Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber12/lect7

Lecture 7

Latin	English
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit aliquam substantiam esse sempiternam, immaterialem et immobilem, cuius substantia est actus, procedit ad inquirendum conditionem ipsius substantiae. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo inquirit de perfectione huius substantiae. Secundo de unitate et pluralitate ipsius, ibi, utrum vero una ponenda. Tertio de operatione eius, ibi, quae vero circa intellectum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit perfectionem praedictae substantiae. Secundo ostendit eam esse incorpoream, ibi, ostensum autem est. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit perfectionem dictae substantiae. Secundo excludit opinionem contrariam, ibi, quicumque autem putant. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit secundum quem modum movens immobile moveat. Secundo ex hoc ostendit ea quae ad perfectionem eius pertinent, ibi, intelligibilis autem altera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ostensum sit, quod sit primum movens non motum, necesse est quod sic moveat sicut desiderabile et intelligibile. Haec enim sola, scilicet desiderabile et intelligibile, inveniuntur movere non mota.	2519. After having shown that there is an eternal, immaterial, immovable substance whose essence is actuality, the Philosopher now proceeds to investigate the attributes of this substance. In treating this he does three things. First (1061:C 2519), he considers the perfection of this substance. Second (1078:C 2553), he asks whether it is one or many (“We must not”). Third (1089:C 2600), he considers its operation (“The things which pertain”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows the perfection of this substance. Second (1076:C 2548), he proves that it is incorporeal (“And it has been shown”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows its perfection. Second (1075:C 2545), he rejects a contrary opinion (“And all those”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how the unmoved mover causes motion; and second (1068:C 2523), he infers from this what is comprised in its perfection (“And one of the two”). He accordingly says, first (1067), that, since it has been shown that the first mover is unmoved, it must cause motion in the way in which the desirable and the intelligible do; for only these, the desirable and the intelligible, are found to cause motion without being moved.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 2 Quod sic patet. Est enim duplex motus: naturalis et voluntarius, sive secundum appetitum. Movens autem motu naturali, de necessitate movetur, cum movens naturaliter sit generans et alterans. Nam etiam gravia et levia secundum locum moventur per se a generante. Generans autem et alterans immediate, oportet quod aliter et aliter se habeant. Unde etiam supra dictum est, quod id quod causat generationem et corruptionem agit aliter et aliter. In motu autem qui est secundum voluntatem et appetitum, voluntas, et appetitus se habent sicut movens motum, ut patet in tertio de anima. Unde relinquitur quod solum id quod movet sicut appetibile, sit movens non motum.	2520. He proves this as follows. Motion is twofold: natural and voluntary, or according to appetite. Now that which causes motion by means of natural motion necessarily undergoes motion, since a natural mover is one that begets and alters things. For both heavy and light bodies are moved locally directly by their begetter. But that which begets and alters things directly must exist in different states. Hence it has also been pointed out above (1065:C 2510) that the cause of generation and destruction acts in different ways. Now in the case of voluntary and appetitive motion, will and appetite have the character of moved movers, as is evident in Book III of The Soul. Hence it remains that only that which causes motion as something appetible is an unmoved mover.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 3 Dicitur autem primum movens movere sicut appetibile, quia motus caeli est propter ipsum, sicut propter finem, causatus ab aliquo proximo movente quod movet propter primum movens immobile, ut assimilet se ei in causando, et explicet in actum id quod est virtute in primo movente. Non enim est motus caeli propter generationem et corruptionem inferiorum sicut propter finem, cum finis sit nobilior eo quod est ad finem. Sic igitur primum movens movet sicut appetibile.	2521. Now it is said that the first mover causes motion as something appetible because the motion of the heavens has this mover as its end or goal, for this motion is caused by some proximate mover which moves on account of the first unmoved mover in order that it may be assimilated in its causality to the first mover and bring to actuality whatever is virtually contained in it. For the motion of the heavens does not have the generation and destruction of lower bodies as its end, since an end or goal is nobler than the things ordained to it. Therefore the first mover causes motion as something appetible.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 4 Sed apud nos aliud est quod movet sicut desiderabile, et aliud quod movet sicut intelligibile bonum; cum tamen utrumque moveat sicut movens non motum. Et hoc praecipue apparet in eo qui est incontinens. Nam secundum rationem movetur ab intelligibili bono. Secundum autem vim concupiscibilem movetur ab aliquo delectabili secundum sensum, quod videtur bonum, cum non sit bonum simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. Sed non potest esse huiusmodi diversitas in primo intelligibili et primo desiderabili. Sed oportet quod primum intelligibile et primum desiderabile sint eadem. Et hoc ideo, quia concupiscibile quod non est intelligibile bonum, est apparens bonum. Primum autem bonum oportet quod sit voluntabile, idest appetibile appetitu intellectuali. Nam voluntas in intellectu est, et non in appetitu concupiscentiae tantum. Et hoc ideo, quia quod appetitur secundum concupiscentiam videtur bonum, eo quod desideratur. Nam concupiscentia pervertit iudicium rationis, ut ei videatur bonum quod est delectabile. Sed illud quod appetitur appetitu intellectuali, desideratur, quia videtur bonum secundum se. Huiusmodi enim appetitus principium est intelligentia, idest actus intellectus qui movetur quodammodo ab intelligibili. Sic igitur patet quod concupiscibile non est bonum nisi quod desideratur secundum rationis dictamen. Non ergo potest esse primum bonum; sed solum illud quod, quia bonum est, movet desiderium, quod est appetibile et intelligibile simul.	2522. But in our own case that which causes motion as a desirable good differs from that which causes motion as an intelligible good, though each causes motion as an unmoved mover. This is particularly evident in the case of an incontinent person; for according to his reason he is moved by an intelligible good, but according to his concupiscible power he is moved by something pleasant to the senses, which, while it seems to be good, is not good absolutely but only with some qualification.—However, this kind of difference cannot be found in the first intelligible and the first desirable good. But the first intelligible and the first desirable good must be the same. The reason is that a concupiscible good, which is not an intelligible good, is merely an apparent good; but the first good “must be an object of will,” i.e., an object desired by intellectual appetite. For will belongs to the intellectual order and not merely to that of concupiscible appetite. And this is so because what is desired by the concupiscible power seems to be good because it is desired; for concupiscence perverts the judgment of reason insofar as something pleasant to sense seems to be good to reason. But what is desired by intellectual appetite is desired because it seems to be good in itself. For “understanding” as such, i.e., the act of intellection, which is moved in a way by an intelligible object, “is the principle of desire.” Therefore it is evident that the object of concupiscible appetite is good only when it is desired through a dictate of reason. Hence it cannot be the first good, but only that which, because it is good, moves desire and is at once both appetible and intelligible.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit intelligibilis autem quia ostenderat primum movens esse intelligibile et appetibile, restat modo ostendere ex hoc, quomodo in primo movente perfectio invenitur. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo enim ostendit ex ratione intelligibilis et appetibilis perfectionem ipsius secundum se. Secundo per comparationem ad primum mobile, ibi, movet autem ut amatum. Tertio per comparationem ad id quod appetit et intelligit ipsum, ibi, deductio autem et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit perfectionem primi moventis ex eo quod est intelligibile. Secundo ex eo quod est appetibile, ibi, at vero quod bonum et cetera. Dicit primo, quod sicut moventia et mota habent suam coordinationem, ita intelligibilia habent suam coordinationem: quam quidem coelementationem intelligibilem vocat, eo quod unum intelligibile est primum principium intelligendi alterum, sicut etiam unum movens, alteri est causa movendi.	2523. And one of the two (1068). Since he has proved that the first mover is both intelligible and appetible, it now remains to show from this how perfection is found in the first mover. In regard to thi8 he does three things. First (1068:C 2523), he shows the perfection of the first mover in itself by considering the formal character of the intelligible and the appetible; second (1070:C 2529), in relation to the first sphere (“And it causes motion”); and third (107:C 2536), in relation to the thing that desires and understands it (“And its course of life”). In treating the first part he does two things. First, he proves that the first mover is perfect on the ground that it is intelligible; and second (106g:C 2526), on the ground that it is appetible (“But that which is good”). He says, first (1068), that, just as movers and things moved are related to one another, so also are intelligible things. He calls this latter relationship an intelligible column of opposites because one intelligible is the first principle for understanding another, just as one mover is also the cause of the motion of another.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 6 Sicut igitur ex ordinatione moventis et moti, ostensum est, quod primum movens est substantia simplex et actus, ita etiam invenitur idem ex ordinatione intelligibilium. Manifestum est enim quod inter intelligibilia substantia est prima, eo quod accidentia non intelligimus nisi per substantiam, per quam definiuntur: et inter substantias prius est intelligibile simplex quam compositum: nam simplicia clauduntur in intellectu compositorum. Et inter simplicia, quae sunt in genere substantiae, actus est prius intelligibile quam potentia: nam potentia definitur per actum. Relinquitur igitur, quod primum intelligibile sit substantia simplex, quae est actus.	2524. Therefore, just as it has been shown (1066:C 298) from the series of movers and things moved that the first mover is a simple substance and an actuality, in a similar fashion the same thing is found to be true from the series of intelligible things. For it is evident that substance is the first of intelligible things, because we understand accidents only by means of substance, through which they are defined; and among substances a simple intelligible substance is prior to a composite one; for simple things are included in the concept of composite things. And of the simple entities contained in the class of substance the actually intelligible are prior to the potentially intelligible; for potentiality is defined by means of actuality. It follows, then, that the first intelligible entity is a simple substance which is an actuality.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 7 Et ne videatur incidere in opinionem Platonis, qui posuit primum principium rerum ipsum unum intelligibile, ostendit consequenter differentiam inter unum et simplex: et dicit, quod unum et simplex non idem significant, sed unum significat mensuram, ut in decimo ostensum est; simplex autem significat dispositionem, secundum quam aliquid aliqualiter se habet, quia videlicet non est ex pluribus constitutum.	2525. And lest he should seem to be adopting the opinion of Plato, who claimed that the first principle of things is the intelligible one-in-itself, he therefore explains the difference between being one and being simple. He says that one and simple do not signify the same thing, but one signifies a measure, as has been pointed out in Book X (825:C 1950-52), and simple signifies that state whereby something is such as not to be composed of many things.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit at vero ostendit idem ex ratione appetibilis: dicens, quod hoc, quod est bonum per se elegibile, secundum eamdem ordinationem se habet. Nam illud quod est prius in genere intelligibilium, est etiam melius in genere appetibilium, aut aliquid ei proportionaliter respondens. Quod quidem dicit, quia intelligibilia actu sunt secundum quod sunt in intellectu, appetibilia autem secundum quod sunt in rebus. Bonum enim et malum in rebus sunt, ut in sexto dictum est.	2526. But that which is good (1069). Then he proves the same point from the formal character of the appetible. He says that that which is good and that which is desirable in itself belong to the same class. For that which is prior in the class of intelligible things is also a greater good in the class of appetible things, or is something analogous to it. He says this because intelligible things are actual insofar as they exist in the intellect, whereas appetible things are actual insofar as they exist in reality; for good and evil are in things, as has been pointed out in Book VI (558:C 1240).
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 9 Sic igitur, sicut ratio intelligibilis substantiae est prior quam ratio intelligibilis accidentis, sic se habent bona, quae proportionaliter respondent his rationibus. Sic igitur optimum erit substantia simplex, quae est actus, quod est primum inter intelligibilia. Et sic manifestum est, quod primum movens idem est quod primum intelligibile et primum appetibile, quod est optimum.	2527. Hence, just as the concept of intelligible substance is prior to that of intelligible accidents, the same relationship holds for the goods which correspond proportionally to these concepts. Therefore the greatest good will be a simple substance, which is an actuality, because it is the first of intelligible things. It is evident, then, that the first mover is identical with the first intelligible and the first appetible good, which is the greatest good.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 10 Sed quia appetibile et bonum habent rationem finis, finis autem non videtur esse in rebus immobilibus, ut in obiectionibus tertii libri actum est, ideo hanc dubitationem removet; et dicit, quod haec divisio, qua distinguitur quot modis dicitur finis, ostendit, quod cuius causa, idest finis, aliquo modo potest esse in immobilibus. Dupliciter autem potest esse aliquid finis alterius. Uno modo sicut praeexistens; sicut medium dicitur finis praeexistens motus gravium, et huiusmodi finem nihil prohibet esse in immobilibus: potest enim aliquid tendere per suum motum ad participandum aliqualiter aliquo immobili: et sic primum movens immobile potest esse finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid esse finis alicuius, sicut quod non est in actu, sed solum in intentione agentis, per cuius actionem generatur, sicut sanitas est finis operationis medicinae; et huiusmodi finis non est in rebus immobilibus.	2528. But since what is appetible and what is good have the character of an end or goal, and there does not seem to be an end in the realm of immovable things, as has been explained in the dialectical discussions in Book III (192:C 374-75), he therefore removes this difficulty. He says that the division in which the various senses of end or goal are distinguished shows that a final cause can be found in a way in the realm of immovable things. Now one thing can be the goal of another in two ways: first, as something having prior existence, as the center of the world is said to be a goal which is prior to the motion of heavy bodies; and nothing prevents a goal of this kind from existing in the realm of immovable things. For a thing can tend by its motion to participate in some degree in something immovable; and the first mover can be a goal in this way. Second, one thing is said to be the goal of another, not as something that exists actually, but only as existing in the intention of the agent by whose activity it is produced, is health is the goal of the activity of the medical art. An end or goal of this kind does not exist in the realm of immovable things.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit movet autem comparat primum movens immobile ad primum mobile; dicens, quod cum primum movens immobile moveat quasi amatum, necesse est, quod aliquid sit primo motum ab ipso, per quod movet alia; et hoc est primum caelum. Quia igitur supponimus, quod motus sit sempiternus, oportet, quod illud, quod primo movetur, sempiterne moveatur, et per ipsum moveantur alia. Dicitur autem melius quasi amatum quam quasi desideratum, cum desiderium sit eius quod nondum habetur, sed amor etiam habiti est.	2529. And it causes motion (1070). He now relates the first unmoved mover to the first sphere. He says that, since the first unmoved mover causes motion as something loved, there must be something which is first moved by it, through which it moves other things. This is the first heaven. Therefore, since we suppose motion to be eternal, the first sphere must be moved eternally, and it in turn must move other things. And it is better to speak of it as something loved rather than as something desired, since there is desire only of something that is not yet possessed, but there is love even of something that is possessed.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 12 Et si oportet quod sempiterne moveatur, necesse est quod non contingat aliter et aliter ipsum se habere; sed ut sit semper in eadem dispositione secundum substantiam. Unde necesse est, quod primus motus, quo movetur primum mobile, sit latio, idest motus localis; quia quod movetur secundum alios motus, idest generationem et corruptionem, augmentum et diminutionem, et alterationem, necesse est quod aliter et aliter se habeat, secundum aliquid quod in ipso est, scilicet secundum substantiam, quantitatem et qualitatem: sed quod movetur secundum loci mutationem habet quidem se aliter et aliter secundum locum, qui est extrinsecus locato, sed non secundum substantiam, vel secundum aliquam intrinsecam dispositionem substantiae.	2530. And if it must be moved eternally, it must be incapable of being other than it is but must always remain substantially the same. Hence the primary kind of motion, by which “the first sphere” is moved, necessarily “is local motion,” i.e., motion as regards place; because that which is moved “according to the other kinds of motion,” i.e., generation and destruction, increase and decrease, and alteration, must differ as regards something intrinsic, namely, substance, quantity or quality. But that which is moved with local motion differs as regards place, which is extrinsic to the thing in place, but not as regards substance or any intrinsic disposition of substance.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 13 Cum igitur primum mobile habeat se aliter et aliter secundum locum, et non secundum substantiam, oportet quod primum movens, quod est immobile et semper actu ens, nullo modo possit aliter et aliter se habere, quia non potest moveri. Moveretur enim maxime secundum primum motum. Primus autem motuum est loci mutatio. In hoc autem genere, primus motus est motus circularis: hoc autem motu non movetur, cum hoc motu moveat. Primum enim movens non movetur illo motu, quo movet, sicut primum alterans non alteratur: non igitur movetur circulariter: et per consequens nullo modo potest moveri: et sic non potest aliter et aliter se habere: unde sequitur, quod primus motus sit existens in mobili ex necessitate: hoc enim est necessarium, quod non potest non esse. Sed ex necessitate est, non sicut ea quae sunt per violentiam, sed necessitas eius est ipsum bene se habere, et eius movens est principium motus, scilicet ut desideratum et finis.	2531. Therefore, since the first sphere differs as regards place but not as regards substance, the first mover, which is immovable and always actual, can in no way be other than it is, because it cannot be moved. For if it were moved, it would be moved especially with the primary kind of motion, which is local motion, of which the first type is circular. But it is not moved with this motion, since it moves other things with this motion. For the first mover is not moved with that kind of motion by which it imparts motion, just as the first cause of alteration is not itself altered. Hence it is not moved circularly, and so cannot be moved in any way. Therefore it cannot be other than it is; and thus it follows that the primary kind of motion exists in that which is moved of necessity; for that is necessary which cannot not be. But it is not necessary in the sense in which things forced are necessary, but its necessity consists in its good state. And the thing which moves it is a principle of motion as an object of desire, or a goal.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 14 Et quod talis sit eius necessitas, manifestum est ex divisione necessarii: necessarium enim tribus modis dicitur. Uno modo quod est per violentiam, quia scilicet non potest non accidere propter impetum inferentis violentiam. Alio modo dicitur, sine quo non est aliquid bene: seu quia sine eo nullo modo potest esse finis: sicut cibus necessarius est ad vitam animalis, sive quia sine eo non est aliquid perfecte se habens; sicut equus est necessarius ad iter, quia sine eo non faciliter itur. Tertio modo dicitur necessarium quod non convenit aliter et aliter se habere sed simpliciter et secundum se necessarium est.	2532. That its necessity is such becomes evident from the different meanings of the term necessary, for it is used in three senses. First it means that which happens by force, i.e., what cannot fail to happen because of the power exerted by the thing applying force. Second, it means that without which a thing does not fare well—either that without which a goal cannot be attained at all (as food is necessary for the life of an animal), or that without which something is not in a perfect state (as a horse is necessary for a journey in the sense that it is not easy to make a journey without one). Third, it means that which cannot be other than it is, but is necessary absolutely and essentially.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 15 Cum ergo dicitur quod caelum ex necessitate movetur, non potest dici, quod huiusmodi sit necessitas violentiae, quia in rebus incorruptibilibus non est aliquid extra naturam; quae autem sunt violenta sunt extra naturam. Similiter non potest esse necessitas absoluta, quia primum mobile est movens seipsum, ut probatur in octavo physicorum; quod autem seipsum movet in seipso habet moveri et non moveri. Relinquitur ergo, quod necessitas primi motus sit necessitas ex fine, inquantum sine perpetuitate talis motus non convenit esse convenientem ordinem ad finem.	2533. Therefore, when it is said that an orb is moved of necessity, such necessity cannot be called necessity of force; for in imperishable things there is not found anything that is outside their nature, but in the case of things which are forced what occurs is not natural. Similarly such necessity cannot be absolute necessity, because the first thing which is moved moves itself, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics, and what moves itself has within itself the power to move or not move. It follows, then, that the necessity of the first motion is necessity from the end, inasmuch as there cannot be a fitting order to the end unless such motion is eternal.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 16 Ex hoc igitur principio, quod est primum movens sicut finis, dependet caelum, et quantum ad perpetuitatem substantiae suae, et quantum ad perpetuitatem sui motus; et per consequens dependet a tali principio tota natura, eo quod omnia naturalia dependent a caelo, et a tali motu eius.	2534. Hence it is on this principle, i.e., the first mover viewed as an end, that the heavens depend both for the eternality of their substance and the eternality of their motion. Consequently the whole of nature depends on such a principle, because all natural things depend on the heavens and on such motion as they possess.
lib. 12 l. 7 n. 17 Attendendum est autem, quod cum Aristoteles hic dicat, quod necessitas primi motus non est necessitas absoluta, sed necessitas, quae est ex fine, finis autem principium est, quod postea nominat Deum, inquantum attenditur per motum assimilatio ad ipsum: assimilatio autem ad id quod est volens, et intelligens, cuiusmodi ostendit esse Deum, attenditur secundum voluntatem et intelligentiam, sicut artificiata assimilantur artifici, inquantum in eis voluntas artificis adimpletur: sequitur quod tota necessitas primi motus subiaceat voluntati Dei.	2535. It should also be noted that Aristotle says here that the necessity of the first motion is not absolute necessity but necessity from the end, and the end is the principle which he later calls God inasmuch as things are assimilated to God through motion. Now assimilation to a being that wills and understands (as he shows God to be) is in the line of will and understanding, just as things made by art are assimilated to the artist inasmuch as his will is fulfilled in them. This being so, it follows that the necessity of the first motion is totally subject to the will of God.