Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber2/lect1

Lecture 1

Latin	English
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 1 Postquam philosophus reprobavit opiniones antiquorum philosophorum de primis principiis rerum, circa quae versatur principaliter philosophi primi intentio, hic accedit ad determinandum veritatem. Aliter autem se habet consideratio philosophiae primae circa veritatem, et aliarum particularium scientiarum. Nam unaquaeque particularis scientia considerat quamdam particularem veritatem circa determinatum genus entium, ut geometria circa rerum magnitudines, arithmetica circa numeros. Sed philosophia prima considerat universalem veritatem entium. Et ideo ad hunc philosophum pertinet considerare, quomodo se habeat homo ad veritatem cognoscendam.	273. Having criticized the ancient philosophers’ opinions about the first principles of things, with which first philosophy is chiefly concerned, the Philosopher now begins to establish what is true. First philosophy considers truth in a different way than the particular sciences do. Each of the particular sciences considers a particular truth out a definite class of beings; e.g., geometry deals with the continuous quantities of bodies, and arithmetic with numbers; whereas first philosophy considers what is universally true of things. Therefore, it pertains to this science to consider in what respects man is capable of knowing the truth.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 2 Dividitur ergo ista pars in partes duas. In prima parte determinat ea quae pertinent ad considerationem universalis veritatis. In secunda incipit inquirere veritatem de primis principiis et omnibus aliis, ad quae extenditur huius philosophiae consideratio; et hoc in tertio libro, qui incipit, necesse est nobis acquisitam scientiam et cetera. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes tres. In prima dicit qualiter se habet homo ad considerationem veritatis. In secunda ostendit ad quam scientiam principaliter pertineat cognitio veritatis, ibi, vocari vero philosophiam veritatis et cetera. In tertia parte ostendit modum considerandae veritatis, ibi, contingunt autem auditiones et cetera. Circa primum tria facit. Primo ostendit facilitatem existentem in cognitione veritatis. Secundo ostendit causam difficultatis, ibi, forsan autem et difficultate et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo homines se invicem iuvant ad cognoscendum veritatem, ibi, non solum autem his dicere et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit intentum, dicens, quod theoria, idest consideratio vel speculatio de veritate quodammodo est facilis, et quodammodo difficilis.	274. First, he states what he intends to prove. He says that “theoretical knowledge,” i.e., the contemplative or speculative understanding of truth, is in one sense easy and in another, difficult.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 3 Secundo ibi signum autem manifestat propositum. Et primo quantum ad facilitatem. Secundo quantum ad difficultatem, ibi, habere autem totum et partem et cetera. Facilitatem autem in considerando veritatem ostendit tripliciter. Primo quidem hoc signo, quod licet nullus homo veritatis perfectam cognitionem adipisci possit, tamen nullus homo est ita expers veritatis, quin aliquid de veritate cognoscat. Quod ex hoc apparet, quod unusquisque potest enuntiare de veritate et natura rerum, quod est signum considerationis interioris.	275. An indication of this (145). Second, he explains what he intends to prove: first, in what sense it is easy to know the truth; and second (278), in what sense it is difficult (“But the fact”). He shows in what sense it is easy to know the truth, by giving three indications: The first is this: while no man can attain a complete knowledge of the truth, still no man is so completely devoid of truth that he knows nothing about it. This is shown by the fact that anyone can make a statement about the truth and the nature of things, which is a sign of intellectual reflection.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 4 Secundum signum ponit ibi et secundum dicens quod licet id quod unus homo potest immittere vel apponere ad cognitionem veritatis suo studio et ingenio, sit aliquid parvum per comparationem ad totam considerationem veritatis, tamen illud, quod aggregatur ex omnibus coarticulatis, idest exquisitis et collectis, fit aliquid magnum, ut potest apparere in singulis artibus, quae per diversorum studia et ingenia ad mirabile incrementum pervenerunt.	276. And while each one individually (146). Here he gives the second indication. He says that, while the amount of truth that one man can discover or contribute to the knowledge of truth by his own study and talents is small compared with a complete knowledge of truth, nevertheless what is known as a result of “the combined efforts” of all, i.e., what is discovered and collected into one whole, becomes quite extensive. This can be seen in the case of the particular arts, which have developed in a marvelous manner as a result of the studies and talents of different men.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 5 Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita se habere videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet? Interiora enim domus difficile est scire, et circa ea facile est hominem decipi: sed sicut circa ipsum introitum domus qui omnibus patet et primo occurrit, nullus decipitur, ita etiam est in consideratione veritatis: nam ea, per quae intratur in cognitionem aliorum, nota sunt omnibus, et nullus circa ea decipitur: huiusmodi autem sunt prima principia naturaliter nota, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare, et quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia. Circa conclusiones vero, ad quas per huiusmodi, quasi per ianuam, intratur, contingit multoties errare. Sic igitur cognitio veritatis est facilis inquantum scilicet ad minus istud modicum, quod est principium, per se notum, per quod intratur ad veritatem, est omnibus per se notum.	277. Therefore, if the situation (147). Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, the situation in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house. For it is difficult to know what the interior of a house is like, and a man is easily deceived in such matters; but just as no one is mistaken about the entrance of a house, which is evident to all and is the first thing that we perceive, so too this is the case with regard to the knowledge of truth; for those truths through which we enter into a knowledge of others are known to all, and no man is mistaken about them. Those first principles which are naturally apprehended are truths of this sort, e.g., “It is impossible both to affirm and deny something at the same time,” and “Every whole is greater than each of its parts,” and so on. On the other hand, there are many ways in which error may arise with respect to the conclusions into which we enter through such principles as through an outer door. Therefore, it is easy to know the truth if we consider that small amount of it which is comprised of self-evident principles, through which we enter into other truths, because this much is evident to all.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit habere autem manifestat difficultatem; dicens, quod hoc ostendit difficultatem quae est in consideratione veritatis, quia non possumus habere circa veritatem totum et partem. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod hoc dixit omnibus esse notum, per quod in alia introitur. Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis. Una quidem per modum resolutionis, secundum quam procedimus a compositis ad simplicia, et a toto ad partem, sicut dicitur in primo physicorum, quod confusa sunt prius nobis nota. Et in hac via perficitur cognitio veritatis, quando pervenitur ad singulas partes distincte cognoscendas. Alia est via compositionis, per quam procedimus a simplicibus ad composita, qua perficitur cognitio veritatis cum pervenitur ad totum. Sic igitur hoc ipsum, quod homo non potest in rebus perfecte totum et partem cognoscere, ostendit difficultatem considerandae veritatis secundum utramque viam.	278. But the fact that we cannot (148). Here he explains in what sense it is difficult to know the truth. He says that our inability to grasp the whole truth and a part of it shows the difficulty involved in the search for truth. In support of this we must consider his statement that the truth through which we gain admission to other truths is known to all. Now there are two ways in which we attain knowledge of the truth. The first is the method of analysis, by which we go from what is complex to what is simple or from a whole to a part, as it is said in Book I of the Physics that the first objects of our knowledge are confused wholes. Now our knowledge of the truth is perfected by this method when we attain a distinct knowledge of the particular parts of a whole. The other method is that of synthesis, by which we go from what is simple to what is complex; and we attain knowledge of truth by this method when we succeed in knowing a whole. Thus the fact that man is unable to know perfectly in things a whole and a part shows the difficulty involved in knowing the truth by both of these methods.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit forsan autem ostendit causam praemissae difficultatis. Ubi similiter considerandum est, quod in omnibus, quae consistunt in quadam habitudine unius ad alterum, potest impedimentum dupliciter vel ex uno vel ex alio accidere: sicut si lignum non comburatur, hoc contingit vel quia ignis est debilis, vel quia lignum non est bene combustibile; et similiter oculus impeditur a visione alicuius visibilis, aut quia est debilis aut quia visibile est tenebrosum. Sic igitur potest contingere quod veritas sit difficilis ad cognoscendum, vel propter defectum qui est in ipsis rebus, vel propter defectum qui est in intellectu nostro.	279. However, since the difficulty is twofold (149). He gives the reason for this difficulty. Here too it must be noted that, in all cases in which there is a certain relationship between two things, an effect can fail to occur in two ways, i.e., because of either one of the things involved. For example, if wood does not burn, this may happen either because the fire is not strong enough or because the wood is not combustible enough. And in a similar way the eye may be prevented from seeing a visible object either because the eye is weak or because the visible object is in the dark. Therefore, in like manner, it may be difficult to know the truth about things either (1) because things themselves are imperfect in some way or (2) because of some weakness on the part of our intellect.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 8 Et quod quantum ad aliquas res difficultas contingat in cognoscendo veritatem ipsarum rerum ex parte earum, patet. Cum enim unumquodque sit cognoscibile inquantum est ens actu, ut infra in nono huius dicetur, illa quae habent esse deficiens et imperfectum, sunt secundum seipsa parum cognoscibilia, ut materia, motus et tempus propter esse eorum imperfectionem, ut Boetius dicit in libro de duabus naturis.	280. (1) Now it is evident that we experience difficulty in knowing the truth about some things because of the things themselves; for since each thing is knowable insofar as it is an actual being, as will be stated below in Book IX (1894) of this work, then those things which are deficient and imperfect in being are less knowable by their very nature; e.g., matter, motion, and time are less knowable because of the imperfect being which they have, as Boethius says in his book The Two Natures.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 9 Fuerunt autem aliqui philosophi, qui posuerunt difficultatem cognitionis veritatis totaliter provenire ex parte rerum, ponentes nihil esse fixum et stabile in rebus, sed omnia esse in continuo fluxu ut infra in quarto huius dicetur. Sed hoc excludit philosophus, dicens, quod quamvis difficultas cognoscendae veritatis forsan possit secundum aliqua diversa esse dupliciter, videlicet ex parte nostra, et ex parte rerum; non tamen principalis causa difficultatis est ex parte rerum, sed ex parte nostra.	281. Now there were some philosophers who claimed that the difficulty experienced in knowing the truth is wholly attributable to things themselves, because they maintained that nothing is fixed and stable in nature but that everything is in a state of continual change, as will be stated in Book IV (683) of this work. But the Philosopher denies this, saying that even though the difficulty experienced in knowing the truth can perhaps be twofold because of different things, i.e., our intellect and things themselves, still the principal source of the difficulty is not things but our intellect.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 10 Et hoc sic probat. Quia, si difficultas esset principaliter ex parte rerum, sequeretur, quod illa magis cognosceremus, quae sunt magis cognoscibilia secundum suam naturam: sunt autem maxime cognoscibilia secundum naturam suam, quae sunt maxime in actu, scilicet entia immaterialia et immobilia, quae tamen sunt maxime nobis ignota. Unde manifestum est, quod difficultas accidit in cognitione veritatis, maxime propter defectum intellectus nostri. Ex quo contingit, quod intellectus animae nostrae hoc modo se habet ad entia immaterialia, quae inter omnia sunt maxime manifesta secundum suam naturam, sicut se habent oculi nycticoracum ad lucem diei, quam videre non possunt, quamvis videant obscura. Et hoc est propter debilitatem visus eorum.	282. He proves this in the following way. If this difficulty were attributable principally to things, it would follow it we would know best those things which are most knowable by nature. But those things which are most knowable by nature are those which are most actual, i.e., immaterial and unchangeable things, yet we know these least of all. Obviously, then, the difficulty experienced in knowing the truth is due principally to some weakness on the part of our intellect. From this it follows that our soul’s intellectual power is related to those immaterial beings, which are by nature the most knowable of all, as the eyes of owls are to the light of day, which they cannot see because their power of vision is weak, although they do see dimly lighted things.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 11 Sed videtur haec similitudo non esse conveniens. Sensus enim quia est potentia organi corporalis, corrumpitur ex vehementia sensibilis. Intellectus autem, cum non sit potentia alicuius organi corporei, non corrumpitur ex excellenti intelligibili. Unde post apprehensionem alicuius magni intelligibilis, non minus intelligimus minus intelligibilia, sed magis, ut dicitur in tertio de anima.	283. But it is evident that this simile is not adequate; for since a sense is a power of a bodily organ, it is made inoperative as a result of its sensible object being too intense. But the intellect is not a power of a bodily organ and is not made inoperative as a result of its intelligible object being too intelligible. Therefore, after understanding objects that are highly intelligible our ability to understand less intelligible objects is not decreased but increased, as is stated in Book III of The Soul.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 12 Dicendum est ergo, quod sensus impeditur a cognitione alicuius sensibilis dupliciter. Uno modo per corruptionem organi ab excellenti sensibili; et hoc locum non habet in intellectu. Alio modo ex defectu proportionis ipsius virtutis sensitivae ad obiectum. Potentiae enim animae non sunt eiusdem virtutis in omnibus animalibus; sed sicuti homini hoc in sua specie convenit, quod habeat pessimum olfactum, ita nycticoraci, quod habeat debilem visum, quia non habet proportionem ad claritatem diei cognoscendam.	284. Therefore it must be said that a sense is prevented from perceiving some sensible object for two reasons: first, (1) because a sensory organ is rendered inoperative as a result of its sensible object being too intense (this does not occur in the case of the intellect); second, (2) because of some deficiency in the ability of a sensory power to perceive its object; for the powers of the soul in all animals do not have the same efficacy. Thus, just as it is proper to man by nature to have the weakest sense of smell, in a similar way it is proper to an owl to have the weakest power of vision, because it is incapable of perceiving the light of day.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 13 Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit ultima in ordine substantiarum intellectivarum, minime participat de virtute intellectiva; et sicut ipsa quidem secundum naturam est actus corporis, eius autem intellectiva potentia non est actus organi corporalis, ita habet naturalem aptitudinem ad cognoscendum corporalium et sensibilium veritatem, quae sunt minus cognoscibilia secundum suam naturam propter eorum materialitatem, sed tamen cognosci possunt per abstractionem sensibilium a phantasmatibus. Et quia hic modus cognoscendi veritatem convenit naturae humanae animae secundum quod est forma talis corporis; quae autem sunt naturalia semper manent; impossibile est, quod anima humana huiusmodi corpori unita cognoscat de veritate rerum, nisi quantum potest elevari per ea quae abstrahendo a phantasmatibus intelligit. Per haec autem nullo modo potest elevari ad cognoscendum quidditates immaterialium substantiarum, quae sunt improportionatae istis substantiis sensibilibus. Unde impossibile est quod anima humana huiusmodi corpori unita, apprehendat substantias separatas cognoscendo de eis quod quid est.	285. Therefore, since the human soul occupies the lowest place in the order of intellective substances, it has the least intellective power. As a matter of fact, just as it is by nature the actuality of a body, although its intellective power is not the act of a bodily organ, in a similar way it has a natural capacity to know the truth about corporeal and sensible things. These are less knowable by nature because of their materiality, although they can be known by abstracting sensible forms from phantasms. And since this process of knowing truth befits the nature of the human soul insofar as it is the form of this kind of body (and whatever is natural always remains so), it is possible for the human soul, which is united to this kind of body, to know the truth about things only insofar as it can be elevated to the level of the things which it understands by abstracting from phantasms. However, by this process it cannot be elevated to the level of knowing the quiddities of immaterial substances because these are not on the same level as sensible substances. Therefore it is impossible for the human soul, which is united to this kind of body, to apprehend separate substances by knowing their quiddities.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 14 Ex quo apparet falsum esse quod Averroes hic dicit in commento, quod philosophus non demonstrat hic, res abstractas intelligere esse impossibile nobis, sicut impossibile est vespertilioni inspicere solem. Et ratio sua, quam inducit, est valde derisibilis. Subiungit enim, quoniam si ita esset, natura otiose egisset, quia fecit illud quod in se est naturaliter intelligibile, non esse intellectum ab aliquo; sicut si fecisset solem non comprehensum ab aliquo visu. Deficit enim haec ratio. Primo quidem in hoc, quod cognitio intellectus nostri non est finis substantiarum separatarum, sed magis e converso. Unde non sequitur, quod, si non cognoscantur substantiae separatae a nobis, quod propter hoc sint frustra. Frustra enim est, quod non consequitur finem ad quem est. Secundo, quia etsi substantiae separatae non intelliguntur a nobis secundum suas quidditates, intelliguntur tamen ab aliis intellectibus; sicut solem etsi non videat oculus nycticoracis, videt tamen eum oculus aquilae.	286. For this reason the statement which Averroes makes at this point in his Commentary is evidently false, i.e., that the Philosopher does not prove here that it is just as impossible for us to understand abstract substances as it is for a bat to see the sun. The argument that he gives is wholly ridiculous; for he adds that, if this were the case, nature would have acted in vain because it would have made something that is naturally knowable in itself to be incapable of being known by anything else. It would be the same as if it had made the sun incapable of being seen. This argument is not satisfactory for two reasons. First, the end of separate substances does not consist in being understood by our intellect, but rather the converse. Therefore, if separate substances are not known by us, it does not follow that they exist in vain; for only that exists in vain which fails to attain the end for which it exists. Second, even though the quiddities of separate substances are not understood by us, they are understood by other intellects. The same is true of the sun; for even though it is not seen by the eye of the owl, it is seen by the eye of the eagle.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit non solum ostendit quomodo se homines adinvicem iuvant ad considerandum veritatem. Adiuvatur enim unus ab altero ad considerationem veritatis dupliciter. Uno modo directe. Alio modo indirecte. Directe quidem iuvatur ab his qui veritatem invenerunt: quia, sicut dictum est, dum unusquisque praecedentium aliquid de veritate invenit, simul in unum collectum, posteriores introducit ad magnam veritatis cognitionem. Indirecte vero, inquantum priores errantes circa veritatem, posterioribus exercitii occasionem dederunt, ut diligenti discussione habita, veritas limpidius appareret.	287. Now it is only right (150). He shows how men assist each other to know the truth; for one man assists another to consider the truth in two ways—directly and indirectly. One is assisted directly by those who have discovered the truth; because, as has been pointed out, when each of our predecessors has discovered something about the truth, which is gathered together into one whole, he also introduces his followers to a more extensive knowledge of truth. One is assisted indirectly insofar as those who have preceded us and who were wrong about the truth have bequeathed to their successors the occasion for exercising their mental powers, so that by diligent discussion the truth might be seen more clearly.
lib. 2 l. 1 n. 16 Est autem iustum ut his, quibus adiuti sumus in tanto bono, scilicet cognitione veritatis, gratias agamus. Et ideo dicit, quod iustum est gratiam habere, non solum his, quos quis existimat veritatem invenisse, quorum opinionibus aliquis communicat sequendo eas; sed etiam illis, qui superficialiter locuti sunt ad veritatem investigandam, licet eorum opiniones non sequamur; quia isti etiam aliquid conferunt nobis. Praestiterunt enim nobis quoddam exercitium circa inquisitionem veritatis. Et ponit exemplum de inventoribus musicae. Si enim non fuisset Timotheus qui multa de arte musicae invenit, non haberemus ad praesens multa, quae scimus circa melodias. Et si non praecessisset quidam philosophus nomine Phrynis, Timotheus non fuisset ita instructus in musicalibus. Et similiter est dicendum de philosophis qui enuntiaverunt universaliter veritatem rerum. A quibusdam enim praedecessorum nostrorum accepimus aliquas opiniones de veritate rerum, in quibus credimus eos bene dixisse, alias opiniones praetermittentes. Et iterum illi, a quibus nos accepimus, invenerunt aliquos praedecessores, a quibus acceperunt, quique fuerunt eis causa instructionis.	288. Now it is only fitting that we should be grateful to those who have helped us attain so great a good as knowledge of the truth. Therefore he says that “It is only right that we should be grateful,” not merely to those whom we think have found the truth and with whose views we agree by following them, but also to those who, in the search for truth, have made only superficial statements, even though we do not follow their views; for these men too have given us something because they have shown us instances of actual attempts to discover the truth. By way of an example he mentions the founders of music; for if there “had been no Timotheus,” who discovered a great part of the art of music, we would not have many of the facts that we know about melodies. But if Timotheus had not been preceded by a wise man named “Phrynis,” he would not have been as well off in the subject of music. The same thing must be said of those philosophers who made statements of universal scope about the truth of things; for we accept from certain of our predecessors whatever views about the truth of things we think are true and disregard the rest. Again, those from whom we accept certain views had predecessors from whom they in turn accepted certain views and who were the source of their information.