Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber12/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam ostendit quod consideratio philosophi principaliter de substantiis est, hic incipit de substantiis determinare: et dividitur in partes duas. In prima dividit substantiam. In secunda de partibus divisionis determinat, ibi, sensibilis vero substantia. Dicit ergo primo, quod tres sunt substantiae. Una quidem est sensibilis, quae in duo genera dividitur. Nam substantiarum sensibilium quaedam sunt sempiternae, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam vero sunt corruptibiles. Substantia vero sensibilis et corruptibilis nota est omnibus, sicut sunt plantae et animalia.	2424. Having explained that philosophy is concerned chiefly with substances, here the Philosopher begins to deal with substances. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1028:C 2424) he makes a division of substance; and in the second (1029:C 2428) he treats the parts of this division (“Sensible substance”). He accordingly says, first (1028), that there are three classes of substances. One is sensible, and this is divided into two kinds; for some sensible substances are eternal (the celestial bodies) and others perishable. Sensible and perishable substances, such as animals and plants, are recognized by all.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 2 Sed alia substantia sensibilis, scilicet sempiterna, est cuius principia quaerere intendimus in hoc libro; scilicet si unum sit eorum principium vel multa. Hoc enim inquiret considerando de substantiis separatis, quae sunt principia moventia et fines corporum caelestium, ut infra patebit. Ponit autem hic large elementa loco principiorum. Nam elementum proprie non est nisi causa intrinseca.	2425. But it is “the other class of sensible substance,” i.e., the eternal, whose principles we aim to discover in this book, whether their principles are one or many. He will investigate this by considering the separate substances, which arc both the sources of motion and the ends of the celestial bodies, as will be made clear below (1086:C 2590-92). He uses elements in the broad sense here in place of principles; for strictly an element is only an intrinsic cause.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 3 Tertium vero genus est substantiae immobilis, quae non est sensibilis. Et haec non est omnibus manifesta, sed quidam ponunt eam esse separabilem a sensibilibus. Quorum opinio diversificatur. Quidam enim dividunt substantiam separabilem in duo genera: scilicet in species, quas vocant ideas, et mathematica. Sicut enim invenitur secundum rationem duplex modus separationis: unus quo separantur mathematica a materia sensibili, alius quo separantur universalia a particularibus: ita et secundum rem ponebant et universalia esse separata, quae dicebant species, et etiam mathematica. Sed quidam haec duo, scilicet species et mathematica, in unam naturam reducebant. Utrique igitur hi erant Platonici. Sed alii, scilicet Pythagorici, non ponebant species, sed solum mathematica.	2426. The third class of substance is the immovable and imperceptible. This class is not evident to all, but some men claim that it is separate from sensible things. The opinions of these men differ; for some divide separate substances into two kinds—the separate Forms, which they call Ideas, and the objects of mathematics. For just as a twofold method of separating is found in reason, one by which the objects of mathematics are separated from sensible matter, and another by which universals are separated from particular things, in a similar way they maintained that both universals, which they called separate Forms, and also the objects of mathematics, are separate in reality. But others reduced these two classes—the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics—to one nature. Both of these groups were Platonists. But another group, the Pythagoreans, did not posit separate Forms, but only the objects of mathematics.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 4 Inter haec autem tria genera substantiarum hoc differt: quia substantiae sensibiles, sive sint corruptibiles sive perpetuae, pertinent ad considerationem naturalis philosophiae, quae determinat de ente mobili. Huiusmodi enim substantiae sensibiles sunt in motu. Substantia autem separabilis et immobilis pertinet ad considerationem alterius scientiae, et non ad eamdem, si tamen nullum principium sit commune utrisque substantiis: quia si in aliquo conveniant, pertinebit utrarumque substantiarum consideratio ad illam scientiam, quae illud commune considerat. Et ideo naturalis scientia considerat solum de substantiis sensibilibus, inquantum sunt in actu et in motu. Et ideo tam de his etiam quam de substantiis immobilibus considerat haec scientia, inquantum communicant in hoc quod sunt entia et substantiae.	2427. Among these three classes of substances there is this difference, namely, that sensible substances, whether they are perishable or eternal, belong to the consideration of the philosophy of nature, which establishes the nature of movable being; for sensible substances of this kind are in motion. But separable and immovable substances belong to the study of a different science and not to the, same science if there is no principle common to both kinds of substance; for if there were a common principle, the study of both kinds of substance would belong to the science which considers that common principle. The philosophy of nature, then, considers sensible substances only inasmuch as they are actual and in motion. Hence this science (first philosophy) considers both sensible substances and immovable substances inasmuch as both are beings and substances.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit sensibilis vero determinat de praemissis substantiis. Et primo de substantia sensibili. Secundo de substantiis immobilibus, ibi, sed quoniam tres sunt. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima inquirit principia substantiae sensibilis. In secunda inquirit utrum sint eadem principia substantiae et aliorum generum, ibi, causae vero et principia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo inquirit de materia. Secundo de forma, ibi, tres vero causae et tria principia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo determinat veritatem de materia. Secundo solvit dubitationem, ibi, dubitabit autem aliquis ex quo. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim manifestat materiam esse in sensibilibus, et quale ens sit. Secundo, quomodo diversimode invenitur in diversis substantiis sensibilibus, ibi, omnia vero materiam habent. Circa primum duo facit. Primo quod dictum est. Secundo solvit argumentum ex quo aliqui antiqui negaverunt generationem, ibi, quoniam autem duplex. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit materiam esse in sensibilibus. Secundo vero ostendit quale ens sit materia, ibi, si itaque transmutationes. Dicit ergo primo, quod substantia sensibilis est mutabilis, ut dictum est. Omnis autem mutatio est ex oppositis, aut ex mediis, ut supra ostensum est. Non autem est mutatio ex quibuscumque oppositis: fit enim album ex non albo, non tamen ex quolibet non albo: nam vox est non album; sed corpus non fit album ex voce, sed ex non albo, quod est nigrum vel medium. Et ideo dicit quod mutatio fit ex opposito, quod est contrarium. Nec est instantia de substantia in qua fit mutatio, cum tamen substantiae nihil sit contrarium; quia in substantia est privatio quae quodammodo computatur inter contraria, ut in decimo ostensum est.	2428. Sensible substance (1029). Then he establishes the truth about the above-mentioned substances. He does this, first (1029:C 2429), with regard to sensible substances; and second (1055:C 2488), with regard to immovable substances (“And since there are three”). The first is divided into two parts. First, he investigates the principles of sensible substances; and second (1042:C 2455), he inquires whether the principles of substances and those of the other categories are the same (“In one sense”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he investigates the nature of matter; and second (1035:C 2440, the nature of form (“The causes or principles”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states his views about matter. Second (1034:C 2437), he meets a difficulty (“And one might raise the question”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that there is matter in sensible substances; and he also shows what kind of being matter is. Second (1033:C 2436), he shows how matter differs in different kinds of sensible substances (“Now all things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proceeds as described. Second (1031:C 2432), he meets an argument by which some of the ancient philosophers denied generation (“And since being is twofold”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that there is matter in sensible substances. Second (1030:C 431), he shows what kind of being matter is (“If, then, there are”). He accordingly says, first (1029), that sensible substance is changeable, as has been pointed out, and every change is either from opposites or from intermediates, as has been shown above (384:C 723-24). Yet change does not proceed from any opposites whatever; for the white comes from the not-white, but not from just any not-white; for a word is not-white, yet a body does not become white from a word, but from a not-white which is black or some intermediate color. Hence he says that change proceeds from an opposite which is a contrary. And there can be no rejoinder based on change in substance on the ground that there is nothing contrary to substance. For in substance there is privation which is included in a sense among contraries, as has been shown in Book X (853:C 2050-53).
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 6 Quia igitur omnis mutatio est de contrario in contrarium, necesse est subesse aliquod subiectum, quod possit mutari de contrario in contrarium. Et hoc philosophus probat dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia unum contrariorum non transmutatur in alterum; non enim ipsa nigredo fit albedo. Unde, si debeat fieri transmutatio de nigro in album, oportet aliquid esse praeter nigredinem quod fiat album.	2429. Hence, since every change is from one contrary to another, there must be some underlying subject which can be changed from one contrary to another. The Philosopher proves this in two ways. First, he argues on the ground that one contrary is not changed into another; for blackness itself does not become whiteness, so that, if there is a change from black to white, there must be something besides blackness which becomes white.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 7 Alio modo probat idem ex hoc, quod in qualibet transmutatione invenitur aliquid manens; sicut in transmutatione, quae est de nigro in album, corpus manet; aliud vero, scilicet contrarium, ut puta nigrum, non manet. Unde manifestum est, quod materia est aliquid tertium praeter contraria.	2430. He proves the same point in another way, namely, from the fact that throughout every change something is found to remain. For example, in a change from black to white a body remains, whereas the other thing —the contrary black—does not remain. Therefore it is evident that matter is some third entity besides the contraries.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit si itaque ostendit cuiusmodi ens sit materia; et dicit, quod transmutationes sunt quatuor: generatio quidem et corruptio simplex secundum substantiam; et augmentum et diminutio secundum quantitatem; alteratio secundum passionem, quae est tertia species qualitatis; latio, idest loci mutatio, secundum ubi. Et manifestum est, quod omnes istae transmutationes erunt secundum contrarietates, quae sunt secundum unumquodque horum generum: ut puta, alteratio in contrarietatem qualitatis; augmentum in contrarietatem quantitatis, et sic de aliis. Et ita, cum in qualibet transmutatione sit quoddam tertium praeter contrarium, quod dicitur materia, necesse est, quod id quod transmutatur, sive subiectum transmutationis, quantum est de se, sit in potentia ad utrumque contrarium. Aliter enim non esset susceptivum utriusque, nec posset de uno in aliud transmutari. Sicut igitur corpus, quod transmutatur de albedine in nigredinem, inquantum est corpus, est in potentia ad utrumque, ita materia in generatione substantiae, quae est subiectum generationis et corruptionis, quantum est de se, est in potentia ad formam et privationem, nec formam nec privationem, quantum est de se, actu habens.	2431. If, then, there are (1030). He now shows what kind of being matter is. He says that there are four kinds of change: simple generation and destruction, which is change in substance; increase and decrease, which is change in quantity; alteration, which is change in affections (and constitutes the third species of quality); and “local motion,” or change of place, which pertains to the where of a thing. Now it has been shown that all of these changes involve the contrarieties that belong to each of these classes; for example, alteration involves contrariety of quality, increase involves contrariety of quantity, and so on for the others. And since in every change there is besides the contraries some third entity which is called matter, the thing undergoing the change, i.e., the subject of the change, considered just in itself, must be in potentiality to both contraries, otherwise it would not be susceptible of both or admit of change from one to the other. Thus, just as a body which is changed from white to black, qua body, is in potentiality to each of the two contraries, in a similar way in the generation of substance the matter, as the subject of generation and destruction, is of itself in potentiality both to form and to privation, and has actually of itself neither form nor privation.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem hic philosophus secundum veritatem determinat de ipsa materia. Circa quod duo facit. Primo solvit dubitationem. Secundo ostendit quomodo aliqui antiqui dixerunt simile praedictae solutioni, ibi, et hoc est Anaxagorae. Solvit autem hanc dubitationem antiquorum naturalium philosophorum, qui removebant generationem propter hoc, quod non credebant quod posset aliquid fieri ex non ente, quia ex nihilo fit nihil; nec etiam ex ente, quia sic esset antequam fieret.	2432. And since being (1031). Here the Philosopher establishes the truth about matter itself, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he meets a difficulty. Second (1032:C 2435), he shows how some of the ancient philosophers offered a solution similar to the one mentioned above (“And this is the ‘One’”). He meets the difficulty of the ancient philosophers who did away with generation because they did not think that anything could come from non-being, since nothing comes from nothing, or that anything could come from being, since a thing would then be before it came to be.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 10 Hanc ergo dubitationem philosophus solvit, ostendendo qualiter aliquid fit ex ente et ex non ente; dicens, quod duplex est ens, scilicet ens actu, et ens potentia. Omne igitur, quod transmutatur, transmutatur ex ente in potentia in actu ens; sicut cum aliquid alteratur ex albo in potentia in actu album. Et similiter est in motu ipsius augmenti et decrementi; quia transmutatur aliquid de potentia magno vel parvo, in actu magnum vel parvum. Unde et in genere substantiae fiunt omnia ex non ente et ente. Ex non ente quidem secundum accidens, inquantum fit aliquid ex materia subiecta privationi, secundum quam dicitur non ens. Sed per se fit aliquid ex ente, non autem in actu, sed in potentia, scilicet ex materia, quae est ens in potentia, ut supra ostensum est.	2433. The Philosopher meets this difficulty by showing how a thing comes to be both from being and from non-being. He says that being is twofold—actual and potential. Hence everything which is changed is changed from a state of potential being to one of actual being; for example, a thing is changed from being potentially white to being actually white. The same thing holds true of the motion of increase and decrease, since something is changed from being potentially large or small to being actually large or small. In the category of substance, then, all things come to be both from being and from non-being. A thing comes to be accidentally from non-being inasmuch as it comes to be from a matter subject to privation, in reference to which it is called non-being. And a thing comes to be essentially from being—not actual being but potential being—i.e., from matter, which is potential being, as has been shown above (1030:C 2431).
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 11 Sciendum est autem, quod praedictae positioni antiquorum naturalium negantium generationem et dicentium, quod generatio non est aliud quam alteratio, voluerunt obviare quidam posteriores dicentes generationem esse per segregationem ab aliquo mixto et confuso.	2434. Now it should be borne in mind that certain later thinkers wanted to oppose the above-mentioned principle of the ancient philosophers of nature (who denied generation and destruction and claimed that generation is merely alteration) when they said that generation comes about through detachment from some mixture or confused mass.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 12 Philosophus ergo tertio cum dicit et hoc est ostendit quod etiam omnes sic dicentes, aliquid simile praedictae positioni dicere voluerunt, sed non attingunt. Dicit ergo quod hoc, scilicet materia quae est ens in potentia ad omnia, esse illud unum quod Anaxagoras posuit. Dicebat enim quod omne quod generatur ex aliquo, est in eo ex quo generatur. Et sic a principio omnia erant mixta in quodam uno, nesciens distinguere inter potentiam et actum. Sed dignius est ponere materiam, in qua omnia sunt in potentia, quam ponere omnia simul in actu, ut videtur ex verbis Anaxagorae. Et hoc est quod Empedocles dixit, quod a principio omnia erant mixta et confusa per amicitiam, et postea lis segregavit. Et similiter Anaximander dixit, quod in uno confuso praeexstiterant omnia contraria. Et Democritus etiam dixit, quod omnia, quae fiunt, prius erant in potentia, sed non in actu. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes isti philosophi tetigerunt quodammodo materiam, sed non perfecte ad eam pervenerunt.	2435. Hence, when the Philosopher in the third part of his division says “And this is the one (1032),” he shows that all who expressed this view wanted to adopt a position similar to the one mentioned above, but did not succeed in doing so. Therefore he says that this, namely, matter, which is in potentiality to all forms, is the “One” of which Anaxagoras spoke; for Anaxagoras said that everything which is generated from something else is present in that thing from which it comes to be. And so, not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and actuality, he said that in the beginning all things were mixed together in one whole. But it is more fitting to posit a matter in which all things are present potentially than to posit one in which all things are present actually and simultaneously, as seems to be the case from what Anaxagoras said. This is what Empedocles also claimed, namely, that in the beginning all things were mixed or mingled together by friendship and later were separated out by strife. Anaximander similarly held that all contraries originally existed in one confused mass. And Democritus said that everything which comes to be first exists potentially and then actually. Hence it is evident that all these philosophers touched upon matter to some extent but did not fully comprehend it.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit omnia vero ostendit, quod non eodem modo materia est in omnibus substantiis sensibilibus; dicens, quod quaecumque transmutantur, oportet quod habeant materiam, sed aliam et aliam. Ea enim quae transmutantur secundum substantiam, idest quae generantur et corrumpuntur, habent materiam, quae est subiectum generationis et corruptionis; quae scilicet de se est in potentia ad formas et ad privationes. Sed corpora caelestia, quae sunt sempiterna et ingenerabilia, sed mobilia secundum locum, habent quidem materiam, sed non quae est subiectum generationis, aut quae sit in potentia ad formam et privationem, sed quae est in potentia ad terminos motus localis qui sunt, unde incipit motus, et quo motus intendit.	2436. Now all things (1033). He shows that matter is not present in all sensible substances in the same way. He says that all things which undergo change must have matter, but of a different kind. For things which “are changed substantially,” i.e., generated and destroyed, have a matter which is subject to generation and destruction, i.e., one which is in itself in potentiality both to forms and to privations. But the celestial bodies, which are eternal and not subject to generation, yet admit of change of place, have matter—not one which admits of generation and destruction or one which is in potentiality to form and to privation, but one which is in potentiality to the termini of local motion, i.e., the point from which motion begins and the point to which it tends.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit dubitabit autem solvit quamdam dubitationem circa praedeterminata; dicens, quod aliquis potest dubitare, cum generatio sit transmutatio de non ente in ens, ex quo non ente in ens fit generatio. Dicitur enim non ens tripliciter. Uno modo quod nullo modo est; et ex tali non ente non fit generatio, quia ex nihilo nihil fit secundum naturam. Alio modo dicitur non ens ipsa privatio, quae consideratur in aliquo subiecto: et ex tali non ente fit quidem generatio, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet generatio fit ex subiecto, cui accidit privatio. Tertio modo dicitur non ens ipsa materia, quae, quantum est de se, non est ens actu, sed ens potentia. Et ex tali non ente fit generatio per se. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod si aliquod non ens est ens in potentia, ex tali, scilicet non ente, fit generatio per se.	2437. And one might raise (1034). Then he meets a difficulty that pertains to the points established above. He says that, since generation is a change from non-being to being, one can ask from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for non-being is said of three things. First, it is said of what does not exist in any way; and from this kind of non-being nothing is generated, because in reality nothing comes from nothing. Second, it is said of privation, which is considered in a/,subject; and while something is generated from this kind of non-being, the generation is accidental, i.e., inasmuch as something is generated from a subject to which some privation occurs. Third, it is said of matter itself, which, taken in itself, is not an actual being but a potential one. And from this kind of non-being something is generated essentially; or in his words, if one kind of non-being is potentiality, then from such a principle, i.e., non-being, something is generated essentially.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 15 Quamvis autem generatio fiat ex non ente quod est in potentia, non tamen fit quodlibet ex quocumque; sed diversa fiunt ex diversis materiis. Unumquodque enim generabilium habet materiam determinatam ex qua fit, quia formam oportet esse proportionatam materiae. Licet enim materia prima sit in potentia ad omnes formas, tamen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia ad formas elementares, et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones commixtionum est in potentia ad diversas formas: unde non potest ex quolibet immediate fieri quodlibet, nisi forte per resolutionem in primam materiam.	2438. Yet even though something is generated from that kind of non-being which is being in potentiality, still a thing is not generated from every kind of non-being, but different things come from different matters. For everything capable of being generated has a definite matter from which it comes to be, because there must be a proportion between form and matter. For even though first matter is in potentiality to all forms, it nevertheless receives them in a certain order. For first of all it is in potency to the forms of the elements, and through the intermediary of these, insofar as they are mixed in different proportions, it is in potency to different forms. Hence not everything can come to be directly from everything else unless perhaps by being resolved into first matter.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 16 Et hoc est contra Anaxagoram qui posuit quod quodlibet fit ex quolibet. Nec ad hoc asserendum sufficit quod posuit omnia esse simul a principio. Oportet enim quod res differant in materia secundum quod diversis diversae sunt materiae. Quomodo enim essent facta infinita, et non unum tantum, si una esset materia omnium secundum positionem Anaxagorae? Posuit enim Anaxagoras esse unum agens, scilicet intellectum. Unde et si materia est una, necesse est etiam quod factum sit unum, scilicet id ad quod materia erat in potentia. Ubi enim est unum agens et una materia, necesse est esse unum factum, ut in decimo habitum est.	2439. This view is opposed to that of Anaxagoras, who claimed that anything at all comes to be from anything else. Nor is his assumption that all things were together in the beginning sufficient to support this view. For things differ by reason of matter inasmuch as there are different matters for different things. For if the matter of all things were one, as it is according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, why would an infinite number of things be generated and not just one thing? For Anaxagoras claimed that there is one agent, mind; and therefore, if matter too were one, only one thing would necessarily come to be, namely, that to which matter is in potentiality. For where there is one agent and one matter there must be one effect, as has been stated in Book X.
lib. 12 l. 2 n. 17 Haec autem ratio procedit contra Anaxagoram inquantum ponebat intellectum indigere materia ad faciendum res. Si autem ponat primum rerum principium intellectum, qui ipsam materiam producat, primum principium diversitatis rerum erit ex ordine apprehenso ab intellectu praedicto, qui secundum quod res diversas producere intendit, instituit materias diversas aptas diversitati rerum.	2440. This argument holds good against Anaxagoras inasmuch as he claimed that mind needs matter in order to produce some effect. And if he claims that the first principle of things is mind, which produces matter itself, the first principle of the diversity of things will proceed from the order apprehended by the above-mentioned mind, which, inasmuch as it aims to produce different things, establishes different matters having an aptitude for a diversity of things.