, this change from one intelligible object to another would be a kind of motion; and therefore it could not be fitting to the first mover, since he is immovable in every respect.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit primum quidem solvit prius positas quaestiones. Et primo ponit veritatem primae. Secundo veritatem secundae, ibi, deinde palam et cetera. Veritatem autem primae quaestionis manifestat dicens, quod si substantia primi non est intelligentia, idest ipsum suum intelligere, sed est potentia quaedam intellectiva, rationabile est, idest probabiliter videtur sequi, quod continuatio intelligentiae, idest operationis intellectualis, sit ei laboriosa. Quod enim est in potentia ad aliquid, se habet ad hoc et ad eius oppositum; quia quod potest esse, potest non esse; unde si substantia primi comparatur ad intelligere sicut potentia ad actum, quantum est de ratione suae substantiae, poterit intelligere et non intelligere: non ergo inerit ei ex sua substantia quod continue intelligat.	2608. Therefore, if the first mover (1094). He nows answers the questions first raised. First, he gives the correct solution to the first question; and second (1095:C 2611), the solution to the second question (“Second, that”). He answers the first question as follows. If the substance of the first mover “is not its act of understanding,” i.e., its own intellectual activity, but an intellective potency, “it is reasonable,” i.e., it seems to follow as a probable conclusion, that “the continuity of its act of understanding,” i.e., of its intellectual operation, is laborious to it. For whatever is in potentiality to something else is related hoth to this something else and to its opposite, because what can be can also not be. Hence, if the substance of the first mover is related to its act of understanding as potentiality to actuality, then according to the nature of its own substance it will be able both to understand and not to understand. Therefore continuous understanding will not be proper to it by reason of its own substance.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 10 Ut autem non se habeat aliquando sicut dormiens, necesse est quod continuationem intelligentiae adipiscatur ex aliquo alio. Quod autem aliquis adipiscitur, et non habet hoc ex sui natura, probabile est quod sit ei cum labore, eo quod sic invenitur in nobis: nam in continue operando laboramus. Non autem est necessarium; quia quod aliquid acquirit ab alio non est laboriosum, nisi vel ipsum, vel aliquid aliud continuans ipsum, sit contra naturam. Unde licet continuitas motus caeli dependeat ab extrinseco, non tamen caelum movetur cum labore.	2609. In order not to be sometimes like one asleep it must derive the continuity of its intellectual activity from something else. Now whatever a thing acquires from something else and does not have by its own nature is probably laborious to it, because this is true in our case; for when we act continuously we labor. But this conclusion is not necessary, because that which one thing acquires from something else is laborious to it only if the thing acquired or something connected with it is contrary to its nature. Therefore, even though the continuity of the motion of the heavens depends on some external principle, such motion is not laborious.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 11 Fuit igitur Aristoteles hic contentus inducere ad inconveniens quod probabiliter sequitur; quia inconveniens quod ex necessitate sequitur est manifestum, scilicet quod bonum et perfectio primi moventis dependeat ab aliquo superiori; non enim esset primum et optimum.	2610. Hence Aristotle was content here to reduce to absurdity the probable conclusion which follows, because the untenable conclusion which necessarily follows is evident, namely, that the goodness and perfection of the first mover will depend on some higher entity; for then it would not be the first and best.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit deinde palam solvit secundam quaestionem. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo determinat veritatem secundae quaestionis. Secundo obiicit in contrarium, ibi, et est intelligentia, et cetera. Tertio solvit, ibi, aut in quibusdam. Dicit ergo primo, quod postquam ostensum est, quod substantia primi non est potentia intellectiva, sed est ipsa intelligentia, ex hoc palam est, quod si primum non intelligit seipsum, sed aliquid aliud, sequitur quod aliquid aliud erit dignius quam primum, idest intellectum ab ipso.	2611. Second, that there is (1095). He now answers the second question; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he establishes the correct answer to the second question. Second (1096:C 2617), he argues on the opposite side of the question (“And its act of understanding”). Third (1098:C 2619), he answers the arguments given (“But in certain cases”). He accordingly says, first (1095), that, since it has been shown (1094:C 2608) that the substance of the first mover is not an intellective potency but is itself an act of understanding, it is evident from this that, if the first mover does not understand itself but something else, it follows that this other thing, i.e., what is understood by it, is nobler than the first mover.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 13 Quod sic probat. Ipsum intelligere in actu, quod est intelligentia, convenit alicui etiam intelligenti quodcumque indignissimum. Unde patet quod intelligere aliquod in actu, est fugiendum; quia dignius est quod quaedam non videantur in actu, quam quod videantur. Non autem hoc esset, si intelligentia esset optimum; quia tunc nullum intelligere esset vitandum. Cum ergo aliquod intelligere sit vitandum propter indignitatem intelligibilis, relinquitur quod nobilitas eius, quod est intelligere, dependeat ex nobilitate intelligibilis. Dignius est igitur ipsum intellectum quam ipsum intelligere.	2612. He proves this as follows. Actual understanding itself, i.e., thinking, also belongs to one who understands the basest thing. Hence it is evident that some actual understanding must be avoided, because there are some things which it is better not to see than to see. But this would not be the case if the act of understanding were the best of things, because then no act of understanding would have ic, be avoided. Therefore, since some act of understanding must be avoided because of the baseness of the thing understood, it follows that the nobility of the intellect, which is found in its understanding, will depend on the nobility of its object. Hence the intelligible object is nobler than the act of understanding.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 14 Cum igitur ostensum sit quod primum sit suum intelligere, sequitur, si intelligat aliud a se, quod illud aliud erit eo nobilius. Cum igitur ipsum sit nobilissimum et potentissimum, necesse est quod intelligat seipsum, et quod in eo sit idem intellectus et intellectum.	2613. Since it has been shown that the first mover is its own act of understanding, it follows that if it understands something different from itself, this other thing will be nobler than it is. Therefore, since the first mover is the noblest and most powerful, it must understand itself; and in its case intellect and thing understood must be the same.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 15 Considerandum est autem quod philosophus intendit ostendere, quod Deus non intelligit aliud, sed seipsum, inquantum intellectum est perfectio intelligentis, et eius, quod est intelligere. Manifestum est autem quod nihil aliud sic potest intelligi a Deo, quod sit perfectio intellectus eius. Nec tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a se sint ei ignota; nam intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia.	2614. Now we must bear in mind that the Philosopher’s aim is to show that God does not understand something else but only himself, inasmuch as the thing understood is the perfection of the one understanding and of his activity, which is understanding. It is also evident that nothing else can be understood by God in such a way that it would be the perfection of His intellect. It does not follow, however, that all things different from Himself are not known by Him; for by understanding Himself He knows all other things.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 16 Quod sic patet. Cum enim ipse sit ipsum suum intelligere, ipsum autem est dignissimum et potentissimum, necesse est quod suum intelligere sit perfectissimum: perfectissime ergo intelligit seipsum. Quanto autem aliquod principium perfectius intelligitur, tanto magis intelligitur in eo effectus eius: nam principiata continentur in virtute principii. Cum igitur a primo principio, quod est Deus, dependeat caelum et tota natura, ut dictum est, patet, quod Deus cognoscendo seipsum, omnia cognoscit.	2615. This is made clear as follows. Since God is His own act of understanding and is the noblest and most powerful being, His act of understanding must be most perfect. Therefore He understands Himself most perfectly. Now the more perfectly a principle is known, the more perfectly is its effect known in it; for things derived from principles are contained in the power of their principle. Therefore, since the heavens and the whole of nature del pend on the first principle, which is God, God obviously knows all things by understanding Himself.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 17 Nec vilitas alicuius rei intellectae derogat dignitati. Non enim intelligere actu aliquod indignissimum est fugiendum, nisi inquantum intellectus in eo sistit, et dum illud actu intelligit, retrahitur a dignioribus intelligendis. Si enim intelligendo aliquod dignissimum etiam vilia intelligantur, vilitas intellectorum intelligentiae nobilitatem non tollit.	2616. And the baseness of any object of knowledge does not lessen His dignity; for the actual understanding of anything more base is to be avoided only insofar as the intellect becomes absorbed in it, and when in actually understanding that thing the intellect is drawn away from the understanding of nobler things. For if in understanding some noblest object base things are also understood, the baseness of the things understood does not lessen the nobility of the act of understanding.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit et est intelligentia obiicit contra veritatem determinatam dupliciter. Primo quidem sic. Primum intelligit seipsum, ut ostensum est, et iterum supra ostensum est, quod primum est sua intelligentia: ergo intelligentia primi non est aliud quam intelligentia intelligentiae. Sed hoc est contra id quod videtur; quia actus sensus, et scientia, et opinio, et meditatio semper videntur esse alterius. Et si aliquando sint suiipsius, sicut cum aliquis sentit se sentire, vel scit se scire, vel opinatur se opinari, vel meditatur se meditari, hoc est quidem praeter opus vel praeter actum principalem: nam hic videtur principalis actio, ut aliquis intelligat intelligibile. Quod autem aliquis intelligat se intelligere intelligibile, hoc videtur esse praeter principalem actum, quasi accessorium quoddam. Unde si intelligere primi non sit nisi intelligentia intelligentiae, videtur sequi quod suum intelligere non sit principalissimum.	2617. And its act of understanding (1096). Then he raises two objections against the correct solution. The first is as follows. The first mover understands himself, as has been shown above (1095:C 2615); and he is his own act of understanding, as has also been shown (1094:C 2608). Hence his act of understanding does not differ f rom his act of understanding his own thought. But this is contrary to what seems to be true, because perception, science, opinion and thought always seem to be about something else. And if they are sometimes about themselves, as when someone perceives that he perceives, or knows that he knows, or is of the opinion that he has an opinion, or thinks that he is thinking, this seems to be something in addition to the principal act or operation; for the principal act here seems to be that whereby someone understands an intelligible object. But that someone should understand that he is understanding something intelligible seems to be accessory to the principal act. Thus if the first mover’s act of understanding consists solely in his understanding his own thought, it seems to follow that his act of understanding is not the most important thing.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit amplius si aliud secundo obiicit alio modo. Manifestum est, quod aliud est intelligere et intelligi. Et si contingat quod idem subiecto sit intellectus, et ipsum intellectum, non tamen sunt idem ratione. Si ergo primum est suum intelligere, et est ipsum quod intelligitur, quod est optimum, videbitur dubium remanere secundum quid insit ei hoc quod est bene esse eius; utrum scilicet secundum hoc quod est intelligentia, vel secundum quod est intellectum.	2618. Again, if understanding (1097). Then he raises a second objection against the correct solution. He says that the act of understanding and the thing understood are obviously different; and even if it were possible for an intellect and its object to be the same in reality, they would not be the same in their formal structure. Hence, if the first mover is himself both his act of understanding and the object that is being understood, which is the best of things, there still seems to be the problem as to which of these confers goodness on him, namely, his act of understanding or the thing understood.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit an in quibusdam solvit positas obiectiones, dicens, quod in quibusdam res scita idem est quod scientia. Et hoc manifestat dividendo scientiam: nam scientia alia est factiva, et alia speculativa. In factivis autem scientiis, res scita sine materia accepta, est ipsa scientia. Sicut patet, quod domus sine materia, prout est in mente aedificatoris, est ipsa ars aedificativa; et similiter sanitas in mente medici est ars medicativa. Et sic patet, quod ars factiva nihil aliud est quam substantia rei factae, et quod quid erat esse eius. Omnis enim artifex procedit in opus ex eo quod considerat quid est quod operari intendit.	2619. But in certain cases (1098). He now answers the objections raised. He says that in certain cases the thing understood is the same as the knowledge of it. This becomes clear when we draw a distinction between the sciences; for one kind of science is productive and another is speculative. In the case of a productive science the thing understood, taken without matter, is the science of that thing; for example, it is clear that a house without matter, insofar as it exists in the mind of the builder, is the very art of building; and similarly health in the mind of the physician is the medical art itself. Thus a productive art is evidently nothing else than the substance or quid, dity of the thing made; for every artist proceeds to his work from a knowledge of the quiddity which he intends to produce.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 21 In speculativis vero scientiis manifestum est, quod ipsa ratio definitiva rei est res scita, et est ipsa scientia sive intelligentia. Per hoc enim est sciens intellectus, per quod habet rationem rei. Cum igitur intellectus in actu et intellectum non sit alterum, in his quaecumque materiam non habent, manifestum est quod in substantia prima, quae maxime remota est a materia, maxime idem est intelligere et intellectum. Et sic una est intelligentia intellecti tantum, et non est aliud intelligentia intellecti, et aliud intelligentia intelligentiae.	2620. In the case of the speculative sciences it is evident that the concept, which defines the thing itself, is the thing understood and the science or knowledge of that thing. For an intellect has knowledge by reason of the fact that it possesses the concept of a thing. Therefore, since in the case of all those things which do not have matter the intellect when actually understanding does not differ from the thing understood, then in the case of the first substance, which is separate from matter in the highest degree, the act of understanding and the thing understood are evidently the same in the highest degree. Hence there is just one act of understanding pertaining to the thing understood; that is, the act of understanding the thing understood is not distinct from that of understanding the act of understanding.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 22 Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem movet tertiam dubitationem praeter duas prius determinatas. Cum enim ostensum sit, quod primum intelligit seipsum aliquid autem intelligitur dupliciter: uno modo per modum simplicis intellectus, sicut intelligimus quod quid est; alio modo per modum compositi, sicut intelligimus enunciationem: restat igitur quaerendum, utrum primum intelligat seipsum, per modum intellectus simplicis aut compositi. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod restat dubitatio si quod intelligitur a Deo est compositum.	2621. Yet the difficulty (1099). Here he raises a third question in addition to the two dealt with above. For since it has been shown (1074:C 2544) that the first mover understands himself, and a thing is understood in two ways: first, by way of a simple understanding, as we understand a quiddity, and second, by way of a composite understanding, as we know a proposition, the question therefore arises whether the first mover understands himself by way of a simple understanding, or by way of a composite one. This is what he refers to when he says that the difficulty still remains whether the object of God’s understanding is composite.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 23 Ostendit autem quod non sit compositum, cum dicit, transmutabitur enim: et hoc tripliciter. Primo quidem sic. In omni intellecto composito sunt plures partes, quae seorsum intelligi possunt. Licet enim hoc intellectum compositum, quod est,- homo currit,- prout est unum intellectum compositum, simul intelligatur, tamen partes eius seorsum intelligi possunt. Potest enim intelligi hoc quod est - homo - per se, et hoc quod est - currit. Sic igitur quicumque intelligit aliquod intellectum compositum, potest transmutari intelligendo de una parte in aliam. Si igitur intellectum primum sit compositum, sequitur quod potest transmutari intelligendo de parte in partem. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est.	2622. Now he shows that it is not composite when he says (1099) “for if it is”; and he gives three arguments in support of this. The first goes as follows. In every composite object of understanding there are several parts, which can be understood separately. For even though this composite object of understanding Man runs, insofar as it is one composite object, is understood all at once, none the less its parts can be understood separately. For the term man can be understood by itself, and so also can the term runs. Hence, whoever understands some composite object can be changed when his act of understanding passes from one part to another. Therefore, if the first intelligible object is composite, it follows that the intellect can change when its act of understanding passes from one part of this object to another. But the contrary of this has been proved above (1098:C 2619).
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 24 Deinde cum dicit aut indivisibile secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Omne quod non habet materiam, est simplex et indivisibile: sed intellectum primum est immateriale: ergo est simplex et indivisibile.	2623. Now whatever (1100). Then he gives the second argument. Whatever does not have matter is Simple and indivisible. But the first intellect does not have matter. Therefore it is simple and indivisible.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 25 Ponit autem exemplum de humano intellectu. Quod quidem exemplum potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo secundum similitudinem, ut intelligatur quod humanus intellectus sit secundum suam essentiam indivisibilis, quia est forma omnino immaterialis.	2624. He gives as an example the human intellect, and this example can be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken as a comparison, meaning that the human intellect is indivisible in its own essence, because it is an immaterial form in every respect.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 26 Alio modo, et melius, potest intelligi secundum dissimilitudinem, ut sit sensus quod humanus intellectus intelligit compositum, quia accipit sua intelligibilia a rebus materialibus, quod non est de intellectu primi.	2625. It can also be taken in a second and better way as a contrast, meaning that the human intellect knows composite things because it derives its intelligible objects from material things. And this is not true of the first intellect.
lib. 12 l. 11 n. 27 Deinde cum dicit aut quod tertiam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Intellectus qui est intelligibilium compositorum, habet suam perfectionem non semper, sed in aliquo tempore. Quod sic patet, quia non habet suum bonum in hac parte vel in illa: sed illud quod est optimum eius, est quoddam aliud, quod est in quodam toto. Unde etiam verum (quod est bonum intellectus) non est in incomplexis, sed in complexo. Simplicia autem priora sunt generatione et tempore quam composita: unde illud quod non habet suum bonum in partibus, quae seorsum accipi possunt, sed in toto, quod ex eis constituitur, habet suum bonum per aliquod tempus, et non semper. Sed intelligentia primi, quae est suiipsius, aeternaliter et eodem modo se habet: intellectum ergo primi non est compositum.	2626. And the act (1101). He gives the third argument. An act of understanding which is concerned with composite things does not possess its perfection always but attains it over a period of time. This is clear from the fact that it does not attain its good in knowing one part or another, but its greatest good is something else, which is a kind of whole. Hence the truth (which is the good of the intellect), is not found in simple things but in a composite one. Further, simple things are prior to composite things as regards both generation and time, so that whatever does not possess its own good in knowing parts which can be understood separately but in knowing the whole which is constituted of them, attains its good at some particular moment and does not always possess it.—However, the first mover’s act of understanding, which is of himself, is eternal and always in the same state. Therefore the thing understood by the intellect of the first mover is not composite.