Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber12/lect9

Lecture 9

Latin	English
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit perfectionem substantiae immaterialis, hic inquirit de unitate vel multitudine eius. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit necessitatem pertractandi hanc quaestionem, quia ab aliis nihil de hoc determinate dictum est. Secundo ostendit quod sunt plures, ibi, nobis autem ex suppositis. Tertio ostendit quot sunt, ibi, pluralitatem vero lationum. Dicit ergo primo, quod non oportet latere utrum sit ponendum unam solam substantiam talem, scilicet sempiternam, immaterialem, aut plures; et si plures, quot sunt: sed etiam oportet commemorare negationes aliorum, idest quod alii nihil dixerunt, quod sit manifestum et planum, de pluralitate harum substantiarum.	2553. Having shown what it is that constitutes the perfection of an immaterial substance, here the Philosopher asks whether this substance is one or many; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1078)C 2553), he indicates that it is necessary to treat this question because nothing definite has teen said about it by other thinkers. Second (1079:C 2555), he shows that there are many such substances (“However, we must discuss”). Third (1081:C 2563), he shows how many there are (“But it is now necessary”). He accordingly says, first (1078), that we must not neglect the question whether it is necessary to posit only one such substance which is eternal and immaterial or many; and if the latter, how many. But we must also “recall the lack of statements on this point by other philosophers,” i.e., the fact that others have said nothing that is clear and evident about the number of these substances.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 2 Quod sic patet. Ponentes enim substantias immateriales maxime fuerunt qui posuerunt ideas. Opinio autem de ideis secundum id quod sunt, non habet rationem alicuius certae pluralitatis, quia ideae ponuntur omnium rerum quae communicant in aliquo communi. Sed quia ponentes ideas dixerunt eas esse numeros, ex parte numerorum aliqua ratio haberi poterat pluralitatis. Sed tamen de pluralitate numerorum non semper eodem modo disserebant: sed quandoque dicebant species numerorum esse infinitas. Quod quidem verum est, quantum ad ipsam propriam numerorum rationem, quia semper unitas addita, aliam speciem numeri facit. Unde, cum in infinito additio fieri possit in numeris, in infinitum species numerorum multiplicantur. Quandoque autem dicuntur species numerorum determinari usque ad decem; et hoc quantum ad numerorum nominationem. Namque omnes numeri supra decem, videntur esse secundum nomen alicuius primi numeri aliqualiter iterati. Sed non possunt ostendere per determinatam rationem, quare sit tanta pluralitas numerorum, scilicet usque ad decem, et non plus neque minus. Nec est mirum, cum ista determinatio specierum non sit secundum rem, sed secundum nomen. Assignant autem alii hanc rationem, quia numerus denarius generatur ex progressione numerorum usque ad quaternarium, qui est primus numerus quadratus. Unum enim et duo sunt tria; quibus si tria addantur fiunt sex, quatuor autem additis consurgunt decem.	2554. This is made clear as follows. Those who made a special claim for immaterial substances were the proponents of the Ideas. Now the opinion about the nature of the Ideas contains no theory about any definite number, because there are assumed to be Ideas of all things which share in a common name. But since those who posited Ideas said that they are numbers, it would seem that we could get some notion about how many numbers there are. However, they did not always say the same thing on this point. Sometimes they said that the species of numbers are unlimited. This is true of numbers by reason of their proper nature, because whenever a unit is added it always produces a different species of number. Hence, since in the case of numbers infinite additions can be made, the species of numbers may increase to infinity. At other times they said that the species of numbers are limited to the number ten. This refers to the naming of numbers, for the names of all numbers after ten seem to repeat in some way the name of a primary number. But they cannot show by any definite argument why there should be just so many numbers, i.e., ten, and not more or fewer. Nor is this to be wondered at, since this limitation of the species of numbers is not a real limitation but a nominal one. Other thinkers offer the argument that the number ten is generated from the progression of numbers up to the number four, which is the first square number. For one plus two equals three; and when three is added to this, the number six results; and when four is added to this, the number ten results.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit nobis autem ostendit, quod necesse est esse plures huiusmodi substantias. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo resumit quod ostensum est de primo principio dicens, quod, cum alii nihil dixerint demonstrative de pluralitate substantiarum separatarum, nobis dicendum est de hoc per ea quae sunt supposita et determinata prius. Dictum est enim supra, quod primum principium entium est quoddam quod non movetur, neque secundum se, neque secundum accidens, sed movet unum motum, qui est primus et sempiternus. Quia enim omne quod movetur, necesse est ab aliquo moveri, ut probatum est in octavo physicorum, necesse est, quod primum movens sit omnino immobile, et sempiternus motus sit a sempiterno motore, et unum motum ab uno motore.	2555. However, we must discuss (1079). He now shows that there must be many substances of this kind; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he returns to the points established about the first principle. He says that, since other thinkers have said nothing demonstrative about the number of separate substances, we must discuss this question by beginning with what has already been laid down and established. For it has been said above that, while the first principle of beings is one which is neither essentially nor accidentally moved, it still causes a single motion, which is the first and eternal motion. For since everything which is moved must be moved by something else, as has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics, the first mover must be altogether immovable, and eternal motion must be caused by an eternal mover, and a single motion by a single mover.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit videmus autem secundo ostendit, quod post primum principium necesse est ponere plures substantias immateriales sempiternas; dicens, quod praeter simplicem motum localem universi, qui est motus diurnus, quo totum caelum revolvitur, et est uniformis, et est simplicissimus, quem motum causat prima substantia immobilis, videmus aliquos motus locales planetarum, qui etiam sunt sempiterni, quia corpus circulare, scilicet caelum, est sempiternum: unde sempiternitas motus non tollitur per corruptionem mobilis. Et est instabile, idest non potest quiescere: unde motus iste non intercipitur quiete. Et ista probata sunt in scientia naturali, tam in libro physicorum quam in libro de caelo. Unde necesse est quod quilibet horum motuum moveatur a motore per se immobili et a substantia sempiterna.	2556. Now we see (1080). Second, he shows that after the first principle it is necessary to posit a number of eternal substances. He says that besides the simple local motion of the universe (one that lasts a day —during which the entire heavens revolve—and is uniform and the most simple), which the first immovable substance causes, we observe the local motions of the planets, which are also eternal; because the circular body, i.e., a heaven, is also eternal. Therefore the eternity of motion is no; destroyed as a result of the destruction of a movable being. And “it never stands still,” i.e., it is incapable of coming to rest. Hence this motion is not broken by rest. These points have been proved in the philosophy of nature, both in the Physics as well as in The Heavens. Each of these motions, then, must be caused by a mover which is essentially unmoved and an eternal substance.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 5 Quod quidem ideo necesse est, quia astra sempiterna sunt, et substantiae quaedam sunt: unde oportet quod movens ea, etiam sempiternum sit et substantia: movens enim est prius moto; et quod est prius substantia, necesse est esse substantiam. Unde manifestum est quod necesse est, quot sunt lationes astrorum, tot esse substantias, quae sunt naturaliter sempiternae, et secundum se immobiles et sine magnitudine, propter causam supra assignatam, quia scilicet movent tempore infinito, et sic per consequens virtute infinita. Manifestum est igitur, quod sunt aliquae substantiae immateriales secundum numerum motuum astrorum, et quod earum etiam ordo est secundum ordinem eorumdem motuum.	2557. Now this must be so because the stars are eternal and are substances. Hence their mover must also be eternal and a substance; for a mover is prior to the thing moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is clear, then, that there must be as many substances as there are motions of the stars, and that these substances must be by nature eternal and essentially immovable and without magnitude, for the reason given above (1076:C 2548-50), i.e., because they move in infinite time and therefore have infinite power. Hence it is evident that there are immaterial substances which are as numerous as the motions of the stars, and that they also have the same order as the motions of the stars.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 6 Considerandum est autem quod post primam lationem Aristoteles non computat nisi lationes planetarum, quia eius tempore nondum erat deprehensus motus stellarum fixarum. Unde existimavit, quod octava sphaera, in qua sunt stellae fixae, esset primum mobile, et motor eius esset primum principium. Sed postea deprehensus est ab astrologis motus stellarum fixarum in contrarium primi motus: unde necesse est quod supra sphaeram stellarum fixarum sit alia circumdans totum, quae revolvit totum caelum motu diurno; et hoc est primum mobile, quod movetur a primo motore secundum Aristotelem.	2558. Now it must be borne in mind that after the first motion Aristotle computes only the motions of the planets, because at his time the motion of the fixed stars had not been detected. Hence he thought that the eighth sphere, in which the fixed stars are located, was the first one to be moved, and that its mover was the first principle. But later on astronomers perceived that the motion of the fixed stars was in an opposite direction to the first motion, so that above the sphere of the fixed stars it was necessary to posit another sphere, [This “ninth” orb or sphere of which St. Thomas speaks was postulated by the astronomers in order to account for the motion which the celestial pole was discovered to be describing every 36,ooo years. Since it encompassed all the other spheres, it was considered to be a ninth or outermost sphere, and therefore the first in order of all the spheres.] which surrounds the entire heavens and turns the whole in its daily motion. This is the first sphere, which is moved by the first mover of which Aristotle spoke.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 7 Sed Avicenna posuit quod primum mobile movetur immediate non a primo principio, sed ab intelligentia a primo principio causata. Cum enim primum principium sit unum simpliciter, existimavit quod ab eo non potest causari nisi unum, quod est intelligentia prima, in qua quidem incidit aliqua pluralitas potentiae et actus, secundum quod acquirit esse ab eo. Comparatur enim ad id, a quo dependet secundum suum esse, sicut potentia ad actum. Sic igitur prima intelligentia potest immediate causare plura. Nam secundum quod intelligit se prout habet aliquid de potentia, causat substantiam orbis, quem movet. Secundum autem quod se intelligit prout habet in actu esse ab alio, causat animam sui orbis. Secundum autem quod intelligit suum principium, causat intelligentiam sequentem, quae movet inferiorem orbem, et deinceps usque ad sphaeram lunae.	2559. But Avicenna claimed that the first sphere is moved directly, not by the first principle, but by an intelligence which is caused by the first principle. For since the first mover is absolutely one, Avicenna thought that only one thing could be caused by it; and this is the first intelligence, in which a plurality of potentiality and actuality is found inasmuch as it derives being from the first principle. For it is related to that on which it depends for its existence as something potential to something actual. Hence the first intelligence can immediately cause many things; for inasmuch as it understands itself as having some potentiality, it causes the substance of the orb which it moves, but insofar as it understands itself as possessing actual existence from some other cause, it causes the soul of its orb. Again, inasmuch as it understands its own principle, it causes the next intelligence, which moves a lower orb, and so on down to the sphere of the moon.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 8 Sed hoc non habet necessitatem. Nam causa agens non est in illis substantiis superioribus sicut in rebus materialibus, ut necesse sit ex uno tantum unum causari, quia causa et causatum in eis sunt secundum esse intelligibile. Unde secundum plura quae possunt intelligi ab uno, possunt ab uno plura causari. Et satis conveniens videtur, ut primus motus rerum corporalium, a quo omnes alii dependent, habeat pro causa principium immaterialium substantiarum, ut sit quaedam connexio et ordo sensibilium et intelligibilium. De hoc autem quod philosophus dicit, quod ordo substantiarum separatarum est secundum ordinem motuum et mobilium, potest esse dubitatio. Nam sol maior est quantitate inter omnes planetas, et eius effectus magis apparet in rebus inferioribus; et etiam motus aliorum planetarum ordinantur per motum solis, et quodammodo consequuntur ipsum. Unde videtur quod substantia quae movet solem, sit nobilior substantiis quae movent alios planetas, cum tamen sol non sit super omnes alios planetas. Sed cum in corporibus id quod est continens sit formalius et per hoc dignius et perfectius, et comparetur ad corpus contentum, sicut ad partem totum, sicut dicitur in quarto physicorum, necessarium est quod, cum sphaera superioris planetae contineat sphaeram inferioris, quod planeta superior, ad quem ordinatur tota sua sphaera, sit altioris et universalioris virtutis quam planeta inferior, et diuturniores operetur effectus, utpote propinquior existens primae sphaerae, quae per suum motum causat sempiternitatem, ut supra dictum est. Et inde est quod, sicut dicit Ptolemaeus in quadripartito, effectus Saturni coaptantur ad universalia loca et tempora, Iovis ad annos, Martis, solis, Veneris et Mercurii ad menses, lunae autem ad dies.	2560. But this is not necessary. For an efficient cause in the realm of superior substances does not act like an Acient cause in the realm of material things, in the sense that a single effect is produced by a single cause, because among higher substances cause and thing caused have intelligible existence. Hence insofar as many things can be understood by a single superior substance, many effects can be produced by a single superior substance. And it seems quite fitting that the first motion of corporeal things, on which all other motions depend, should have as its cause the principle of immate:ial substances, so that there should be some connection and order between sensible and intelligible things. A problem can arise, however, regarding the Philosopher’s statement that the order of separate substances corresponds to the order of motions and bodies moved. For of all the planets the sun is the largest in size, and its effect is more evident in lower bodies; and even the motions of the other planets are arranged in accordance with the motion of the sun, and in a sense are subsequent to it. Hence it seems that the substance which moves the sun is nobler than the substances which move the other planets, even though the sun is not located above the other planets. But since among bodies one which contains is more formal, and is thereby nobler and more perfect, and is related to a contained body as a whole to a part, as is said in Book IV of the Physics; and since the sphere of a superior planet contains that of an inferior planet, therefore a superior Planet, to which its whole sphere is subordinated, must have a higher and more universal power than an inferior planet, and must produce more lasting effects because it is nearer to the first sphere, which by its motion causes the eternality of things, as has been pointed out above (1065:C 2510). And this is the reason, as Ptolemy says in the Quadripartitum, why the effects of Saturn correspond to universal places and times, and those of Jupiter to years, and those of Mars, the sun, Venus and Mercury to months, and those of the moon to days.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 9 Et inde est quod effectus planetarum apparent in istis inferioribus secundum ordinem eorumdem. Nam primi tres superiores videntur ordinari ad ea quae pertinent ad existentiam rei secundum seipsam: nam ipsa stabilitas esse rei attribuitur Saturno, perfectio autem rei et bona habitudo correspondet Iovi. Virtus autem rei, secundum quod se contra nociva tuetur et ea propellit, correspondet Marti. Tres vero planetae alii videntur proprium effectum habere ad motum ipsius rei existentis, ita quod sol sit ut universale principium motus: et propter hoc eius operatio in motionibus inferioribus maxime apparet. Venus autem videtur quasi proprium effectum habere magis determinatum, idest generationem, per quam aliquid consequitur speciem, et ad quam scilicet omnes motus alii ordinantur in istis inferioribus. Mercurius autem videtur proprium effectum habere in multiplicatione, idest distinctione individuorum in una specie; et propter hoc varios habet motus. Et ipse etiam cum naturis omnium planetarum miscetur, ut astrologi dicunt. Lunae autem proprie competit immutatio materiae, et dispositio ipsius ad recipiendum omnes impressiones caelestes: et propter hoc videtur quasi esse deferens impressiones caelestes, et applicans inferiori materiae.	2561. This is also the reason why the effects of the planets appear in lower bodies in accordance with the order among the planets. For the first three highest planets seem to be directed to effects which pertain to the existence of a thing taken in itself; for the very stability of a thing’s act of being is attributed to Saturn, and its perfection and state of well-being to Jupiter, and the power by which it protects itself from what is harmful and drives it away, to Mars. The other three planets seem to have as their proper effects the motion of a being. The sun is a universal principle of motion, and for this reason its operation is most evident in the case of lower motions. For Venus seems to have as its proper effect a more limited one, namely, the process of generation, by which a thing attains its form, and one to which all the other motions among lower bodies are directed. Mercury seems to have as its proper effect the multiplication of things, i.e., the distinction of individuals in the same species; and for this reason it has various motions. It is also mixed with the natures of all the planets, as the astronomers say. The changing of matter and the disposing of it to receive all celestial impressions belongs properly to the moon; and for this reason it seems that it is the planet which transmits celestial impressions and applies them to inferior matter.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 10 Sic igitur quanto corpus caeleste est superius, tanto habet universaliorem, diuturniorem et potentiorem effectum. Et cum corpora caelestia sint quasi instrumenta substantiarum separatarum moventium, sequitur quod substantia quae movet superiorem orbem sit universalioris conceptionis et virtutis; et per consequens oportet quod sit nobilior.	2562. Hence the higher a celestial body, the more universal, lasting, and powerful its effect. And since the celestial bodies are the instruments, so to speak, of the separate substances which cause motion, it follows that a substance which moves a higher orb has a more universal knowledge and power, and must therefore be nobler.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit pluralitatem vero inquirit quot praedictae substantiae sint; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima inquirit primo numerum motuum caelestium. In secunda ex hoc concludit numerum substantiarum moventium, ibi, quare et substantia et principium. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit unde accipiendus sit numerus motuum caelestium. Secundo ponit circa hoc opiniones diversas, ibi, Eudoxus quidem. Dicit ergo primo, quod pluralitatem lationum, sive motuum caelestium, oportet considerare ex astrologia, quae maxime propria est ad hoc inter scientias mathematicas. Ipsa namque sola inter eas speculatur de substantia sensibili et aeterna, scilicet de corpore caelesti. Aliae vero scientiae mathematicae de nulla substantia considerant, sicut de arithmetica patet, quae est circa numeros, et de geometria quae circa magnitudines est: numerus autem et magnitudo, sunt accidentia.	2563. But it is now necessary (1081). Then he investigates the number of these substances; and this is divided into two parts. In the first part (1081:C 2563) he first investigates the number of celestial motions; and in the second (1084:C 2586), he infers from this the number of substances which cause motion (“Hence it is reasonable”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the source from which we must derive the number of celestial motions. Second (1082:C 2567), he gives the different opinions about this (“Now Eudoxus”). He says, first (1081), that we must use the science of astronomy in studying the number of revolutions or celestial motions, which is a subject that belongs particularly to this branch of the mathematical sciences. For of these sciences only astronomy speculates about sensible and eternal substances, i.e., celestial bodies. But the other mathematical sciences do not consider any substance, as is clear in the case of arithmetic, which treats of numbers, and in the case of geometry, which treats of continuous quantity. Number and continuous quantity are accidents.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 12 Quod autem sunt plures motus corporum quae feruntur in caelo, scilicet planetarum, manifestum est his, qui parum attingunt de scientia astrologiae, quia unumquodque astrorum errantium, idest planetarum, movetur pluribus lationibus et non una tantum. Dicuntur autem planetae astra errantia, non quia irregulariter moveantur, sed quia non semper servant eamdem figuram et positionem ad alias stellas, sicut illae adinvicem, quae propter hoc fixae dicuntur.	2564. That there are many motions belonging to the bodies which move about in the heavens, i.e., the planets, is evident even to those who have little acquaintance with the science of astronomy; for “each of the wandering stars,” i.e., the planets, is moved by several motions and not just by one. Now the planets are called “wandering stars,” not because their motions are irregular, but because they do not always maintain the same pattern and position in relation to the other stars, as these do among themselves and for this reason are called “fixed.”
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 13 Quod autem sint plures motus huiusmodi astrorum, tribus modis deprehenditur. Est enim aliquis motus apprehensus a vulgo visu. Est et alius motus qui non deprehenditur nisi instrumentis et considerationibus. Et horum motuum quidam comprehenduntur longissimis temporibus, et quidam parvis. Est etiam tertius motus, qui declaratur ratione; quia motus stellarum errantium, invenitur quandoque velocior, quandoque tardior; et quandoque videtur esse planeta directus, quandoque retrogradus. Et, quia non potest esse secundum naturam corporis caelestis, cuius motus debet esse omnino regularis, necessarium fuit ponere diversos motus, ex quibus haec irregularitas ad debitum ordinem reducatur.	2565. That there are many motions of stars of this kind is detected in three ways. There is one motion which is perceived by plain sight. There is another which is perceived only by instruments and calculation; and of these motions, some are grasped after a very long period of time, and others after a short one. There is also a third motion, which is demonstrated by reason; for the motion of the wandering stars is found at one time to be more rapid and at another slower; and sometimes a planet seems to be moving forward, and sometimes backward. And because this cannot be in keeping with the nature of a celestial body, whose motion ought to be regular in all respects, it has been necessary to posit different motions by which this irregularity might be reduced to a fitting order.
lib. 12 l. 9 n. 14 Quot autem sint motus planetarum, nos nunc dicemus ea quae circa haec mathematici dicunt, ut circa haec reddamur attenti, ut aliqua pluralitas determinata mente concipiatur a nobis. Reliquum vero quod non dicetur oportet quod per nos ipsos quaeramus; vel quod in hoc suadeamur ab his qui hoc quaerunt, et si aliquid appareat postmodum per ea quae modo dicuntur ab his qui de huiusmodi tractant. Sed, quia in eligendis opinionibus vel repudiandis, non debet duci homo amore vel odio introducentis opinionem, sed magis ex certitudine veritatis, ideo dicit quod oportet amare utrosque, scilicet eos quorum opinionem sequimur, et eos quorum opinionem repudiamus. Utrique enim studuerunt ad inquirendam veritatem, et nos in hoc adiuverunt. Sed tamen oportet nos persuaderi a certioribus, idest sequi opinionem eorum, qui certius ad veritatem pervenerunt.	2566. As to the number of planetary motions, let us now state what the mathematicians say about this, so that with this in mind we may conceive some definite number. But as to the other things which have not been stated, we must either investigate these for ourselves or in this matter accept the opinion of those who do investigate the problem. The same thing applies if some view should appear later on in addition to” those which are now stated by men who treat this kind of problem. And since in choosing or rejecting opinions of this kind a person should not be influenced either by a liking or dislike for the one introducing the opinion, but rather by the certainty of truth, he therefore says that we must respect both parties, namely, those whose opinion we follow, and those whose opinion we reject. For both have diligently sought the truth and have aided us in this matter. Yet we must “be persuaded by the more certain,” i.e., we must follow the opinion of those who have attained the truth with greater certitude.