Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber12/lect4

Lecture 4

Latin	English
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit de principiis substantiae sensibilis, nunc intendit inquirere utrum sint eadem principia substantiarum et aliorum generum, aut alia et alia. Manifestum enim est, quod si sunt eadem, assignatis principiis substantiae, assignata sunt principia omnium aliorum generum. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo proponit veritatem. Secundo subiungit inquisitionem de veritate proposita, ibi, dubitabit autem quis. Tertio recapitulando recolligit veritatem, ibi, quaerere. Dicit ergo primo, quod quodammodo sunt alia aliorum et principia et causae, et quodammodo sunt eadem omnium, secundum universalitatem, et secundum proportionem.	2455. Having stated his position regarding the principles of sensible substances, the Philosopher’s aim here is to investigate whether the principles of substances and those of the other classes of things are the same or different. For if they are the same, it is evident that, when the principles of substances are given, the principles of all the other classes of things are also given. In regard to this be does three things. First (1042)C 2455), he states what is true. Second (1043:C 2456), he introduces a question relating to the answer proposed (“And one might”). Third (1054:C 2484), he gives a summary of what is true (“And to ask”). He says, first, that in one sense the principles and causes of different things are different, and in another sense they are the same for all things, i.e., universally and proportionally.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit dubitabit autem inquirendo discutit veritatem praemissam; et circa hoc tria facit. Primo movet dubitationem. Secundo obiicit ad quaestionem, ibi, sed si eadem, inconveniens. Tertio determinat veritatem, ibi, at ut dicimus. Dicit ergo primo, quod dubitatio est, utrum substantiarum, et eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et similiter aliorum praedicamentorum, sint eadem principia, aut alia et alia.	2456. And one might (1043). Then he examines the true answer given above, by raising a question; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1043:C 2456), he raises the question. Second (1044:C 2458), he argues on one side of the question (“But it would be”). Third (1046:C 2464), he settles the issue (“Or, as we say”). He accordingly says, first (1043), that one might raise the question whether the principles of substances and those of relations, and also those of the other categories, are the same or different.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 3 Et ponit specialiter de ad aliquid, quia ea quae sunt ad aliquid, remotiora videntur esse a substantia quam alia genera, ex eo quod sunt debilioris esse. Unde et substantiae inhaerent mediantibus aliis generibus, sicut aequale et inaequale, duplum et dimidium, mediante quantitate. Movens autem et motum, pater et filius, dominus et servus, mediante actione et passione. Et hoc ideo, quia substantia est per se existens; quantitas autem et qualitas sunt entia in alio; sed relativa non solum sunt in alio, sed ad aliud.	2457. He makes special reference to relations because they seem to be farther removed from substance than the rest of the categories are inasmuch as they have a more imperfect mode of being. And for this reason they inhere in substance by means of the other categories; for example, equal and unequal, double and half, inhere in substance by way of quantity; and mover and thing moved, father and son, master and slave, inhere in substance by way of action and passion. The reason is that, while substance is something which exists of itself, and quantity and quality are things which exist in something else, relations are things which not only exist in something else but also have being in reference to something else.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit sed inconveniens obiicit ad propositam quaestionem; et ponit duas rationes ad ostendendum, quod non sunt eadem principia substantiae et aliorum generum. Quarum prima talis est. Si eadem sint principia substantiae et aliorum generum, aut oportet quod illa principia eadem sint praeter substantiam et alia genera, aut oportet quod sint in genere substantiae, vel in aliquo alio genere.	2458. But it would be (1044). Then he argues on one side of the question mentioned above. He gives two arguments to show that the principles of substance and those of the other classes of things are not the same. The first argument is as follows. If the principles of substance and those of the other classes of things are the same, the same principles must either exist apart from substance and from the other categories, or they must belong to the category of substance or to some other category.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 5 Sed non potest dici, quod sint extra substantiam et alia praedicamenta; quia oportet quod essent priora tam substantia quam aliis praedicamentis. Prius enim est principium his quae sunt a principio. Cum ergo id quod est prius, inveniatur esse communius, sicut animal est prius homine, sequitur, si aliquid est prius substantia et aliis generibus, quod aliquid sit commune substantiis et aliis generibus, et praecipue secundum opinionem Platonicorum, qui posuerunt universalia esse principia, et unum et ens quasi communissima esse principia omnium.	2459. But it cannot be said that they exist apart from substance and from the other categories, because then they would have to be prior both to substance and to the other categories; for a principle is prior to the things which come from it. Therefore, since what is prior is found to be more common, as animal is prior to man, it follows that, if some principle is prior both to substance and to the other categories, there must be some principle which is common both to substance and to the other categories. This applies especially to the opinion of the Platonists, who claimed that universals are principles—particularly being and unity as the most common principles of all things.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 6 Neque etiam potest dici, quod principia communissima omnium generum sint in genere substantiae, aut in genere ad aliquid, vel in aliquo alio genere. Cum enim principia sint homogenea his quae sunt ab eis, non videtur possibile quod substantia sit principium eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, aut e converso. Non igitur eadem sunt principia substantiae et aliorum generum.	2460. Neither can it be said that the most common principles of all categories belong either to the category of substance or to that of relation or to any other category. For since principles are of the same kind as the things which come from them, it seems impossible that substance should be a principle of relations, or vice versa. Therefore the principles of substance and those of the other categories are not the same.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 7 Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius quomodo quae talis est. Nullum elementum est idem cum eo quod ex elementis est compositum: quia nihil est causa aut elementum suiipsius; sicut huius syllabae ba, elementum est haec litera b aut a.	2461. Further, how is it (1045). He gives a second argument, which runs thus: no element is the same as a composite of elements, for nothing is the cause or element of itself; for example, an element of this syllable ba is the letter b or the letter a.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 8 Et quia videbatur hoc habere instantiam in principiis a Platone positis, quae sunt unum et ens, eo quod unumquodque principiatorum est unum et ens; ideo consequenter hoc excludit, dicens, quod neque etiam intellectualium elementorum, quae sunt unum et ens, possibile est aliquod esse idem cum his quae sunt ex elementis. Vocat autem ea intellectualia, quia universalia intellectu percipiuntur, et quia Plato ea ponebat separata a sensibilibus.	2462. And since there would seem to be a rejoinder to this based on the principles laid down by Plato, namely, being and unity, since each thing composed of principles is one and a being, he therefore next rejects this argument. He says that it is also impossible that any of the intelligible elements—unity and being—should be the same as the things which are derived from them. He calls them intelligible, both because universals are grasped by the intellect, and because Plato claimed that they are separate from sensible things.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 9 Et quod huiusmodi elementa sint alia ab eis quorum sunt elementa, probat, quia huiusmodi elementa, idest unum et ens, insunt singulis compositorum ex eis, nullum autem compositorum ex eis inest aliis. Unde patet, quod et ista elementa differunt ab his quae sunt composita ex eis. Si igitur verum est quod elementa non sunt idem cum his quae sunt ex elementis, si eadem sunt elementa substantiarum et aliorum generum, consequitur, quod nihil eorum sit in genere substantiae, neque in aliis generibus. Sed hoc est impossibile; quia necesse est omne quod est, esse in aliquo genere: non igitur possibile est, quod sint eadem principia omnium.	2463. He proves that elements of this kind differ from the things of which they are the elements, because “elements of this kind,” i.e., unity and being, are found in each of the things composed of them, whereas no one of the things composed of them is found in other things. Hence it is evident that these elements also differ from the things composed of them. If it is true, then, that elements are not the same as the things composed of them; and if the elements of substances and those of the other classes of things are the same, it follows that none of them belong either to the category of substance or to any other category. But this is impossible, because everything which exists must belong to some category. Hence it is impossible that all the categories should have the same principles.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit at ut dicimus solvit propositam dubitationem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod eadem sunt principia omnium proportionaliter. Secundo, quod eadem sunt universaliter, ibi, adhuc autem videre et cetera. Haec enim duo supra posuerat, dicens quod principia sunt eadem omnium universaliter et secundum proportionem. Prima pars dividitur in duas partes, secundum quod duos modos assignat, quibus proportionaliter sunt eadem principia omnium. Secunda incipit, ibi, amplius autem alio modo. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo proportionaliter sunt eadem. Secundo quomodo et simpliciter sint eadem principia omnium prima, ibi, amplius autem praeter haec. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod proportionaliter sunt eadem principia omnium quantum ad causas intrinsecas. Secundo quantum ad causas intrinsecas et extrinsecas simul, ibi, quoniam autem non solum. Dicit ergo primo, quod quodammodo est verum dicere omnium eadem principia, et quodammodo non.	2464. Or, as we say (1046). Then he solves the question which was raised, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1046:C 2464), shows that the principles of all categories are proportionally the same; and second (1053:C 2482), that they are universally the same (“Further, we must note”). For he laid down these two qualifications above (1042:C 2455) when he said that there are the same first principles for all things universally and proportionally. The first part is divided into two members inasmuch as he gives two ways in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same. He begins to treat the second (1052:C 2477) where he says, “Again, there is.” In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how the principles of all things are proportionally the same. Second (1049:C 2474), he shows how they are the same without qualification (“And besides”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the principles of all things are proportionally the same as regards their intrinsic causes; and second (1047:C 2468), as regards both their intrinsic and their extrinsic causes (“And since not only”). He accordingly says, first (1046), that in one respect it is true to say that the principles of all things are the same, and in another respect it is not.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 11 Et hoc ostendit dicens: sicut si ponamus quod sensibilium corporum sit principium, tamquam species et forma calidum, et tamquam privatio frigidum, et materia sensibilium corporum sit id quod est secundum se in potentia ad haec duo. Nam materia secundum se sumpta est principium susceptivum formae et privationis. Dicit autem, forsan, quia calidum non est forma substantialis corporum sensibilium, neque frigidum est privatio, sed ambo sunt qualitates. Utitur tamen eis tamquam forma et privatione in genere substantiae ad maiorem manifestationem. Unde subiungit, quod et huiusmodi principia sunt substantiae, non sicut species in genere, sed sicut principia.	2465. He explains this by saying that it would be the same as if we were to hold that the principle of sensible bodies in the line of specifying principle or form is the hot and in the line of privation is the cold, and that the matter of sensible bodies is what is of itself in potentiality to these two; for matter taken in itself is a principle that is susceptible both of form and of privation. He says “perhaps” because, while heat is not a substantial form of sensible bodies and cold is not a privation but both are qualities, still he uses them as form and privation in the category of substance in order to make the case more evident. Hence he adds that principles of this kind are substances, not as species in a genus, but as principles.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 12 Et iterum illa quae sunt ex his, quorum haec sunt principia, scilicet ignis et aqua: ac si intelligamus quod ignis componatur ex calido, sicut forma et propria materia, et aqua ex frigido, sicut ex privatione et materia. Aut etiam si aliquid unum fit ex calido et frigido commixtis, eorum sunt praedicta principia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et materia eorum; quia necesse est id quod fit ex calido et frigido, esse aliquid diversum ab illis, scilicet calido et frigido, et a primis corporibus, quorum imaginamur haec esse formas.	2466. Again, we say that things which are composed of these, i.e., the things of which these are the principles, namely, fire and water, are substances, granted that we understand fire to be composed of hot as a form and of its own matter, and water of cold as a privation and of matter; or again, granted that some one thing comes to be from the mixture of hot and cold, the above-mentioned contraries, hot and cold, and matter are the principles of these things; because that which comes to be from hot and cold must be something different from hot and cold, i.e., from the first bodies of which we imagine these to be the forms.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 13 Sic igitur horum, scilicet simplicium corporum, et compositorum ex eis, sunt eadem principia et elementa. Sed aliorum sunt alia proxima principia. Non autem omnium sunt eadem nisi proportionaliter. Sicut si aliquis dicat quod sicut praedicta tria, scilicet calidum et frigidum et subiectum eorum, se habent in generatione corporum simplicium ut forma et privatio et materia, ita in quolibet alio genere illa tria sunt, quae se habent ut forma, privatio et materia; sed ista diversa sunt in diversis generibus. Sicut in genere colorum, album est sicut species, nigrum sicut privatio, et superficies sicut materia et subiectum. Et in genere distinctionis temporum, lumen est sicut species, tenebrae sicut privatio, aer sicut materia et subiectum. Ex quibus tribus principiis constituuntur dies et nox.	2467. Therefore the principles and elements of these things, i.e., of the simple bodies and the things composed of them, are the same. But other things have different proximate principles. However, the principles and elements of all these things are the same only proportionally. We might, for example, say that, just as the three things mentioned above—hot, cold, and their subject—have the character of form, privation and matter respectively in the generation of simple bodies, so too in every other genus there are three things which are proportioned to each other as form, privation and matter. But these three differ for different classes of things. For example, in the genus of color, white has the character of form, black the character of privation, and surface the character of matter or subject; and in the genus of distinctions of time, light has the character of form, darkness the character of privation, and air the character of matter or subject; and from these three principles day and night come to be.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem ostendit idem in causis intrinsecis et extrinsecis. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit quod computando tam causas intrinsecas quam extrinsecas, sunt quatuor proportionaliter omnium. Secundo, quomodo reducuntur ad tres, ibi, quoniam vero movens. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia non solum sunt causae ea quae dicta sunt intrinseca rei, sed etiam ea quae sunt extra rem, sicut movens, manifestum est quod principium et elementum differunt. Nam principium proprie dicitur quod est extra sicut movens. Nam ab eo est principium motus. Elementum autem proprie dicitur causa intrinseca ex qua constituitur res.	2468. And since not only (1047). Then he shows that the same thing is true of intrinsic and extrinsic causes, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1047:C 2468), he shows that, when we enumerate the intrinsic and extrinsic causes together, there are four causes proportionally of all things. Second (1048:C 2473), he shows how they are reduced to three (“And since in the case”). He accordingly says, first (1047), that, since not only what is intrinsic is a cause, but also what is extrinsic, i.e., a mover, it is evident that principle and element differ. For principle in the strict sense means an extrinsic cause, as a mover, since it is from this that motion proceeds; whereas element in the strict sense means an intrinsic cause, of which a thing is composed.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 15 Sed ambo dicuntur causae, scilicet tam principia extrinseca quam intrinseca. Et principium quodammodo dividitur in ea, scilicet intrinsecas causas et extrinsecas. Sunt enim quaedam principia intrinseca, ut in quinto ostensum est. Sicut fundamentum est principium domus secundum materiam, et animal hominis secundum formam. Sed id quod est movens, aut sistens, idest quiescere faciens, est principium quoddam, sed non est elementum; quia elementum est ex eo quo fit aliquid, et est in eo, ut habitum est in quinto.	2469. Yet both are called causes, i.e., both extrinsic principles and intrinsic ones. And in a sense principle is divided into these, i.e., into intrinsic causes and extrinsic causes. For there are certain intrinsic principles, as has been shown in Book V (403:C 755-56); for example, the foundation of a house is a principle of it in the sense of matter, and a soul is a principle of a man in the sense of form. But that which causes motion or makes it cease, i.e., which brings it to rest, is a principle but not an element; because an element is an intrinsic principle from which a thing comes to be, as has been stated in Book V (411:C 795-98).
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 16 Sic igitur manifestum est quod secundum analogiam, idest proportionem, tria sunt elementa omnium; idest materia, forma et privatio. Dicuntur enim privationes esse elementum non per se, sed per accidens, quia scilicet materia cui accidit, est elementum. Materia enim sub una forma existens, habet in se privationem alterius formae. Sed causae et principia sunt quatuor, ut addamus tribus elementis causam moventem. Non facit autem mentionem de causa finali, quia finis non est principium nisi secundum quod est in intentione moventis.	2470. It is clear, then, that analogously, or proportionally, the elements of all things are three in numbermatter, form and privation. For privations are called elements not essentially but accidentally, i.e., because. the matter to which a privation is accidentally related is an element. For matter existing under one form contains within itself the privation of another form. But the causes and principles of things are four in number inasmuch as we may add the moving cause to the three elements. Aristotle does not mention the final cause, however, because a goal is a principle only inasmuch as it is present in the intention of the moving cause.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 17 Sic igitur causae et principia omnium secundum analogiam sunt quatuor; scilicet materia, et forma, et privatio, et principium movens. Non tamen haec sunt eadem in omnibus, sed alia in aliis. Sicut enim supra dictum est, quod species et materia et privatio sunt alia in aliis, ita etiam prima causarum, quae est quasi movens, est alia in aliis.	2471. Therefore the causes and principles of all things analogously are four in number—matter, form, privation, and the source of motion. Yet they are not the same in all cases, but differ in different things. For just as it has been said above (1046:C 2467) that matter form and privation differ in different things, so too the first of the causes, which has the character of a mover, differs in different cases.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 18 Et hoc manifestat per exemplum. Sicut in sanatis sanitas est sicut forma, infirmitas sicut privatio, corpus sicut materia; sicut movens autem ars medicinalis. In aedificativis autem est species domus sicut forma, inordinatio talis, idest opposita ordini quem requirit domus, est privatio, lateres autem sicut materia, movens autem est ars aedificatoria. Et sic in ista quatuor dividitur principium.	2472. He clarifies this by giving examples. In the case of things healed, health has the character of form, sickness the character of privation, the body the character of matter, and the art of medicine the character of a mover; and in the case of things built, the shape of a house is the form, “a certain kind of disorder,” i.e., the opposite of the order which the house requires, is the privation, bricks are the matter, and the art of building is the mover. Principles, then, are divided into these four kinds.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit quoniam autem reducit praedicta quatuor ad tria, eo quod movens et forma reducuntur in idem specie tam in artificialibus quam in naturalibus. Dicit ergo quod quia movens in naturalibus est homo, inquantum habet formam, et in his quae fiunt a mente sive intellectu movens est species concepta ab intellectu, aut etiam contrarium speciei per cuius remotionem species inducit; manifestum est, quod quodammodo tres erunt causae, inquantum movens et forma sunt idem specie, quodam vero modo erunt quatuor, inquantum scilicet differunt numero. Sanitas enim aliqualiter est ipsa ars medicinalis. Et forma domus quodammodo est ipsa ars aedificatoria, inquantum scilicet ipsa ars est similitudo quaedam et ratio formae quae est in materia. Et similiter in rebus quae generantur, in generante invenitur similitudo formae generati. Homo enim generat hominem.	2473. And since in the case (1048). He now reduces these four kinds of causes to three on the ground that in the case of artifacts and in that of natural things the mover and the form are specifically the same. He accordingly says that this is clear because (a) in the case of natural things man is a mover inasmuch as he has a form; and (b) in the case of things which are made by mind or intellect the cause of motion is the form conceived by the mind, or even the contrary of the form through whose removal the form is induced. Therefore it is evident that in one sense there are three causes, inasmuch as the mover and the form are specifically the same, and in another sense there are four, inasmuch as these two causes differ numerically. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of the house, i.e., inasmuch as the art itself is a kind of likeness and intelligible representation of the form which is in the matter. And similarly in the case of things which come to be through generation the generator is similar in form to the thing generated; for man begets man.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ostendit quod, licet prima principia non sint eadem in omnibus secundum rem, sed solum secundum proportionem, prima tamen principia sunt simpliciter eadem omnium. Et hoc ostendit quantum ad tria. Primo quidem quantum ad hoc quod inter causas quatuor assignatas, movens est causa prima, quia movens est quod facit esse formam vel privationem in materia. In genere autem moventium, est devenire ad aliquod unum movens, ut ostensum est in libro octavo physicorum. Id igitur primum movens unum et idem, est primum principium omnium.	2474. And besides these (1049). Then he shows that, although first principles are not identically the same beings in all things but only proportionally the same, none the less the first principles of all things are the same in an unqualified sense. He proves this by three arguments. First, he shows that the moving cause is the first of the causes which have been given because it is the one which makes the form or the privation exist in matter. Now in the class of movers it is possible to reach a single cause, as has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Therefore this first mover, which is one and the same for all, is the first principle of all things.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 21 Secundo ibi, quoniam autem ostendit idem secundum aliud. Entium enim quaedam sunt separabilia, scilicet substantiae; alia sunt inseparabilia, scilicet accidentia, quia passiones et motus et huiusmodi accidentia non possunt esse sine substantiis. Unde manifestum est quod principia prima in genere substantiae sunt etiam causae omnium aliorum generum, non solum quantum ad primam causam moventem, sed etiam quantum ad causas intrinsecas. Nam materia et forma substantiae, sunt causae accidentium.	2475. Since some things (1050). Second, he proves the same point in a different way. For some beings (substances) are capable of separate existence, and others (accidents) are not, because modifications and motions and accidents of this kind cannot exist apart from substances. It is evident, then, that the first principles in the category of substance are also the causes of all the other categories. This applies not only to the first moving cause but also to intrinsic causes; for the matter and form of a substance are the causes of its accidents.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 22 Tertio ibi, deinde erunt ostendit ulterius, quod etiam in genere substantiae est devenire in aliqua prima. Nam prima principia in genere substantiarum sunt substantiae viventes animatae, secundum opinionem Aristotelis ponentis caelestia corpora animata. Et sic prima principia in genere substantiae ut materia et forma, erunt anima et corpus, vel etiam corpus et intellectus vel desiderium, nam anima corporis caelestis, si sit animatum, non habet alias partes animae nisi intellectum et appetitum. Aliae enim partes ordinantur ad conservationem corporum generabilium et corruptibilium. Intellectus etiam et desiderium habet rationem causae moventis.	2476. Next, all of these (1051). Third, he shows that we must also reach certain first principles in the category of substance; for first principles in the category of substance are living animated substances according to the thought of Aristotle, who claimed that the celestial bodies are animated. Hence in the category of substance the first principles which have the character of form and matter will be soul and body, or also body and intellect or appetite; for assuming that a celestial body is animated, its soul has none of the different parts of the soul except intellect and appetite; for the other parts of the soul are directed to the preservation of bodies which are capable of being generated and destroyed. Intellect and appetite also have the character of a mover.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 23 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit alium modum, secundum quem sunt eadem principia omnium proportionaliter: et dicit, quod alio modo sunt eadem principia omnium proportionaliter, ita quod dicamus quod actus et potentia sunt principia omnium.	2477. Again, there is another sense (1052). Then he gives a second way in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same. He says that the principles of all things are proportionally the same in another sense inasmuch as we say that actuality and potentiality are the principles of all things.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 24 Sed in hoc est differentia quantum ad duo. Uno quidem modo, quia alia potentia et alius actus sunt principia in diversis rebus. Alio modo, quia aliter invenitur potentia et actus in quibusdam, et aliter in aliis.	2478. But in this case two differences are to be observed. The first is that a different potentiality and a different actuality are principles in different things. The second is that potentiality and actuality are found in different things in different ways.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 25 Et hoc secundum primo manifestat; dicens, quod in quibusdam idem quandoque est in actu et quandoque in potentia; ut patet in omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus et mobilibus et contingentibus: sicut vinum et caro et homo, quandoque sunt in actu, quandoque etiam in potentia. Quaedam vero semper sunt in actu, sicut substantiae sempiternae.	2479. Then the second difference is first clarified. He says that in some cases the same thing is at one time actual and at another time potential, as is evident of all things which admit of generation and destruction and are movable and contingent; for example, wine, flesh and man are at one time actual and at another potential. But some things are always actual, as the eternal substances.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 26 Et quia dixerat hunc modum, quo proportionaliter sunt principia eadem omnium, esse alium modum a praeassignato, consequenter ostendit quomodo reducantur in idem. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod haec, scilicet actus et potentia, cadunt in praedictas causas, quae sunt forma, privatio, et materia, et movens: quia forma est actus, sive sit separabilis a composito, ut Platonici posuerunt, sive etiam sit aliquid compositum ex ambobus, scilicet materia et forma. Et similiter privatio est quodammodo actus, ut tenebrae, aut laborans, idest infirmum: materia vero est in potentia, quia ipsa secundum se potest fieri sub ambobus, scilicet sub forma et privatione. Sic igitur manifestum est, quod actus et potentia in idem redeunt cum materia et forma et privatione; et quod actus et potentia in diversis uno modo differunt: quia non similiter est in omnibus, sed aliter et aliter.	2480. And since he had said that the way in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same differs from the one previously given, he next shows how these principles (actuality and potentiality) are reduced to the.same class. He says that these principles (actuality and potentiality) fall under the classes of causes mentioned above, which are form, privation, matter and mover; because form is an actuality, whether it is separable from the composite, as the Platonists claimed, or whether there is something composed of both, i.e., of form and matter. And similarly privation is in a sense an actuality, for example, darkness or “suffering,” i.e., sickness. But matter is in potentiality, because of itself it is capabie of receiving both form and privation. It is evident, then, that actuality and potentiality amount to the same thing as matter, form and privation; and that in a sense actuality and potentiality differ in different things, because they are not present in all things in the same way but in different ways.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 27 Et quia dixerat quod non solum aliter est potentia et actus in diversis, sed etiam sunt alia in aliis, hoc consequenter exponit, dicens, quod alio modo potentia et actus differunt in diversis, quorum non est eadem materia, quae est potentia, et quorum non est eadem species, quae est actus, sed diversa. Sicut hominis causa ut materia, elementa, scilicet ignis etc., et causa ut forma, species propria, scilicet anima; et causa movens est aliquod extrinsecum; sicut pater est causa movens propinqua, et causa remota sol, et obliquus circulus, idest zodiacus in quo movetur sol, et alii planetae, qui suo motu causant generationem in istis inferioribus. Huiusmodi autem causae extrinsecae neque sunt materiae neque formae neque privatio, neque aliquid conforme eis, aut eiusdem speciei, ut possit dici quod reducuntur ad has causas sicut actus et potentia; sed sunt in alio genere causae, quia sunt moventia, et ipsa etiam reducuntur in actum. Alia vero ab homine habent materiam aliam propriam, et aliam formam propriam, et aliquod agens proprium.	2481. And since he had said that actuality and potentiality not only apply to different things in different ways but also differ for different things, he next explains this by saying that it is in a different way that the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies to different things of which the matter, which is in potentiality, is not the same, and the form, which is actuality, is not the same but different. For example, the material cause of a man is his elements, namely, fire and the like, and his formal cause is “his proper form,” i.e., his soul, and his moving cause is something extrinsic—his father being a proximate efficient cause, and the sun and “the oblique circle,” or zodiac, through which the sun moves together with the other planets which cause generation in lower bodies by their motion, being remote efficient causes. But extrinsic causes of this sort are neither matter nor form nor privation nor anything conforming to or specifically the same as these so that it could be said that they are reduced to these causes as actuality and potentiality. They are reduced to a different class of cause because they are movers, and these are also reduced to actuality. But things which differ from man have a different proper matter anA a different proper form and some proper agent.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 28 Deinde cum dicit adhuc autem quia iam ostensum est, quod sunt eadem principia omnium proportionaliter, vult ostendere quomodo sunt omnium eadem universaliter. Utrumque enim supra dictum fuit. Dicit ergo, quod oportet videre quomodo principia aliqua dicuntur universaliter, et aliqua non universaliter. Et prima principia maxime universaliter significata sunt actus et potentia; nam haec dividunt ens inquantum huiusmodi. Haec autem dicuntur principia universalia, quia universaliter significantur et intelliguntur; non ita quod ipsa universalia subsistentia principia sint, ut Platonici posuerunt, quia singularium non potest esse aliquod principium nisi singulare; universale enim principium est effectus universaliter accepti, ut homo hominis. Sed, cum non sit aliquis homo universaliter subsistens, non erit aliquod principium universale hominis universalis, sed solum hoc particulare huius particularis, sicut si Peleus Achillis est pater, tui vero, pater tuus. Et haec litera b huius syllabae ba, sed b universaliter acceptum, est principium eius quod est ba, universaliter accepti. Sic igitur principia universaliter significata sunt eadem omnium.	2482. Further, we must note (1053). Since it has been shown already (1046:C 2467) how the principles of all things are proportionally the same, Aristotle now wishes to show how the principles of all things are universally the same; for both of these points were mentioned above (1046:C 2464). He accordingly says that we must see how some principles are predicated universally and how some are not. The first principles which are understood to be most universal are actuality and potentiality, for these divide being as being. They are called universal principles because they are signified and understood in a universal way, but not so that universals themselves are subsisting principles, as the Platonists claimed, because the principle of each singular thing can only be a singular thing; for the principle of an effect taken universally is a universal, as man of man. But since there is no subsisting universal man, there will be no universal principle of universal man, but only this particular man will be the principle of this particular man; for example, Peleus is the father of Achilles, and your father is the father of you. And this particular letter b is a principle of this particular syllable ba, but b taken universally is a principle of ba taken universally. Therefore principles signified universally are the same for all things.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 29 Deinde inducit alium modum, secundum quem principia substantiarum sunt universaliter omnium, inquantum accidentia ex substantiis causantur. Sicut autem actus et potentia sunt universaliter principia omnium, quia consequuntur ens commune, ita oportet quod secundum quod descendit communitas principiatorum, descendat communitas principiorum. Eorum enim quae non sunt in eodem genere, puta colorum, sonorum, substantiarum et quantitatis, sunt aliae causae et elementa, ut dictum est, praeterquam quod proportionaliter sint eadem omnium. Eorum autem, quae sunt in eadem specie, sed diversa secundum numerum, sunt diversa principia, non specie, sed numero. Sicut aliud est materia tua, et forma et movens, et aliud mea. Sed secundum universalem rationem sunt eadem. Nam anima et corpus sunt materia et forma hominis. Huius autem hominis, haec anima et hoc corpus.	2483. Then he introduces a third way in which the principles of substances are universally the principles of all things, i.e., inasmuch as accidents are caused by substances. Now just as actuality and potentiality are the universal principles of all things because they flow from being as being, so also, to the extent that the community of things caused is lessened, the community of the principles must also be lessened. For things which do not belong to the same genus, as colors, sounds, substance and quantity, have different causes and elements, as has been pointed out (1046:C 2467), even though these are proportionally the same for all things. And things which belong to the same genus but are numerically different have different principles, not formally, but numerically. For example, your matter and form and moving cause are one thing and mine are another, but in their universal intelligibility they are the same; for soul and body are the form and matter of man, but this soul and this body are the form and the matter of this man.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 30 Deinde cum dicit quaerere vero recapitulat ea quae dicta sunt in hoc capitulo. Dicit ergo, quod quaerere utrum sint eadem principia et elementa generum et ad aliquid et qualitatum et aliorum generum, aut diversa, est quaerere de multipliciter dictis; quia diversorum non sunt eadem principia, sed diversa, nisi quodammodo.	2484. And to ask (1054). Here he summarizes what has been said in this chapter. He says that to ask whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations and of qualities and of the other categories are the same or different is to raise questions about terms which are used in various senses, because the principles of different things are not the same except in a certain respect but different.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 31 Omnium enim quodammodo sunt eadem principia, aut secundum proportionem; sicut si dicamus, quod in quolibet genere inveniuntur aliqua quae se habent ut materia et forma et privatio et movens; aut eo quod causae substantiarum sunt causae omnium, quia destructis eis, alia destruuntur. Aut quia principia sunt endelechia, idest actus et potentia. Istis autem tribus modis sunt eadem principia omnium.	2485. For the principles of all things are the same in a certain respect, either proportionally, as when we say that in each class of things we find certain principles which have the character of matter, form, privation and moving cause; or in the sense that the causes of substances are the causes of all things, because when they are destroyed other things are destroyed; or because the principles are “complete reality,” i.e., actuality, and potentiality. The principles of all things, then, are the same in these three ways.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 32 Alio autem modo sunt diversa principia; quia contraria, quae sunt principia rerum, et ipsa materia, non univoce dicuntur, quia non sunt genera; nec etiam dicuntur multipliciter quasi aequivoca; et ideo non possumus dicere quod sunt eadem simpliciter, sed secundum analogiam.	2486. But in another respect the principles are different, because contraries, which are principles of things, and matter itself are not predicated in the same way; for they are not genera, nor are they even predicated of things in many ways as though they were equivocal. Hence we cannot say that they are the same without qualification but only analogously.
lib. 12 l. 4 n. 33 Ultimo autem concludit quod dictum est, quot sunt principia sensibilium, et quomodo sunt eadem aut diversa.	2487. Last, he concludes by saying that he has shown the number of principles which sensible substances have and how they are the same or different.